































This book explores the potential creation of a broader collaborative economy through commons-based peer production (P2P) and the emergent role of information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
The book seeks to critically engage in the political discussion of commons-
based peer production, which can be classified into three basic arguments: 
the liberal, the reformist and the anti-capitalist. This book categorises the 
liberal argument as being in favour of the coexistence of the commons with 
the market and the state. Reformists, on the other hand, advocate for the 
gradual adjustment of the state and of capitalism to the commons, while 
anti-capitalists situate the commons against capitalism and the state. By 
discussing these three viewpoints, the book contributes to contemporary 
debates concerning the future of commons-based peer production.
Further, the author argues that for the commons to become a fully 
operational mode of peer production, it needs to reach critical mass arguing 
that the liberal argument underestimates the reformist insight that technology 
has the potential to decentralise production, thereby forcing capitalism to 
transition to post-capitalism. Surveying the three main strands of commons-
based peer production, this book makes the case for a post-capitalist commons-
orientated transition that moves beyond neoliberalism.
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The last decades have witnessed the rise of peer production driven by three main 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing factors: 1) the sustainability crisis; 
2) neoliberalism, and 3) low-cost information and communication technologies 
(ICTs). Peer production is a type of social relations, a technological infrastruc-
ture and a new mode of production and property, whereby participants have 
maximum freedom to cooperate and connect (Bauwens et al. 2019, 1). Peer 
production disrupts centralised capitalist production through the decentral-
ised use of the Internet and open source technologies. It is a  relational dynamic 
playing out in terms of sharing, openness, co-creation, self-governance and 
bottom-up eco-techno-social innovation (Bauwens et al. 2019, 2). ‘Peer pro-
duction (often also “P2P Production”) has been broadly portrayed as a generic 
form of self-organisation among loosely-affiliated individuals that volunteer on 
equal footing to reach a common goal’ (Bauwens et al. 2019, 4). 
Peer production is often referred to in the literature as the collaborative econ-
omy, comprising various sorts of economic models (Morell et al. 2017). This 
book, however, will stick to the term ‘peer production’, since, as will become 
evident later on, the term ‘collaborative economy’ is often attached to models 
that are rather extractive than collaborative, that is, they centrally coordinate 
online decentralised peer production downstream to disproportionally reap 
the benefits upstream. 
The literature (Bauwens et al. 2019; Benkler 2006; Morell et al. 2017; Kostakis 
and Bauwens 2014; Scholz 2016a; 2016b; Troxler and Wolf 2016) has docu-
mented thus far three main streams of peer production: 1) firm-hosted peer 
production or platform capitalism (user-centric open innovation business 
models, the so-called sharing and gig economy); 2) the commons (local and 
digital commons, the solidarity economy); and 3) and a hybrid commons-based 
peer production operating on the models of platform and open cooperativism. 
The commons consist of distributed or common property resources/ 
infrastructures (natural resources, technology, knowledge, capital, culture), 
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self-managed by their user communities in accordance with collectively 
established rules or norms (Bollier and Helfrich 2012; Ostrom 1990). While 
platform capitalism solely focuses on creating company value and maximis-
ing profits from leveraged user knowledge, commons-based peer production 
introduces new and radical forms of ownership, governance, entrepreneur-
ship and financialisation in a mission to promote sustainability and empower 
individuals and communities against the pervasive economic inequalities and 
power asymmetries generated by neoliberalism. 
This book focuses on commons-based peer production, or briefly the com-
mons, which is facilitated today by the architectural design of the Internet and 
free/open source software/hardware, supporting various grassroots initiatives 
operating in terms of sustainability, decentralisation, openness, self- governance 
and equitable distribution of value (Benkler 2006; Scholz 2016a). Whereas plenty 
of diverse theoretical approaches to the commons have been developed over 
the last decades, only two comprehensive critical accounts of the commons are 
currently available in the literature. Alexandros Kioupkiolis (2019) and Pierre 
Dardot and Christian Laval (2014) have recently offered two illuminating criti-
cal studies on contemporary theories of the commons. This book deviates from 
these two influential works in at least one major respect: it takes into account a 
number of techno-economic factors, the cross-examination of which is deemed 
appropriate to introducing a multidisciplinary approach to the commons.
This work attempts to contribute to the contemporary discussion over the 
commons, which revolves around three main axes: a liberal (Benkler 2006; 
Lessig 2001; Ostrom 1990), a reformist (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013; Bollier 
2003; Kostakis and Bauwens 2014; Rifkin 2014; Rushkoff 2016; Scholz 2016a; 
2016b; Wright 2009) and an anti-capitalist (Caffentzis 2013; Dardot and Laval 
2014; Dean 2009; 2012; De Angelis 2017; Dyer-Witheford 1999; 2015; Federici 
2012; Fuchs 2008; 2011; Gibson-Graham 1996; 2006; Hardt and Negri 2000; 
2004; 2009; Harvey 2003; 2010; Kioupkiolis 2019; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 
Mason 2015; Söderberg 2008; Žižek 2008; 2010). 
This book is not all-inclusive. It covers only authors who do not rest on 
a piecemeal approach to the commons that singles out one dimension over 
 others – collaborative consumption (Botsman and Rogers 2010), free/libre and 
open source software (Raymond 1999; Weber 2004), open culture (Leadbeater 
2010; Stalder 2005), firm-hosted peer production and open innovation  business 
models (Tapscott and Williams 2006; Benyayer 2016), networking (Castells 
2000; 2009; 2010), intellectual communal property (Wark 2004),  produsage 
(Bruns 2008), access (Belk 2014; Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012), decentralisation 
(Crowston and Howison 2004) or stigmergy (Siefkes 2010). This book, instead, 
grapples with the work of authors who intend to make or extend a more or 
less systematic theory out of the commons in terms of an alternative socio-
economic paradigm that opposes neoliberalism. 
The classification of liberal, reformist and anti-capitalist authors is but a 
schematic one since arguments often intersect. It does not, therefore, seek to 
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produce any sort of dualities. The classification criterion corresponds to the 
position where each argument situates the commons in relation to market and 
state operation. Advocates of the liberal argument take a stand in favour of the 
coexistence of the commons with market and state operation. The reformists 
argue for the gradual adjustment of the state and capitalism to the commons, 
while the anti-capitalists differ from both liberals and reformists by placing the 
commons against capitalism and the state. 
The core thread that penetrates both the reformist and the radical argument 
dates back to Karl Marx’s claim that the technological evolution of the means 
of production will force capitalism to transform into communism in the long 
run. Marx was of course a humanist and not a techno-determinist theorist. This 
conviction, however, does not detract from the fact that technology assumes a 
central role in his political economy. Today, the presumed advent of commu-
nism is projected through the prism of a post-capitalist transition powered by 
the Internet of Things (IoT), free software/hardware (FOSS), the digital com-
mons and Blockchain. The commons literature portrays multiple variants of 
this potential transition.
A similar reading of the politics of the commons has been recently under-
taken by Antonios Broumas (2017; 2018), though to a limited extent. Broumas 
classifies theories of the commons into two basic strands: social democratic 
and critical, with the social democratic diversifying into liberal and reformist 
versions, and the critical into poststructuralist and anti-capitalist ones. How-
ever, Broumas’s work focuses on the intellectual commons, that is commons 
referring to the production, distribution and consumption of information, 
communication, knowledge and culture, whereas this book examines all types 
of commons, whether material or immaterial, local or global. This book pur-
ports to cover the overall political landscape of the commons, while elaborating 
a unique critical perspective on the commons.
Drawing on the work of Kioupkiolis and Dardot and Laval, the main thesis of 
this book is that there is a significant lack of the political in the post-capitalist 
argument. The political is understood in the theoretical framework of Cornelius 
Castoriadis’s (1988; 1993) concept of the commons as the self-instituting power 
of the people, exercised against capitalism and the state. The political embraces 
democracy as the core moral value of society, promoting individual and collec-
tive autonomy. Real democracy is based on the equality of all people participat-
ing in the creation of the law governing society (Papadimitropoulos 2016). 
Whereas all approaches to the commons substantiate the self-instituting 
power of the people as the key concept of the common, they do not fully 
address the political in terms of radical democracy, agonistic freedom, conflict 
and power structures (Kioupkiolis 2019; Mouffe 2005, 15–16, 22, 33–34; Tully 
2008, 306–314). Theorists often rest on a limited or ideological standpoint that 
runs counter to a holistic account of the political, which would translate into 
a set of cross-disciplinary policies conducive to the sustainability of the com-
mons against the current neoliberal hegemony. 
4 The Commons 
This book intends to produce a critical dialogue between the different 
approaches to the commons. By no means can it cover all the issues, nor is the 
coverage of any particular issue complete. The book serves as an introduction 
to the commons. It aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the core arguments 
on the commons. Yet the book does not limit itself to a broad-brush approach. 
It rather seeks to put forward a multidisciplinary account of the commons with 
the aim of bringing together technology, finance, politics, economics, sustain-
ability science, education and law under commons governance. It does not elab-
orate another systematic theory of the commons, nor does it reproduce another 
postmodern, ‘anything goes’ narrative. It rather maps key proposals that stand 
out in the literature in a mission to integrate them into a holistic, multi-format 
political strategy that could variously advance the self-instituting power of the 
people beyond capitalism and the state. By ‘multi-format’ strategy this book 
does not introduce a politics à la carte, but an arsenal of policies that could vari-
ously pursue a unique goal: the advancement of the commons into the domi-
nant socio-economic paradigm. The objective here is to critically reconstruct 
the current theoretical framing of the commons in the networked information 
economy and unravel the potential of ICTs for the creation of an economic 
democracy based on sustainability, openness, solidarity and cooperation. 
The core argument running through this book is as follows: for the commons 
to become a fully operational mode of peer production they need to reach a 
critical mass. Economic democracy cannot exist without a critical mass partici-
pating in it. To do so, the commons need to create compelling benefits and use 
cases for people. They need to provide a steady income to their members along 
with the incentive to join an alternative socio-economic paradigm anchored 
in openness, sharing, cooperation, sustainability and democracy. Much of 
this depends on the degree to which technology can democratise finance and 
politics, while offering user-friendly solutions to citizens’ concrete needs, sup-
ported by commons-friendly state policies. In short, to rephrase Bauwens and 
Kostakis’s dictum, it all depends on whether commons-based peer production 
can become competitive with capitalist production. 
The commons could be viewed as vehicles for the creation of a more  inclusive 
social economy, aiming to eliminate the gaping inequalities and power asym-
metries of neoliberalism by establishing a sustainable mode of production 
anchored in openness, sharing, democratic self-governance and the equitable 
distribution of value. The intent here is not to carve out a unique path but rather 
to encompass alternative visions of a commons-orientated transition under a 
holistic, post-hegemonic perspective that contrasts the liberal conception of 
the commons as ‘club’ goods, as niche markets coexistent with capitalism and the 
state. It also disengages from the anarcho-capitalist or libertarian strand of 
the commons that champions individualism as the core moral value of our times. 
My perspective is post-hegemonic in that it seeks to embed the market into 
the political by socialising the state and economy. The goal is to transform 
 capitalism into the post-capitalism of the commons, that is, a social economy 
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self-organised around the commons. Post-hegemonic holism expresses the 
need to radically transform the core structure of society by cross-fertilising 
commons policies and practices across the entire psyche and body of the social. 
It is often underestimated in the literature that the key to this social change is 
first and foremost the moral transformation of society; the replacement of ‘eve-
ryday libertarianism’ with ‘everyday cooperativism’. This requires the reinven-
tion of humanism and community, the expansion of the politics of care and the 
overall improvement of the quality of life, including tackling climate change, 
securing health, food quality and well-being, promoting culture, affection, 
 gender equality, sexuality and self-realisation, which are all primarily tasks of 
politics, everyday education and collective action. 
My argument develops against the backdrop of the struggle between the 
commons and neoliberalism, which mutates today into the struggle of the digi-
tal commons (Aigrain 2012; Griffiths 2008; Morell 2010; Stalder 2010) against 
platform capitalism. This book situates this struggle within the broader norma-
tive framework of Marxism and liberalism, where major political concepts such 
as power, democracy, freedom, justice and equality are debated (Freeden 1996; 
Swift 2019). This book cannot but draw some basic lines of argument that serve 
as an introduction to the struggle between the commons and  neoliberalism. 
Central theoretical categories (i.e. the commons, the political, Marxism, neo-
liberalism) are outlined upfront to help the reader connect the dots, when 
 necessary, and gain a solid understanding of the core argument. Several other 
major concepts such as ‘platform capitalism’, ‘the digital commons’, ‘digital 
labour’, ‘immaterial labour’, ‘post-Fordism’, the ‘general intellect’, ‘cognitive cap-
italism’ and ‘the multitude’ are recurrent themes variously worked out in the 
course of the book. My argument, thus, disassembles into several modules to be 
reassembled at the conclusion in a set of concrete policies intended to put for-
ward a post-capitalist, commons-orientated transition beyond neoliberalism.
1.1 The Contours of the Commons
Historically, the term ‘commons’ has served diverse theoretical contexts, 
charged with heterogeneous philosophical, religious, legal and economic con-
notations. To begin with, the etymology of the word ‘commons’ (cum = with 
and munus = obligation), analysed through the prism of ethnology and sociol-
ogy (Clastres 1989; Godelier 1999; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Mauss 1967), implies a 
political principle of shared responsibility in the collective practice of public 
tasks, which is of theological-mythical origin, dating back to primitive socie-
ties (Dardot and Laval 2014, 25). The commons represents the ‘common good’ 
inherited from Gods/ancestors and further ‘incarnated’ in the communal insti-
tutionalisation of society and nature (Dardot and Laval 2014, 24–27). It is not 
society and nature in terms of objects or properties that constitute the com-
mons, but the very collective activity of the instituting. 
6 The Commons 
The sense of community through unity and equality took a juridico-political 
and philosophical turn in Greek and Roman thought, without ever losing its 
theological component, especially after the birth of Christianity (Dardot and 
Laval 2014, 24–27). Aristotle’s Politics defines the ‘common good’ in terms of 
the collective activity of the demos to autonomously decide on the law gov-
erning the city. The ‘common good’ is less a common land and more a public 
deliberation over the city’s common interests. Thus, in Aristotle, the ‘common 
good’ refers to the political self-institutionalisation of the city by citizens them-
selves (Dardot and Laval 2014, 24–27). Cicero revived the Aristotelian repub-
lican content of the commons by reconfiguring the ‘common good’ under the 
invention of the Roman law (Dardot and Laval 2014, 24–27). The officials of 
the Roman Empire were obliged by law to serve the ‘common good’, which was 
replaced by the public good as represented by the state. Roman republicanism 
nationalised the ‘common good’. The state now held the monopoly of the com-
mons. The common good translated into the public good run by the state and 
its officials.
The commons republicanism had at least two counter-effects. It highlighted, 
on the one hand, the juridico-political dimension of the commons over the 
theological dimension, while limiting, on the other hand, the knowledge of 
the commons to the experts, namely the legislators or the sovereign. Rousseau 
would, in one sense, redemocratise the commons by rendering the ‘common 
good’ the object of the general will. The ‘common good’ identifies with what 
is common between the particular interests of the citizens, turning the sover-
eignty of the general will against the monopoly of the state (Dardot and Laval 
2014, 30, 241–242, 385). Thus, Rousseau prioritised anew the concept of the 
common as the self-instituting power of the people, which would take an eco-
nomic turn in the Ricardo school of socialists and the work of Saint-Simon, 
Fourier, Proudhon and Marx.
Marx, in particular, radicalised the content of the common by integrating the 
economy into the ‘common good’. Contra the separation of the economy from 
the ‘common good’ and the representation of the latter by the state, adopted by 
both republicanism and liberalism, Marx locates in the primitive communism 
of tribal societies the socio-economic model of the free association of produc-
ers that would replace capitalism and state despotism with future communism 
(Dardot and Laval 2014, 67).
The last two centuries have witnessed the emergence of a post-Marxist 
and post-foundational political ontology of the commons (Marchart 2007). 
 Following the rupture with the philosophical foundations of modernity brought 
about by Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger, a number of authors have embraced 
a post-Heideggerian notion of community and the common with the aim of 
‘commoning the political’, that is, refiguring politics in light of an ontological 
sense of coexistence, aiming to clear the ground for social openness, solidarity, 
plurality and autonomy.
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Drawing on the conceptual difference between the ‘political’ and ‘politics’, 
first introduced by Carl Schmitt, a number of authors such as Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito elaborate on a concept of the com-
mon that welds together a plurality of singularities in a way that overcomes 
the fragmentation and exclusion of gated communities marked by fixed ethnic, 
cultural and ideological boundaries (Kioupkiolis 2017). Contrary to econom-
ics, the political is the ontological substratum that sustains the different areas 
of politics, including the economy, culture and state policies. Politics is the con-
crete instantiation of the political, which is the very ontological possibility of 
the social (Marchart 2007). 
Nancy (1991; 2000), Agamben (1993) and Esposito (2011; 2012; 2013) attempt 
to address the ‘retreat of the political’ caused by the current hegemony of neo-
liberalism by bringing to the fore the political as an open, plural and ‘inessential 
commonality’, thereby aiming to reinvigorate the politics of the common. Con-
trary to variants of liberal communitarianism (Freeden 1996) that conceive of 
the community in terms of tradition, family, state and nation, the common rep-
resents the being-with a plurality of singularities, thus opposing closed identities 
of blood, soil, community or self. The political brings to the fore an ontological 
community that determines politics in terms of a collective deliberation that 
constitutes the common accordingly.
Alexandros Kioupkiolis, among others, has pointed out the political lim-
its of this existential thought. He argues that Nancy, Agamben and Esposito 
reproduce an abstract level of philosophising, detached from any actual politics 
(2017, 284). Conversely, he attempts to politicise the common by comparing 
the ontologies of the common with the political theory of hegemony set out by 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) draw on the work of Schmitt and Gramsci, among 
others, to put forward a politics of the common predicated on the premises of 
hegemony and antagonism. Hegemony is the articulation of a precarious chain 
of equivalence among political alternatives, subject to constant change due to 
the antagonism inherent in the political. Conflict, power and representation are 
necessary components of democratic politics due to the unavoidable division 
between oppositional blocks. 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemonic politics, the commons refers to a mul-
tiplicity of spaces, social relations, movements, forms of identification and 
democratic practices, which retains its partial autonomy with regard to the 
ever-changing hegemonic articulation of the social (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 
176–193). Kioupkiolis (2017, 300) detects a tension, however, between the 
hegemony of a particular chain of equivalence and the autonomy of the com-
mons. The hegemony of hierarchy is the cause and effect of uneven power, 
which contrasts the plurality and horizontality of the commons. To mitigate 
the tension, he situates hegemony and autonomy at different sites of the politi-
cal, calling for the post-hegemonic alignment of the former with the latter. 
8 The Commons 
 Post-hegemony is the democracy of the common that seeks to balance out 
hegemony and autonomy. 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004) were the first to dissolve the mis-
conception of the commons as certain properties or natural resources by intro-
ducing the notion of the common in the singular, thereby describing the peer 
production of the multitude, that is, a network of individuals spontaneously 
self-organising around common resources. The common stands beyond the 
private and public sphere of capitalism and the state respectively. It is not so 
much about destroying or protecting the commons, but about producing the 
common as the trans-historical political principle of governing nature and 
society according to collective rules and norms.
David Bollier and Silke Helfrich (2015, 1–12) describe the commons as 
shared resources, co-governed by their user community, according to the 
rules and norms of that community. They (2015, 1–12) emphasise the activity 
of commoning as a social process. The commons is neither the resource nor 
the community that determines protocols for its stewardship, but the dynamic 
interaction between all these elements. The term commoning, popularised by 
historian Peter Linebaugh, signifies the relationship between physical resources 
and the communities that utilise them and depend upon them for essential 
human needs. Massimo De Angelis (2017, 119) defines the commons as social 
systems in which resources are pooled by a community of subjects engaging in 
commoning, that is, the self-governing and reproducing of the community and 
the resources. Therefore, the commons consists of three elements: 1) the com-
mon-pool resources or common wealth, 2) the community and 3) commoning. 
Dyer-Witheford (2006) and Gibson and Graham (1996; 2006) champion the 
circulation of the commons alongside the capitalist economy with the aim of 
transforming the latter into a post-capitalist economy. In the same vein, Bauw-
ens and Kostakis (Scholz 2016b, 163) treat the commons as ‘a new logic of col-
laboration between networks of people who freely organise around a common 
goal using shared resources, and market orientated entities that add value on 
top of or alongside them’. Arvidsson and Peitersen (2013) refer to the com-
mons as productive publics that help rationalise the public sphere along eco-
logical and democratic lines. Kioupkiolis (2019) approaches the common as a 
post-hegemonic regime of agonistic freedom, radical democracy, conflict and 
antagonism. Similarly, Dardot and Laval (2014) conceive of the common as a 
new type of collective right best exercised under regimes of direct democracy.
Yochai Benkler (2006) discovers this new type of right in the digital com-
mons of the Internet and free/open source software. For Benkler, the commons 
constitute a third institutional axis of civil society that coexists alongside capi-
talism and the state. He introduces the term ‘commons-based peer produc-
tion’ to demarcate a non-market sector of information, knowledge and cultural 
production, not treated as private property but as an ethic of open sharing, 
self-management and cooperation between peers having access to fixed capital, 
namely computers and software (2006, 59–90). 
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The commons are also often used with a neoliberal connotation. Corporate 
terms such as ‘flat hierarchies’, ‘community spirit’, ‘the sharing economy’, ‘con-
sumer tribes’ and ‘the collaborative economy’ are euphemisms and marketing 
buzzwords that aim to exploit commons-based peer production. Neoliberalism 
occasionally manages to infuse a competitive mentality into the commons them-
selves, alienating them into extractive enterprises adopting capitalist criteria. 
On the flipside, several values of the commons such as common owner-
ship, egalitarianism and collective self-government throb at the heart of 
communism. Yet the commons are at odds with several features of orthodox 
 communism such as the centrality of the state and the party, top-down direc-
tion, totalitarian control, authoritarianism, violence, terror and the idolatry of 
leaders. Therefore, the signifier is not up for resignification, since it contrasts 
with the self-instituting power of the people, advanced here as the quintessen-
tial concept of the common.
Paradoxically, the digital commons meet with neoliberalism at the crossroads 
of cyber-libertarianism and cyber-collectivism. Whereas cyber- libertarianism 
advocates for a minimal state that protects the social and economic freedom 
of the individual to voluntarily reach mutual, consent-based, online agree-
ments, cyber-collectivism embraces a state that promotes the cybernetic ‘gen-
eral will’ or ‘common good’ (Thierer 2009). Maximum freedom and autonomy 
for the individual are common moral values within cyber-libertarianism and 
 cyber-collectivism. But the digital commons part ways from both cyber- 
libertarianism and cyber-collectivism by opposing capitalism and the state. By 
reformatting the mechanisms of managerial hierarchies, property rights, con-
tracts and prices, the digital commons play out in a variety of formats ranging 
from networked socialism to spontaneous networked anarchism or anarcho-
communism (Benkler 2006; Wright 2009).
Ultimately, the concept of the common as the self-instituting power of the 
people today has three major and often entangled interpretations: a liberal, a 
reformist and an anti-capitalist. Yet all three interpretations falter to a lesser 
or greater degree upon the problem of collective action, formalised today 
by neoliberalism. 
1.2 Neoliberalism and the Problem of Collective Action
The task of this chapter is to explore the problem of collective action posed by 
neoclassical economics which sustains the bedrock of neoliberalism, which, 
according to Michel Foucault (2004), is a new form of governmental reason, 
expanding the corporate model into state management. After exposing the 
problem of collective action in the normative framework of neoliberalism (1.3), 
the chapter goes on to introduce a number of challenges to neoclassical eco-
nomics posed by non-mainstream currents of economic thought (1.4). The task 
of the latter section is to highlight some crucial heterodox economic points of 
view that could support a commons-orientated transition. 
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1.3 The Tragedy of the Commons
Aristotle (1932, Book II, ch. 3) observed long ago that individual interest often 
prevails over what is considered common to the greater number. Thomas 
 Hobbes’s parable of man in a state of nature indicates that the innate selfishness 
of humans culminates in a war of all against all, whence the need for a Levia-
than state to settle conflict and prevent civil war. Most recently, Garret Hardin 
(1968) introduced the famous ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ to pose the free-rider 
problem in economics. He called on us to picture a pasture open to all, in which 
each herder acts as a self-interested actor, aiming to maximise his/her gain 
by adding more and more animals for grazing. Self-interest alone eventually 
results in overgrazing and pasture depletion. Hardin’s metaphor has been often 
formalised as a prisoner’s dilemma game expanding from economics to inter-
national relations and politics. To address the alleged tragedy, Hardin advocates 
for private–public control of common-pool resources, which resonates today 
with neoliberalism, that is, a contemporary version of economic liberalism.
The crux of the classical economic liberal argument is that the basic motive 
of behaviour is self-interest, the unintended consequences of which generate 
common welfare (Smith 1977/1776). By trying to maximise her own benefit via 
commerce and entrepreneurship, each individual unwittingly serves the com-
mon good. Unfettered markets are the most efficient means of allocating scarce 
resources, ensuring that everybody does what they are best suited for and gets 
what they deserve. Value derives from scarcity and, hence, is confronted by an 
opportunity cost, that is, the benefit one misses out by choosing one alternative 
over another. Unrestricted individual exchange guarantees the flow of scarce 
resources to the highest valued uses. Collective action, on the other hand, can-
not produce the ‘spontaneous order of the market’ due to a lack of the informa-
tion necessary to coordinate economic activity (Hayek 1944). Collective action 
either planned by the state or by groups misallocates resources, resulting in 
societal malfunction. 
Classical economic liberal responses to the problem of collective action 
combine Hobbes’s Leviathan approach – central command and control – with 
Smith’s theory of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market that matches supply and 
demand through property rights and contracts enforced by the state. Cycles of 
the Leviathan state and the invisible hand of the market intersect historically 
at the overlapping peripheries of liberal democracy and the market economy, 
which demarcate multiple variants of state capitalism.
Neoclassical economics built on classical liberalism’s ethics of individualism 
to construe a utilitarian theory of economics that laid the moral foundation 
for neoliberalism. David Hume and Jeremy Bentham introduced the notion of 
 utility to argue that each individual aims to satisfy her economic preferences. 
This ethical idea spilled over into economics to replace the labour theory of 
value with the theory of utility maximisation. Whereas in classical econom-
ics value is synonymous with the labour necessary for the production of a 
Introducing the Commons 11
 commodity, in neoclassical economics the value of a commodity resides in its 
utility to a buyer (Mazzucato 2018, 57–74). 
Alfred Marshall (2013/1890) shifted thinking about value from the study of 
capital, labour and technology inputs to that of marginal utility measured by 
the usefulness of a commodity to a consumer. The value of chocolate is not 
solely determined by the means of production (land, labour, capital, technol-
ogy), but is also proportional to the degree of customer satisfaction. Utility 
translates into the price a customer is willing to pay for the chocolate. Money is 
not concealed labour, as Marx would have it, but the measure of utility, which 
varies between individuals, reflecting the evolution of human preferences over 
time. Marginalism, thus, inverted the objective theory of value measured by 
labour into the subjective theory of value measured by consumer utility. 
Neoclassical economic explanations of behaviour are anchored in the 
assumption of a fundamentally self-interested rational actor motivated by 
financial and other incentives (Lowenberg 1990). Humans mutate into eco-
nomic ‘rational’ agents using a cost–benefit analysis to choose the market 
alternative that best satisfies their preferences (Mazzucato 2018, 65). Scarcity 
and marginal utility − that is, the added satisfaction a consumer garners from 
consuming additional units of goods or services − determine prices and the 
relative supply and demand equilibria. Scarcity renders resources rivalrous and 
subtractable. Hence, private property, contracts and compensation incentives 
are necessary for individuals to invest in the resource, exchange their valuable 
products and maximise their subjective utility. Prices, and not labour, are now 
the sole markers of value. Thus, market allocation produces more efficiency by 
directing resources to the highest valued use. 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ is, then, due to the absence of clear property 
rights, resulting in either underinvestment in resources or overuse and deple-
tion. Motivation is considered lacking in collective action, since no one will 
invest time, money and energy in a project if they cannot appropriate its ben-
efits. Power to organise collaboration is absent. Therefore, organisation lacks 
and collaboration necessarily fails. The ‘tragedy of the commons’ represents, 
thus, a version of the prisoner’s dilemma game, implying that rational strategies 
of self-interested maximisers can lead to collectively irrational outcomes. 
In neoliberal versions of rational choice theory, there can be no common good 
save for the coincidence of individual ends (Downs 1957). The common 
good is served best if no one is there to serve it except for the invisible hand 
of the market. Neoliberalism is predicated on the assumption that collective 
action fails to manage the economy owing to the uncertainty and complex-
ity inherent in information-processing, which renders coordination and plan-
ning impossible (Hayek 1944; Reisman 1990). Complexity and uncertainty 
impede collective action – the prisoner’s dilemma game renamed. Given that 
 centralised planning lacks substantial information on markets and goods, pri-
vatisation is the most efficient method for managing resources. Only pricing in 
markets produces good information and coordination.
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Marginalism, the economic bedrock of neoliberalism, suggests that govern-
ment should limit itself to regulating the economy and intervening only under 
conditions of market failure. Democracy is merely ‘a utilitarian device’ for 
assessing the interests of competing elites (Schumpeter 1994). Voter apathy is 
then explained on the grounds of massive ‘rational ignorance’ adopted on the 
grounds of opportunity costs (Downs 1957). The citizen considers obtaining 
information on complex policy issues as a highly costly and time-consuming 
activity. Based on Kenneth Arrow’s (1950) theorem pointing out the math-
ematical impossibility of aggregating individual preferences, some theorists 
have even been arguing for the complete dismissal of democracy, since, when 
citizens are faced with three or more alternative options, there is no rational 
way to reach a consensus and therefore account for democratic governance 
(Riker 1982). 
Capitalism, on the other hand, is considered a peaceful economic system that 
encapsulates the liberal ideal of self-regulating markets, operating as sites of 
voluntary exchange based on free trade and property rights, designed to foster 
technological progress and rising labour productivity to satisfy the wants and 
needs of all (Mazzucato 2018, 63). An ideal capitalism is supposed to produce 
multiple equilibria, allocating scarce resources under conditions of ‘perfect 
competition’ and perfect information fully accessible to all (Mazzucato 2018, 
63–64). The democracy of the market, thus, comes to represent an ethical plu-
ralism that breeds on freedom of choice, tolerance and the rule of law.
1.4 Mainstream vs Non-mainstream Economics
Michel Foucault (2004) describes neoliberalism as a normative order of gov-
ernmental reason that differs from classical economic liberalism in a number of 
respects. Government intervention replaces the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, 
which is supposed to naturally serve the common good out of individual self-
interested actions. The naturalism of liberalism gives way to the constructiv-
ism of neoliberalism (Brown 2015, 84). Government intervention should not 
identify with central planning. Rather, it aims to regulate market operation 
and facilitate entrepreneurship (Foucault 2004, 121, 131, 145, 164). The liberal 
image of humans as creatures of needs who contribute to the common good by 
pursuing individual interest through market exchange is now replaced by the 
image of humans as entrepreneurs, epitomised in the model of homo oeconomi-
cus (Foucault 2004, 276–278). 
In neoliberalism, capital replaces labour and entrepreneurship production 
(Foucault 2004, 116–118). Humans are now managers and self-investors of 
human capital, rather than solely sellers, workers, clients or consumers. Each 
person is a mini-capitalist susceptible to the uncertainties, risks and contin-
gencies of the market. Responsibility becomes the indispensable component of 
self-sustenance inasmuch as the cost–benefit analysis of economic behaviour 
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meshes with state constituencies and the overall health of the economy, the lat-
ter standing now as the main site of veridiction (Brown 2015, 68, 84, 131–134). 
Economic metrics and market prices hold as the only truth valid for legiti-
mising state policies. State governance, finally, breaks down to a neoclassical 
cost–benefit analysis subject to the dictates of the market. 
Neoliberalism, thus, signals a two-way transformation of the economy and 
the state. On the one hand, the economy becomes the model of the state, mar-
ketising all sectors of governance, while, on the other hand, it becomes denatu-
ralised and loses its liberal status as autarchic and self-regulated, requiring the 
intervention of the state to correct market failures and stimulate competition 
and growth. 
Competition replaces exchange as the fundamental dynamic of the market 
economy, creating winners and losers and, by extension, inequality (Brown 
2015, 64). In the neoclassical model, inequality is a non-issue, since utility is 
subjective and, therefore, non-comparable. There can be no inequality of utility, 
but only varying degrees of utility among economic actors (Varoufakis 1998, 
43–113). Whereas political equality in the rule and application of law is both 
the norm of market exchange and the founding principle of the social contract 
in liberal democracy, economic inequality is considered a structural indica-
tor of meritocracy and an additional incentive for the overall improvement of 
the economy. Economic inequality is both a cause and an effect of competi-
tion, resulting in multiple equilibria that render liberal democracy a contested 
terrain of corporate interests competing for favourable state policies through 
negotiation, lobbying, consensus and win–win public–private partnerships 
(Varoufakis 1998, 43–113). Both persons and states are now construed on the 
model of the contemporary firm, aiming to maximise their capital value and 
utility through entrepreneurialism, self-investment and/or attracting investors 
(Brown 2015, 22). The model of the market expands to all domains and activi-
ties, thus reconfiguring human beings first and foremost as market actors.
Simon Springer (2012) describes neoliberalism as a complex discourse artic-
ulated in various forms: a hegemonic ideology, a policy and a programme, a 
form of governmentality. Wendy Brown (2015) makes the case that neoliberal-
ism inaugurates a new era of de-democratisation, thus marking the substitution 
of politics by technocracy and economics. William Davies (2017) argues that 
neoliberalism is the disenchantment of politics by economics. From a Marx-
ist standpoint, David Harvey (2005) perceives neoliberalism as a class project 
 aiming at consolidating class power through accumulation by dispossession, 
that is, the privatisation of public goods and services by financial institutions 
and state mechanisms. 
From a neoclassical standpoint, neoliberalism is supply-side economics 
born out of the failure of Keynesian demand-side economics to maintain the 
mixed economy of the post-war period (Stiglitz 2016). Put simply, the state is 
too costly to sustain and prone to the periodic crises of capitalism. The goal 
should be, instead, to shrink the state, remove regulation and lower taxes at the 
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top to incentivise the economy and lead to faster economic growth that would 
trickle down to all and ‘lift all boats’ to prosperity. Neoliberalism, thus, has been 
hailed as a solution to the problem of collective action manifested in markets 
and institutions.
Yet neoclassical economics acknowledges that markets fail under various 
circumstances. Monopolies, information asymmetries between consumers 
and producers, externalities not reflected in market prices and the provision 
of public goods are all instances of market failure (Jacobs and Mazzucato 2016, 
16). Governments should intervene and seek to ‘correct’ market failures, where 
appropriate, by promoting competition, requiring more available information 
for consumers, forcing firms to pay for externalities and providing or subsi-
dising public goods. Neoclassical economics insists that competitive markets 
 produce on average positive outcomes that maximise welfare (Jacobs and 
Mazzucato 2016, 17). Therefore, they should be allowed to operate with the 
least state interference possible. Governments should limit themselves to a 
minimum regulatory framework of employment, low taxation, consumer and 
 environmental protection. Excessive regulation is considered to slow economic 
activity to a crawl and precipitously reduce government revenues, eventually 
‘killing the goose that lays the golden eggs’.
Yet a number of mainstream economists (Blanchard and Summers 2017) 
admit today that the market is not a self-stabilising system; the financial  system, 
in particular, becomes over time more complex and is still poorly understood. 
Therefore, the market needs the state to stabilise the economy with proper 
policies. The basic difference between mainstream and non-mainstream eco-
nomics − and between non-mainstream economics themselves − lies in the 
degree of state intervention and the mixture of policies necessary to regulate 
the economy. 
1.4.1 Post-Keynesian Economics
Post-Keynesian economics considers neoclassical economics an inadequate 
model for understanding how capitalism operates. A number of authors claim 
that there are different kinds of market behaviour and several varieties of capi-
talism (Jacobs and Mazzucato 2016, 17–23). Post-Keynesian economics builds 
on Keynes’s key insight that private investment is volatile and procyclical. It 
therefore requires public investment to balance it out. Governments should do 
more than ‘levelling the playing field’. They should help tilt the playing field 
towards publicly chosen goals by investing in education, training, health, child-
care, social care and infrastructure: 
Public policies are not ‘interventions’ in the economy, as if markets 
existed independently of the public institutions and social and environ-
mental  conditions in which they are embedded. The role of policy is not 
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simply of ‘correcting’ the failures of otherwise free markets. It is rather 
to help create and shape markets to achieve the co-production, and the 
fair distribution, of economic value. Economic performance cannot be 
measured simply by the short-term growth of GDP, but requires better 
indicators of long-term value creation, social well-being, inequality and 
environmental sustainability. (Jacobs and Mazzucato 2016, 23)
Joseph Stiglitz (2013; 2016) argues that neoliberalism has failed, since it has 
produced immense income and wealth inequalities from the 1980s onward, 
exacerbated by the credit-fuelled boom and bust cycles of the market, as in the 
case of the 2008 financial crisis. Thomas Piketty (2014) describes a patrimonial 
capitalism of inherited wealth where the rate of return of capital surpasses the 
rate of growth in the long run. Monopoly rent creates an oligarchy of the 1% 
that undermines democracy. The winners of the capitalist competition are not 
compensating the losers, but speculate and hoard profits through rent-seeking 
mechanisms instead. Rather than expanding the economic pie by means of 
reinvestment, innovation and job creation, they occupy an even larger space 
in the economy, with idle capital circulating in the finance sector in the form 
of share buybacks, derivatives, options, and the like. Asset prices inflate while 
wages rest more or less stagnant. 
For conventional economics, finance performs a number of essential func-
tions for the economy: it allocates capital by recycling surpluses across the 
globe from surplus countries to deficit countries in the form of investment and 
credit, it mediates between savers and investors providing credit to individu-
als and companies, it promotes innovation and job creation, it manages risk, 
it provides liquidity, and it runs the payment mechanism (Stiglitz 2016, 40). 
Finance adds value to the real economy by completing markets, thereby pro-
pelling the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium momentum: if only all different 
agents create as many contracts as possible, complete all markets and trade con-
tinually among them, the economy will reach the Pareto-efficient maximum 
possibility of human welfare. 
However, Stiglitz (2013; 2016) has shown that trading in financial instruments 
is not trading between different people with different consumer  preferences 
or production possibilities. It is rather trading between different people with 
 different points of view over the state of an uncertain future wherein more trad-
ing can be actually harmful. One of the justifications of high-frequency trading 
is that it increases price discovery, thus contributing to perfect information. 
Yet the Grossman–Stiglitz theorem (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) has revealed 
that high-frequency trading reduces the informativeness of the price system. 
Opaqueness and leverage produce a zero-sum game, a casino activity that 
impacts all sectors of the economy, from retail to wholesale. By creating lever-
age, that is, speculation, finance shifts risk from one sector to another, with risk 
eventually ending up in the public sector due to the interconnectedness of the 
financial sector and its spreading into the real sector.
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The 2008 crisis proved that finance failed in every dimension: it misallocated 
capital, it did not provide credit for new job creation, it mismanaged risk, it 
misguided innovation, it prioritised exploitation and market manipulation and 
created an exorbitantly expensive payments mechanism (Stiglitz 2016, 108). 
Finance became, finally, a negative sum game, creating enormous profits for 
corporations and benefiting the affluent few at the expense of the rest. Many of 
the profits were achieved as a result of predatory lending, abusive credit card 
practices, market manipulation and excessive market power. The economic 
consequences of the failures of finance have been gaping inequality, low growth, 
high instability, and high levels of private and public indebtedness.
The sociopolitical result has been the revival of the nightmares of the 1930s 
in the form of the rise of racist, xenophobic and neo-fascist far right-wing 
 populism. Wealth and income inequality, economic nationalism, deglobalisa-
tion, trade wars, geopolitical tensions and the migrant crisis accompany the 
sustainability crisis, in which global warming increases, pandemics spread, 
ecosystems degrade, fossil fuels are diminishing and food remains insecure 
(Dedeurwaerdere 2013).
To reverse the neoliberal tide, Stiglitz (2016, 97–168) suggests changes to 
executive compensation schemes, combat against short-termism, the reduc-
tion of rent seeking, the elimination of racial and gender discrimination, mac-
roeconomic policies to restore full employment, the regulation of the shadow 
banking system, greater investment in education and infrastructure and the 
reform of capital taxation, among other things. Mariana Mazzucato calls for 
the ‘socialisation of investment’ by an ‘entrepreneurial state’ investing in inno-
vation to address major societal problems such as climate change and elderly 
healthcare (Jacobs and Mazzucato 2016, 14). Yanis Varoufakis (2011) calls for 
a Green New Deal funded by the issuing of Eurobonds as a first step before 
reimagining the corporation. Piketty (2014) advocates for a global wealth tax 
and higher top marginal tax rates. 
1.4.2 Radical Economics
Theorists coming from the radical left call for a socialist transition to an eco-
nomic democracy via either more or less direct state intervention. Erik Olin 
Wright (2009) is one of the most prominent scholars to have advocated for 
radical reforms wherein the state should assume a central role towards a social-
ist transition. He argues for the creation of a more democratic financial system 
where we should reimagine the role of governments in private capital markets. 
Under neoliberalism, the state is considered a drain on taxpayers’ private 
money, with its capacity to print money causing inflation. Conventional eco-
nomics considers money a scarce resource that is more efficiently managed by 
the law of supply and demand. Money is a market innovation that replaced the 
barter economy with a more efficient economic system (Mellor 2019, 638). It 
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dates back to the invention of coinage, that is, the adoption of precious metal as 
a valued commodity. Given the scarcity and the physical properties of gold and 
silver (durability, divisibility, transferability, storability, usability), money in the 
form of coins is considered the embodiment of economic value, circulating in 
the market as the general equivalent of goods and services. Money functions 
simultaneously as a unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store of value.
Yet money is also a means of social and economic power. What fuelled the 
market and the growth of capitalism was not the invention of coinage but 
the proliferation of bank-issued debt (Mellor 2019, 639). Money accumulates 
into profit, which then transforms into rent and interest-bearing credit and 
debt. Banking became the steam engine of modern capitalism, anchored in the 
gold standard, linking money to the price of gold. Since the final decoupling 
of the US dollar from gold in 1971 and the subsequent establishment of fiat 
money, that is, government-issued money not backed by a physical commodity, 
finance has held the steering wheel of neoliberalism. 
Conventional economics sees banking and finance as intermediaries between 
supply (surplus units) and demand (deficit units). Robert Hockett (2019, 492) 
calls this the ‘intermediated scarce private capital orthodoxy’. According to this 
view, capital is limited to what has previously been accumulated by rentiers in 
the form of financial assets held in banks and other financial institutions. Banks 
and capital markets link rentiers of surplus capital with households, firms and 
governments. Surplus capital is deposited in banks in the form of short-term 
demand deposits, which are then loaned out on a one-to-one basis in the form 
of longer-term loans. Interest amounts to money rental rates determined by the 
law of supply and demand just like all other prices. Deposits, thus, make loans, 
savings determine investment and interest rates equilibrate private fund supply 
and demand (Hockett 2019, 500–503).
Hockett (2019, 501) instead makes the case that loans make deposits accord-
ing to a none-to-many credit-generation model. When a bank receives an 
application for a loan from a creditworthy business or household, it does not 
check out how much money is deposited in its vaults. It creates the money de 
novo by simply crediting a borrower account with the given amount and then 
booking the transaction as an asset and liability of its own and of the borrower. 
Banks do not merely act as intermediaries between savers and borrowers; 
they simply type digits on a computer ledger to create money ab initio (Mellor 
2019, 639). Therefore, the money supply is not scarce. Credit is not limited 
to  privately  pre-accumulated capital but endogenously issued. Banks actually 
 borrow depositors’ money, keep a percentage to handle daily operations and 
fictitiously multiply the rest in the form of circulating debt to be invested in the 
real economy and generate the money that will repay the interest-bearing debt, 
thus coming full circle ad infinitum. Money is actually interest-bearing 
debt fuelling the production of future value. In Britain only 3% of total money 
amounts to tangible currency (notes and coins) in circulation, the remaining 
97% being composed of numbers saved in computers. The fear of the  central 
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banks that became the money creators of last resort for the banks in the 
2008 financial crisis was not the collapse of the money supply, but that ATM 
machines would run dry (Mellor 2019, 637). 
Hockett paints a different picture of finance where the central bank in effect 
publicly monetises the promissory note privately issued and signed by the bor-
rower in favour of the lending bank. The central bank is placing the full faith 
and credit of the nation behind the credit of the borrower in the form of the 
Federal Reserve notes. The private bank is simply assisting the central bank 
with privately issued promissory notes to swap for spendable, publicly issued 
promissory notes. The interest it earns on the loan is its payment for serving 
a public utility. Credit is not based on privately deposited loanable funds, but 
on the monetised full faith and credit of the state that pays private seigniorage 
rents with public currency. ‘The financial system then looks like a franchise 
arrangement in which the public is franchiser and the institutions dispensing 
its full faith and credit are its franchisees’ (Hockett 2019, 491). In other words, 
the capacity of banks to create credit rests on the laws, regulations and guaran-
tees of the state under which they operate. Contemporary financial systems are 
then best interpreted as public–private franchise arrangements. 
The state has been granting monopoly rights to corporations to build 
 infrastructures, energy and telecommunications networks from capitalism’s 
inception, and has been heavily investing in the development of new technolo-
gies thereafter (Mazzucato 2013). The Fed and the Treasury department have 
been directly channelling and managing the flow of monetised public faith and 
credit through the financial system by backing and often turning private liabili-
ties into public ones. The world’s first heavily capitalised securities exchanges, 
such as those in Amsterdam, London, Paris and New York, were set up as gov-
ernment instrumentalities or sites where government-issued debt could be 
purchased and sold. Venture capital dates back to 1958 when federal legislation 
created Small Business Investment Companies that had access to guaranteed 
financing. ‘Capital markets ride on treasury and government agency liabilities 
just as bank lending markets ride on central bank liabilities’ (Hockett 2019, 
504). The latter became amply evident with the financial crisis of 2008, when 
the Fed stepped in to save the bankrupt banks:
Following the crisis, the very evident public creation of money revealed 
the inherently political nature of money. When other fiscal and mon-
etary solutions appeared unable to refloat damaged economies, cen-
tral banks resorted to the explicit creation of money out of thin air. 
Under what was described rather obscurely as ‘quantitative easing’, vast 
amounts of newly created electronic money were used to rescue finan-
cial institutions. There was no question of the new money’s being bor-
rowed from anywhere. It was a clear demonstration of the sovereign 
power to create money. Radical voices quickly asked why if the central 
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bank could create money out of thin air to rescue the banks they could 
not create new money to rescue the people. (Mellor 2019, 645)
Mary Mellor (2019, 640–641) argues that bank-created money is socially, 
ecologically, economically and politically unsustainable. It exacerbates racial 
inequality by favouring the more creditworthy borrower and locking out the 
poor and the non-white. Flows of finance at low interest rates are channelled 
into hedge funds, private equity funds and speculative investments in financial 
instruments, whereas poor and working-class people are forced to borrow from 
payday lenders or loan sharks at confiscatory interest rates. Financialisation 
has created a ‘winner-takes-all’ economy that has produced the exorbitant con-
centration of wealth and income documented by Piketty. It drives economic 
growth and creates ecological damage. It is crisis-ridden, turning private losses 
into public liabilities. Mellor (2019, 645) stresses the need not just to democ-
ratise finance but to reclaim the sovereign power to create money free of debt 
that could be spent directly into circulation. She calls for a public money system 
based on a widely democratic, transparent and accountable management of the 
creation and allocation of money. 
Hockett takes this argument to its logical end, suggesting that there are 
no limits on the state’s capacity to generate credit or money. He introduces a 
tweak to existing institutional arrangements by advocating for the creation of 
a National Investment Council to coordinate public–private investment at a 
federal level, accompanied by Federal Reserve reforms such as the creation of 
Fed Citizen and Residents Accounts, a Fed price stabilisation fund or  People’s 
Portfolio and a Fed-administered digital dollar engineered by Blockchain 
(Hockett 2019, 515–522). These reforms would eventually initiate a ‘QE for the 
people’ that would ignite the transition to a full ‘People’s Fed’ steered by a more 
effective counter-inflationary and counter-deflationary Fed monetary policy. 
Fred Block (2019, 529–556) suggests the creation of a national investment 
bank linked to locally based and non-profit financial institutions such as credit 
unions, public banks, community banks and non-profit investment banks. 
Large-scale investment in research and development, infrastructure and clean 
energy would combine with local investment in affordable housing, small busi-
nesses, non-profits and employee cooperatives. The ultimate goal would be the 
creation of a parallel financial system alongside the existing financial institu-
tions that would gradually replace the private sector with a public one. 
Lenore Palladino (2019, 573–591) proposes that the ‘parallel credit system’ be 
accompanied by a ‘parallel equity system’. He suggests the creation of a Public 
Investment Platform followed by a ‘public investment account’ that would offer 
a ‘public option’ for investment opportunities to individuals and  households 
locked out of the expensive private sector. Michael McCarthy (2019, 611–633) 
argues for the creation of state-administered sovereign wealth funds and 
worker-owned inclusive funds run by firms and corporations. 
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In short, the aforementioned proposals build on Wright’s argument for the 
creation of a more democratic financial system that would fuel a socialist tran-
sition. However, unlike Wright’s intention, they tend to address the periphery 
rather than the core of the problem. To tackle the structural contradictions 
of capitalism that produce immense inequalities and destroy the planet, it is 
necessary to alter the mode of capitalist production from within. State-centred, 
radical democratic rebalances of the capitalist economy need to tilt towards 
a decentralised, post-capitalist, post-hegemonic, commons-orientated transi-
tion geared by the self-management of the economy and society as a whole. As 
a response to the various crises of capitalism, ecologists, activists, politicians, 
scholars and citizens gather in all sorts of social movements and communities 
across the globe to juxtapose capitalist production with commons-based peer 
production anchored in the principles of democratic self-management, equita-
ble distribution of value, sustainability science and the ethics of collaboration.
1.5 In Defence of the Commons
Following up on the critique of neoliberalism, we now put forward additional 
arguments to move the terrain of discussion from post-Keynesianism and 
radical state-centred economics to post-capitalism. The standard neoclassi-
cal model of perfect competition, perfect information, perfect risk markets 
and perfect rationality fails to correctly depict how the economy works. The 
model of homo oeconomicus introduced by marginalism and incarnated there-
after by neoliberalism is challenged today in multiple disciplines, starting with 
economics itself (Dedeurwaerdere 2013; Keen 2001; Mason 2015; Mazzucato 
2018; Vatn 2005). The theory of marginalism that dominates textbook econom-
ics is fallacious, superfluous and ideological (Keen 2001; Mason 2015, 162). It 
reduces humans to calculating ‘machines’ of pain and pleasure, gain or loss; to 
mere traders, entrepreneurs or capitalists. It discards an exuberant human psy-
che replete with heterogeneous emotions, motives and rationales. The model 
of a rational actor calculating past and present information to maximise future 
utility is in stark contrast with real-world social dynamics driven by informa-
tion asymmetries along with diverse motivations (Dedeurwaerdere 2013, 7). 
Humans are complex animals, fusing monetary with non-monetary motiva-
tions in unimaginable ways.
1.5.1 The Digital Economy
The development of ICTs over the last decades poses a number of challenges 
for neoclassical economics. Information technology transforms norms of 
consumption, modes of production, commercial transactions, organisational 
forms, network management, and so on (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 2). 
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Industry now comes to be organised around a flexible assembly model (dis)
intermediated by digital platforms that (dis)connect the place where value is 
produced from the place where value is collected by decentralising and trans-
nationalising economic space, while constituting a mobile global audience that 
navigates between e-commerce and e-communities; competitiveness relies 
heavily on technological innovation; products and services bear an increasing 
information intensity generating a two-way commoditisation and customisa-
tion; new business models emerge that adopt a great variety of communication, 
differentiation and discrimination strategies based on the multimedia charac-
ter of the Internet (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 3–17). 
But instead of information technology becoming the ‘lubricant’ that removes 
all friction in commerce and gives reality to a transparent, ultra-competitive 
market economy, it brings about typical market failures such as club effects, 
market concentration and monopolisation, while sowing the seeds of a cooper-
ative economy. Markets tend towards greater segmentation rather than greater 
fluidity; hierarchies become more malleable rather than more efficient; and, 
most importantly, information becomes a free input into the production of 
knowledge (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 19). 
A number of often disparate authors such as Yochai Benkler (2006), Eric 
Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (2014), Jeremy Rifkin (2014), Paul Mason 
(2015) and Michel Bauwens (2019) argue that information technology chal-
lenges the basic tenet of marginalism, which is scarcity. Whereas the market 
economy aims to allocate efficiently scarce resources, information creates an 
abundance of value owing to its unique characteristics: 1) it is not ‘used up’; 2) it 
can be infinitely reproduced at zero marginal cost; and 3) it produces a number 
of positive externalities through the creation of network effects. Information 
‘dematerialisation’, that is, the dissociation between information and commodi-
ties, produces a knowledge economy built around intellectual commons that 
constitute a non-rivalrous good, thereby giving rise to a public good within a 
market economy (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 3, 19–21; Broumas 2020). An 
agent who transmits information can still keep and consume the same informa-
tion, granting a very low opportunity cost compared to the utility transferred to 
the receiver. Therefore, given the limits of saturation effects, a great number of 
agents can consume the same information simultaneously. 
Kenneth Arrow (1962, 609–626), a mainstream economist, pointed out in the 
1960s the problem of the optimal allocation of information as a  commodity due 
to its zero marginal cost of reproduction accounting for its incomplete appro-
priability by a seller. In contrast to tangible commodities such as a car or a chair, 
the moment information is disclosed, it can be infinitely copied and reproduced 
almost freely. And since information is abundant by nature and markets exist 
for allocating scarce resources, there can be no markets for  information. Put 
simply, one cannot easily create a market to sell  information. Given that the root 
of invention and innovation is knowledge, information breeds a  contradiction 
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between market economics and the production of knowledge. If firms can-
not appropriate the returns of producing knowledge, then they will have little 
incentive to invest in it. Whence, the notion of knowledge as a public good to 
be provided by state universities and further advanced through research grants 
and subsidies. Intellectual property rights protected by the state aim to tackle 
this contradiction, but they lead to the underutilisation of information and the 
inefficient use of knowledge.
Ultimately, information technology produces a paradox for conventional 
economics: it disrupts the function of the price signal and the relevant match-
ing of supply and demand either because richer information than just price is 
necessary (information-intensive goods) or because it pushes marginal price 
close to zero (pure information goods) (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 22). The 
transition to the knowledge economy has led to the increased importance of 
fixed costs and the diminishing role of competition. The marginal cost, that is, 
the extra cost in the reproduction of knowledge, is very low. The cost of distrib-
uting an ebook on the Internet is close to zero. But the fixed cost of writing a 
book is still present. Therefore, the existence of large fixed costs upstream com-
pared to the low marginal cost in the reproduction of knowledge downstream 
undermines the neoclassical ideal of a well-functioning competitive economy.
To recover the increased fixed costs upstream, companies finance them 
downstream either by rationing demand or applying coarse pricing or shifting 
revenue towards advertising or, finally, calling for the state to finance infrastruc-
ture (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 22). To fill in the gap between supply and 
demand caused by information overload, they co-opt infomediation among 
self-organised online consumer communities that spontaneously  couple supply 
with demand, using the zero marginal free supply of tools and content on the 
Internet to share information. Rather than market operation reaching Arrow-
Debreu’s neoclassical equilibrium model of perfect information and perfect 
competition, it resembles a Schumpeterian-Hayekian model wherein suppliers 
and consumers constantly ‘co-invent’ the terms of their trade. 
Eric Brousseau and Nicolas Curien suggest that the digital economy should 
become in the long run a ‘co-opetition’ economy that breeds business to  business 
(B-to-B) marketplaces where companies cooperate upstream as monopolies 
as well as monopsonies, benefiting from scale effects generated by mass pur-
chases, and compete downstream on the retail markets. Apple is a monopsony 
in purchasing apps from developers across the globe (Tepper and Hearn 2019). 
Facebook is the sole ‘purchaser’ of user-generated content at zero price. It con-
trols almost 80% of mobile social traffic. Airbnb dominates  short-term rentals. 
Amazon bought dozens of e-commerce rivals and online booksellers, acquir-
ing a monopsony position in the book industry. It gets about 75% of ebook 
sales. Facebook bought Instagram and WhatsApp. Google bought its main 
competitor, DoubleClick, and vertically integrated online ad markets by buying 
 advertising exchanges. It controls 90% of search advertising. Google’s monop-
sony vision is to become the dominant digital wholesale information broker to 
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the global Internet audience. On the whole, Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook 
and Microsoft have together acquired more than 500 companies in the past 
decade (Tepper and Hearn 2019). Altogether, these companies make up a data-
extracting model of platform capitalism to the tune of 3 trillion dollars.
Down the line, Brousseau and Curien (2007, 21–24) anticipate that the 
digital landscape should experience a ‘path-dependent’ reconstruction of the 
value chain where the differentiation of goods and services reduces competi-
tion, with infomediation leading to the coexistence of several ecosystems rather 
than a merciless struggle of the winner-takes-all type. Thus, ‘fringe’ monopolies 
allow for a multitude of small businesses or cooperatives to subsist in niche 
markets. Network interactions will eventually create adaptable relations rather 
than hierarchical subordination, reconciling stability and flexibility under a 
repeated game equilibrium. 
At present, however, technological change exacerbates the disparity between 
private and social returns to information (knowledge) (Stiglitz 2016, 48). It 
enhances rent seeking and the capacity for rent extraction, turning informa-
tion into an artificially scarce good disproportionally exploited by corporations 
having differential access to it. Asymmetries of information and concentrated 
market power create an oligopoly of knowledge production that stifles innova-
tion. The extent to which technological change will reproduce − and even exac-
erbate − the current concentration of market power or lead to an equilibrium 
among reticular market powers will be determined by the rules of the game 
over privacy rights, among others. To the extent that data will be treated as a 
public good, technological change is likely to produce a game equilibrium and 
a balance between static and dynamic efficiency rather than an oligopoly of 
market power. 
1.5.2 The Commons
But this depends largely on the future of class struggle. Mainstream infor-
mation economics focuses on supply and demand dynamics, discarding the 
potential of online consumer communities actually turning into self-organised 
prosumer communities that make use of open source technologies on the 
Internet to create an alternative mode of production that bypasses both firms 
and managerial hierarchies. They take for granted that capitalist production 
is the most efficient mode of allocating resources. Yet digital networks, open 
source technologies, Blockchain and the Internet of Things have the potential 
to support a new type of social relations anchored in the mutual coordination 
of common-pool resources, which are not set according to the price mecha-
nism of the market nor the managerial hierarchies of corporations and states. 
There are plenty of ideological elements in the Hayekian framework: prices 
are an accurate and sufficient signal of information to allow for decentralised 
coordination to produce social welfare; intellectual property rights are  necessary 
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and sufficient for the production of knowledge; competition is hard wired into 
the human species; collective self-management of the economy is destined to 
failure, and so on. Yochai Benkler (2006) and Elinor Ostrom (1990) consider 
prices, contracts and strict property rights lossy, sticky and costly. The com-
mons advance, instead, a more refined, flexible and cost-efficient information 
processing, better attuned to the variability of human creativity than manage-
rial hierarchies (firms, states). The free flow of information among large sets of 
agents who have cheap access to means of communication produces substan-
tial information gains by better allocating value to preferable courses of action, 
thereby unleashing creativity and innovation while reducing complexity and 
uncertainty. The information and allocation gains of the commons could under 
certain circumstances translate into better, fairer and more sustainable socio-
economic outcomes in comparison to price signals and managerial hierarchies. 
Transparency, openness and sharing could distribute value more equitably than 
firms that restrict access to knowledge by enclosing information under strict 
intellectual property rights.
The commons are premised on a simple yet radical idea: great improvements 
in production could be achieved by reducing barriers to knowledge exchange 
(Bollier and Helfrich 2015, 145). Collaboration and openness could produce a 
constantly improving collective repository of best ideas and practices; hence, the 
open source technologies of the digital commons adding up to rural and urban 
commons. The commons consist in a shared pool of resources from which 
everybody can draw or to which everybody can contribute  according to their 
needs and capacities. Collaboration prevents free riding by self- monitoring 
mechanisms reinforced both online and offline. Cosmolocalism, that is, the 
local use of global (digital) commons, could democratise the economy and set a 
new socio-economic paradigm anchored in the self-management of the means 
of production (Kostakis and Bauwens 2014). 
Price signals, property rights and contractual relations are just some ele-
ments in an institutional toolkit. Commons-based peer production increases 
the diversity of actors, motivations and transaction forms (Benkler 2006). It 
decentralises authority where the capacity to act exists, thereby diffusing power 
and freedom to the many. Free access to information and the means of pro-
duction empowers citizens and helps address the sustainability crisis through 
the ecological control of the economy. Open design, open protocols, open sup-
ply chains and open book accounting ensure maximum participation through 
modularity, and promote strigmergic collaboration by mutual coordination, 
which can in turn advance democracy, reduce waste and sustain a circular 
economy (Bauwens et al. 2019). 
Further evidence from evolutionary biology and the social sciences illustrates 
the shift in the scientific understanding of human rationality from the model 
of the self-interested maximiser, driven by competition and separable moti-
vations, to the model of homo socialis featuring cooperation and diverse pro-
social motivations (Benkler 2011). The competition hailed by neoliberalism 
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as the evolutionary pattern of human society is contradicted on the grounds 
of cooperation facilitated today by ICTs. Competition is not a zero-sum game 
between rivals but a win–win game between peer producers collaborating on 
Table 1.1: Neoclassical vs commons-based economics.
Neoclassical economics Commons-based economics
scarcity scarcity (local commons and ethical market  
entities)  abundance (global, digital commons) > 
cosmolocalism, glocal commons




strict property rights relationalised property through sharing
hierarchical management self-management
planned obsolescence circular economy
profit maximisation profit is not central but peripheral > equitable  
distribution of value and risk
individual labour > capitalist 
division of labour 
collective labour > mutual coordination by stigmergic 
collaboration, equipotentiality = participation  
conditioned a posteriori by the  process of  
production itself, where skills are verified and  
communally validated in real time > creativity,  
self-realisation vs alienation of labour, precariousness, 
intensification of labour,  performance pressure, stress
growth > climate crisis degrowth > sustainability
collective action > tragedy of 
the commons
self-monitoring mechanisms for avoiding  
common-pool resource depletion > comedy of the 
commons
network effects (Internet) > 
positive externalities > value 
crisis > enclosure of the  
digital commons >  
surveillance capitalism
the tokenisation/monetisation of positive  
externalities across the commons value chain > 
federalism, post-capitalism
finance and credit community transaction mechanisms such as as  
internal lending, smart contracts, participatory 
budgeting, common liquidity fund, resource pooling, 
microfunding
entrepreneurial innovation commons-based eco-techno-social innovation
regulatory state, minimum 
state, capitalist state, social 
democratic state
commons-centric partner state
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symmetric terms. Rationality does not always translate into self-interest, since 
humans often rationally pursue non-self-interested goals. Cooperation rather 
than competition is the evolutionary drive of human species’ survival (Bowles 
and Gintis 2011). 
Today, the decentralised use of the Internet and free software/hardware dis-
rupts centralised capitalist production on the model of commons-based peer 
production operating in terms of sustainability, openness, sharing and bottom-
up techno-social innovation. Commons-based peer production is alive and 
kicking, as evidenced by the range of the digital commons, the Free and Open 
Source Software (FOSS) movement, the solidarity economy, platform and 
open cooperatives, all joining forces with social movements to subvert the neo-
liberal hegemony of capitalism. Prominent cases of the digital commons, FOSS, 
platform and open cooperatives (e.g. Stocksy, Fairmondo, Mozilla Foundation, 
WikiHouse, Mondragon) will be examined in the course of this book. 
1.6 Structure of this Book
Part 1 deals with the liberal argument on the commons. Elinor Ostrom (1990) 
proved Hardin wrong by illustrating hundreds of cases of common-pool 
resources self-managed by user communities for centuries according to well-
defined rules and norms collectively established. She showed that not only is 
cooperation possible in hundreds of cases of common-pool resources, but that 
locally developed institutions and practices occasionally outperform market or 
state-driven systems governed by private property control and expert regula-
tion respectively. Ostrom’s empirical work offers important insights into how 
formal and informal norms can structure collaboration along the lines of non-
property-based schemes. 
Lawrence Lessig (2001) and Yochai Benkler (2006) expanded Ostrom’s work 
on the digital commons. Lessig introduced the innovation commons of the Inter-
net. Benkler coined the term ‘commons-based peer production’ to describe open 
contributory networks of distributed tasks, set and executed by groups online 
in a decentralised and autonomous fashion. The proliferation of open/free soft-
ware in the digital landscape today testifies to a set of collaborative practices not 
adequately explained in terms of property rights and monetary motivations. 
Part 2 examines the reformist argument. David Bollier builds on the work 
of Ostrom to introduce the model of the green governance of the commons 
 (Bollier and Helfrich 2012). He argues that the state must shift its focus to 
become a partner of the commons, rather than the market. Along with Silke 
Helfrich (Bollier and Helfrich 2019), he demonstrates a theoretical framework 
for the commons based on a common language. Jeremy Rifkin (2014) introduces 
the model of green capitalism connecting to the Internet of Things 
 infrastructure, fuelled by renewables. He advocates the gradual shift of green 
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capitalism towards the commons, supported by the Internet and free/open 
source  software/hardware. 
Trebor Scholz (2016a; 2016b) adds a cooperative twist to the commons by 
juxtaposing platform cooperativism against platform capitalism (the so-called 
sharing and gig economy). Platform cooperativism consists of online business 
models based on democratic self-governance, platform co-ownership and the 
equitable distribution of value. Kostakis and Bauwens (2014) give a challenging 
spin to platform cooperativism by introducing the model of open cooperativ-
ism between the commons and ethical market entities, operating in terms of 
open protocols, open supply chains, commons-based licensing and open book 
accounting. Open cooperativism is backed by a partner state through taxation, 
funding, regulation, education, and so on. Open cooperativism aims at the 
creation of a commons-orientated economy based on shared resources from 
which actors can draw or to which they can contribute according to their needs 
and capacities. DECODE (Decentralised Citizen Owned Data Ecosystems) is 
an ambitious research project that seeks to democratise data infrastructures. It 
has conducted extensive research to apply the principles of platform and open 
cooperativism in concrete case studies located in Amsterdam and Barcelona 
(Morell et al. 2017). 
Adam Arvidsson and Nicolai Peitersen (2013) illustrate a technologi-
cally advanced Habermasian transformation of the public sphere, where 
 collaborative networks of peer producers, supported by the Internet and mobile 
 applications, would open up a more rational and democratic negotiation of 
economic value, bringing together politics, the commons and a reformed capi-
talism. Douglas Rushkoff (2016) introduces a model of digital distributism 
that would  reprogramme capitalism into post-capitalism, where the pursuit of 
growth is subsumed to a sustainable economy based on value creation and the 
recycling of money. 
Erik Olin Wright (2009) portrays a pluralistic socialist transformation, 
grounded on a centrally coordinated decentralisation of power. His socialist 
transformation strategy is premised on the radical democratisation of both the 
state and the economy by civil society. 
Part 3 critically engages the anti-capitalist argument. Alexandros Kioupkiolis 
(2017) attempts to politicise the commons by commoning the political. He 
calibrates the tension between Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s verticalism 
and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s horizontalism in favour of the self-
instituting power of the people. Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2014) work 
on a similar line of argument to transform the common into a new type of right 
anchored in the self-instituting power of the people.
Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham (Gibson-Graham 1996; 2006) embark 
on a concrete elaboration of the commons into a post-capitalist context. 
They articulate the creation of a community economy that would gradually 
 transform capitalism into the commons. Dyer-Witheford (1999; 2015) and 
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De Angelis (2017) formalise the circulation of the commons alongside the cir-
culation of capital with the aim of transforming capitalism into post-capitalism. 
George Caffentzis (2013) and Silvia Federici (2012) take a more radical stance 
against capitalism and the state, arguing for the autonomous reproduction of 
the commons.
Slavoj Žižek (2008; 2010), Jodi Dean (2009), David Harvey (2003; 2010), Paul 
Mason (2015) and Christian Fuchs (2008; 2011) approach the commons in the 
context of classical Marxism. Whereas Žižek and Dean adopt a more statist 
approach, Harvey, Mason and Fuchs seek to strike a balance between the state 
and the commons. 
1.6.1 Thesis
This book makes the case that the liberal argument underestimates the reform-
ist insight that technology has the potential to decentralise production, thereby 
forcing capitalism to transform into post-capitalism. While the reformists argue 
for the cooperation of the commons with the state and friendly capital, the 
anti-capitalists argue for the autonomous development of the commons against 
and beyond capitalism and the state. Yet the anti-capitalists cannot provide a 
viable strategy as to how to safeguard the autonomy of the commons under 
conditions of grave dependency on state and capitalist production. While the 
reformists attempt to abolish the heteronomy of the commons by means of 
reverse co-optation via transvestment, they cannot address the precariousness 
and economic unsustainability that pervades commons-based peer produc-
tion. They lack concrete strategies to help peers monetise use value and gain 
public trust and involvement in commons-based peer production. Finally, both 
the reformists and the anti-capitalists lack adequate strategies to reach a critical 
mass and transform capitalism into post-capitalism or anti-capitalism. 
This is partially due to the contradictions of the commons often replicating 
the contradictions of capitalism and the state. Localism, gated communities, 
vested interests, atavism, traditionalism, ideology, conflict, neoconservatism 
and techno-elitism represent some of the internal contradictions of the com-
mons (Harvey 2003, 169). One of the major problems of the commons is the 
equilibrium of communities with the fluid, hybrid and mobile identities of indi-
viduals in the networked information economy. This is partially coextensive 
with the tension between the non-commerciality and the commerciality of the 
commons, that is, the principle of keeping the open character of the commons 
while securing income for those contributing (Morell et al. 2017, 11). Exter-
nally, the commons are facing problems in access to capital and training, lack of 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills and the absence of institutional support 
from governments, larger cooperatives and NGOs (Bollier and  Helfrich 2015). 
Both internal and external contradictions can equally result in the tyranny of 
the commons over the heterogeneity of the individual immanent in the cultural 
diversity of any collectivity. 
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Technology has, indeed, the potential to address these issues. It can help 
feed more people, cure illness, address climate change, create a more equitable 
economy and enhance democracy. But only a few commons-based applications 
can currently support such a claim. Human–computer interaction is still in its 
infancy and relevant research is at a preliminary stage. There are still limited 
successful cases available to point towards an economically, ecologically and 
socially sustainable commons-based peer production. 
The problem with the information argument is the technological determin-
ism that often comes to downplay the political. It falsely presumes that techno-
logical fixes can account for democratic processes. A number of authors such 
as Trebor Scholz (2016a; 2016b), Bauwens and Kostakis (Bauwens et al. 2019) 
and Alexandros Kioupkiolis (2019) attempt to address this issue, but still the 
problem persists: the big challenge lying ahead for the commons is the com-
patibility of democratic governance with technological efficiency. Participatory 
democracy, tele-democracy, cyber-democracy, post-democracy, the commons 
democracy are all terms invented to solve the puzzle. But cyber-optimism is 
still contradicted by the non-replicability of the digital commons in the rest of 
the economy, let alone the technical inadequacies in addressing environmental 
and societal issues along democratic lines. Technology cannot but be subject to 
the political, that is, the moral ground that forms the rationale behind coding 
and algorithms. Put simply, technology is necessarily embedded in the broader 
political institutionalisation of society.
For the commons to avoid both tragedy and/or parody, it is crucial to grow 
into open, transparent and mutually reinforcing networks that can provide for 
their members a sustainable livelihood along with the political conditions 
for democracy, autonomy and justice. To do so, it is essential to transform into 
multi-way socio-economic circuits of peer production and ethical market oper-
ation, supported by relevant state policies. The short-term goal of the commons 
would be the creation of a commons/private/public economy on the basis of a 
common pool of resources from which actors can draw and to which they can 
contribute according to their needs and capacities. The long-term goal would 
be the gradual adjustment of capitalism to the post-capitalism of the commons. 
The commons-based, post-capitalist transition needs to be enacted by a 
holistic, multidisciplinary strategy aimed at encompassing technology, finance, 
politics, economics, education, sustainability science and law under commons 
governance. Proper incentive schemes, well-designed policies, financial mecha-
nisms, law reforms, education are all part and parcel of a post-hegemonic  strategy 
aiming to transform capitalism and liberal democracy into the post-capitalism 
of the commons, supported by a partner state that represents the interests of 
the people rather than elites. The comprehensive understanding of a commons-
orientated socio-economic transition can potentially lead to the introduction 
of relevant policies that can mobilise the collective action necessary to embrace 
a truly collaborative economy premised on principles of sustainability, justice, 








Liberalism is a moral philosophy built on the concept of negative freedom, 
which dates back to Thomas Hobbes, who defined freedom as the absence of 
external impediments to the pursuit of one’s preferences. Negative freedom 
does not attribute to freedom a positive content, but is rather synonymous 
with freedom of individual choice. Negative freedom has thereafter become 
the backbone of liberal political thought, as demonstrated in the work of John 
Locke and John Stuart Mill, up until its most contemporary versions such as the 
work of John Rawls (1971), Robert Nozick (1974) and Friedrich Hayek (1944), 
to mention some of the most prominent figures. Variations of negative freedom 
depend on how one defines ‘interference’, but all agree that to be free is, more 
or less, to be left alone to do whatever one chooses (Carter et al. 2007, 3). As 
such, negative freedom encapsulates the core of modernity’s legal rights, which 
demarcate the bounds between the private and public sphere along the lines 
of property, ethical pluralism and tolerance. Liberalism is associated with the 
modern state founded on the rule of law and the separation of powers, both 
constitutive of representative democracy. The fundamental normative principle 
of liberal democracy is the sovereignty of the people, exercised in the public 
sphere through the freedoms of speech, assembly and press, and under condi-
tions of transparency and accountability. 
In its economic meaning, liberalism champions free trade and market capi-
talism. The common good identifies with the social welfare generated by the 
‘invisible hand’ of the market regulated by the democratic state. The common 
good consists in the harmonious coordination of the private and the public 
sphere for the benefit of the capitalist market, which lays the moral founda-
tion of society. What should be considered private and public is subject to 
acute political controversy within and beyond liberalism. Very schematically, 
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liberals and libertarians argue for a minimal state, left-liberals and social 
 democrats argue for increased state intervention, leftists argue for a socialist 
state and anarchists argue for the abolition of the state. 
The last decades have witnessed the emergence of a liberal discourse that 
seeks to revitalise the concept of the common as the self-instituting power of 
the people. Whereas the common stands for the collective capacity for self-
management, the commons are the concrete instantiations of the common, 
manifested in local and global (digital) commons. This part covers the liberal 
argument on the commons, as articulated in the work of Elinor Ostrom, Law-
rence Lessig and Yochai Benkler. The criterion by which I classify their work 
under the term ‘liberal’ is that all three place the development of the commons 
in parallel with state and market operation. They advocate for the coexistence 
of the commons with the public (its associated state and institutions) and pri-
vate sector. The task of this part is to critically examine the liberal argument and 
trace out convergences and divergences in the scope of the commons vis-à-vis 
state and market operation. 
Section 2.2 deals with Ostrom’s work on local commons. Ostrom addresses 
the problem of collective action by elaborating the model of polycentrism, 
whereby the dichotomy between privatisation and/or government regulation 
is overcome through a combination of state, market and community-based 
mechanisms governing common-pool resources. 
Section 2.3 focuses on the work of Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler who 
expand Ostrom’s work from the local to the global commons of the Internet 
and free/open source software. They introduce the term ‘digital commons’ 
to describe a non-market sector of information, knowledge and cultural 
 production, not treated as private property, but as an ethic of sharing, self-
management and cooperation between peers who have free access to online 
platforms.  Similarly to Ostrom, they both consider commons-based peer pro-
duction as complementary to state and market operation. Benkler often crosses 
his liberal lines by pointing to the autonomous development of the commons 
beyond capitalism and the state. Yet this underlying goal generally conforms to 
the  liberal tradition. 
The crux of the argument here is that the liberal approach to the commons falls 
short of connecting local and global commons and, thus, envisioning an autono-
mous existence of the commons even within the liberal-democratic framework 
of market capitalism. This shortcoming is coextensive with the broader lack of 
the political introduced by Alexandros Kioupkiolis to stress the impotence 
of the liberal commons to address the contradictions of capitalism and the state. 
2.2 Local Commons
In his seminal article, Hardin (1968) stressed the problem of the free-rider with 
regard to the management of common pool resources such as a pasture. The 
absence of clear property rights results in overgrazing and pasture depletion. 
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Hardin concludes that the most efficient solution to ‘the tragedy of the com-
mons’ is either state management or privatisation. When it comes to priva-
tisation, Hardin’s argument is consistent with the dominant neoliberalism of 
our times (Castree 2010, 14). Hardin’s metaphor of the grazing commons has 
been used to explain various situations where the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is 
likely to occur, ranging from international relations and state politics to climate 
change and Internet broadband access. 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ is commensurate with the problem of collec-
tive action posed by Marcun Olson (1965) to describe the action of benefit-
ing from the commons without contributing back (Hess and Ostrom 2007, 10). 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ has also been formalised as a prisoner’s dilemma 
game, in which interdependent decisions by rational agents lacking communi-
cation produce irrational outcomes when self-interest prevails (Ostrom 1990, 
3). However, all three models are but simplified versions of social dilemmas, the 
diversity of which surpasses a one-size-fits-all solution (Hess and Ostrom 2007, 
11–12). Hardin’s argument, in particular, is mistaken for four reasons (Hess and 
Ostrom 2007, 11). First, he utilises a limited view of private property. Secondly, 
he presupposes that people act only on self-interest. Thirdly, he identifies com-
mon-pool resources with open access commons, taking for granted the absence 
of rules in the use of the resource in question. Fourthly, he argues that there are 
only two ways to avoid tragedy: privatisation or government intervention. 
But these are not the only options. Ostrom (1990) introduced the analyti-
cal distinction between open access and common-pool resources. Whereas 
open access commons feature the absence of rules in the use of resources, 
common-pool resources are self-managed according to the norms and rules of 
the communities involved. Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize in Econom-
ics in 2009 for having examined numerous successful cases of self-managed 
natural resources such as forests, fisheries, pastures, groundwater basins and 
irrigation fields, stretching across the globe from Switzerland to Spain, Nepal 
to Indonesia (Ostrom 1990). She proved that not only is cooperation possible 
in hundreds of cases of common-pool resources, but locally developed insti-
tutions and practices occasionally outperform market or state-driven systems 
governed by private property control and expert regulation respectively.
Private property rights have combined with common property regimes for 
centuries. In the Swiss Alps, for example, plots are individually owned by farm-
ers, while the summer meadows, forests, irrigation systems, paths and roads 
connecting individually and communally owned plots are managed collectively 
(Ostrom 1990, 61–65). Mixed regimes of private and common property apply in 
cases with no clear boundaries, or with a cultural hostility to private property 
rights. On the other hand, private property rights are most effective in cases 
where there are clear boundaries to a resource, and the community is highly 
mobile and heterogeneous.
Hardin neglects several cases where privatisation or government  regulation 
of common-pool resources have had disastrous effects due to rent-seeking 
mechanisms of the market, combined with government corruption and 
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 deficient knowledge of particular circumstances in time and place (Van de 
Walle 2001; De Alessi 1998). Ostrom has demonstrated that hierarchies, prices 
and property are ‘lossy’ in processing information under conditions of uncer-
tainty and complexity. The plethora of limited-access commons thriving across 
the globe for centuries evince that there is no single model of ideal organisation. 
There is vast diversity consistent with polycentricity. Redundancy,  resilience 
and experimentation with the freedom to cooperate often produce better prac-
tices. Exclusive property, by contrast, limits exploration. 
Ostrom’s work on the commons breaks the dichotomy between ‘privatisa-
tion’ and/or ‘government regulation’ by pointing to ‘polycentric’ systems of 
 governance, where ‘a rich mixture of public and private instrumentalities’ is 
employed across a vast diversity of institutions (Ostrom 2012, 60–61). ‘We have 
found that government, private and community-based mechanisms all work in 
some settings’ (Ostrom 2012, 70). Polycentricity refers to a diversity of institu-
tions governing common-pool resources via quasi-autonomous and overlap-
ping decision centres relating to different types and scales of resources. The 
large scale of climate change, for example, demands the involvement of all three 
sectors (public, private and the commons) to effectively address the problem, 
whereas the parcelling out of a meadow in a village for the purpose of grazing 
involves the villagers and the municipality alone. Ostrom’s model of polycen-
tricity manifests today, among other places, in urban commons wherein public-
common-private partnerships co-administer common-pool resources such as 
land, buildings, food, energy, culture and knowledge (Foster and Iaione 2016).
Polycentricity differs from a misconceived sense of anarchism that assumes 
the total absence of rules, since common-pool resources are governed by well-
established rules. After extensive field observations, Ostrom came up with a set 
of design principles governing the commons, such as the demarcation of clear 
boundaries, the matching of rules with local needs and conditions, the modifi-
cation of rules by those directly involved, the monitoring of resources and the 
imposition of sanctions on free-riders.
2.2.1 A Typology of the Commons
Hess and Ostrom later expanded this research to include intangible goods 
such as knowledge and information. What followed was a typology of prop-
erty classified along two axes: exclusion and rivalry (Table 2.1). In neoclassical 
 economics, scarcity produces rivalry and exclusion. A good is scarce and, thus, 
rivalrous if its use by one person subtracts from the total available, thereby 
excluding others. Property is the legal form of exclusion rendering a good 
private. We can distinguish between three types of goods: private, public and 
common. Private goods are marked by high rivalry and exclusion. An apple or 
book cannot be used by two people simultaneously and such goods are subject 
to the economics law of supply and demand. Public goods, on the other hand, 
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exhibit low rivalry and exclusion. All citizens can make use of public education, 
national defence, parks and highways simultaneously. Some common goods, 
sometimes also referred to as public goods, can be excludable and rivalrous, 
and others can be non-excludable and non-rivalrous (Kostakis and Bauwens 
2014; Benkler 2006; Ostrom 1990). Grazing lands, fisheries and water can be 
rivalrous and occasionally excludable. But nobody can be excluded from walk-
ing on a mountain, swimming in the sea, or breathing the air. Information, 
language and knowledge – not ‘enclosed’ by intellectual property rights – are 
non-rivalrous and anti-rivalrous, meaning respectively that the cost of repro-
ducing an additional unit is near zero, while its use by more people increases 
its value overall. The more people use a language or software, the more valu-
able it becomes. Public and common goods thus often blur. The criterion for 
distinguishing between them is their type of governance. Whereas the former 
are managed by state governance, the latter are self-managed by communities 
(Quilligan 2012).
We can further distinguish between two main types of common goods: 
m aterial/rivalrous (natural resources) and immaterial/non-rivalrous/ anti-
rivalrous (language, information, knowledge, culture). Depending, then, on 
the context, the commons can be regulated or unregulated. De Angelis (2017, 
62–64) has highlighted the relational/contextual character of the commons. 
Commons and free access are not always opposed, as Ostrom claims, since they 
often identify or interrelate. The commons are often open access as in the case 
of free/open source software and the digital commons (De Angelis 2017, 146).
2.2.2 Institutional Economics vs Neoclassical Economics
Ostrom’s work on the commons can be broadly situated within institutional 
economics, focusing on the impact of incentives on the functioning of institu-
tions and the dissolution of social dilemmas. As such, it adheres to the liberal 
tradition for a number of reasons. First, she adopts the liberal theory of prop-
erty rights, albeit in a twisted fashion. Let us recall that John Locke  justifies 
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private property on the grounds of individual labour. An apple becomes 
the private property of the farmer who laboured to produce it. Yet, for Ostrom, 
property rights do not necessarily equate to individual property rights, but 
apply to mixed regimes of private and common property rights. Ostrom makes 
the distinction between exclusive private property rights, and a bundle of 
rights most pertinent to the use of common-pool resources, such as the right 
to access and usage (to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-subtractive 
benefits), withdrawal (to obtain resource units or products), management (to 
regulate internal use patterns), and exclusion and alienation (to sell or lease 
management and exclusion rights) (Hess and Ostrom 2007, 11). In Ostrom’s 
account, property rights define authority over a range of possible actions. 
Secondly, she examines common-pool resources through the lens of rational 
choice theory, employing the methodological individualism of liberalism to 
solve social dilemmas. In this context, individualism evolves from Hume’s and 
Bentham’s utility theory into the self-interested maximiser of neoclassical eco-
nomics who uses a cost–benefit analysis to maximise her utility by satisfying 
her preferences. Ostrom, however, challenges the dominant neoclassical model 
of individual agency in that she considers incentives more complex and varied 
than a zero-sum game. She rejects the idea that rationality translates solely into 
selfishness and opportunism. Economic behaviour has always been dependent 
not only on competition, but also on cooperation in solving day-to-day col-
lective problems (Ostrom 2000, 143). Finally, motivations are often shaped by 
collective norms and institutional arrangements.
2.2.3 The Critique of Polycentrism
Ostrom’s work is attuned to the liberal tradition, given that her polycentrism 
model situates the commons in parallel with state and market operation. 
Most importantly, the self-institutionalisation of common-pool resources is 
 foreshadowed by the power of the state and the market, thus limiting the self-
instituting power of the people. Dardot and Laval (2014, 143) correctly men-
tion that Ostrom’s non-mainstream use of institutional economics and game 
theory cannot help but conceal the exploitation and power asymmetries inher-
ent in capitalism and the state. In a similar vein, Alexandros Kioupkiolis (2019, 
47–48) argues that Ostrom neglects the political as antagonism, struggle and 
power structures. Within a state-governed polity, any communal  autonomy 
remains at the discretion of the central sovereign authority, while neoliberal 
capitalism is bent on colonising both the state and the commons. Ostrom fails 
to see the contradictory logics that bring the commons into conflict with capi-
talist markets and the modern state. 
Benkler (2002b, 378) holds that her studies focus on relatively limited groups 
of participants, putting her work in tension with large-scale, non-proprietary, 
open access commons, such as public infrastructures (Frischmann 2012) and 
the digital commons. Benkler (2013a, 1518–1519) meets De Angelis from the 
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opposite direction: not only do limited access and open access commons depend 
upon each other, but they often contrast. The asymmetric use (excludability) of 
common-pool resources – owing to their inherent scarcity –  contradicts the 
open access character of highways and the Internet, for example. 
A wide chorus of scholars (Carlsson and Sandström 2008; Dowsley 2008; 
Harvey 2012; Ostrom and Andersson 2008) have objected that the non- 
hierarchical self-governance of common-pool resources is politically debilitat-
ing at higher levels. It cannot translate into solutions for large-scale problems. 
Conventional economics considers Ostrom’s local commons to be developing 
at the periphery, thereby not touching the core of the world economy, where the 
model of the self-interested maximiser reigns supreme (Benkler 2013a).
Nonetheless, Ostrom’s empirical work offers significant insights into how 
formal and informal norms can structure collaboration along the lines of non-
property-based schemes. She shifted the discourse on incentives from the 
methodological individualism of neoclassical economics to the institutional 
structure of collective agency. In other words, she brought to the fore the con-
cept of the common as the self-instituting power of the people by reinvigorating 
the democratic elements of participation and inclusion in the collective man-
agement of resources. Ostrom inspired a new school of economic thought that 
works today on applying her design principles to various fields, ranging from 
rural and urban commons to the digital commons. Yet all these efforts need 
to integrate into a broader, more coherent political perspective that seeks to 
move the terrain of discussion from the liberal commons to a post- hegemonic 
account of the commons. Thus, this book seeks to radicalise the commons and 
pave the way for a holistic, post-capitalist, commons-orientated transition. 
2.3 Global Commons
The notion of the commons was introduced into the contemporary legal debate 
by Carol Rose with her paper entitled ‘The Comedy of the Commons’ (1986), 
spurring a revival of commons scholarship. Rose reversed the so-called tragedy 
of the commons by highlighting the ‘inherently public property’ of goods such 
as roads, navigable waterways and open squares. These sorts of goods are not 
amenable to private or state management, since they are governed by ‘custom’ 
or norms within the relevant communities. Nor can they be classified as lim-
ited access commons, since they are open access commons. The unique feature 
of these goods is that their value is proportional to the increasing number of 
users. Rose introduced an early version of ‘network effects’: open access sys-
tems that increase their value through the permissionless use of the resource by 
an indefinite amount of users. This is the case when the value from increased 
participation outweighs the costs from increased utilisation, thereby reversing 
the tragedy of the commons into a comedy. Efficiency and welfare would sug-
gest opening relevant resources to public use instead of enclosing them with 
property rights and state regulation. 
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Network effects apply today par excellence on the Internet and the digital 
commons, following Metcalfe’s law (1995): ‘The value of a communications 
network is proportional to the square of the number of its users.’ The more peo-
ple use a network, the more valuable it becomes. Jodi Dean (2012, 130–131), 
however, criticises Metcalfe’s law with respect to scale (larger networks may be 
more prone to crashes and delays) and the suppositions between the links. The 
problem is magnified if one considers the information asymmetries (Grossman 
and Stiglitz 1980) inherent in networks due to the power asymmetries between 
corporations, institutions and non-institutional agents. Network effects are 
exploited today by platform capitalism instead of contributing to a robust and 
decentralised peer production. 
Inversely proportional to the comedy of the commons is the tragedy of the 
anti-commons, introduced into the legal literature by Michael Heller (1998). In 
contrast to the tragedy of the commons resulting in the potential overuse of a 
resource, the tragedy of the anti-commons is a type of coordination breakdown 
where excessive intellectual property rights and overpatenting (for example, in 
biomedical research) results in the underuse of a resource. Take the example 
of AIDS patents preventing the use of drugs by millions of Africans dying of 
AIDS simply because they cannot afford to buy the medicine. Anti-commons 
property is the mirror image of commons property. Yet identifying a case of 
anti-commons does not necessarily induce open access commons or common 
property regimes, since this could also translate into refined property rights. 
When the market misallocates resources, the latter can be stuck in low-value 
uses at either end of the property rights spectrum. Whether this misalloca-
tion results in overuse or underuse, the common denominator is waste (Heller 
1998, 626). It then depends on the scope and definition of the resource whether 
this tragedy can be solved by means of better-defined property rights or better-
designed commons (Benkler 2013a, 1498–1499). 
An intermediary use of the commons lies in Henry Smith’s term ‘semi-com-
mons’ (2000), illustrating well-functioning mixed regimes of private property 
and commons, as in the case of wheat growing in private allocations within 
open fields used for animal grazing, the latter having both costs (trampling) 
and benefits (manure) for the former. A number of scholars have attempted to 
apply the use of semi-commons to telecommunications regulation, intellectual 
property and the Internet (Grimmelmann 2010; Heverly 2003; Smith 2005). 
Relevant policies would demarcate accordingly the private and commons part 
within the semi-commons, rather than posing the dilemma of either commons 
or private property. As regards intellectual property, for example, it would deal 
with the term of coverage or the definition of fair use. 
Benkler (2013a, 1523), however, has shown the limits of this approach when it 
comes to the basic protocols of the Internet such as TCP/IP, HTML and HTTP, 
which are by default open access commons. Benkler and Lessig extend the legal 
analysis of the commons to the Internet and the digital commons, which repre-
sent a new model of information, knowledge and culture production, anchored 
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in openness, cooperation, mutual coordination and decentralised, bottom-up, 
techno-social innovation. This new mode of production was first named by 
Benkler (2006) ‘commons-based peer production’. Unlike Ostrom’s school of 
ecological commons, commons-based peer production encapsulates a broader 
paradigm shift facilitated by new technological development in the networked 
society (Castells 2000; 2009; 2010). The digital commons are not confined to 
small-scale communities and local ecosystems, but expand into open and plu-
ral shapes of networks that have the potential to occupy centre stage in eco-
nomic, political and social life.
However, a number of thinkers such as Dardot and Laval (2014), De Angelis 
(2017) and Kioupkiolis (2019) argue that digital commons are beset with defi-
ciencies similar to those of local commons in their grasp of the political. Addi-
tionally, they fail to connect with local commons and counter the contradictory 
logics of the state and the market. This failure is exacerbated by the current 
conditions of social fragmentation, exclusion, precarisation, individualism and 
collective disempowerment. 
2.3.1 The Digital Commons
Lawrence Lessig (2001) wraps up the legal debate on the commons in the last 
decade to focus on the Internet and generalise to the online production of 
 information, knowledge and culture. The Internet originated in the  American 
scientific community and military, sponsored by research fellowships and 
licensing contracts from the American government. It dates back to the idea 
of Paul Baran, among others, of digitising communication by translating waves 
into bits chopped into packets that travel along the wires of a telephone network. 
Instead of waves transmitting from one line to another via circuits, data could 
now travel as packets via many lines simultaneously (Lessig 2001, 31). This idea 
was then implemented in the ARPANET project, funded by the United States 
Department of Defense, to create a telecommunications network that could 
withstand a nuclear attack. ARPANET was the first packet-switching network 
to apply the TCP/IP protocol that would allow computers to communicate with 
each other, thereby setting the technical foundation for the Internet, which then 
became the network of networks running in telephone lines (Lessig 2001, 34; 
Fuchs 2008). The Internet is based on the interoperability between decentral-
ised sub-networks/computers using a generic addressing system (IP numbers 
and domain names) and technical standards (TCP/IP protocol and HTML) that 
take the form of open source software (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 5).
Control and freedom on the Internet
Lessig (2001, 23) draws on Benkler to illustrate the architectural design of the 
Internet. Benkler (2000) divides the Internet into three ‘layers’: 1) the  ‘physical’ 
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layer consisting of the hardware, wires, cables and the radio frequency 
spectrum that link computers together on the Internet; 2) the ‘logical’ layer, 
that is, the code, the protocols and the software that make the hardware run; 
3) the ‘content’ layer, that is, the data transmitted across the wires, including 
text, images, music, movies and the like. These three layers together make com-
munication possible on the Internet. Much of these three layers is today either 
state or privately owned, or both. Yet the code – the instructions inscribed in 
both software and hardware – that accounts for the core structure of the Inter-
net is still to some extent free. So, too, is much of the content delivered across 
the network. 
Lessig (2001, 177) discovers a tension between control and freedom at all 
three levels, potentially pregnant with two contrasting tragedies of the com-
mons. On the freedom side, the tragedy derives from potential congestion in 
the frequency spectrum, resulting in the overuse of the resources on the Inter-
net and beyond (for example, traffic, electricity, etc.) (Lessig 2001, 83–84, 229). 
On the control side, the tragedy consists in the creation of digital monopo-
lies that limit freedom by causing Internet underuse (Lessig 2001, 175). Les-
sig (2001, 200–202) argues for a balance between freedom and control on the 
Internet, tilting towards the protection of the free space across the three layers, 
which breeds the digital innovation commons, that is, the free and unrestricted 
production of applications and content by Internet users. 
Digital freedom relies basically on the code that regulates the flow of con-
tent via the controlled physical layer of the Internet. Code consists in the basic 
 protocols − TCP/IP, HTML, HTTP − that make for the core structure of the 
Internet, that is, the end-to-end principle, which locates intelligence at the ends 
of the network rather than at the centre, thereby sustaining a decentralised 
architecture devoid of central control. On the Internet, each user has the capac-
ity to influence the flow of communication via digital technology’s ability to 
encrypt information. In a digital system all information is coded in a sequence 
of digits, which can then be easily encrypted. Encryption permits a user to filter 
information and authorise access to all or part of the information depending on 
the identity of other users or other criteria (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 7–8). 
In short, encryption enables all Internet users to lay down ‘norms’ on the use of 
information and the subsequent flow of communication.
Internet use, of course, is neither always legitimate nor regulation-free. 
Given the Internet’s effects on commerce, intellectual property, cyber-crime, 
national security, public freedoms, and so on, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) such as the ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers), the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) and the W3C (World 
Wide Web Consortium), in concert with states, have progressively become 
involved to  co-regulate the network (Brousseau and Curien 2007, 6–8). Thus, 
the self-organisation of the Internet does not lack an institutional framework 
completely. Rather, it employs ‘framed’ self-organisation. 
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Code is law
Code is law and architecture is politics inasmuch as it enables certain forms of 
social interaction, while disabling others (Lessig 2001, 35). Code embedded in 
the technical architecture of the Internet is the social engineering of informa-
tion, knowledge and cultural production. The underlying political philosophy 
of the Internet is the liberal ideal of network neutrality that advocates for non-
discriminatory traffic management by Internet service providers (ISPs) with 
regard to the content and applications running in the network. Network neu-
trality is enforced by the end-to-end principle, which epitomises unconstrained 
value creation. The Internet was initially designed to remain open and enhance 
freedom via interconnected networks and flexible applications built on top of 
basic protocols. Under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, plasticity – 
the ability of a system to evolve easily in a number of ways – is the optimal 
method to allow for the broadest range of development and innovation (Lessig 
2001, 39). Internet architecture was the key to the explosion of new services 
and software applications. Cyberspace could, thus, be the dream of the libertar-
ian who envisions the elimination of control. 
The hallmark of freedom in the Internet is free and open source software 
(FOSS) invented in 1984 by Richard Stallman who introduced the GNU Gen-
eral Public License (GPL) as a legal hack in the traditional copyright system, 
allowing programmers to freely access, copy, modify and distribute software on 
the same copyright terms. The core defining feature of FOSS is the renouncing 
of exclusive proprietary control over the software in which one has copyright 
(Benkler 2013b, 221). FOSS is the collective reversal of the proprietary copy-
right system through the combination of contract law and copyright (Lessig 
2001, 58). Far from meaning the abolition of copyright, FOSS establishes a 
‘copyleft’ system on the basis of the traditional copyright system. While most 
licences limit the copies one can make, the GPL limits the restrictions on copy-
ing. Building on top of the GPL, Linus Torvalds in 1991 developed the Linux 
operating system, which supports a model of collaborative production of soft-
ware developers, based on volunteering and sharing (Lessig 2001, 54). GPL/
Linux is now the fastest-growing operating system in the world.
Jeremy Rifkin makes the case that the GPL could be considered a digital ver-
sion of the regulation of the limited access commons, inasmuch as it incorpo-
rates many of Ostrom’s principles: the conditions of inclusion; the restrictions 
of exclusion; the rights governing access; withdrawal, enhancement and stew-
ardship of the resources; and so on (Rifkin 2014: 175). The difference here is 
that FOSS is open access rather than limited access. 
Similar efforts are underway to implement Ostrom’s principles on Block-
chain, which is a decentralised ledger on the Internet, allowing for numerous 
applications with as yet uncertain potential (Rozas et al. 2018). Blockchain is 
one of the applications of peer production, which makes use of the  end-to-end 
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principle of the Internet, allowing content (file sharing, processing cycles, 
etc.) to be delivered by equal computers along the network. FOSS, Blockchain 
and the digital commons are instances of peer production, supported by the 
architecture of the Internet. 
The general idea behind distributed ledgers such as Blockchain is to use peer-
to-peer networks to verify the authenticity of a token of value (money), an indi-
cator of personal reputation, a recognised legal agreement among parties or a 
group encapsulated in smart contracts, or a tool for voting and decision making 
(Bollier and Helfrich 2019, 326). Distributed ledgers can support the creation 
of community currencies that enable people to coordinate the terms of their 
cooperation at scale, without the threat of enclosure. Instead of making deci-
sions through rigid hierarchies with centralised direction and relying on prop-
erty rights vested in a few people, distributed ledgers can support transparency 
and democratic decision making. 
Holochain is another example of a lighter, far more energy-efficient and 
versatile set of software applications than Blockchain, since there is no single 
ledger in Holochain to store data. Holochain is based on an open data, distrib-
uted architecture that allows every user to have his or her own secure ledger 
to store their personal data (Bollier and Helfrich 2019, 326). The core idea of 
Holochain is to enable the ‘renting out’ of user-computing capacity in exchange 
for Holo Fuel currency to circulate within the network and kick-start a new 
parallel economy of services (Bollier and Helfrich 2019, 328–332). This estab-
lishment of Holo Fuel currency basically constitutes a mutual credit system 
backed by an asset (computing power). As more enterprises join Holochain and 
back its value with actual assets and services such as food, transport, energy or 
elderly care services, a commons-based economy will emerge. Holochain can 
be further used to build decentralised applications for peer governance, social 
networks, platform cooperatives, open supply chains, community resource 
management as well as tokenless mutual-credit cryptocurrencies and reputa-
tion systems. Thus, Holochain can express the flows of value that market prices 
cannot represent such as positive (social relationships and contributions to the 
commons) and negative externalities (waste, pollution).
Cyber-communism, cyber-libertarianism and  
firm-hosted peer production
Free code builds a digital commons in the production of information, knowl-
edge and culture thanks to the non-rivalrous/anti-rivalrous nature of infor-
mation. The consumption of one ebook, for example, by one person does not 
subtract from the total available to others. On the contrary, it produces more 
information and creates new knowledge. The nature of information combines 
with the architecture of cyberspace, which, contrary to the physical world, 
allows users altogether to give away much more information than they can 
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receive alone, thus spontaneously creating a gift economy (Barbrook 1998). 
One ebook can be uploaded by millions at the same time, while a user can 
download a limited number of ebooks at a time. Jodi Dean (2012, 146–148) 
marks this unique feature of the web as a contradiction between the abundance 
of knowledge production versus the scarcity of human capacity for consump-
tion. This is also the case with scientific research, innovation and culture in the 
physical world. Information breeds information in the networked social inter-
action, surpassing individual human limits. The difference with cyberspace is 
that the proliferation and abundance of information and knowledge can be 
faster and denser on the Internet, covering simultaneously multiple points in 
time-space. In purely economic terms, cyberspace carries a ticking time-bomb 
for the capitalist economy: an abundance of supply versus a scarcity of demand. 
In contrast with tomatoes which still cannot be cloned indefinitely, information 
is destined to reproduce information at zero marginal cost. 
According to Vasilis Kostakis and Michel Bauwens (2014), FOSS sustains a 
sort of cyber-communism operating at the very heart of capitalism, where eve-
rybody can contribute and share according to their needs and skills.  However, 
the most common political interpretations of FOSS tend to be libertarian 
rather than communist. Others have pointed to the political agnosticism of 
FOSS developers (Coleman 2004; Raymond 1999; Stallman 2002). 
Richard Barbrook (1998) considers cyberspace a form of high-tech anarcho-
communism, which is not only in conflict with digital capitalism, but coex-
ists in symbiosis with the latter. Anarcho-communism is often sponsored by 
corporate capital. The free circulation of information among users depends 
upon the capitalist production of computers, software and telecommunica-
tions.  Anarcho-communism is also symbiotic with the state that subsidises 
and regulates digital capitalism. Within the digital mixed economy, anarcho- 
communism blends with state democracy. The Internet user is a consumer in 
the market, a citizen of a state and an anarcho-communist within a gift econ-
omy largely co-opted by finance capital. 
Alongside the proliferation of the digital commons, the last decades have 
witnessed the development of the capitalist commons, with several companies 
incorporating FOSS development within their operations. For Lessig (2001, 
70–72), this offers a win–win partnership for both capitalism and FOSS pro-
duction. Illustrative is the case of IBM which invested more than $1 billion 
to support the development of Linux and Apache. Most recently, IBM bought 
RedHat, one of the most iconic companies in open source development, for 
$34 billion. 
The crucial questions here are, first, why does IBM pay for what it could 
get for free and, second, why does it give its improvements back to the public. 
IBM profits from the improvements made by millions of developers in the open 
source movement by incorporating them in the hardware and adding paid ser-
vices on top of the free software. Instead of IBM paying ten programmers to 
produce software, it pays significantly lower salaries to a community of peer 
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producers to produce the same software with much better quality. If IBM par-
ticipates and deflects from the open source movement, it becomes extremely 
costly to keep its software up to date, since it cannot compete with the work of 
millions of developers across the globe. 
The limitations of the digital commons
Lessig (2001, 9) champions a mixed regime of private property and the digital 
commons. His core argument is that digital technology could enable more and 
more people to participate in the creative process, thereby democratising the 
production of information, knowledge and culture. Following Rose, he holds 
that FOSS and the digital commons demonstrate that the added value from 
increased production outweighs the cost from increased utilisation. Therefore, 
the Internet creates more wealth when held in common than in private (Lessig 
2001, 86–88). As Lessig puts it:
Where a resource has a clear use, then, from a social perspective, our 
objective is simply to assure that that resource is available for this high-
est and best use. We can use property systems to achieve this end. By 
assigning a strong property right to the owners of such resources, we can 
then rely upon them to maximise their own return from this resource by 
seeking out those who can best use the resource at issue. But if there is 
no clear option for using the resource – if we can’t tell up front how best 
to use it – then there is more reason to leave it in common, so that many 
can experiment with different uses. Not knowing how a resource will be 
used is a good reason for making it widely available […] Where uncer-
tainty is highest, network designs that embrace end-to-end maximise 
the value of the network; and where uncertainty is low, then end-to-end 
is not a particular value. (2001, 89) 
Lessig (2001, 72) advocates that intellectual property rights must strike the right 
balance between free and controlled resources. Control makes sense in the case 
of scarce and, hence, rivalrous resources suited for commercial appropriation 
in the market, whereas freedom belongs to the world of ideas held in com-
mon. Strict property rights, he claims, burden innovation and creativity (2001, 
139–140). Economists have long emphasised the costs of patents to informa-
tion production, given the public goods nature of information (Arrow 1962). 
Strong patent protection increases the costs that current innovators have to 
pay for existing knowledge more than it increases the benefits of appropriating 
the value of their own contributions (Benkler 2006, 38–39). Strong intellectual 
property rights lead to commercialisation, concentration and homogenisation 
of information production rights, thus underutilising information and stifling 
innovation (Benkler 2002a; Boyle 1996; Samuelson 1990). On the flipside, the 
more open the access to information goods, the more the value for all.
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Today, changes in the architecture of the Internet – both legal and technical 
– aim at increasing the scope for control of code and content (Lessig 2001, 15). 
Instead of the Internet promoting innovation, creativity and freedom, it turns 
into the most efficient censorship and surveillance mechanism, as evidenced 
in the cases of China and the USA. ‘There is no “nature” of the Internet that 
will assure a continued commons at the code layer, no strong protection limit-
ing the Congress to ensure that adequate resources remain free at the content 
layer’ (Lessig 2001, 139). Some authors claim that we have entered the age of 
surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2019). The Internet is not immune to potential 
gatekeepers and supernodes such as governments and corporations forestalling 
the openness of the network. Rather, the Internet sustains the political and eco-
nomic battle of freedom and control, playing out on the interface of software 
and hardware. 
Lessig (2001, 9) is pro-market. He does not question property per se, but 
only the scope of property. He demonstrates a liberal version of the commons, 
arguing for the coexistence of the commons with state and market operation 
across separate but entangled spheres of action. However, such an approach has 
two major shortcomings: not only does Lessig limit the commons to the digital 
commons, he also limits the latter with respect to state and market operation. 
Most importantly, Lessig’s version of the commons is undermined by the con-
tradictions of capitalism and the state, that is, the power asymmetries inherent 
in the core structure of managerial hierarchies, namely the division between 
directors and executants, managers and workers, representative and citizens, 
elites and the people. For the commons to provide a sustainable democratic 
paradigm shift, they need to integrate into a broader political debate that seeks 
to unify diverse projects under a holistic, post-hegemonic perspective that rad-
ically challenges the current neoliberal status quo. 
2.3.2 Commons-based Peer Production
Benkler develops a more radical version of the commons compared to Les-
sig’s innovation commons. He builds on Manuel Castells’s (2000; 2009; 2010) 
concept of the networked society – which marks the shift from groups and 
hierarchies to networks as social and organisational models – with the aim of 
introducing a novel normative framework for refiguring civil collaboration 
with respect to the market–state nexus. He demonstrates a model of  networked 
pragmatism/anarchism, based on the decentralised self-management of infor-
mation, knowledge and cultural production, supported by the Internet and 
FOSS. The idea of decentralised self-management is not novel in econom-
ics and political theory. It is reminiscent of the work of numerous thinkers, 
related to diverse and often disparate strands, ranging from anarcho-capitalism 
and anarcho-communism to autonomous Marxism and radical republican-
ism. What is novel in Benkler’s work is the technological substratum of a lib-
eral  critique of managerial hierarchies and market limitations on individual 
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 freedom,  participatory democracy and justice, ameliorated today by the emer-
gence of a new organisational model termed ‘commons-based peer production’.
The term ‘commons’ signifies a particular institutional form of structuring 
the right to access, use and control resources, which differs significantly from 
 managerial hierarchies and markets. The distinctive features of the commons are: 
1) decentralised self-governance through the utilisation of participatory, meri-
tocratic (do-ocracy) and charismatic rather than proprietary or contractual 
 models; 2) the centrality of non-monetary motivations; and 3) the  permeation 
of state and firm boundaries (Benkler et al. 2015, 2–3; Benkler 2016a, 2). High-
ways, squares, shipping lanes, water, airwaves, scientific knowledge, ideas and 
the Internet are all commons. The main event for all these systems is open com-
mons, which designate free access, use and control of common-pool resources 
under symmetric terms (Benkler 2013a, 1500). Open access commons differ 
from Ostrom’s limited access commons in that they are not limited to a restricted 
number of people who cooperate at a local level, but expand to the global level. 
Benkler (2006, 59–90) focuses on the Internet. He defines commons-based 
peer production as a non-market sector of information, knowledge and cultural 
production, not treated as private property, but as an ethic of open sharing, self-
management and cooperation among peers who have access to fixed capital 
such as software and hardware. Commons-based peer production consists of 
open contributory networks of distributed tasks, set and executed online in a 
decentralised and autonomous fashion.
Benkler mentions that not all peer production qualifies as commons- 
based production. The term ‘commons-based’ denotes the absence of 
exclusive  property:
The salient characteristic of commons, as opposed to property, is that 
no single person has exclusive control over the use and disposition of 
any particular resource in the commons. Instead, resources governed by 
commons may be used or disposed of by anyone among some (more or 
less well-defined) number of persons, under rules that may range from 
‘anything goes’ to quite crisply articulated formal rules that are effec-
tively enforced. (Benkler 2006, 61)
The term ‘peer production’ signifies a subset of commons-based production 
practices, which ‘refers to production systems that depend on individual action 
that is self-selected and decentralised, rather than hierarchically assigned’ 
(Benkler 2006, 62). Similarly to Lessig, Benkler distinguishes between two 
basic modes of peer production: 1) commons-based peer production (FOSS 
and the digital commons); and 2) firm-hosted peer production (peer produc-
tion incorporated into firms such as IBM and Google). The latter refers also 
to the online business models of the so-called sharing and gig economy (for 
example, Uber, Airbnb, Kickstarter, TaskRabbit and Upwork), which will be 
analysed later. 
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The quintessential instance of commons-based peer production is FOSS, 
which produces some of the core software utilities running the Web –  servers, 
email, scripting, applications, plug-ins. FOSS accounts for 70% of web servers 
running on the Apache web server; more than 70% of web browsers (Firefox, 
Chrome); server-side programming languages (PHP); content management 
systems (Wordpress, Joomla and Drupal have more than 70% of servers); 
smartphone operating systems; enterprise software (Google, Amazon and 
CNN.com run their servers on the GNU/Linux operating system; 40% of firms 
engaged in software development contribute to FOSS development). In short, 
roughly half of the Internet runs on FOSS.
FOSS development, however, is not the only instance of commons-based peer 
production. The commons expand into large-scale collaboration in the net-
worked information environment. They range from the scientific, digital and 
knowledge commons to non-professional information and cultural production 
taking place on entertainment sites and in grassroots movements, communities 
and interpersonal relationships (for example, families and friendships).
The digital commons, in particular, extend beyond FOSS development to 
distributed content production and sharing of processing, storage and com-
munications platforms. Examples of distributed content production are the 
Nasa Clickworkers, Wikipedia, Kuro5hin, Multiplayer Online Games, Open 
Directory Project, Slashdot and Project Gutenberg. Examples of sharing of pro-
cessing, storage and communications platforms are Napster, Gnutella, SETI@
home, Skype, Bitcoin and WiFi. The digital commons have proliferated globally 
in the last decade to a degree that largely escapes Benkler’s own work. Recent 
research has documented hundreds of cases currently in progress (De Filippi 
2015a; 2015b; De Filippi and Tréguer 2015a; 2015b; De Filippi and Troxler 
2016). Also, Blockchain technology has arguably the potential to support both 
online and offline decentralised collaboration (De Filippi and Hassan 2016).
The explanation of commons-based peer production
In explaining the rise of commons-based peer production, Benkler draws on 
a number of sources. First and foremost, he uses Ronald Coase’s transaction 
costs theory to argue that the rise of commons-based peer production is due 
to four basic features inherent in the networked information economy: 1) the 
primary inputs and outputs of production are open access commons –  existing 
information, knowledge and culture; they are non-rivalrous/anti-rivalrous 
goods, since their marginal cost of reproduction is near zero; 2) there are cheap 
physical capital costs (cheap processor-based computer networks) coupled with 
the digitisation of information production; 3) the architecture of the Internet 
allows for the decentralisation and modularity of human–computer interac-
tion; in addition, human creativity is more central and variable in information 
production than in other modes of production, meaning that it is more diverse, 
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 flexible and, therefore, potentially more effective; and 4) there has been a dra-
matic decline in communication costs.
However, transaction costs theory alone cannot explain the rise of  commons- 
based peer production. The latter features a diversity of non- monetary 
 motivations, the centrality of which on the digital commons poses a puzzle 
for  neoclassical economics, since it seemingly contradicts its main behavioural 
model of the self-interested maximiser. Benkler shows that there is no puzzle to 
solve, since the theoretical framework adopted to explain behaviour by neoclas-
sical economics is simply flawed. The widely held assumption that self-interest 
motivates behaviour, that managerial hierarchies and markets are the best ways 
to produce goods, that property rights and contracts are the sine qua non for 
organising production, are not equally applicable to information  (Benkler 
2006, 41). FOSS forces us to re-evaluate these claims by placing intrinsic and 
social motivations, rather than material incentives, at the core of innovation; by 
questioning the centrality of managerial hierarchies and markets to the innova-
tion process; and by challenging the centrality of property, as opposed to the 
interaction of property and commons (Benkler 2016a, 1).
Lerner and Tirole (2002) have listed a series of intrinsic and social motiva-
tions in FOSS production that testify to some combination of hedonic gain 
and indirect appropriation: the playful joy of creation, reputation, social- 
psychological rewards and increases in human capital are some of the indirect 
benefits for those participating in commons-based peer production. Given that 
two-thirds of the revenues of the software industry are service-based, the skills 
indirectly appropriated in free software development can be directly redeemed 
in proprietary projects (Benkler 2002b, 424–425). 
Benkler draws on the work of Eric von Hippel (1988; 2005) to further argue 
that innovation is a collective process of knowledge production and learning. 
He invokes extensive empirical work to show that humans exhibit diverse pro-
social motivations, responding to a range of non-material, non-self-interested 
motivations, from reciprocity to group identity through, in some cases, altru-
ism (2016a, 8). Experimental and observational data has exhaustively docu-
mented that the effects of standard economic incentive tools such as material 
rewards and punishments are not only inseparable from but, in some cases, 
detrimental to the sum of motivations across the target population (Bowles and 
Hwang 2008; Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Frey 1997; Frey and Jegen 2001). 
One cannot buy friendship and love with money. Not only is there often a ten-
sion between material rewards and pro-social motivations, but also between 
diverse pro-social motivations themselves. Individuals are driven by motiva-
tions that differ from each other in mixing motivational drivers. 
Beyond neoliberalism
Benkler’s goal is not merely to highlight the diversity of pro-social motiva-
tions inherent in commons-based peer production, but to question the  current 
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 dominance of neoliberalism by dispelling the myth of universal selfish-
ness. His main intent is to help transform the commons into an autonomous 
and sustainable mode of production. His basic argument is that the Inter-
net and FOSS bring to the fore the cooperative element of human nature, 
occasionally counterweighting self-interested motivations. To further back up 
this claim, he brings up evidence from evolutionary biology and the social sci-
ences, illustrating the shift in the scientific understanding of human ration-
ality from the model of the self-interested maximiser, driven by competition 
and separable motivations, to the model of homo socialis featuring coopera-
tion and diverse pro-social motivations (Benkler 2011). Rationality does not 
always translate into self-interest, since humans often rationally pursue non-
self-interested goals.
Benkler cites, in particular, Ostrom’s work as a landmark in the social  sciences, 
proving that cooperation at a local level occasionally out-competes traditional 
proprietary and state models. He points, though, to a tension between local 
commons and the scale at which the digital commons operate in modern com-
plex economies (2013a, 1505). A challenge remains to unite local and global 
(digital) commons. Conventional economics has noted that Ostrom’s work is 
limited to the periphery, thereby not touching the core of modern economies 
where the model of the self-interested maximiser still prevails. Yet this does not 
hold true for the digital commons, which account for a considerable part of the 
actual economy. FOSS, in particular, is an economically significant institutional 
and organisational strategy for both corporations and the commons:
As of January of 2013, Apache held a 55% market share, Microsoft 17%; 
nginx, an alternative FOSS platform, 13%; Google’s servers for its own 
machines, 4%; and the remainder was held by platforms bunched as 
‘other’ (Netcraft Websurvey 2013). Server-side scripting languages 
are the primary languages used for programming functions of the 
Web. PHP, an open source language, is used by 78% of websites, while 
Microsoft’s ASP.Net holds the remaining 20%; most of remaining lan-
guages, like Ruby or Python, are also open source (W3Techs 2013). 
Web Browser statistics are less clearly in favor of open source. Histori-
cally, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer held over 95% of the market after it 
squeezed Netscape Navigator out of the market (illegally, according to 
antitrust adjudications in both the US and EU). Netscape then spun out 
Navigator to a non-profit, the Mozilla Foundation, as FOSS. Over time, 
Firefox gradually captured market share over the 2000s, and in 2008 
Google released Chrome, and at the same time a parallel, FOSS pro-
ject, Chromium. As of January 2013, competing methods identify IE as 
either having 55% of the desktop browser market or 31%; and Chrome 
and Firefox having either 18% and 20%, respectively, or 36% and 22% 
respectively (ZDNET 2013). By a different measure, almost 40% of firms 
engaged in software development reported spending development time 
on developing and contributing to FOSS software. (Benkler 2016b, 6–7)
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The Internet has given the opportunity to individuals, groups and firms to pro-
duce a wide range of commercial and non-commercial products and services 
through a variety of strategies that combine exclusive to non-exclusive property 
rights applied both to market and non-market models. FOSS testifies to the fact 
that property (as opposed to a mixed infrastructure of property and commons) 
is not the sole determinant factor for growth. Commons-based peer produc-
tion comes in a variety of licences (Ostrom’s bundle of rights, GNU, Creative 
Commons) that do not entail the complete rejection of the property model, 
but rather the reimagination of it. Property and contractual relations are just 
elements in an institutional toolkit. Commons-based peer production can be 
individual or collaborative, commercial and non-commercial. The individual 
can be both part of and apart from the collective. Commons-based peer pro-
duction does not dismiss market actors, but increases the diversity of actors, 
motivations and transaction forms. It decentralises authority where capacity to 
act exists, thereby diffusing power and freedom to the many. 
Like Lessig, Benkler considers commons-based peer production as a third 
institutional model that offers substantial degrees of freedom and power in 
addition to state and market operation. The main question then, for him, con-
cerns the scope and role of commons-based peer production in relation to state 
and market operation. To answer this question, Benkler juxtaposes commons-
based peer production with capitalism in terms of information- processing 
 systems. Similarly to Lessig, Benkler illustrates a number of trade-offs between 
managerial hierarchies (firms and state), markets and the commons, based on 
the core variables of uncertainty and complexity. His core argument is that 
 commons-based peer production offers some significant information and 
 allocation gains compared to managerial hierarchies and markets. In contrast 
to capitalism, which tackles uncertainty and complexity with clear property 
rights and pricing, commons-based peer production introduces more refined, 
flexible and cost-efficient information processing, better attuned to the variabil-
ity of human creativity than managerial hierarchies (firms, state) and markets. 
The fine-grained, diverse qualities of agents, resources and projects and the 
subsequent differences in input combinations or user interactions account for 
the impossibility of reaching managerial decisions or price clearance without 
significant loss of information, control and, ultimately, effectiveness (Benkler 
2016b, 9). The divergence of the existing modes of production – peer produc-
tion, markets and firms – from the ideal condition of ‘perfect information’ 
results in respective information opportunity costs. Human creativity is dif-
ficult to qualify/quantify for efficient contracting or management due to the 
diversity of talent, motivation, experience, availability, and so on. Perfect infor-
mation is all the more unattainable due to the increased transaction costs inher-
ent in the specification process. Therefore, markets and firms are costly and 
lossy compared to commons-based peer production. Property and contractual 
relations render agents and resources ‘sticky’. That is, employees are not flexible 
enough to change information, collaborate and thus co-produce knowledge 
The Liberal Commons 53
and  innovation. Commons-based peer production aspires to improve on mar-
kets and firms by correcting these two failures:
Where the physical capital costs of information production are low and 
where existing information resources are freely or cheaply available, 
the low cost of communication among very large sets of agents allows 
agents to collect information through extensive communication and 
feedback instead of using information-compression mechanisms like 
prices or managerial instructions. (Benkler 2002b, 413)
Commons-based peer production has particular advantages for identifying 
and allocating human creativity to work on information and cultural resources, 
since it relies on decentralised information gathering and exchange to reduce 
uncertainty and complexity in information processing. Information exchange 
among large sets of agents who use existing information resources cheaply 
to freely communicate reduces uncertainty as to the likely value of various 
courses of productive action by creating substantial information and allocation 
gains. The latter overcome the information exchange costs due to the absence 
of transaction and coordination costs related to pricing, managerial direction, 
contractual relations and property rights (Benkler 2002b, 406–412). In short, 
information production in managerial hierarchies and markets is lossy, sticky 
and costly. 
Given the uncertainty as to the value of various productive activities and the 
variability of human creativity vis-à-vis any set of production opportunities, 
decentralised coordination and continuous communication among the pool 
of potential producers and consumers can generate better information about 
the most valuable productive actions and the best human agents available at a 
given time. This way, peer production has the potential to identify who will best 
produce a specific component of a project.
Yet commons-based peer production will not always be successful or supe-
rior to markets and firms. This depends on a complex and varied function play-
ing out in several trade-offs. The primary trade-off is between monetary and 
non-monetary motivations, and depends on two counterbalancing variables: 
the degree of information uncertainty and the degree of capital investment nec-
essary for the realisation of a project. The more routine the tasks, and the more 
capital-intensive a project is, the more appropriate monetary ‘incentives’ are 
to motivating contributions, and, therefore, the bigger the role of markets and 
firms will be in organising production. The more complex and the less costly 
or capital-intensive a project is, the more likely it is to attract non-monetary 
motivations, and, therefore, the bigger the space for peer production (Benkler 
2002b, 403–404). Benkler perhaps misses out in his hypothesis the superpow-
ers of the corporations that have come to dominate the current economy. The 
vast majority of people are dependent on capitalism to the extent that they can-
not easily leave to enter commons-based peer production.
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The success of commons-based peer production depends on four additional 
variables: 1) the scale of peer production; 2) the degree of modularity and 
granularity; 3) the trade-off between waste and efficiency; and 4) the cost of 
integration. Commons-based peer production has an advantage over markets 
and firms in large-scale collaborations, which are costly to sustain. It would be 
extremely costly for a firm to produce Wikipedia or Linux. Moreover, large-
scale commons-based peer production renders the motivations problem triv-
ial, since monetary and non-monetary motivations coexist in non-exclusive 
ways (Benkler 2002b, 433–434). As Benkler (2002b, 434–435) puts it: ‘The sus-
tainability of any given project depends, therefore, not on the total cost but on 
how many individuals contribute to it relative to the overall cost.’
The sustainability of commons-based peer production depends also on the 
degree to which it can reduce the waste produced from duplication of effort. 
The problem disappears when duplication of effort produces more efficiency 
than waste. Redundancy, that is, the production of the same component by 
different people, makes peer production more innovative, robust and resilient.
Commons-based peer production is further limited not by the total cost or 
complexity of a project, but by its modularity and granularity. Modularity is the 
degree to which a project can break down into smaller components that can 
be independently and asynchronously produced and recombined. The higher 
the degree of modularity, the bigger the autonomy and flexibility of peer pro-
duction. Granularity refers to the size of each module in terms of the time and 
effort needed to produce it. The smaller the size, the more people are likely to 
participate in peer production.
The remaining obstacle to commons-based peer production is the cost of 
integration, that is, first, the filtering out of incompetent and malign actors 
and, secondly, the combination of the modules into a whole. One could argue 
that commons-based peer production could result in various tragedies and 
Babels of the commons on the Internet and beyond. Benkler (2002b, 436–443) 
argues that these problems can be solved by a combination of four mechanisms: 
1) iterative and modular peer production of the integration function itself (for 
example, moderation and meta-moderation on Slashdot); 2) technical solu-
tions embedded in the collaboration platform (for example, Slashdot, Nasa 
Clickworkers project, Kuro5hin); 3) norm-based social organisation (for exam-
ple, limited access commons, Wikipedia, Kuro5hin); and 4) limited reintroduc-
tion of hierarchy or markets to provide the integration function alone without 
appropriating the full value of the product (for example, IBM, Linux Kernel, 
Apache). Benkler puts it very succinctly:
Where the physical capital requirements of a project are either very 
low, or capable of fulfillment by utilising pre-existing distributed  capital 
endowments, where the project is susceptible to modularisation for 
incremental production pursued by diverse participants, and where 
the diversity gain from harnessing a wide range of experience, talent, 
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insight, and creativity in innovation, quality, speed, or precision of con-
necting outputs to demand is high, peer production can emerge and 
outperform markets and hierarchies. (Benkler 2016b, 10–11)
To sum up, commons-based peer production is an information, innovation and 
knowledge production system that, under certain conditions, bears an organi-
sational advantage over firms, governments and pure market clearance. Its suc-
cess has additional implications for politics and economics. It requires that we 
modify our conceptions about motivations and incentives; it recalibrates the 
role of property and contract in the domains of information-dependent pro-
duction and innovation; and it requires adaptations to the theory of the firm 
and organisational management (Benkler 2016b, 2). What would, therefore, be 
the role of firms, governments and markets in relation to the potential future 
development of commons-based peer production?
Future scenarios of peer production
One plausible scenario is that firms would continue to prevail under conditions 
of high capital costs and rent-extraction opportunities that give an  advantage 
over firm-hosted or commons-based peer production. The role of firms in 
innovation becomes then contingent and path-dependent, rather than effi-
ciency or growth-orientated (Benkler 2016a, 7). 
Firms might move also from information product-based business models to 
information-embedding material products and service-based business mod-
els, thereby gradually shifting towards firm-hosted peer production. Jeremiah 
Owyang argues that, to avoid disruption by peer production, companies must 
adopt the collaborative economy value chain. He defines the collaborative econ-
omy as an economic model where ownership and access are shared between 
corporations, start-ups and people (Owyang 2013, 4). Given that people are 
empowered today by digital platforms, companies must change their business 
models by becoming a company-as-a-service, motivating a marketplace, or 
providing a platform (Owyang 2013, 1). Rather than sell goods the traditional 
way, companies can offer products and services to customers on demand or 
through a subscription model; foster a community around a brand and enable 
customers to resell or co-purchase products, swap goods or even lend and gift; 
or transform consumers into partners by enabling them to build products and 
new services on their platform (Owyang 2013, 10–13). A third scenario would 
be the transition from firm-hosted peer production to a broader collaborative 
economy that embraces peer production more openly by adopting a coopera-
tive model rooted in sustainability and reciprocity (Benkler 2016a, 8). 
Benkler limits commons-based peer production to information, knowledge 
and cultural production, arguing that decentralised social production  cannot 
apply to large-scale material goods such as the manufacturing of  automobiles, 
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steel or aeroplanes. Commons-based peer production, he claims, is not always 
the most efficient model even for the production of information, knowledge 
and culture. It can be prone to failure due to insufficient contributions or to 
large parts of the population being sceptical about non-market models of 
provisioning goods (Benkler 2013b, 244). The crux of his argument is that 
 commons-based peer production has certain advantages over the state,  markets 
or firms in identifying and allocating human capital and creativity (Benkler 
2002b, 381). Yet commons-based peer production will not replace state and 
market operation.
Following Jürgen Habermas (1996), Benkler incorporates commons-based 
peer production into civil society, aiming to broaden the scope of individual 
and collective autonomy by surpassing the limits of managerial hierarchies and 
market limitations on freedom, participatory democracy and justice. His core 
argument is that the commons offer additional degrees of freedom and power 
for the individual and collectivities. Benkler, thus, abides by the liberal notion 
of negative freedom inasmuch as he conceives of the commons as an alternative 
institutional space within the bounds of civil society: ‘Freedom inheres in diver-
sity of constraint, not in the optimality of the balance of freedom and constraint 
represented by any single institutional arrangement’ (Benkler 2006, 145–146). 
In contrast to positive freedom which gives a meaning to an action, negative 
freedom consists in a diversity of contextual constraints for actors, opening up 
more opportunities for action. The role of the law, then, would be to implement 
policies that diversify the set of options available to all (Benkler 2006, 152). 
Like Lessig, Benkler expands state neutrality to the digital commons, arguing 
that the state would do better to enhance commons-based licensing rather than 
strengthening intellectual property rights (Benkler 2002b, 444–446). Network 
neutrality would be supported by a liberal state that could play constructive 
roles in the digital economy through the municipal funding of neutral broad-
band networks, state funding of basic research, and possible strategic regula-
tory interventions to negate monopoly control over essential resources in the 
digital environment (Benkler 2006, 21). In this sense, commons-based peer 
production is compatible with various theories of democracy and justice in the 
liberal tradition (Benkler 2006, 184–185; 2003).
Paradoxically, Benkler holds that it is worthwhile to continue building on the 
successes of commons-based peer production, and trying to control as much 
of our world as possible with its mutualistic modality of social organisation 
 (Benkler 2013b, 216). However, he points out that the basic problem for a polit-
ical theory dealing with the emergence of commons-based peer production is 
the unfeasibility of removing power from even a reasonably well-functioning 
democratic state and market economy (Benkler 2013b, 242). 
But if it is unfeasible to remove power from the state and the market, how 
can commons-based peer production control as much of our world economy 
as possible? Benkler himself wonders how generalisable the commons can be 
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beyond constituting a mere hack, beneficial only under particular circum-
stances and overlaid on the background of a liberal state with a reasonably 
liberal property and market system (Benkler 2013b, 242). One can, therefore, 
identify a tension between Benkler’s liberal commitments and his anarchistic 
vision of the commons. On the one hand, he defends the moral values of nega-
tive freedom, individual autonomy and pluralism, as embedded in modern 
capitalist markets and state democracies. On the other hand, he advocates the 
expansion of propertyless, decentralised and stateless commons-based peer 
production. Benkler’s anarchist side deviates from libertarianism in that the 
latter acknowledges property rights and a minimum state. Anarchism, instead, 
rejects property rights, contracts, managerial hierarchies and the state.
Benkler overstates the collective and non-monetary features of commons-
based peer production. The work of Lerner and Tirole on FOSS at best shows 
that extrinsic motivations combine with intrinsic motivations rather than being 
overshadowed by the latter. Despite Benkler (2002b, 444–446) admitting that 
commons-based peer production faces a critical design challenge for balancing 
out motivations, he does not see that monetary motivations still prevail by and 
large. The need for most parts of society to pay the bills and make a living in a 
capitalist economy overtakes non-monetary, pro-social motivations. As men-
tioned earlier, there are no easy exits from capitalism – if any. 
A number of authors have identified the co-option of FOSS by capital over 
the last decades rather than its quasi-autonomous development on the model 
of the capitalist commons (Bauwens and Kostakis 2014; Birkinbine 2018). 
 Capitalism is capable of adapting and enclosing the commons for its own bene-
fit. Whereas commons-based peer production seems to encapsulate both social 
and environmental sustainability, it still cannot reproduce itself (Bauwens and 
Pantazis 2018). Commons-based peer production has difficulty in capturing 
value creation and providing a steady income for its participants. It is unclear, 
then, how and to what degree commons-based peer production can sustain a 
livelihood or create a viable enterprise. Hence, claims about the sustainability 
of commons-based peer production still rest on thin conceptual and empirical 
foundations.
Benkler is being realistic when addressing the current premature develop-
ment of commons-based peer production. He draws attention to the fact that 
commons-based peer production is still in its infancy and suffers from several 
imperfections. Further qualitative and quantitative studies are needed to yield 
better outcomes regarding how central or peripheral a phenomenon this is 
(Benkler 2002b, 444). At the same time, Benkler is utopian when pushing fur-
ther the boundaries of commons-based peer production to control as much as 
possible of the world economy. Alas, he does not illustrate a clear path towards 
a commons-orientated transition that connects local with global (digital) com-
mons. This is due to the general syndrome that plagues the liberal approach to 
the commons: the lack of the political. 
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2.4 The Lack of the Political I
The liberal approach to the commons suggests the quasi-autonomous coex-
istence of the commons with state and market operation. Ostrom succeeded 
in shifting the discourse in political science from the methodological indi-
vidualism of neoclassical economics to polycentric institutions that combine 
private and public management with collective self-management of common-
pool resources, ranging from natural resources to knowledge commons. Les-
sig introduced the innovation commons of the Internet in the production of 
information, knowledge and culture, defending the loosening of copyright law 
in order for the digital commons to unleash freedom and creativity. Along with 
Benkler, he expanded Ostrom’s local commons to global (digital) commons on 
the model of commons-based peer production, operating in tandem with the 
state and the market. 
All three have contributed to rethinking the common in the singular, mean-
ing the democratic self-instituting power of the people, exercised both on the 
local and global level. Contrary to local eco-commons, the communities of 
the digital commons are open, plural, voluntary and dispersed, reaching across 
social and national boundaries, across geographical space and political divi-
sions. Hierarchies tend to be flat and reversible, with the type of affiliation 
binding the commons being loose and fluid. The ground of the common is 
not any ethnic or local identity, but a shared sense of purpose and an ongoing 
interaction and collaboration along symmetric rules and ethical lines. 
Benkler highlights the potential of the digital commons to democratise 
 politics, the economy and culture. The commons can, indeed, bypass the filter 
of marketability and decentralise the production of information and knowl-
edge. Like Lessig, he stresses the battle over the institutional ecology of a new 
digital environment: 
The pattern of information flow in such a network is more resistant  
to the application of control or influence than was the mass media 
model. But things can change. Google could become so powerful on 
the desktop, in the email utility, and on the Web, that it will effectively 
become a supernode that will indeed raise the prospect of a reemer-
gence of a mass-media model. (Benkler 2006, 261)
To avert the corporatism of cyberspace, Lessig and Benkler propose the expan-
sion of commons-supporting licences and copyrights enforced by adequate 
lobbying, litigation and legal reforms to support the production of open 
source knowledge and peer-to-peer networks. Rather that clashing head-on 
with capitalism, commons-based peer production is anticipated as rendering 
predatory capitalism obsolete through superior working anti-models, running 
code and a healthy commons that will trump polemics. Historical transforma-
tion is  projected into a long, incremental, technological development that will 
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establish new social relations of production. Notwithstanding the absence of 
the revolutionary flame, this immanent transformation of society is actually 
reminiscent of Marx, who postulated that technological evolution is bound to 
replace capitalism with communism.
2.4.1 ICTs and Deliberative Democracy
A similar line of argument, drawing often on Habermas, has developed in the 
last decades to introduce a model of participatory or deliberative democracy 
anchored in the effective participation of people in decision making (Barber 
1984; Bohman 1996; Dryzek 2000; Fishkin 1991; Held 1987; Pateman 1970; 
Yankelovich 1991). A number of authors have advocated for digital democ-
racy or tele-democracy, supported by ICTs (Arterton 1987; Coleman and Gotze 
2001; Grossman 1995; Hague and Loader 1999; Hill and Hughes 1998; van 
Dijk 2006; Ward 1996). The Internet and mobile applications, it is claimed, can 
bring about the massification of discourse and prototype the democratisation 
of media. Push-button voting, tele-referenda, tele-polling, free access to online 
databases and registers can now provide a higher degree of citizen involvement 
in political and legislative procedures. Technology can now ensure greater 
transparency, openness and inclusiveness (Vesnic-Alujevic et al. 2019).
A number of analysts argue that ICTs facilitate the participation of citizen-
amateurs in formerly professionalised activities, thus signalling the ‘open 
sourcing’ of journalism (Gillmor 2004), politics (Castells 2007; Jenkins 2006), 
science (Benkler 2002b) and culture (Jenkins 2006; Lessig 2004). The power of 
‘everybody’ (Shirky 2008), the ‘crowd’ (Surowiecki 2004) or the ‘mob’ (Rhein-
gold 2003) is giving rise to a new populist renaissance of democratic participa-
tion and inclusion. 
However, freedom of expression, direct voting and easier access to the 
media, public services and digital interaction do not automatically translate 
into a  participatory democracy. Lessig and Benkler have warned of the dangers 
inherent in mass media concentration. With information filtered out by mass 
media to serve the interests of elites, the manufacturing of consent  (Herman 
and Chomsky 1988) could be even stronger in the case of direct participa-
tion in decision making, bringing closer to reality the Orwellian nightmare of 
Big Brother. The massification of discourse, as manifested on the Internet and 
social media, can easily result in fake news, delusional narratives and straight-
forward propaganda. 
The pipe dream of a free and ‘unbiased’ Internet runs the risk of techno- 
populism, orchestrated by elites for the sake of power, money and dominance. 
Liberal democracies in concert with capitalism portray the semblance of a plu-
ralistic market democracy. E-populism and fragmentation can be channelled 
into authoritarian democracies, particularly at times of crisis. Majoritarian-
ism can take various turns: socialism, outright fascism, economic  nationalism, 
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social democracy, neoliberalism, and so on. Capitalism has proven resilient 
enough to accommodate technological change in the ever-expanding cycle 
of capital accumulation by commodifying even contradictory narratives 
and  lifestyles.
2.4.2 Critique of the Digital Commons
Marinus Ossewaarde and Wessel Reijers (2017) build on a number of authors 
as diverse as Georg Simmel, Peter Sloterdijk, Martin Heidegger, Katherine 
 Gibson, Julie Graham and Antonio Negri to argue that the digital commons 
produce an ‘illusion of the commons’, thereby giving rise to cynicism, which 
in turn can be interpreted as a contemporary form of false consciousness. The 
term ‘false consciousness’ dates back to Friedrich Engels and came to be concep-
tualised later by the Frankfurt School, Antonio Gramsci and Karl  Mannheim, 
among others, as the compulsive belief that capitalism is an unalterable natural 
condition based upon widespread consent (Ossewaarde and Reijers 2017, 18). 
False consciousness resonates today within the widespread belief that there is 
no alternative to capitalism.
Simmel showed that the monetary economy has the unique capacity to 
homogenise a diverse order of worth under a single price, thereby reducing 
particular social values (such as sharing, empathy, solidarity, etc.) into quanti-
tative logic (Ossewaarde and Reijers 2017, 20). Sloterdijk holds that Simmel’s 
analysis reveals the cynicism of money as a particular form of false conscious-
ness that cannot be unmasked through a critique of ideology in the style of 
Georg Lukács, Gramsci and Mannheim (Ossewaarde and Reijers 2017, 20). It 
requires, instead, a critique of technology. Jacques Ellul (1967), Herbert Mar-
cuse (1964), Cornelius Castoriadis (1991a) and Andrew Feenberg (2002), 
among others, expanded the critique of ideology in the field of technology to 
unmask the so-called neutrality of techne. Contrary to the presumption that 
technology bears its own autonomous scientific logic, they demonstrated 
that technology embodies the one-dimensional, calculative logic of capitalism, 
showing that technology is primarily shaped by sociohistorical values. In con-
trast to this critique of technology, Sloterdijk targets the modern individual as 
the incarnation of cynicism in the elevated superstructure of capitalism (Osse-
waarde and Reijers 2017, 20). 
Ossewaarde and Reijers (2017, 19–20) extrapolate the cynicism of the mod-
ern individual into a technologically mutated false consciousness in the digital 
commons. Digital commons, they claim, depend on implicit and explicit 
pricing mechanisms that draw the practices of digital communing towards 
the monetary economy, thus being co-opted finally by capitalism. Digital 
 commoners are actually disillusioned by the power of technology, turning 
eventually into an undifferentiated swarm of cynical ‘embittered loners’ and 
‘mass figures’. They share the same false consciousness as employees, consum-
ers and managers acting in the monetary economy. Rather than resisting the 
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 neoliberal hegemony, they internalise the new spirit of capitalism, which has 
succeeded in dissolving the Marxist ideology critique of industrial capitalism 
(alienation, domination, the calculative logic of technoscience) into a utility 
satisfaction deriving from a bunch of commodities. Cynicism manifests itself 
in conformism to the neoliberal hegemony. Therefore, contrary to the ecologi-
cal, non-digital commons, there is little emancipatory potential in the digital 
commons given their apolitical principles. Ossewaarde and Reijers (2017, 26) 
advocate instead for a free relation with technologies through which the digital 
commons will supplement emancipatory practices embedded in the ecological, 
non-digital commons. They consider the digital commons as the ‘mirror image’ 
of the ecological commons. 
Ossewaarde and Reijers’s critique reads like a technological update of the 
classical ideology critique of capitalism turned against the digital commons. 
However, they conflate the digital commons with the so-called sharing econ-
omy of platform capitalism (for example, Airbnb, Uber, Couchsurfing, etc.). It 
is a mistake to identify the digital commons with top-down capitalist enter-
prises operating in terms of profit maximisation. Ossewaarde and Reijers make 
the same error that the classical ideology critique did: they reproduce a gener-
alised argument that fails to acknowledge a nuanced reality. While it is true that 
the digital commons have been largely co-opted by platform capitalism today, 
it is not true that they are apolitical and lack a cooperative ethos. Digital com-
moners exhibit diverse motivations actualised into hybrid contexts, whether 
apolitical, libertarian, anarcho-communist, leftist, ecological, hipster, and so 
on. Ossewaarde and Reijers discard a number of successful cases of platform 
and open cooperatives which demonstrate the opposite. Vasilis Kostakis (2018) 
is right to argue that the digital commons have both an immanent and a trans-
cendent aspect vis-à-vis capitalism. In the first scenario, capital and state sub-
sume the commons under a commons-centric, crowdsourced capitalism. In 
the second scenario, the commons become dominant, forcing capital and the 
state to adapt to their interests. 
2.4.3 Castoriadis and the Political
This book mounts the case that, instead of patiently waiting for post-capitalism 
to replace capitalism, the paramount political task for the commons would 
be to form a counter-hegemonic power against and beyond neoliberalism. The 
current impotence of the liberal commons vis-à-vis capital and the state lies, 
among other things, in the absence of a link between local and global com-
mons. This absence is indicative of the broader lack of the political that accounts 
for the failure of the liberal commons to band together dispersed initiatives 
into a coherent social movement capable of challenging the current neolib-
eral regime. Dardot and Laval and Kioupkiolis correctly argue that the liberal 
approach to the commons cannot address the contradictions of capitalism 
and the state.
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Contrary to liberal and illiberal democratic regimes, ICTs today enable the 
self-instituting power of the people, elaborated in multiple variants of radical 
democracy. The concept of the common as the self-instituting power of the 
people put forward in this book stems basically from the work of Cornelius 
Castoriadis, best recognised for his articles published in the journal Socialisme 
ou Barbarie from 1949 to 1965. In the 40 issues of the journal, Castoriadis 
developed a radical critique of capitalism and Marxism, resulting in the redef-
inition of the content of socialism. Castoriadis conceives of socialism as the 
self-institutionalisation of society by collective management, established first 
and foremost at the level of production. Socialism presupposes the abolition of 
the division between directors and executants, penetrating both capitalism and 
Leninism-Stalinism. It consists instead in the expansion of individual and col-
lective autonomy at all levels of society (Castoriadis 1988, 92–95). 
In his later writings, Castoriadis engages in the contemporary discussion over 
the political and politics (Marchart, 2007) to enrich his concept of  autonomy, 
which now sets out in two stages: the instituting and the instituted (Castoriadis 
1991b). The instituted signifies the radical ground-power, or primordial power, 
necessary for the self-preservation and self-perpetuation of the human species. 
It constitutes an explicit power, termed the political and manifesting in law, 
language, religion, and so on. By ‘power’ Castoriadis (1991b, 149) refers to ‘the 
capacity for a personal or impersonal instance (Instanz) to bring someone to 
do (or to abstain from doing) that which, left to him/herself, s/he would not 
necessarily have done (or would possibly have done) […]’.
The instituted is nurtured by the instituting of the radical and social imagi-
nary. The instituting transcends the instituted by virtue of the autonomy of 
the anonymous collective to transform the political (Papadimitropoulos 2019). 
Whereas societies have mostly evolved under conditions of instituted heteron-
omy, with the essential constituent being the representation of an extra-social 
source of nomos (whether myth, tradition, religion, class, etc.), autonomy iden-
tifies with politics that constantly challenges the political. Politics conditions the 
self-institutionalisation of society according to the democratically established 
rules of the anonymous collective. Democratic politics introduces the concept 
of the common as the self-instituting power of the people. The common aims 
at the abolition of heteronomy by establishing the autonomy of the people by/
for the people. 
Castoriadis’s stance on democracy breaks with the liberal separation of pol-
itics and the economy by restoring democracy to the roots of the economy. 
Real democracy cannot exist without economic democracy; without people 
having an equal say in the production process and planning of the economy; 
without people regaining their individual and collective autonomy through 
the  self-management of the means of production, the redistribution of surplus 
value, the division of labour, working conditions and so forth. Real democracy 
cannot but be direct democracy expanding from production across all spheres 
of society. Castoriadis, thus, defines the common as the democratic power of 
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the people geared towards the abolition of state capitalism and the establish-
ment of socialism.
It is not, therefore, enough to consider the colonisation of democracy by 
capitalism as a legitimation crisis, as Habermas (1988) argues. Nor does the 
contribution of digital commons to an ‘ideal’ speech situation settle the issue 
once and for all. The crisis of democracy reflects the structural failure of capi-
talism to address the real wants and needs of people. The main contradiction of 
capitalism is not that between owners and non-owners of the means of produc-
tion, as Marx would have it, but the division between directors (managers) and 
executants (workers), spreading from the economy to the state and all spheres 
of society (Castoriadis 1988). Communism is not the final stage of state owner-
ship of the means of production, but the self-management of the commons by 
people themselves. 
In capitalism and the so-called socialism of the Eastern Bloc, workers partici-
pate in the production of the enterprise insofar as they do not interfere with the 
management; citizens participate in state management insofar as they do not 
govern. The division between directors and workers, representatives and citi-
zens renders power and knowledge inaccessible and secret. The management 
of the economy and society becomes an affair of experts, a Marxist ideology, a 
liberal or post-political technocratic consensus, a game theory, a postmodern 
narrative, a neoliberal competition. Democracy is a sham, a rigged process, 
a win–win deal, a communication marketing of competing elites in a corpo-
rate society. The individual blindly obeys the party or retreats into her private 
sphere of conformism, becoming a self-interested maximiser and a consumer. 
Society turns into a cluster of hobbies and lobbies, with populism, nihilism and 
cynicism representing the new disorder of things. 
The division between directors and workers constitutes the core of the 
rational mastery of capitalism, driving the unlimited expansion of the economy 
and technology in society and nature (Papadimitropoulos 2018a). Rational 
mastery echoes the Weberian rationalisation of bureaucracy. But while 
 Castoriadis was calling for the abolition of the division between directors and 
executants and the establishment of direct democracy at all levels of society, 
Weber (1978/1922) was arguing for the inevitability of bureaucracy in mod-
ern societies and the impracticability of direct democracy. For Weber, direct 
democracy is functional only locally and among relative equals. The complexity 
of contemporary societies renders direct democracy inefficient and potentially 
dangerous in the long term. 
2.4.4 The Challenges of Direct Democracy 
Daniel Kreiss, Megan Finn and Fred Turner (2011) build on Weber to desig-
nate the limits of commons-based peer production. They draw attention to the 
merits of bureaucracies such as explicit rule making, precision, credentialing, 
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expertise and efficiency that may be undermined by commons-based peer pro-
duction. They claim that bureaucracies are important in retaining democratic 
values such as equality, transparency and inclusivity, whereas commons-based 
peer production is prone to opaqueness, ‘benevolent dictators’ and gatekeepers. 
They warn of the danger of commons-based peer production being absorbed by 
firms and managerial bureaucracies and, finally, extending their mechanisms. In 
this scenario, the digital commons turn out to intrude into privacy by coercively 
expanding the workplace into everyday life, thereby technologically reproduc-
ing previous forms of social and economic organisation. Rather than offering a 
revolutionary alternative, they are co-opted by capitalism and the state. 
However, the authors are uncritically taking for granted certain bureaucratic 
values, while omitting the bureaucratic defects that the commons are coming to 
fix. They abstain from situating bureaucracies in a broader political  framework. 
They dismiss the fact that bureaucracies have been controlled by elites, often 
lending a helping hand to colonialism, fascism and modern  liberal oligar-
chies. Their argumentation, finally, culminates in fragmented generalisations 
for both bureaucracies and peer production. A more nuanced and  rigorous 
approach is necessary to unravel the complex dynamics of bureaucracies and 
peer  production. The authors are right to claim that scholars need to examine 
peer production more thoroughly by posing a new set of research questions 
 regarding the scope of bureaucracies and peer production and their interde-
pendencies. One can begin by asking: Is direct democracy limited solely to 
locals and equals? 
Ostrom proves Weber partially wrong. Lessig and Benkler expand the self-
instituting power of the people from local to global (digital) commons. But 
they cannot offer a holistic alternative for a commons-orientated transition that 
would clash head-on with neoliberal capitalism. Castoriadis (1988, 121) was 
one of the first to stress that information technology can support direct democ-
racy on a large scale. He called for the abolition of capitalism and the state 
through the establishment of the self-instituting power of the people across all 
spheres of society. Instead of patiently waiting for technology to progressively 
transform capitalism into post-capitalism, Castoriadis calls for radical social 
change. The problem with Castoriadis is that he rejected the current political 
system in toto, relying solely on the autonomous activity of individuals and 
collectivities. However, the commons face today multiple external and internal 
constraints. They depend largely on financial and technological systems man-
aged by corporate capital and neoliberal state policies. In Castoriadis’s terms, 
the commons are still largely heteronomous rather than autonomous. 
For the commons to evolve into a sustainable mode of production, state sup-
port is necessary. The state can facilitate the transition to a decentralised and 
self-managed economy by various means: funding, education, infrastructure, 
law reform, and so on. Autonomous movements, however, should not resort 
to any sort of state paternalism to sustain themselves. Heteronomy is not the 
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necessary counterpart of autonomy in order for the latter to abolish the former 
in the long run. Individual and collective autonomy cannot depend on a flawed 
representative democracy subject to the neoliberal dictates of capitalism. 
Dyer-Witheford (1999; 2015) and Kostakis and Bauwens (2014; 2019), 
whose work is examined in detail later on, call for the de-statification or 
commonification of the state. De-statification devolves administrative power 
to a  multiplicity of associations. The role of government is redefined to sup-
port  collective  initiatives rather than substitute for them; diffuse rather than 
 concentrate power; and nurture social transformation from the bottom up 
rather than engineer it from the top down. 
The state should transform into mini-states of commons-based peer produc-
tion ecosystems that implement direct democratic procedures and practices. 
This political task requires the institutional reconfiguration of the separation 
of powers. Post-hegemony is the vision to create a holistic political alterna-
tive to neoliberal state capitalism out of self-perpetuating, autonomous, 
commons-based enterprises and organisations, supported by reticular mar-
ket and institutional mechanisms aligned around the commons. To this end, 
Ostrom’s polycentric model needs to transform into the post-hegemony of the 
 commons. The main challenges for post-hegemonic politics today are how to 
connect local with global commons; how to bring together and coordinate dis-
persed, small-scale civic initiatives; how to confront established social systems 
and power relations in the market and the state; and how to create a counter-
hegemonic power that fosters a commons-orientated, sociopolitical transition 








As discussed in Part 1, Benkler sets out three basic future scenarios for the com-
mons: 1) the capitalist commons on the model of firm-hosted peer  production; 
2) the transition from firm-hosted peer production into a broader collaborative 
economy that embraces commons-based peer production more openly; and 
3) the autonomisation of commons-based peer production. Part 2 critically 
engages with the work of a number of thinkers who have built on the second 
scenario with the intent of pushing for the third. From a political viewpoint, 
the reformist approach to the commons combines liberal, social democratic, 
socialist and revolutionary elements in multiple variants. 
David Bollier (2003; 2008) recalibrates the liberal state towards the support of 
the commons rather than the capitalist market. He introduces a green govern-
ance model aiming to tackle climate change and protect the natural commons. 
Along with Silke Helfrich (Bollier and Helfrich 2019), he provides an analytical 
roadmap towards a radical commons-orientated transition. Jeremy Rifkin 
(2014) introduces the model of green capitalism, connecting to the Internet of 
Things infrastructure, fuelled by renewables. He advocates the gradual shift  
of green capitalism towards the collaborative commons, supported by the 
Internet and free/open source software/hardware. 
Trebor Scholz (2016a; 2016b) adds a cooperative twist to the collaborative 
commons by juxtaposing platform cooperativism against platform capitalism 
(the so-called sharing and gig economy). Platform cooperativism consists of 
online business models based on democratic self-governance, platform co-
ownership and equitable distribution of value. Kostakis and Bauwens (2014) 
give a challenging spin to platform cooperativism by introducing the model 
of open cooperativism between the commons and ethical market entities, 
operating in terms of open protocols, open supply chains, commons-based 
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licensing and open book accounting. They attempt to bridge local and global 
(digital) commons by incorporating the ecological model of Design Global–
Manufacture Local (DG–ML) into open cooperativism, backed by a partner 
state through taxation, funding, regulation, education, and so on. DECODE 
(Decentralised Citizen Owned Data Ecosystems) is an ambitious EU-funded 
research project that attempts to push forward platform and open cooperativ-
ism by building the technological tools necessary to sustain decentralisation, 
democratic e-governance and alternative business models.
Adam Arvidsson and Nicolai Peitersen (2013) illustrate an ethical economy of 
productive publics, consisting of collaborative networks of peer producers, sup-
ported by the Internet and mobile applications. Commons-based peer produc-
tion could be a model of economic democracy in which the universal measure 
of value would be the general sentiment. Arvidsson and Peitersen demonstrate 
a technologically advanced Habermasian transformation of the public sphere, 
which would open up a more rational and democratic negotiation of economic 
value, bringing together politics, the commons and a reformed capitalism. 
Douglas Rushkoff (2016) suggests a hybrid business model of cooperation 
between corporations and the commons in the form of a ‘benefit corporation’ 
where the pursuit of growth is subsumed to a sustainable economy based on 
value creation and the equitable recycling of money among the commons. The 
‘benefit corporation’ model would be framed by non-profit and social enter-
prises, crowdfunding, local currencies, time banks and platform cooperatives 
built on Blockchain protocols. 
Erik Olin Wright (2009) posits a pluralistic and heterogeneous socialist trans-
formation, grounded on a centrally coordinated decentralisation of power. His 
socialist transformation strategy is premised on the radical democratisation of 
both the state and the economy by civil society. 
Overall, the reformist camp contributes to the discussion on the commons by 
offering a concrete link between the local and the global commons, embedded 
in a broader societal transformation steered towards a commons-orientated 
transition. But still, there is a considerable lack of the political with regard to 
the formation of a coherent counter-hegemonic block of the commons against 
and beyond neoliberalism. This lack translates into the absence of a set of con-
crete policies that would provide a clear path towards a broader commons-
orientated social change. 
3.2 The Green Governance Commons 
David Bollier has offered one of the most widely accepted definitions of the 
commons as shared resources self-managed according to the rules and norms 
of the community (Bollier and Weston 2012, 343–352). His early work mostly 
relates to the preservation of the traditional commons of nature against the 
current tragedy of the commons caused by a predatory capitalism eating up 
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the earth’s resources for the sake of profit maximisation and unlimited growth 
(Bollier 2001; 2003). He addresses the commons from the viewpoint of the 
human right to a healthy and clean environment, encapsulated in the long tra-
dition of the ‘commons law’ that aims at securing the conservation of natural 
resources, while keeping them open for public use (Bollier and Weston 2012, 
347). Bollier and Helfrich’s later work encompasses all fields of the commons, 
from Ostrom’s traditional commons, arts and cultural commons, neighbour-
hood commons, exchange and credit commons to the digital commons (Bollier 
and Helfrich 2015).
Bollier introduces a new policy and law architecture on the model of ‘green 
governance’. On a local level, he adheres to Ostrom’s design principles. On a 
macro-policy level, like Ostrom, Lessig and Benkler, he places the development 
of the commons in parallel with state and market operation:
The overall goal must be to reconceptualise the neoliberal State/Market/
Commons – to realign authority and provisioning in new, more benefi-
cial ways. The State would maintain its commitments to representative 
governance and management of public property just as private enter-
prise would continue to own capital to produce saleable goods and ser-
vices in the Market sector. (Bollier and Weston 2012, 350)
At first sight, Bollier’s model of green governance seems to follow the lib-
eral tradition. Yet Bollier holds that the state must shift its focus to become 
a  partner not only of the market sector but mainly of the commons sector 
 (Bollier and Weston 2012, 349–350). The state must assume a more active role 
in  establishing and overseeing large-scale common-pool resources such as the 
atmosphere, the oceans, hard and soft minerals, timber, public land, national 
parks and wilderness areas, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water (Bollier and 
Weston 2012, 349–350). Like Lessig and Benkler, he goes along with wealthy 
corporations becoming business partners of the digital commoners (2008, 
15–16, 20, 229). His perspective, however, extends well beyond the state and 
capital by envisioning the autonomous development of the commons. 
In accordance with the General Public License (GPL) invented by Stallmann, 
Bollier points to the inversion of private contract and property to serve  collective 
goals. New property regimes could combine with ‘stakeholder trusts’ and digital 
networking technologies for the purpose of sustaining a more transparent, 
participatory and accountable commons (Bollier and Weston 2012, 350–351). 
Bollier has also proposed a variety of measures for the democratic finance of the 
commons: social and ethical lending by credit unions and public banks, crowd-
funding (for example, Goteo), complementary currencies, time banks, and so 
on (Conaty and Bollier 2015). 
Bollier and Helfrich (2012; 2015) document dozens of notable commons. 
In their most recent book (2019), they put forth the socio-ontological dimen-
sion of the commons to stress the deep interrelationality of the commons. They 
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formulate a language for the commons that contrasts the terminology of main-
stream economics and neoliberalism. The commons language moves beyond 
misleading binaries such as collective/individual, cooperation/competition, 
consumer/producer, public/private by introducing terms such as the capping 
of common wealth instead of scarcity, care-wealth instead of wealth, affective 
labour instead of labour, collaborative finance instead of finance, commons–
public partnership instead of public–private partnership, DIT (do it together) 
instead of DIY (do it yourself), reciprocity instead of trade, heterarchy instead 
of hierarchy, provisioning instead of production, semi-permeable membranes 
instead of closed boundaries, sharing and pooling instead of resource allocation, 
value sovereignty instead of price sovereignty, relationalised property instead 
of public–private–collective property (Bollier and Helfrich 2019, 51–73). 
Under these terms, Bollier and Helfrich construct a theoretical ‘umbrella’ for 
numerous already existing commons-based patterns. By ‘pattern’ they mean a 
kernel idea for solving problems that shows up again and again in different con-
texts that require different solutions. For example, a co-op in a German city and 
in an American city may face similar problems but in different legal, economic 
and cultural contexts. Bollier and Helfrich demarcate a triad of commoning 
that consists of three interconnected spheres: 1) social life (the social sphere), 
2) peer governance (the institutional sphere) and 3) provisioning (the economic 
sphere). All three spheres are penetrated by various patterns that transgress 
Ostrom’s design principles: the cultivation of shared purpose and values, free 
contribution, gentle reciprocity, deep communion with nature, cultural diver-
sity, the creation of semi-permeable membranes between the commons and 
the state/market, transparency, conviviality, consent in decision making, the 
relationalisation of property, monitoring and graduated sanctions, the distinc-
tion between commons and commerce, the support of care and decommodi-
fied work, the reliance on federated/distributed structures, and so on (Bollier 
and Helfrich 2019, 93–193).
Bollier and Helfrich (2019, 290) illustrate a relational approach to state power 
through which the state could support the commons in various ways. The state 
could provide infrastructure, technical advice and funding to help people 
acquire land and buildings for community-supported agriculture and hous-
ing commons, offer neighbourhood services such as care for the elderly, and 
launch maker-spaces, energy cooperatives, tool-sharing commons, repair cafés 
and time-banking exchanges. The state could serve as clearing house for tech-
nical, legal and financial issues concerning the commons in diverse contexts 
(agriculture, social services, energy, alternative currencies, etc.). The state could 
install open platforms inviting citizens to assist city councils in urban  planning, 
government websites encouraging citizen feedback about public services, par-
ticipatory budgeting programmes to allow citizens to co-determine spending 
decisions. The state could also support co-housing, volunteer networks for the 
elderly, food cooperatives, and so on. Free and open source software could 
become the default infrastructure in public administration and  education. 
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Instead of schools turning into the quasi-captive extensions of large software 
corporations’ marketing departments, they could educate students in the use 
of open source software, which would then have spin-off effects for higher 
education, municipal government and the general public. State-endorsed open 
design protocols for information services, housing, ride-hailing services and 
energy grids could foster open source innovation and benefit local communi-
ties, preventing proprietary lock-ins by larger companies (Bollier and Helfrich 
2019, 307–311). Bollier and Helfrich call on us to imagine a town: 
in which supermarkets are run as cooperatives, helping residents to 
buy higher-quality, local food produced under fair and eco-responsible 
conditions. The local taxi service and tourist lodgings are managed by 
platform cooperatives, letting households and the community share the 
benefits. Nursing services are run by a neighborhood home care venture 
such as Buurtzorg [...] Electricity generated by rooftop solar panels is  
pooled and shared via distributed ledger technology software, which  
is reducing high electricity bills and allowing public divestment from 
fossil fuels and nuclear power. (2019, 305–306) 
Ultimately, the state would facilitate a commons-orientated, post-capitalist 
transition by shifting power from the market to the commons. This would be 
supplemented by three distinct strategies by/for the commons: 1) the devel-
opment of community charters as tools for constituting commoning; 2) the 
creation and use of distributed ledger platforms that can advance cooperation 
on digital networks; and 3) the design of commons–public partnerships, as 
outlined above, that could leverage state power for the commons (Bollier and 
Helfrich 2019, 310–311). 
Overall, Bollier and Helfrich offer both a theoretical framework and an ana-
lytical roadmap for a commons-orientated, post-capitalist transition, aiming 
to bring together local and global (digital) commons under commons govern-
ance. Perhaps this scattered transition could be accelerated by a holistic politi-
cal strategy seeking to bootstrap the spontaneous coalescence of the commons 
around a coherent post-hegemonic socio-economic paradigm moving beyond 
and against neoliberalism. 
3.3 The Collaborative Commons
Jeremy Rifkin (2014, 1) makes the case that we have witnessed over the last 
decades a paradigm shift from market capitalism to the collaborative commons 
on the model of a hybrid economy, part capitalist and part commons. The term 
‘collaborative commons’ is a contradiction in terms, since by definition there 
are no non-collaborative commons. Rifkin perhaps seeks to emphasise by that 
term the collaborative element inherent in the commons.
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Rifkin (2014, 30) reads modern history through the lens of technological 
evolution, embedded in different business models and social norms. The com-
mons date back to feudalism, when agricultural life was communally struc-
tured. The landlords leased their land to peasants who combined the individual 
plots into open fields and farmed them collectively. The birth of capitalism 
originated in the enclosure of the commons for the purpose of wool produc-
tion. Capitalism began in the textile industry, powered by hydraulic energy. The 
synergies created by the print revolution and wind/water power democratised 
both literacy and energy, challenging the hierarchical organisation of feudalism 
(Rifkin 2014, 36). Later, the convergence of coal-powered printing and coal-
powered rail transport, combined with the invention of the telegraph, created 
the communications/energy matrix of the First Industrial Revolution (Rifkin 
2014, 46). The discovery of oil, the harnessing of electricity, the telephone and 
the internal combustion engine gave rise to the communications/energy matrix 
of the Second Industrial Revolution. Colonial capitalism, backed by govern-
ment funding, was the business model for both the First and Second Industrial 
Revolutions, consolidating production and distribution under centralised, top-
down management (Rifkin 2014, 46). Rifkin binds the rise of the commons in 
the last decades to a Third Industrial Revolution, fostered by the interlinking of 
renewables with ICTs.
3.3.1 The Third Industrial Revolution
The Third Industrial Revolution disrupts the centralised capitalist model 
through the decentralised use of data analytics, artificial intelligence, 3D print-
ers and FOSS, all sustaining the communications/energy matrix of the Internet 
of Things. Hundreds of start-up businesses infofacture their products using 3D 
printers in FabLabs powered by their own energy (Rifkin 2014, 70). The Internet 
is gradually becoming a neural network, transforming homes and businesses into 
micropower plants, harvesting renewable energy on site. Alvin Toffler (1980) 
coined the term ‘prosumers’ to describe the class of consumers who have evolved 
beyond passive consumption. Prosumers now produce their own energy across 
the net; manufacture almost everything using 3D printers and open source soft-
ware; advertise their products for free on hundreds of websites; acquire educa-
tion for free through massive open online courses (MOOCs); exchange products 
and services in the sharing economy, and so on (Rifkin 2014, 19). 
The Internet and free software already disrupt several media industries 
in software production, web services, entertainment, communications and 
publishing (Rifkin 2014, 65). Blockchain may also have a significant impact 
on the finance sector, among others, insofar as it could support various sorts 
of micro-finance based on cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, enabling peer- 
to-peer transactions to take place instantaneously anywhere in the world with 
no intermediaries (banks, governments) or transaction fees (Rifkin 2014, 
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255–260). Alongside cryptocurrencies, community currencies and micro-
currencies could also produce an alternative currency system (Rifkin 2014, 
261). The democratisation of communication, energy and logistics could bring 
back the commons by distributing finance and the means of production to the 
people, thereby empowering individuals and collectivities. The commons, thus, 
emerge as the self-instituting power of the people on the web and beyond. 
In the future, ICTs are expected to integrate into life sciences on the model 
of bioinformatics, which has the potential to convert the ones and zeros of 
digital information into the letters that make up the alphabet of DNA, thereby 
virtually unleashing unlimited information capacity and storage (Rifkin 2014, 
86). Rifkin’s core argument is that the coming together of the Communications 
Internet with the Energy Internet and the Logistics Internet in the intelligent 
infrastructure of the Internet of Things (IoT) is giving rise to a Third Indus-
trial Revolution, fuelled by the renewables that will increase thermodynamic 
efficiencies in the marshalling of resources and the recycling of waste, thereby 
driving down the costs of production and distribution of goods to near-zero 
marginal levels:
The Internet of Things will connect everything with everyone in an 
integrated global network. People, machines, natural resources, produc-
tion lines, logistics networks, consumption habits, recycling flows, and 
 virtually every aspect of economic and social life will be linked via sen-
sors and software to the IoT platform, continually feeding Big Data to 
every node – businesses, homes, vehicles – moment to moment, in real 
time. Big Data, in turn, will be processed with advanced analytics, trans-
formed into predictive algorithms, and programmed into automated 
systems to improve thermodynamic efficiencies, dramatically increase 
productivity, and reduce the marginal cost of producing and delivering 
a full range of goods and services to near zero across the entire economy. 
(Rifkin 2014, 11)
The end of capitalism and the rise of the  
collaborative commons
Rifkin repeats Marx’s and Keynes’s claim that capitalist competition will bring 
about new technologies that will increase productivity, decrease prices and 
replace human labour with machines. Automation will produce technological 
unemployment that will eclipse capitalism in the long run due to the absence of 
consumers to buy the cheaper products. Given the near-zero marginal cost 
of production, scarcity will give way to abundance that will deplete exchange 
value in favour of shareable use value, thus rendering the ‘invisible hand’ of the 
market obsolete. Put simply, nobody will be willing to pay for products if they 
can get them for free or produce them on their own. 
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Capitalism will then shrink to niche markets, clearing the ground for the 
rise of the collaborative commons, that is, a broad movement of civil society, 
 comprising NGOs, charities, organisations, arts and cultural groups, social 
enterprises, cooperatives, scattered communities, Transition Towns, ecovil-
lages, FabLabs and other formal and informal institutions that generate social 
capital. Thus, Rifkin simply reproduces the argument that dates back to Marx 
and is taken up by often disparate contemporary authors such as Barbrook and 
Benkler, arguing that technology will help create an abundance of the commons 
that will eventually replace capitalism with another socio-economic model, be 
it anarcho-communism or post-capitalism. 
Capitalism’s internal contradictions not only undermine its own survival, 
they also threaten the sustainability of the planet itself. Hyper-productivity 
accounts for the entropic bill of the capitalist machine in the Industrial Age, 
that is, the massive energy waste shown in the carbon emission rates and cli-
mate change. The collaborative commons, instead, champion the transition 
from carbon-based fuels to renewable energies and the use of fewer natural 
resources more efficiently on the model of a circular economy, supported by the 
Internet of Things. In contrast to the centralised, proprietary and profit-driven 
capitalist business model, the collaborative commons represents an alternative 
business model based on a communication/energy/logistics matrix that sus-
tains a ‘smart’ infrastructure designed to be open, collaborative, decentralised 
and distributed. The end-to-end principle of the Internet provides autonomy 
for the users, enhancing commons innovation and creativity. The collaborative 
commons advance sustainability, open source innovation, access, transparency 
and the search for community. As Rifkin (2014, 18) eloquently puts it: ‘The IoT 
is the technological “soul mate” of an emerging Collaborative Commons.’
Rifkin brings up the work of Brett M. Frischmann (2012) to criticise  Benkler. 
Frischmann conceives of the commons as infrastructures rather than open 
access commons, addressing demand-side market failures that stem from posi-
tive externalities widespread in natural resources, roads, electricity systems, 
telecommunications and knowledge. Rifkin (2014, 194) claims that Benkler 
neglects the critical role that energy plays in infrastructure. The course of mod-
ern history is marked by the convergence of new communications media with 
new energy regimes that sustained the infrastructure of the First and Second 
Industrial Revolutions. Rifkin goes along with the liberal commons by intro-
ducing a three-stakeholder model in the Third Industrial Revolution, compris-
ing the commons, the state and the market (Rifkin 2014, 196). But he takes a 
leap forward by linking local and global commons via the Internet of Things 
infrastructure, the operating logic of which is best served by commons man-
agement (Rifkin 2014, 195). He therefore introduces a commons-based busi-
ness model as an alternative to capitalism, envisaging the gradual adjustment 
of the latter to the former. 
Like Lessig and Benkler, Rifkin acknowledges that the adjustment of capitalism 
to the commons is not going to be a smooth one: ‘The struggle over  governance 
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of the three interlocking Internets that make up the Internet of Things is being 
aggressively waged among governments, capitalist enterprises, and champions 
of the nascent social economy on the Commons, each with ambitions to define 
the coming era’ (2014, 195). Rifkin (2014, 202) invokes studies showing that the 
Communication Internet increasingly looks like a Monopoly board, where a 
handful of corporations compete for dominance: Google rules search; Facebook 
social networking; eBay auctions; Apple online content delivery; Amazon retail, 
and so on. Global media are concentrated in the hands of a few giant corpora-
tions that decide what is news (Rifkin 2014, 213). 
‘Algorithmic manipulation’ is the name of the game for actors who have a com-
mercial interest in tampering with the data and producing fake news, predatory 
advertising and corporate propaganda (Rifkin 2014, 203). Surveillance capital-
ism is engineered by the power of algorithms to create toxic feedback loops 
of class and ethnic racism, transforming into weapons of math destruction. 
Software used in job recruitment, college admission processes, criminal justice 
and crime prediction often encodes racial prejudices and biases into sloppy sta-
tistical models, reproducing unfairness and inequality (O’Neil 2016). Yet, for 
Rifkin, free software, creative commons licensing and free wi-fi are still islands 
of freedom in the capitalist ocean of control (Rifkin 2014, 147–151, 173–192). 
On the Energy Internet, global energy companies aim to centralise the smart 
electricity grid and enable the commercial enclosure of new renewable energies 
(Rifkin 2014, 205). Countries, on the other hand, are introducing green feed-in 
tariffs to motivate users to produce their own electricity and share it across the 
net. In response, companies are changing their business model to accommo-
date decentralised energy production. They are focusing on the management of 
energy use rather than solely on sales (Rifkin 2014, 206).
Reality check
The struggle between prosumer collaborators and investor capitalists has only 
just begun, with the state calibrating corporate centralisation versus commons 
decentralisation. The main question is whether the digital oligarchy of surveil-
lance capitalism can control the billions of prosumers who will have access 
to the means of production in the decades to come. The answer, obviously, 
depends on the future of class struggle in global politics.
At the moment, however, despite the fact that more and more people pro-
duce their energy locally, the EU follows the US in the adoption of a series 
of neoliberal policies well suited to large energy companies. Most EU policies 
and regulations have abstained from introducing community-based feed-in 
tariffs or micro-grid infrastructures to support local renewable energy produc-
tion. Instead, the EU has been granting massive subsidies to large gas, coal and 
nuclear companies, promoting gas pipelines, enormous energy infrastructures 
and modest CO2 reductions (Hammerstein 2019, 29–30).
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Rifkin overstates the current status of the collaborative commons. He men-
tions that community currencies are proliferating in Greece and Spain (2014, 
262). But this is not the case. While it is true that there are 1,100 cooperatives 
in Greece at the time of writing, most of them are struggling to survive and 
facing considerable financial strains. This holds true for most commons-based 
peer production across the globe. The major problem of the commons is their 
economic sustenance due to the lack of access to resources and capital. The 
 commons depend almost exclusively on state funding and the volunteering of 
activists who can afford to contribute. However, most of society cannot exit capi-
talism, even if they aspired to. Additional barriers relate to the significant gap in 
managerial and technical skills, sectoral and operational isolation in a number 
of subsectors, and a lack of public policy and institutional support from both the 
state and larger cooperatives (Papadimitropoulos 2018b; Scholz 2016b). More 
than 90% of co-ops are consumer co-ops, with the main owners not being work-
ers themselves. Even in worker-owned cooperatives, workers are often not co-op 
members. Therefore, many co-ops are co-ops in name only. They are basically 
market entities that have adopted capitalist practices, as their main interest is 
to get a higher selling price or lower buying price in the market (Gindin 2016).
3.3.2 Platform Capitalism, aka the Sharing Economy 
Rifkin includes the so-called sharing economy in the collaborative commons. 
The term ‘sharing economy’ arises from the early development of a number 
of non-profit, peer-to-peer initiatives inspired by the moral values of a gift 
economy supported by ICTs (for example, Couchsurfing). Nowadays, the term 
sharing economy has evolved to refer to a collaborative economy where indi-
viduals are coordinated through online software platforms for the production, 
distribution, trade and consumption of goods and services, typically in a peer-
to-peer fashion. 
Yet not only does the online commercialisation of the gift economy in the last 
decade render the sharing economy a fallacy, it also misclassifies true aspects of 
the gift economy − manifested in commons-based peer production − under the 
wrong term. The term sharing economy is a greatly misleading marketing buz-
zword that deliberately confuses two different economic modes: sharing and 
commercial exchange (Lee 2015; Olma 2015; Schor 2015; Slee 2015; Walker 
2015). Sharing is a feature of a gift economy that has been prevalent among 
communities (families, friends and colleagues) from society’s inception (Mauss 
1967). Sharing means giving something away as a gift, allowing someone to 
use something you own temporarily or having something in  common with 
 somebody else. Sharing can be an act of distribution, co-belonging and commu-
nication, as in the cases of sharing a chocolate, a room or thoughts and  emotions 
(John 2012, 169–170). Sharing became widespread as a term  particularly with 
the advent of Web 2.0, which gave Internet users the  opportunity to  generate 
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content online on platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, Twitter, in 
wikis, on blogs and on several other websites (John 2012, 167). Sharing has 
transformed into a form of prosumption, that is, the blending of consumption 
with production that has served the creation of big data, fuelling marketing and 
advertising during the last decades (John 2012, 168). 
The sharing economy is, then, a euphemism for the emergence of a neoliberal 
model of platform capitalism that creates value by facilitating exchange between 
consumers and producers. Platform capitalism is a vast digital ecosystem that 
interconnects cloud computing, big data and mobile apps  (Norton 2018). Dig-
itisation and networking on the Internet has helped expand the monetisation 
of goods and services, thus rendering on-demand commercial exchange of all 
kinds more viable and efficient. 
Platform capitalism relies on the intersection of three economic laws: 
1)  Metcalfe’s law of network effects, 2) the Pioneer Advantage Law and 
3) the winner-takes-all law (Vercellone et al. 2019, 8–13). Whereas industrial 
capitalism is supply-side economics of scale, platform capitalism depends on 
demand-side economies based on network effects on the Internet, that is, social 
networking and demand aggregation enhanced by applications and algorithms 
controlling big data (Van Alstyne et al. 2016). Platform capitalism is actually a 
data-extractivism model generated by network effects.
In contrast to ‘pipeline’ businesses creating value by controlling a produc-
tion line where inputs at one end of the chain transform into outputs at the 
other end, platform capitalism incorporates the classic value-chain model into 
a digital landscape marked by three major shifts: 1) from resource control to 
the orchestration of the network of producers and consumers; 2) from internal 
optimisation to network interaction; and 3) from a focus on customer value to 
a focus on ecosystem value (Van Alstyne et al. 2016). In short, platform capi-
talism is set up by the algorithmic top-down orchestration of the bottom-up 
networking between producers and consumers on the Internet. 
Network effects reinforce the competitive advantage that a pioneering 
 platform gains in a market thanks to a technical innovation or commercial 
intuition. Pioneering platforms ‘lock in’ consumers and producers, thereby 
preventing potential competitors from penetrating. This progression leads to 
the establishment of a monopoly, with a few players capturing the largest share 
of a market.
Platform capitalism employs several business models (Torregrossa 2018). A 
key one is the multi-sided platform model based on intermediaries (companies) 
acting as matchmakers in multi-sided platforms that create value  primarily 
by enabling direct interactions between two or more customer or participant 
groups. Prominent examples of multi-sided platforms and the participants they 
connect include Alibaba.com, eBay (buyers and sellers); Airbnb (dwelling own-
ers and renters); the Uber app (professional drivers and passengers); Facebook 
(users, advertisers, third-party game or content developers and affiliated third-
party sites); Upwork, Freelancer (professionals and companies). 
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Online platforms help companies to realise monopoly rents on big data, 
advertising space and cloud-based computing (Facebook, Google, Amazon); 
to sell products and services (Amazon); to extract fees by enabling peer-to-peer 
and peer-to-business transactions (eBay, Alibaba.com, Airbnb, Uber, Upwork, 
Freelancer); or a combination of the above (Amazon) (Kenney 2014; Lobo 
2014; Pasquale 2017, 312; Srnicek 2017). 
The illusion of economic freedom
Platform capitalism is considered to transform consumers into micro-entre-
preneurs, trading, sharing, swapping and renting products and services, thus 
unlocking the untapped value or excess capacity of underutilised assets and 
services (cars, rooms, consumer goods, labour, capital, wi-fi, etc.). The online 
on-demand economy creates a 24-hour global marketplace, supposed to reduce 
waste and transaction costs, deepen human capital specialisation and increase 
efficiency in labour markets, employment, asset management and pricing, thus 
resulting in higher levels of productivity, innovation, environmental sustaina-
bility and inclusive growth (Codagnone et al. 2016a; 2016b; Sundararajan 2016). 
Rifkin’s inclusion of the so-called sharing economy in the collaborative com-
mons reflects a neoliberal economic account, represented by some thought 
leaders in Silicon Valley such as Tad Friend (2015) and Nicholas Lemann 
(2015), who conceive of the emergence of platform capitalism as a natural 
transition towards a more autonomous, deregulated and flexible market where 
both companies and independent contractors are now freer to work outside 
the conventional time and place framework (Codagnone et al. 2016a, 13; Pas-
quale 2017, 309–311). Freelancers can now have a more creative, autonomous 
and flexible work life, thus leading to a more balanced private life. Platform 
capitalism can bolster a decentralisation of power that would translate into an 
economic democracy and participatory culture, thus leading to the highest 
possible freedom for firms, households and individuals (Bruns 2008, 227–228; 
Jenkins 2006, 275; Tapscott and Williams 2006, 267). 
Silicon Valley’s techno-populist tales of ‘user empowerment’ and ‘digital 
socialism’ are made of promises to bridge the gap in consumption and income 
inequality (Morozov 2014; 2015). However, equalising access to communication 
services and digitising disintermediation between idle capital and consumers via 
online platforms do not automatically eliminate or weaken inequalities. On the 
contrary, they can augment existing inequalities concentrating the new markets 
of platform capitalism into the hands of a few corporations (Morozov 2018). 
Arun Sundararajan (2016) mistakenly claims that the so-called sharing econ-
omy consists of crowd-based ‘networks’ rather than centralised institutions or 
‘hierarchies’. While it is true that platform capitalism has decentralised  economic 
activity, by no means does this point to a truly decentralised economy. Online 
platforms are available to front-end users who are controlled by  back-end 
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 centralised server infrastructures, managed hierarchically by decisions made in 
Silicon Valley and executed by black box algorithms (Scholz 2016a, 26). Con-
sumers, providers and producers pay a fee to exchange  products and services 
online, thereby bringing enormous profits to platform owners. The big money 
goes to the oligarchy of the shareholders, and the scraps to on-demand work-
ers. In short, platform capitalism represents a digital oligarchy that leverages 
market power via network effects to extract rents from participants.
In Marxian terms, platform capitalism captures the use value of the general 
intellect, produced by the sociality of Internet users in social media, online 
platforms, search engines, blogs and mobile applications. It leverages the net-
work effects generated by user interaction on the Internet, thereby sustaining 
a digital oligarchy that commodifies the social imaginary (Fuchs 2014). Tre-
bor Scholz has termed the commodification of network effects ‘crowd fleecing’, 
meaning a new form of exploitation, put in place by four or five upstarts, to 
draw on a global pool of millions of workers in real time (Scholz 2016a, 4). Plat-
form capitalism is a technologically advanced form of exploitation, resulting 
– on average – in a ‘race to the bottom’ with regard to workers’ wages and liv-
ing standards. Earnings in platform capitalism range from very low to  modest, 
with only a small minority of workers making above middle-level incomes 
(Codagnone et al. 2016a, 6). 
What is at stake in platform capitalism is the meaning of work per se. A 
number of authors have built on the Marxian notion of the proletariat, argu-
ing that digitisation has created a new, diverse type of proletariat. Already in 
the 1980s, Andre Gorz (1980, 69) argued that automation and computerisation 
had rendered the underemployed, probationary, contracted, casual, temporary 
and part-time worker a ‘post-industrial neo-proletariat’. This tendency is even 
more pronounced today in the context of digitisation. Ursula Huws (2003; 
2014) speaks of a new class of information-processing workers – the cyber-
tariat. Guy Standing (2011) and Nick Dyer-Witheford (1999, 88, 96) claim that 
poorly paid, insecure and deskilled service workers constitute the new type 
of precariat. Castells (2000, 244) considers low-paid service workers as a new 
‘white collar proletariat’. 
However attractive the prospect of transforming workers into micro- 
entrepreneurs or flexible freelance workers, platform capitalism puts – on 
average – the worker at a disadvantage, as it transforms labour into an auction, 
creating a disproportionate supply and demand feedback. On the one side, it 
favours the ‘haves’ over the ‘have-nots’ − as every auction does − while, on the 
other, it obliges the exploited amateurs to push professional prices down by sell-
ing their services cheaper. In the name of entrepreneurship, labour flexibility, 
autonomy and freedom of choice, platform capitalism shifts the burdens of risk 
(unemployment, illness, old age) on to the workers’ shoulders. It offers no min-
imum wage, no security, no health insurance, no pension, no unemployment 
insurance, no paid holiday or paid sick days (Scholz 2016a). The elimination 
of workers’ rights and democratic values such as accountability and consent 
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indicate the lack of dignity for workers who are in a position of unfavourable 
information and power asymmetry (Newlands et al. 2016, 9, 14).
Platform capitalism has colonised the public and private sphere to such an 
extent that it has integrated communication and information technologies 
into a global cyber-market, blurring the boundaries between ‘virtual’ and ‘real’, 
‘work’ and ‘play’, ‘production’ and ‘consumption’, ‘private’ and ‘public’. Dallas 
Smythe speaks of the ‘audience commodity’, which portrays the media audi-
ence as a commodity sold to advertisers. Especially today, social media on the 
Internet commodify the sociality of users by converting the latter into data 
sold to advertisers. Personal data are used in the creation of targeted advertise-
ments, and the user’s click and buy process generates profit for the advertis-
ing company. Off-the-job time becomes a marketing playground, serving the 
reproduction of commodities. Everything, including leisure, play, friendship, 
love and sexuality, becomes a 24-hour commodity market. Consumers of social 
media become prosumers, producing commodities in the form of personal 
data (Fuchs 2014, 89–95). 
Christian Fuchs (2014) holds that the use value generated in social network-
ing and search engines is part of digital labour that produces surplus value for 
the social media corporations, thus creating a new form of exploitation. Not 
only do digitisation and automation result in unemployment and precarious 
labour, they also render produsers and prosumers part of the working class, 
transforming society into a cyber-factory. Digital labour splits into waged and 
unwaged online labour. Whereas waged online labour consists in labour per-
formed on crowdsourcing platforms, unwaged online labour includes almost 
any social activity on the Internet, from chatting, posting and searching to 
reviewing, commenting, and so on (Fuchs 2014; Scholz 2012). 
Micro-tasking, that is, the decomposition of work into small parts, on plat-
forms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk is a further expansion of Taylorist 
logic in the field of digital labour that disconnects the worker from the overall 
product of his work, thereby rendering her a mere cog in the machine of a 
faceless production. Labour alienation, exploitation, precarity and insecurity 
are the outcomes of the strategic nullification of federal law in platform capital-
ism by corporations making use of legal grey zones to misclassify employees as 
independent contractors, avoid taxes, and violate local laws, labour laws, pri-
vacy and anti-discrimination laws (Codagnone et al. 2016a; Huws 2014, 26–39; 
Scholz 2016a; Standing 2011). There is also strong evidence that  insecure 
employment and precariousness result in psychological morbidity (Virtanen 
et al. 2005).
Beyond social democracy
Rifkin’s optimism is only partially supported by the facts. The expansion of 
neoliberalism across the globe has been accompanied by the rise of neo-fascist 
The Reformist Commons 83
far right-wing populism in the United States and Europe. Neoliberal neocolo-
nialism spreads from public assets, real estate and agriculture to big data and 
biotechnology, privatising the very genes of nature. On the Internet, platform 
capitalism is making billions by exploiting FOSS development and the digital 
commons to the extent that a number of open source software companies are 
now adopting a more closed approach with regard to their copyright licences 
(Krazit 2018). Hence, rather than the so-called sharing economy paving the way 
for the collaborative commons, it signals a new era of cyber-exploitation. Koen 
Frenken (2017) anticipates three possible futures for the sharing economy: 
1) the neoliberal development of platform capitalism, where several micro-
platforms integrate into super-platforms; 2) the social democratic development 
of platforms where the state intervenes to tax and redistribute rents from win-
ners to losers; and 3) the citizen-led democratic control of platforms in the 
form of platform cooperativism. 
Rifkin advocates a social democratic, commons-orientated transition, in 
which the developed nations in concert with big corporations would be the 
leaders of the Third Industrial Revolution, which is projected to gradually align 
around the collaborative commons. Rifkin has succeeded in linking local with 
global commons via the Internet of Things infrastructure, best served by self-
management. Yet he overstates the role of technology while underplaying the 
role of democracy. Similar to the liberal approach to the commons, he abstains 
from addressing the contradictions of capitalism and the state, thus reproduc-
ing the lack of the political in the reformist approach to the commons. 
The transition to the commons is not merely a technical issue of algorithms 
programming win–win partnerships between capitalism, the state and the 
commons. It requires a shift to another model of society, anchored in the aboli-
tion of the division between directors and executants; hence the need for the 
creation of a novel anthropological type. Rifkin (2014, 274–286) touches on 
this issue by considering humans equipped with empathy, affection, reciprocity 
and companionship rather than self-interest alone. He downplays, though, the 
right to have a direct say in the economic and societal affairs that determine 
one’s life. Instead of assigning politics to technocratic elites, supposed to repre-
sent the people, freedom as autonomy consists in the equality of participation 
in the formation of the law governing society. Freedom translates into the self-
instituting power of the people. Therefore, the key to the commons transition is 
the establishment of direct democratic procedures on a post-hegemonic politi-
cal level that encompass the reconfiguration of power in the direction of the 
commons. 
3.4 Platform Cooperativism
Trebor Scholz (2016a; 2016b, 23–24) juxtaposes platform cooperativism against 
platform capitalism in a mission to bring together the roughly 170 years of the 
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cooperative movement with commons-based peer production. The idea is to 
use the algorithmic design of apps such as Uber in the service of a cooperative 
business model premised on communal ownership, democratic governance, 
sustainability and equitable distribution of value (Scholz 2016a; 2016b). Instead 
of workers earning paltry fees from precarious labour that makes investors 
rich, they would design, manage and own apps themselves. Platform coopera-
tivism operates on the model of a multi-stakeholder cooperative of consumers, 
providers, investors and producers. It aims to reunite existing cooperatives and 
labour unions under digital self-governance. 
Platform cooperativism spans the economic landscape. Since 2015,  platform 
co-ops have emerged across a broad range of sectors, including e-commerce, 
cleaning services, culture, finance, software development, transportation 
and more. Over 300 case studies of platform cooperativism have been 
 documented thus far.1 A non-exhaustive typology classifies cooperatives as 
follows:  cooperatively owned online labour brokerages and market places 
(for  example, Loconomics, Fairmondo); city-owned platform cooperatives (for 
example, Fairbnb); producer-owned platforms (for example, Stocksy, Resonate); 
 union-backed labour platforms (for example, National Domestic Workers Alli-
ance); data co-ops (for example, MIDATA); and protocolary co-ops enabling 
peer -to-peer interaction (for example, Backfeed, La΄Zooz). These innovative 
organisations are increasing in numbers and testing a range of operating mod-
els. In the following, I illustrate the cases of Stocksy and Fairmondo to exem-
plify the organisational principles of platform cooperativism.
3.4.1 The Stocksy Case
Stocksy is a platform cooperative that accepts and provides royalty-free stock 
photography and video via an online marketplace that provides sustainable 
careers to artists through co-ownership, profit sharing and transparent business 
practices (Scholz 2016b, 78). Stocksy was started by iStockphoto co-founders 
Bruce Livingstone and Brianna Wettlaufer, who in 2000 pioneered the idea of 
selling stock photos online in exchange for small fees (Cortese 2016). iStock 
caught the attention of Getty Images, which acquired it in 2006 for $50 mil-
lion. Livingstone and Wettlaufer grew dismayed as the community spirit they 
had cultivated and the royalties photographers received began to erode under 
the new ownership. Photographers grumbled that they were being underpaid 
and exploited by online sites, thereby feeling disenfranchised. This is a general 
trend in the creative industry where workers are likely to have no control over 
their artistic work, experience precarity and are poorly paid.
For this reason, using money from the sale of iStock to Getty, Livingstone 
and Wettlaufer founded Stocksy in 2013 with the aim of putting power back 
into the hands of the artists. Stocksy pays photographers 50–75% of sales.2 This 
is well above the going rate of 15–45% that is typical in the stock photography 
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field. The company also distributes 90% of its profits at the end of each year 
among its photographers. Contributing Stocksy photographers receive 50% of 
a Standard Licence Purchase and 75% of an Extended Licence Purchase. Every 
Stocksy contributor receives a share of the company, with voting rights. 
At the time of launch, Stocksy had about 220 contributing photographers, 
with plans to grow to approximately 500 photographers in its first year. Stocksy 
now has over 900 contributing members, selected from over 10,000 applica-
tions. Its revenue doubled from 2014 to 2015 to $7.9 million. For 2015, Stocksy 
paid out over half of its revenue as royalties to its contributors, totalling $4.3 
million. Revenue for 2016 grew to $10.7 million, with $4.9 million paid out 
to contributors. In total over its first four years of business from 2013 to 2017, 
Stocksy paid out over $20 million to its nearly 1,000 artists. After starting with 
six founding members, Stocksy’s staff numbers reached 50 in early 2018.
Stocksy is a multi-stakeholder cooperative divided into three membership 
classes: founders, staff and artists (Gordon-Farleigh 2017); 90% of the divi-
dends are awarded to Class C (artists), and 5% each goes to Class A (founders) 
and Class B (staff). Every member has an equal voting share. The governance 
does not follow a vote-by-committee approach, but a transparent, flat decision-
making process, with members participating through an online system. The 
board includes directors from each class and any member can propose resolu-
tions. An exhaustive resolution and voting process is considered bureaucratic 
and costly. Having open conversations on a simple platform is more effective. 
3.4.2 The Fairmondo Case
Fairmondo is an online marketplace that aims to challenge the big players in 
e-commerce such as Amazon and eBay (Scholz 2016b, 79). Founded in Ger-
many in 2012, Fairmondo is a multi-stakeholder cooperative open both to pro-
fessional and private sellers. The products on offer have no general restrictions 
unless they are illegal or run counter to Fairmondo’s core values such as fairness 
and sustainable consumption. The fairness of the products is assessed by shared 
criteria, which remain open to discussion and improvement by the members 
and the more than 12,000 users. Currently, Fairmondo offers over 2 million 
products, the majority being books and media articles. 
Its governance model is based on a legally binding commitment to uncom-
promising transparency and democratic accountability.3 Democratic control is 
guaranteed through the one-member-one-vote principle. The managing board 
is elected by employees. Decision making is based on a majority consensus; 
90% of Fairmondo constituents must agree prior any modification to the gen-
eral principles. Fairmondo’s inclusive and transparent principles actively build 
on members’ trust by avoiding the deceptive information that plagues tradi-
tional marketplaces, such as false externalities or hidden costs. The Fairmondo 
crowd receives real information about what they are buying.
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Fairmondo was financed through crowdfunding, with over 2,000 members 
investing over €600,000 in shares. There is a cap of €25,000 for the number 
of shares that anybody can hold. Thus, disproportionate financial investment 
or investment by non-cooperative associations are prohibited. Dividends 
are distributed as broadly as possible: 25% is distributed to co-op members 
through shares; 25% is distributed through ‘Fair Funding Points’ (voluntary 
work is rewarded by points that legally stake a claim on future surpluses); 25% 
is donated to a number of non-profits chosen by Fairmondo members. The 
last 25% is pooled into a common fund used for the development of the wider 
Fairmondo project. Internal stakeholders (partners, staff, etc.) operate under a 
defined salary range ratio of 1 to 7 from lowest to highest paid.
Fairmondo co-ops are committed to open source and innovation. The code 
used for its online marketplace platforms must be published under a licence 
that ensures full openness regarding developments or forks. The code can 
be found on Github. By contributing to the digital commons, Fairmondo rep-
resents a model of open cooperativism, the operating principles of which will 
be detailed in the following section.
3.4.3 The Challenges of Platform Cooperativism
The two cases illustrated above adhere to the seven principles of platform 
cooperativism defined by Scholz (2016a, 18–21; Platform Coops Infographic 
2017) as follows: 1) voluntary and open membership; 2) democratic member 
control; 3) members’ economic participation; 4) autonomy and independence; 
5) education, training and information; 6) cooperation among cooperatives; 
7) concern for community. Platform co-ops respond to the market failures of 
platform capitalism by lowering transaction and retention costs, transferring 
surplus revenue to members, protecting workers from exploitation, disincenti-
vising short-termism and offering a prospect of data democracy.
Scholz identifies a number of challenges for platform cooperativism. He 
touches upon the main obstacles that the cooperative movement has faced 
from its inception, such as competition, financing, regulation, education, 
member involvement and identity. Some scholars (Frenken 2017; Van Doorn 
2017) have argued that platform cooperativism needs to address three major 
problems regarding: 1) self-government, 2) financing and 3) market competi-
tion/value proposition. 
Platform co-ops seeking to scale up in the digital landscape need to accom-
modate a wider range of member identities with divergent needs and interests 
that tend to produce conflicts and ideological oppositions (Frenken 2017, 12). 
Blockchain could perhaps offer solutions to the problems inherent in digital 
decision making. It might enable decentralised trust-creation mechanisms and 
provide automatic and secure coordination of network interactions through 
smart contracts (Morell et al. 2017, 60). The present discourse on Blockchain, 
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however, is rather libertarian and conceals the danger of replacing the current 
oligarchies with new oligarchies in the name of democracy, decentralisation, 
and so on. Attention, therefore, should be drawn to shifting the discourse from 
libertarianism to cooperativism.
Platform co-ops also have difficulty in raising venture capital, and embark 
on R&D on their own, which is significantly detrimental to their capacity to 
innovate and produce new lines of products and services (Frenken 2017, 12). 
New funding structures (crowdfunding, cooperative banks and credit unions, 
Blockchain and alternative currencies) and locally focused commissioning 
from the public sector could provide vital revenue to platform co-ops (McCann 
and Yazici 2018, 4). Attracting funding relates directly to the need of platform 
co-ops to offer a convincing value proposition if they are to survive market 
competition (Van Doorn 2017). If platform co-ops are to move beyond ‘lux-
ury cooperativism’, they must address the needs and limited resources of low-
income workers, their households and their neighbourhoods. To do so, they 
need to serve a specific need better than competing platforms, while embody-
ing a concrete set of values for specific consumer categories.
One central problem that potentially undermines platform cooperativism is 
the pitiless competition it faces from traditional and platform capitalism. In 
light of the 20–30% that companies such as Uber are taking as profit, one solu-
tion put forward by Scholz is for platform cooperatives to run on 10% profit, 
which could then be partially translated into social benefit for workers (Scholz 
2016a, 13). Indeed, this is one of the competitive advantages of platform co-ops 
compared to capitalist platforms. Yet Scholz is aware that the competitiveness 
problem of platform cooperativism cannot be dealt with solely through a pric-
ing strategy. A broader regulatory framework is a sine qua non for the advance-
ment of platform cooperativism (Smorto 2017). 
Scholz founded the Platform Cooperativism Consortium (PCC) in 2016, 
which has received funding to support the cooperative platform economy 
through research, experimentation, education, advocacy, documentation of 
best practices, technical support and the coordination of funding and events.4 
In 2018, the PCC received an additional Google.org grant of $1 million to 
 further enhance the economic development of cooperatives in the digital 
economy.5 The PCC focuses specifically on creating a critical analysis of the 
digital economy, and designing open source tools for education, governance 
and finance, among others. The goal is to create a platform ecosystem that can 
be variously supportive for local co-op initiatives. Several other incubators and 
accelerators have emerged in recent years such as CoopVenture (France), Start.
Coop (US) and incubator.COOP (Australia), aiming to finance the develop-
ment of co-ops across the globe. Resonate, a platform co-op made by and for 
musicians, recently received $1 million from Reflective Venture Partners, which 
funds Blockchain technology-related start-ups and organisations (Hurst 2018).
Scholz has also been involved in lobbying to introduce regulation on 
 cooper atives. The Platform Cooperativism Consortium Policy Group recently 
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 submitted an agenda to promote and build support for platform coopera-
tives through a new bill of rights for American workers to US Senator Kirsten 
 Gillibrand.6 Andrea Nahles, head of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 
committed to support platform cooperativism in Germany. Jeremy Corbyn’s 
Labour Party in the UK included platform cooperativism in its Digital 
 Democracy Manifesto.7
Scholz has met critiques from the far left that, especially with the Google.
org co-signing, platform cooperativism still mimics the gig economy, a capi-
talistic structure (Anzilotti 2018). To truly dismantle capitalism, those critics 
argue, fundamental changes are needed at the national political level to regulate 
against monopolies such as Google, and to provide for equity-creating, dis-
tributive resources such as Universal Basic Income and universal healthcare. 
Scholz counter-argues there can still be reforms that work within capitalism 
and that really change power relationships. He contends that it is unrealistic to 
think that platform co-ops will dominate capitalist markets. Rather, he envi-
sions a more diversified economy. Therefore, there is a tension here between 
his radical pretensions and his projecting a mixed economy. A more radical line 
of argument holds that platform cooperativism should integrate into a broader 
model of open cooperativism. 
3.5 Open Cooperativism
Bauwens and Kostakis (2017a) argue that cooperatives in general and platform 
cooperatives in particular usually function under the patent and copyright 
 system, and they are, consequently, not creating, protecting or producing com-
mons. They are limited to local or national membership, thereby leaving the 
global field open to be dominated by capitalist enterprises. As a result, tradi-
tional and platform cooperatives are closed market entities, bending over time 
to the competitive pressure of capitalist enterprises. To address these issues, 
Bauwens and Kostakis advocate for the incorporation of platform cooperativ-
ism into a broader model of open cooperativism grounded on the principles of 
commons-based peer production. Before delving deep into this argument, it is 
essential first to examine its broader normative premises.
3.5.1 Extractive Peer Production
Bauwens and Kostakis (2014; 2019) build on the work of Ostrom, Lessig and 
Benkler, but they differ from them in that they seek to transform capitalism 
into the commons. From this angle, they are closer to Bollier who follows 
Michel Bauwens in his argument that the state should support the commons 
instead of market capitalism. As with Rifkin, Bauwens and Kostakis’s general 
argument echoes Marx’s claim that capitalism is doomed to failure as the evolu-
tion of technology reduces the costs of production to the degree that capitalism 
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can no longer sustain itself. The evolution of technology undermines capitalism 
inasmuch as it makes workers redundant for the reproduction of production. 
Bauwens and Kostakis’s core argument is that the digital commons can merge 
with local cooperatives and replace capitalism from within, just as capitalism 
did with feudalism. Pace Rifkin, they take a radical stance, introducing a post-
capitalist model that will force capitalism to adjust to the commons in the long 
run with the aid of a commons-orientated partner state. 
Instead of a Marxist revolutionary party capturing state power and imple-
menting central planning of production in a long-term mission to establish 
communism, Bauwens and Kostakis concentrate power ab initio on commons-
based peer production. They demonstrate a post-capitalist version of the 
 commons on the model of Design Global–Manufacture Local (DG–ML) or 
‘cosmolocalism’, which connects local with global commons via the Internet 
and free and open source software/hardware. The commons advance a sim-
ple yet radical idea: great improvements in production could be achieved by 
reducing barriers to knowledge exchange. Collaboration and openness could 
result in a constantly improving collective repository of best ideas and prac-
tices; hence, the significance of the digital commons adding up to the rural and 
urban commons. Cosmolocalism, that is, the localised use of the digital com-
mons, can help people reappropriate the means of production across the globe 
and secure their sustainability against capitalism and statism.
At the crossroads of traditional capitalism, cognitive capitalism and 
peer production
Bauwens and Kostakis’s political economy of post-capitalism is predicated 
on a philosophy of history premised on a mix of Schumpeterian and Marx-
ian insights. In Network Society and Future Scenarios for a Collaborative 
Economy, they adhere to a somewhat teleological account of history, deter-
mined by  successive techno-economic shifts in the modes of production and 
exchange (2014, 2–14). They integrate their analysis of peer production into 
a neo-Schumpeterian narrative, developed in particular by Carlota Perez, in 
which economic crises, triggered by technological innovation, are an inherent 
characteristic of capitalism, forcing the latter to progress over time. Techno-
logical innovation drives capitalism’s development into a spiral of upswings and 
downswings, lasting approximately 40–60 years, until the next one ‘takes off ’ 
(Perez 2002, 15). Following Andrew Feenberg (2002), they do not conceive of 
technology as neutral, deterministic or univocal in its effects, but rather as a 
terrain of social struggle between alternative norms, values and social imagi-
naries (Bauwens et al. 2019, 33). 
Kostakis and Bauwens (2014, 10–14; Bauwens 2014) hold that the global 
economy is now at the turning point of a novel technological revolution, with 
three different value models competing for dominance: traditional capital-
ism, neo-feudal cognitive capitalism and peer production. Like Benkler, they 
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 identify two modes of peer production: 1) an extractive peer production with a 
for-profit orientation, developing on the model of neo-feudal cognitive capital-
ism; and 2) a generative peer production with a for-benefit orientation, emerg-
ing in the form of local and global commons.
Traditional proprietary capitalism is in decline, since it suffers from an irre-
versible contradiction: it aims at infinite growth on a finite planet, causing both 
economic and ecological crisis. Industrial capitalism evolves into a neo-feudal 
cognitive capitalism, in which strong intellectual property rights are in the 
process of being replaced by centralised networks of peer production, dom-
inated by finance capital (Bauwens 2005; Benkler 2006; Castells 2000; 2009; 
2010). Cognitive capitalism is considered a new type of capitalism in which 
the control of information has replaced traditional material production and 
distribution, becoming, therefore, the basic source of value (Bell 1973; Boutang 
2012; Drucker 1968; Webster 2006). As such, cognitive capitalism splits into 
two modes: 1) netarchical capitalism; and 2) anarcho-capitalism (Kostakis and 
Bauwens 2014, 25–27). 
Netarchical capitalism is another name for platform capitalism. It refers to 
front-end digital platforms centrally controlled by back-end server infrastruc-
tures, whose primary function is the extraction of value from peer production 
and crowdsourcing (Kostakis and Bauwens 2014, 23–29). One prevalent busi-
ness model of netarchical capitalism is the monetisation of attention capital 
and Internet user data through advertising. Netarchical capitalism lives on the 
positive externalities produced by Internet users, transforming into a parasitic 
and rent-seeking capital (Bauwens et al. 2019, 37). Some of the most prominent 
companies of netarchical capitalism are Google, Facebook, Amazon, Airbnb 
and Uber. Jeff Howe defines crowdsourcing as follows:
Simply defined, crowdsourcing represents the act of a company or insti-
tution taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing 
it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form 
of an open call. This can take the form of peer-production (when the 
job is performed collaboratively) but is also often undertaken by sole 
individuals. The crucial prerequisite is the use of the open call format 
and the large network of potential labourers. (Howe 2006)
Crowdsourcing is part of outsourcing, that is, a business practice of one 
company hiring another company or individuals to perform tasks, handle 
operations or provide services previously done by the company’s own employ-
ees. Digitisation has propelled outsourcing and the concomitant globalisation 
of neoliberalism from 1980 onwards. The Internet, software technology and 
telecommunication devices have allowed corporations to outsource produc-
tion with the aim of becoming more competitive. Online platforms helped 
decrease their costs and increase productivity by buying cheap and temporary 
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labour from precarious freelancers or peer producers across the globe 
(Howe 2008). 
The 2008 financial crisis exacerbated the low-wage crisis of the last decades 
and, combined with the expansion of neoliberalism and digitisation, gave rise 
to the platform capitalism of the so-called sharing and gig economy. Whereas 
the ‘sharing economy’ consists in the online renting or exchange of idle assets 
such as cars, bikes, rooms, and so on, the ‘gig economy’ refers to the buying and 
selling of freelance labour online. Both the gig and the sharing economy are 
crowdsourcing models, enabled by digital platforms (Bock et al. 2016; Codag-
none et al. 2016a; 2016b; Sundararajan 2016). 
Crowdsourcing is centralised inasmuch as companies control production 
and profit from freelancers and peer producers, and distributed inasmuch as 
freelancers and peer producers across the globe can earn a living. As mentioned 
earlier, prominent examples are digital platforms such as Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk, Upwork and Freelancer where businesses and freelancers (design-
ers, developers, copywriters, translators and so forth) connect and collaborate 
remotely. TaskRabbit is a ‘skills’ marketplace, which matches freelancers with 
local demand, allowing consumers to buy labour for everyday tasks, including 
cleaning, moving, delivery and handyman work. Kickstarter is a case of crowd-
funding enabling people to go to the marketplace itself to fund their projects 
instead of depending on banks. What is interesting to consider here, according 
to Bulajewski (2012), is that Kickstarter charges ‘60 times the actual cost of 
providing a service by skimming a percentage off financial transactions’. Thus, 
Kickstarter is but a parasitic form of netarchical capitalism.
The second mode of cognitive capitalism is digital anarcho-capitalism, which 
echoes the Austrian school of economics (Schulak and Unterköfler 2011) in the 
sense that it approximates its theoretical models. ‘While netarchical capitalism 
mainly exploits human cooperation, distributed capitalism is premised on the 
idea that everybody can trade and exchange; or, to put it bluntly, that “every-
one can become an independent capitalist”’ (Kostakis and Bauwens 2014, 31). 
 Anarcho-capitalism differs from anarchism in that it is still based on property 
law and a minimum state, whereas the latter rejects property and state altogether.
In digital anarcho-capitalism, the Internet sustains the infrastructure for a 
decentralised peer network of for-profit entrepreneurs. The most profound 
example is the Bitcoin project, which relies on the distributed database − public 
ledger − of Blockchain which maintains a continuously growing list of records 
called blocks. Bitcoin is a digital currency based on the open source software 
of Blockchain, which enables decentralised peer-to-peer transactions without 
the need for intermediaries such as banks, states, and so on. It is deliberately 
scarce (21 million bitcoins), which makes it highly speculative and competitive. 
As a result, Bitcoin is prone to producing oligarchies and crises (Kostakis and 
 Bauwens 2014, 32–33). In this sense, not only does it reproduce already exist-
ing inequalities by excluding the penniless, it also creates new ones. 
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Kostakis and Bauwens (2014, 27–28) claim that neo-feudal cognitive capital-
ism produces an increased contradiction between decentralised peer produc-
tion and centralised profit accumulation. Technology enhances the production 
of a decentralised use value, which cannot fully translate into exchange value, 
thus undermining the very foundation of capitalism, that is, profit maximi-
sation. Innovation becomes social, diffusing via peer-to-peer networks, and 
capital becomes an a posteriori parasitical intervention rather than the a priori 
condition of innovation (Kostakis and Bauwens 2014, 28–29). 
In capitalism, value is mostly related to things, that is, commodities, 
and is expressed in their exchange for one another based on a nominal 
representation of money. In the realm of P2P, value is attributed to con-
tributions as a shared effort among peers, and is reflected in the shared 
significance of those contributions as recognised by those peers […] In 
a transition period, there is value competition: a dominant form of value 
operates under the capitalist logic, and a new social logic of value is 
emerging in seed forms. (Bauwens et al. 2019, 15)
Paradoxically, neo-feudal cognitive capitalism produces non-capitalist 
and  post-capitalist forms of value creation. Users and communities utilise 
digital platforms to connect themselves for multiple purposes, as in the case 
of the revolutions of the Arab Spring and the various groups active in social 
media (Bauwens et al. 2019, 38). Bitcoin illustrates that digital currencies could 
provide a viable alternative to banks, financial institutions and state monetary 
policies. It remains to be seen whether and to what degree Bitcoin can scale 
up and decentralise the economy. Irrespective of that, Blockchain technolo-
gies have the potential to help communities reach consensus and self-organise, 
among other things. 
Ultimately, neo-feudal cognitive capitalism creates a value crisis, reintro-
ducing the Marxian argument that technological progress is antagonistic to 
profit rates. The response of neo-feudal cognitive capitalism is the enclosure 
as much as possible of the digital commons into the confines of surveillance 
capitalism. Yet Bauwens et al. (2019) stress that the basic underlying freedom 
of the Internet has not yet been brought fully under corporate control. The 
commons use the Internet as much as capital and governments do. The unsus-
tainability of contemporary value flows can be counteracted by the innovative 
social relations of generative commons-based peer production. Bauwens et al.’s 
(2019, 4–5) core argument is that commons-based peer production contains 
both an immanent and transcendent aspect. It is immanent to the extent that 
 commons-based peer production is essential to allowing capitalism to repro-
duce itself. It is transcendent to the degree that it can progress into an autono-
mous mode of production that can subsume both capitalism and the state. 
At this stage, commons-based peer production is a prefigurative pro-
totype of what could become an entirely new mode of production and 
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a new form of society. It is currently a prototype since it cannot as yet 
fully reproduce itself outside of mutual dependence with capitalism. 
This emerging modality of peer production is not only productive and 
innovative ‘within capitalism,’ but also in its capacity to solve some of 
the structural problems that have been generated by the capitalist mode 
of production. In other words, it represents a potential transcendence of 
capitalism. (Bauwens et al. 2019, 6)
3.5.2 Generative Peer Production
Bauwens, Kostakis and Pazaitis (2019, 3) adhere to Bollier’s definition of the 
commons as shared resources self-managed by user communities according 
to the rules and norms of the community. Commons-based peer production 
is further inspired by the principles of free software. It is characterised by 
equipotentiality, holoptism and stigmergy (Bauwens et al. 2019, 12). Equipo-
tentiality opens up equal opportunities for everyone to participate according 
to their skills. Participation is conditioned a posteriori by the process of pro-
duction itself, where skills are verified and communally validated in real time. 
Holoptism contrasts with the panopticism that penetrates modern systems 
of power (Foucault 1977) in that it grants access to all information necessary 
 irrespective of participants’ position or power. Holoptism allows, thus, for stig-
mergic processes of mutual coordination wherein participants can match their 
contributions to the needs of the system (Bauwens 2005). Stigmergy is a form 
of self-organisation based on indirect coordination (Marsh and Onof 2007). 
As in the cases of Wikipedia and FOSS development, an action leaves a trace 
which stimulates another action, and so on. Hence, commons-based peer pro-
duction favours mutual coordination over central control, self-management 
over hierarchy, access over ownership and transparency over privacy. 
Commons-based peer production develops in two basic modes: local and 
global (digital) commons (Kostakis and Bauwens 2014, 45–58; Bauwens et al. 
2019, 39–46). Some examples of local commons are community land trusts, 
degrowth and permaculture movements, Transition Towns, the Bologna 
 project, the Quebec economy, interest-free banks, autonomous energy produc-
tion, and plenty of other collective projects scrutinised by Ostrom (1990). 
Global commons, on the other hand, develop on the basis of the Internet and 
FOSS. The architecture of the Internet has facilitated decentralised and quasi-
autonomous communication between multiple computer users, while the 
applications of FOSS have disrupted capitalism by supporting hybrid modes of 
ownership, value distribution and governance.8 Commons-based peer produc-
tion is neither hierarchyless nor structureless. 
Further, CBPP projects do have systems of quality control that repre-
sent a kind of benevolent hierarchy or heterarchy. These ‘maintainers’ 
or ‘editors’ protect the integrity of the system as a whole and can refuse 
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contributions that endanger the integrity of the system. However, and 
this is crucial, they do not coerce work. (Bauwens et al. 2019, 12)
For example, Wikipedia’s governance is a mixture of democracy, aristocracy 
and monarchy. Democratic voting with regard to the content is accompanied 
by the aristocracy of the most reliable users and the monarchy of the founder/
leader in cases where neither solely democracy nor aristocracy works. 
Cosmolocalism: the Design Global–Manufacture Local model
Despite the ever-growing potential of the digital commons and the optimi-
sation of local assets and infrastructures by local commons, Bauwens and 
 Kostakis admit that both local and global commons are more like centripetal 
lifeboat strategies that cannot but conform in the long run to the mainstream of 
 capitalism. To address this issue, they attempt to connect local with global com-
mons on the model of Design Global–Manufacture Local (DG–ML), which has 
been enabled by the conjunction of modern ICTs with desktop manufacturing 
technologies (such as 3D printing and computer numerical machines) (Bauw-
ens et al. 2019, 39–46; Kostakis and Bauwens 2014). Open coding connects to 
design and manufacturing via the Internet, free software and 3D printers. In a 
nutshell, the DG–ML model follows the logic that what is not scarce becomes 
global (for example, global commons of knowledge, design, software) and what 
is scarce (for example, hardware) is local. Global commons connect to local 
commons via Transition Towns, decentralised communities and  FabLabs/
maker-spaces based on FOSS and renewable energy systems distributed 
through microgrids on Blockchain and the Internet of Things. Blockchain tech-
nology has the potential to ‘plug’ into the DG–ML model on the principles of 
self-governance, decentralisation, transparency and equitable distribution 
of value (Pazaitis et al. 2017a). The DG–ML model also links to the degrowth 
movement which signals a radical political and economic reorganisation lead-
ing to reduced resource and energy use (Kallis et al. 2018). 
The DG–ML model represents an on-demand distributed mode of produc-
tion that differs from mass production in scale, location, operation and con-
sumer–producer relationship. As such, it bears significant advantages: 1) it low-
ers production and transaction costs (no patent costs, no transportation and 
maintenance costs, no planned obsolescence); 2) it democratises production by 
unleashing new bottom-up forms of value creation, collaboration and techno-
social innovation; 3) it blurs production and consumption, thus empowering 
prosumers; 4) it equitably distributes value to community members; 5) it has the 
potential to enhance gender balance and non-discriminatory practices via cus-
tomisation and open access; and 6) it contributes to a sustainable and resilient 
society and economy (Kostakis et al. 2015, 126). The literature has documented 
thus far several case studies in the fields of agriculture, manufacturing and 
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 biotechnology (Kostakis et al. 2015; 2016; Giotitsas and Ramos 2017; Papadim-
itropoulos 2017). However, these do not currently pose a threat to capitalism. 
The DG–ML model is still at a preliminary stage and is premised on hypotheses 
that need to be tested empirically before it crystallises into a sustainable eco-
nomic model. Bauwens and Kostakis are aware that the DG–ML model alone 
cannot challenge capitalism. 
The principles of open cooperativism
For this reason, they endeavour (Scholz 2016b, 163–166) to address the chal-
lenges of the cooperative movement. Cooperatives tend to self-enclose around 
local or national membership, thereby losing their broader political identity 
and gradually adopting competitive mentalities. They thus risk being out-
performed and, finally, absorbed by the large corporations that dominate the 
global arena. Cooperatives also do not create, protect or produce commons, 
since they usually function under the copyright and patent system. Platform 
cooperativism improves on these deficiencies by linking to commons-based 
peer production and furthering international alliances both on the economic 
and political level. Fairmondo, for example, contributes to the commons by 
publishing its code on Github, while expanding its operating model in the UK. 
Bauwens and Kostakis (Scholz 2016b, 164) recognise that this practice needs 
to radicalise and integrate into a generalised commons-orientated transition. 
They therefore embark on merging traditional and platform co-ops with the 
commons on the model of open cooperativism. Their goal is to infuse tradi-
tional and platform co-ops with the principles of commons-based peer pro-
duction. To this end, they approach commons-based peer production as ‘a new 
logic of collaboration between networks of people who freely organise around 
a common goal using shared resources, and market orientated entities that 
add value on top of or alongside them’ (Scholz 2016b, 163). Open cooperatives 
internalise negative externalities; adopt multi-stakeholder governance models; 
contribute to the creation of material and immaterial commons; and are ori-
entated towards a global socio-economic and political transformation, albeit 
locally based. 
In contrast to the corporate strategy of planned obsolescence that renders 
resources artificially scarce, open cooperatives function under conditions of 
natural abundance where what can be shared is shared as commons. Market 
value is created from scarce resources, adding value on top of or alongside 
the abundance of the commons. Open cooperatives employ market strategies 
that recognise natural abundance and refuse to generate income and profits by 
extracting rents from artificially limited resources. 
Abundance and scarcity combine communism and reciprocity respectively. 
Under conditions of abundance, peer production satisfies the communist prin-
ciple: from each according to their ability, to each according to their need. 
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Under conditions of scarcity, peer production adopts the reciprocity principle: 
to each according to their contribution (Bauwens et al. 2019). Peer production 
often involves distributed tasks rather than fixed jobs. Compensation, thus, in 
the form of salaries may not always be the most adequate means of reward 
for those contributing to the commons. For this reason, open co-ops should 
practise open value accounting or contributory accounting in which incomes 
are distributed according to one’s contribution. In the case of Sensorica, a 
co-op that produces scientific instruments, each contributor is assigned ‘karma 
points’ (Scholz 2016b, 165). 
In addition to paid wage labour for members and contributors, value is also 
distributed via tokens of reputation that can be variously redeemed. Tokens may 
count for equity, decision-making power, property ownership or labour certifi-
cates (Rozas et al. 2018). ‘Tokenisation’ of reputation prevents the  co-optation 
of commons value by a few well-placed contributors, as in the case of plat-
form capitalism. It creates a fair immaterial value flow alongside wage labour 
rather than an unjust capitalist co-optation. Blockchain could be employed 
here to register reputation in a transparent way. One should, however, notice 
the dangers of economism and data fetishism – even robotism and automation 
– lurking behind the intent to translate everything into algorithms, numbers or 
tokens registered on Blockchain. A balance, therefore, should be kept between 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable variables. 
In contrast to imperfect market price signals and overproduction, open 
cooperatives can enhance sustainability and reduce waste by adopting 
open supply chains and open book accounting, thereby achieving greater 
coordination between supply and demand, which can in turn sustain a circu-
lar economy wherein outputs of one production process are used as inputs for 
another. ‘What market pricing is to capitalism and planning is to state-based 
production, mutual coordination is to peer production’ (Bauwens et al. 2019, 
5). Open knowledge and open design ensure further optimum participation 
through modularity and granularity.
Open co-ops adopt Copyfair licences that allow for the commercial use of 
the commons and ensure a level playing field for ethical enterprises willing 
to contribute to the commons (Bauwens et al. 2019). In contrast to Benkler’s 
optimism about the prospects of commons-based licensing, Bauwens and 
Kostakis are vigilant against the actual co-optation of cyber-communism by 
platform capitalism. They argue that the more communist the sharing licence, 
the more capitalist the practice (Bauwens and Kostakis 2014). And this is, 
indeed, what the last two decades have seen occurring in FOSS production 
(Birkinbine 2018). Existing copyleft licences (GPL, Creative Commons) are not 
sufficient for the reproduction of the commons, since they do not require reci-
procity (contributions in the form of money or know-how, resources, and so 
on). To reverse this, Bauwens and Kostakis suggest a Peer Production/Copyfair 
Licence (PPL), first designed and proposed by Kleiner (2010). Copyfair differs 
from copyleft licences in that it allows for the commercialisation of commons 
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 knowledge in exchange for rent or analogous contributions. This way, the com-
mons could secure their economic sustainability and autonomy vis-à-vis capi-
talist enterprises. 
The ecosystem of open cooperativism
Let us imagine, therefore, two overlapping platforms: the commons platform 
and (platform) capitalism. The former is based on an abundance of resources 
whereas the latter counts on scarce resources and draws on the commons on 
condition that it uses Copyfair licences, thereby establishing an open coopera-
tivism between the commons and a friendly capitalism. Bauwens and Kostakis’s 
(Bauwens et al. 2019, 6) core argument is that firms that cooperate with the 
digital commons and, therefore, have access to a vast pool of knowledge, as in 
the case of IBM, obtain a competitive advantage over proprietary firms that rely 
solely on their private R&D. The hybrid of post-capitalist commons can beat 
capitalism on its own ground: that is, competition. 
Let us take one step further and imagine the gradual consolidation of friendly 
capitalism with the commons, of scarcity with abundance. Corporations grad-
ually merge with open cooperatives built on the commons. Open cooperatives 
expand from digital infrastructures to physical ones − phygital − and achieve a 
more efficient resource use through the creation of a genuine sharing economy 
based on co-ownership, transparency, distribution of value and co-governance. 
The ideal gift economy would then be a simple mathematical function of abun-
dance and scarcity, democratically programmed to reproduce the sustainabil-
ity of the commons. Planned grassroots socialism comes into play in the form 
of open cooperativism engineered by a mix of institutional and technological 
reforms. This new ecosystem of open cooperativism comprises three institu-
tions/partners: 1) the productive community, 2) the entrepreneurial coalition 
and 3) the for-benefit association (Figure 3.1).
The productive community consists of all members, users and contributors 
of glocal commons who produce the shareable resource, either for payment or 
as volunteers. The commons-orientated entrepreneurial coalition consists of 
generative enterprises that add value to the scarce common resources. Genera-
tive enterprises contrast with extractive enterprises in that they do not seek to 
maximise profits without sufficiently reinvesting surplus in the maintenance 
of the productive communities (Figure 3.2). They integrate values such as 
sustainability, knowledge sharing, the mutualisation of infrastructure and a 
more inclusive distribution of value (Bauwens and Niaros 2017, 21). Profit is 
not central but peripheral to the social and environmental goals of the com-
munity. The best example of the difference between extractive and generative 
enterprises is industrial agriculture and permaculture. Whereas in the first case 
the soil becomes poorer and less healthy, in the latter the soil becomes richer 
and healthier. Some striking examples of extractive corporations are Facebook, 
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Uber and Airbnb, which do not share any profits with the co-creating com-
munities they depend on for their value creation and sustenance (Bauwens et 
al. 2017, 13–14). 
In the best of cases, generative enterprises identify with the productive com-
munity, which forms a meta-economic network rooted in the transition from 
community-orientated business to business-enhanced communities. Some 
prominent examples are the Catalonian Integral Cooperative or CIC (Catalo-
nia Spain), the Mutual Aid Network (Madison, Wisconsin USA) and Enspiral 
(New Zealand) (Bauwens et al. 2017, 14–15). 
Figure 3.1: The three institutions that shape the model of open cooperativism 
(Bauwens et al. 2017, 13).
Figure 3.2: The differences between extractive and generative ownership 
(Bauwens et al. 2017, 13).
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The third institution that binds together productive communities and com-
mons-orientated enterprises is the for-benefit association, which supports 
the infrastructure of commons-based peer production. In contrast to tradi-
tional non-governmental and non-profit organisations which operate under 
 conditions of scarcity, for-benefit associations operate under conditions of 
abundance. Whereas the former identify a problem and provide a solution, 
the latter maintain an infrastructure of cooperation between productive com-
munities and commons-orientated enterprises, protect the commons through 
licences, manage conflicts, fundraise, etc. (Bauwens et al. 2017, 15). For exam-
ple the Wikimedia Foundation collects the funds to support the server space 
without which access to Wikipedia would become impossible.
The WikiHouse case
In the following, I illustrate the case of WikiHouse for the purpose of exempli-
fying the model of open cooperativism. WikiHouse is an open source project 
that allows anyone to design, share, fabricate and assemble their own house 
(Priavolou 2018, 75–76). The idea is simple: globally crowdsourced and freely 
downloadable designs are used to manufacture building components locally. 
WikiHouse enables users to download Creative Commons-licensed building 
plans from its online library and customise them to create jigsaw puzzle-like 
pieces out of plywood with a CNC router. The WikiHouse project is, thus, a 
distinct example of the DG–ML model: what is light (the design templates, 
blueprints, help manuals and support) is shared globally, while what is heavy 
(cutting the wood, assembling the house) takes place locally, with improve-
ments on the design then fed back into the common-resource global pool.
WikiHouse takes levels of energy performance, quality, precision and user 
customisation that were previously prohibitively expensive, and dramatically 
lowers the factors of time, cost and difficulty. WikiHouse components can be 
digitally manufactured not just in large centralised factories, but by a distrib-
uted network of small businesses and maker-spaces using widely available tools 
and materials. This allows many companies to combine their innovations and 
create the most sustainable, low-cost building systems, based on interoperable 
standards and design principles.
The design principles of WikiHouse can be summarised as follows:9
1. Share global, manufacture local. Take something that works, copy, adapt, 
give credit and share.
2. Design for cheap, abundant, standardised, sustainable and, if possible, 
‘circular’ materials. Release small, iterate and ‘fork’.
3. Design to lower thresholds of time, cost, skill, energy and resources in 
manufacturing, assembly and use.
4. Maximise the safety, security, health and well-being (physical and mental) 
of users at all stages of a product’s life. 
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5. Design software and hardware that is modular and inclusive, whereby ele-
ments can be independently altered, substituted, mended or improved.
6. Knowledge should always be free but professionals should be paid.
7. Democracy is a good design principle that superpowers citizens.
8. All companies can participate in the WikiHouse commons, but no one 
ever gets a monopoly or lock-in.
WikiHouse’s early development was supported by an entrepreneurial coalition 
bringing together a structural engineering company (Momentum Engineer-
ing Ltd), an architectural studio (Architecture00), a multidisciplinary firm 
(Arup Associates Ltd) and a social housing company (Space Craft Systems Ltd) 
 (Priavolou 2018, 76). WikiHouse is now being developed by a passionate R&D 
community of thousands of designers, engineers, inventors, coders and social 
entrepreneurs. In 2014 the WikiHouse foundation was established as a non-
profit legal entity to maintain the commons infrastructure and open source 
licences, fundraise and coordinate cooperation between the productive com-
munity and the entrepreneurial coalition.
WikiHouse prototypes have been adopted by various communities across the 
globe (for example, Farmhouse, WikiStand and WikiTower) (Priavolou 2018, 
76). The first WikiHouse in Latin America was built in 2015 to spark interest 
in innovation in the favelas of the city of Rio de Janeiro, while the WikiLab 
project in São Paulo aims to adapt the WikiHouse technology to mild climates. 
In Europe, it is worth noting the adaptation of the WikiHouse system by an 
ongoing programme in the city of Almere in the Netherlands, where 20 pilot 
prototypes are to be built by non-professionals. The project is financed by the 
city of Almere, the national government and the province of Flevoland.
WikiHouse is a response to the failures of centralised systems and markets 
since the industrial revolution. It aims to address unsustainable, undemo-
cratic and unaffordable housing by breaking our dependence on fossil fuels 
and debt, empowering smarter citizens and building resilient communities and 
healthy, sustainable, economically productive, liveable cities. The goal is to 
build  digital tools to support a new social and economic infrastructure for 
democratic  development by diffusing sustainable housing tools to every citizen 
and  company on earth. 
The partner state and the challenges to post-capitalism
The replication of the WikiHouse model across other sectors of the economy 
could enhance the future of open cooperativism. Kostakis and Bauwens (2014; 
Bauwens et al. 2019) hold that the model of open cooperativism should scale 
up from regional to national and transnational level to establish a hegemonic 
counter-power against and beyond predatory capitalism and neoliberalism. 
At the macro-level, the three institutions of productive communities, 
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 entrepreneurial coalitions and for-benefit associations could apply to the evo-
lution of civil society, market entities and the state respectively. They portray a 
 post-democratic model of power distributed in a meritocratic, stigmergic and 
negotiated  coordination that thrashes out differences and designs away ‘unnec-
essary’ conflict by allowing for the maximum human freedom compatible with 
the object of cooperation (Bauwens 2012). The for-benefit association, in par-
ticular, could be considered a snapshot of a future partner state, which could 
facilitate commons-orientated production. A number of ‘partner cities’ such as 
Barcelona, Ghent, Bologna and Napoli already support and guide various urban 
commons in the fields of mobility, shelter, food, energy and culture through 
public–common partnerships (Bauwens and Niaros 2017). The  ultimate goal 
would be the transition from urban commons to the city as commons (Foster 
and Iaione 2016).
The role of the partner state is of paramount importance, since it could boost 
the transition from capitalism to the commons through a de- bureaucratisation 
and commonification of the public sector with the aim of sustaining an open 
cooperativism between the commons and ethical market entities willing to 
minimise negative social and environmental externalities. To this end, taxation 
of social/environmental entrepreneurship, ethical investing and  productive 
labour should be minimised, whereas taxation of speculative, unproductive 
investments, unproductive rental income and negative social and environ-
mental externalities should be increased (Bauwens 2014; Bauwens et al. 2016; 
Kostakis and Bauwens 2014, 66–67). In addition, education and publicly funded 
research and innovation could be aligned with the commons-orientated eco-
nomic model (Kostakis and Bauwens 2014, 68). 
The last decades have witnessed the dominance of a neoliberal narrative lim-
iting the state to the role of regulator. When this is not the case, political discus-
sion revolves around a liberal or social democratic narrative focusing on issues 
of fair competition, new labour regulation, lifelong learning and training, the 
green economy, work security, trade unions, minimum wages, and so on. 
Bauwens and Kostakis, on the other hand, argue that it is necessary to move 
away both from a distributionist welfare state and a neoliberal state by estab-
lishing mini-states of commons-based peer production ecosystems steered by a 
commons-centric partner state that implements direct democratic procedures 
and practices (Bauwens and Kostakis 2017b). Likewise, leftist or post-Keynesian 
versions of the state focusing solely on taxation, public investment, public own-
ership and capital controls should be ‘updated’ according to the principles of 
the commons. 
To sum up, Bauwens and Kostakis’s model constitutes a strategy, which is 
both reformist and revolutionary, aiming to transform the current politico-
economic system towards the creation of a commons-orientated ethical econ-
omy based on a democratic self-institutionalisation of society. It champions 
a post-capitalist model of open cooperation with a friendly capital willing to 
adjust in the long run to a commons-centric society.
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Jacob Rigi (2014) has argued that by embracing a sort of ‘corporate com-
mons’, as in the case of IBM investing in open source software, Bauwens and 
Kostakis reproduce capitalist exploitation inasmuch as they adhere to the capi-
talist categories of the market, commodity, surplus value, profit and capital. The 
commons exploit their contributors by renting their surplus value to capital-
ism. But this argument is not valid, given that profit is redistributed within the 
commons. Bauwens and Kostakis conceive of the commons as entrepreneurial 
projects operating in terms of the medieval guilds or the Enspiral project (Paza-
itis et al. 2017b), which externally trade their goods in the marketplace, while 
acting internally as solidarity systems redistributing their income in new pro-
jects through a collaborative funding process. 
Bauwens and Kostakis admit that capital flows towards peer production 
might distort the commons. However, friendly capital provides the means for 
undermining capitalism itself. Capital investment is a necessary condition 
for commons sustainability. One should also notice that Bauwens and Kostakis 
are introducing Copyfair with the aim not of selling but of renting commons 
knowledge. Instead of predatory capital free-riding on the commons, friendly 
capital would circulate within the commons with the aim of securing the repro-
duction of the latter. In any case, the transvestment of value (Kleiner 2010) 
from capitalism to the commons is unavoidable in any scenario involving a 
future transition to the commons, whether reformist, revolutionary or state-
driven. Expropriated surplus value returns to the ‘production source’. 
Bauwens and Kostakis’s model of open cooperativism echoes in a sense 
Cornelius Castoriadis’s project of individual and collective autonomy. Like 
Bauwens and Kostakis, Castoriadis was arguing for the democratic self- 
institutionalisation of society via the establishment of regimes of direct democ-
racy, implemented first and foremost at the level of production and expanding 
accordingly to all levels of society (Castoriadis 1988). But whereas Castoriadis 
was against any sort of state- or market-driven reformism, Bauwens and Kosta-
kis aim to reform capitalism into a commons-orientated civil society through 
the establishment of a post-capitalist economy built around the commons, 
ethical market entities and a partner state. Bauwens and Kostakis’s less radi-
cal stance makes sense, since capitalism and the state are not going to wither 
away any time soon – if at all. Occasional deals with capitalism and the state 
are unavoidable even in the most radical and revolutionary options for a com-
mons transition. Bauwens and Kostakis’s project could read as a technological 
‘update’ of Habermas’s model of deliberative democracy. Yet, contrary to the 
liberal premises of Habermas’s theory, commons-based peer production is not 
a third institutional force merely adding up to state and market operation, but a 
quasi-autonomous socio-economic model aiming to gradually absorb both the 
state and the market in its operation. 
Bauwens and Kostakis have succeeded in connecting local and global com-
mons via digital platforms that bear the potential to promote self-governance, 
cooperation, innovation, sustainability and distribution of value. The virtue of 
their work is that they have introduced a model of self-institutionalisation 
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of civil society, comprising both state and market mechanisms along  democratic, 
ethical and ecological lines. They advocate a global, decentralised and mutually 
coordinated open cooperativism facilitated by ICTs. They thus intend to beat 
capitalism on its own ground by competing in terms of self-management fos-
tered by eco-technological and economic hacks, which seems, indeed, a plau-
sible strategy. Bauwens and Kostakis employ a high-tech rationale to produce 
a concrete plan of transforming capitalism from within. Yet this is not enough. 
The commons are still in their infancy and face numerous barriers and contra-
dictions owing to the global dominance of surveillance capitalism (Papadimi-
tropoulos 2018b). It is reasonable to assume that the commons cannot compete 
with the behemoths of capitalism on various grounds: economic and politi-
cal power, know-how, infrastructure, skills, etc. Bauwens and Kostakis’s model 
needs a more vibrant political spin to propel a post-hegemonic strategy aimed 
at politically combatting capitalism and reaching a critical mass. It requires 
centrally coordinated macro-policies to apply the principles of the commons 
at a local, regional, national and international level in a mission to reverse the 
current tide of neoliberalism towards a commons-orientated transition. This 
could be achieved by a partner state embracing the principles of the commons 
more openly. 
3.6 DECODE: A Multidisciplinary Framework  
for the Commons 
It is worth mentioning here a groundbreaking research project that has con-
tributed to the creation of a multidisciplinary framework for the commons 
from the perspective of open data. DECODE (Decentralised Citizen Owned 
Data Ecosystems) was funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research 
and innovation programme during the period 2017–19 to develop technol-
ogy (applications of Blockchain and the Internet of Things) that puts people 
in control of their personal data and paves the way for the creation of a ‘data 
commons’.10 DECODE has introduced an alternative to surveillance capitalism 
by building privacy-enhancing and rights-preserving data infrastructures in 
 Barcelona and Amsterdam with the aim of giving back data sovereignty to citi-
zens and creating public value with data. One could read the DECODE project 
as an attempt to expand Ostrom’s ‘bundle of rights’ on or to the digital land-
scape by designing a set of economic, eco-social, legal and technical tools to 
support new decentralised technologies, democratic e-governance and alterna-
tive business models, which treat data as a common good (Morell et al. 2017, 8). 
Part of the DECODE project was to conduct research (literature review, digital 
ethnography, co-creation sessions, interviews) on the commons with the aim of 
checking the applicability of the commons principles (democratic governance, 
openness, transparency, sustainability) through a sample of one hundred cases 
located in the city of Barcelona (Morell et al. 2017, 16). The sample reflected the 
heterogeneity of the commons, taking into account cases  involving different 
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types of actors (public administration, companies, cooperatives, communities 
without legal format), in diverse areas (cultural, tourism, mobility), with dif-
ferent goals (knowledge co-creation, community engagement, business) and 
economic models (profit and non-profit orientated). By mapping a vast num-
ber of cases, DECODE has offered one of the most systematic classifications of 
the commons, thereby: 
1. expanding the geographical and empirical base of the literature;
2. providing insights into the design and performance of the commons 
from the perspective of their economic, social and environmental 
sustainability;
3. helping advance commons-based peer production on the models of 
platform and open cooperativism.
DECODE has articulated the commons principles along four dimensions: 
governance, economic model, knowledge/technology policy and sustainabil-
ity (Table 3.1). The ways in which the commons principles combine with the 
above four dimensions create a variety of open commons-based business mod-
els classified into four families of digital content commons or data commons 
(Table 3.2) and five families of open data (Table 3.3). The term ‘family’ indi-
cates the proximity and interrelation of different business models. A business 
model ‘describes the distinctive and fundamental principles and mechanisms 
by which an organisation deploys a strategy to create, sell and use values (of 
use and exchange) in order to fulfil its primary goals’ (Harracá 2017, 9). Open 
business models can be understood as those models that encourage sharing 
of knowledge under open licences, whether free or with some rights reserved 
(Tebbens 2017). Open data and the commons are not always identical. Open 
data and the commons have in common that anyone can access, use or share 
the data/content under certain licences. Open data are a subset of the commons 
most of the time. However, there are cases where not all open data is produced 
as a common (i.e. private firms), and some data can be common but not open 
to all (i.e. Good Data) (Morell et al. 2017, 52). 
Table 3.1: Dimensions of commons principles (adapted from Morell et al. 
2017, 16).
Dimensions Principles
governance model cooperative, foundation, openness in participation
economic model non-profit, transparency
knowledge/technology policy open content, open data, FOSS,  decentralised
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The tables shown here demonstrate that the commons experience a variety 
of business models, with some cases fully adhering to the commons princi-
ples, and others combining commons-based peer production with firm-hosted 
peer production, community governance with centralised governance, open 
licences with proprietary licences, and so on. Different types of commons – 
from digitally supported natural commons and platform cooperatives to open 
data and the digital commons – have particularities, thus bearing some intrin-
sic possibilities with regard to the business models that can be developed to 
ensure their sustainability. Different business models apply to different types of 
commons. To mention some examples: 
• In general, digital commons and/or digitally supported commons have 
 created new logics of value creation and business model possibilities 
that are not present in the natural-resources-based commons such as 
gardens or summer meadows. Digital commons cannot sell their content, 
but they can leverage it to create revenue or they can sell advertising space 
and  sponsorship. 
• Crowdsourcing and donations, as sources of revenue, may be more success-
ful when a project is supported by a broader community as in the case of 
Wikipedia and Mozilla Firefox. 
• Unlike FOSS, open hardware commons can sell hardware. But open hard-
ware commons face non-negligible marginal costs included in the produc-
tion and distribution of physical goods. The materiality of hardware does 
not allow for the freemium and premium strategy that FOSS has recourse to. 
Some firms can, instead, produce a product with a free licence and another 
product with a proprietary licence. In terms of the mode of production and 
governance, commons-based peer production is often only possible at the 
design stage. The complexity of the manufacturing, delivery and quality-
control phases may require managerial coordination by firms. 
• Subscriptions and transaction fees are the most common ways of obtaining 
revenue for platform cooperatives due to their crucial role in coordinating 
diverse activities such as the selling of products and the renting of different 
professional services (for example, Stocksy, Fairmondo, Loconomics).
• When a platform is under an open licence it can easily be replicated, which 
poses a threat to the community, since its value-creation tool can be co-
opted by other communities or profit-orientated firms. On the flipside, 
when the common produced is platform-based and material, licensing can 
be less of restriction with regard to potential revenue models (Morell et al. 
2017, 51). 
Overall, the above tables help systematise the main features that define the 
compatibility of open business models with the commons and identify further 
the right choices regarding the sustainability of the common in question. They 
help envisage a model of open cooperativism that deploys a number of business 
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models and incorporates a multitude of communities and organisations in a 
mission to further expand commons-based peer production. Yet the sustain-
ability of the commons relies on other factors apart from the business model 
such as democratic governance, social and gender inclusion and the environ-
mental impact of the commons. Access to finance, legal regulation and compet-
itive dynamics with capitalist firms can also profoundly affect the sustainability 
of a common. Whence, the need for a holistic, multidisciplinary framework 
that integrates commons sustainability into a post-hegemonic political strategy 
capable of encompassing the various dimensions of the commons under com-
mons governance. 
3.7 Productive Publics
Arvidsson and Peitersen draw on Benkler’s conceptualisation of the digital 
commons as a decentralised mode of social production to develop in tune with 
Bauwens and Kostakis a post-capitalist theory of value. Similarly to Bauwens 
and Kostakis, they hold that the suicidal contradictions of capitalism, counter-
vailed by the commons, can pave the way for the creation of an ethical economy 
immanent in the technological evolution of the factors (means and relations) of 
production, as Marx would have it (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013, viii). They 
suggest that the necessary precondition for the realisation of an ethical econ-
omy is the construction of a new public sphere articulated on the productive 
publics built around the commons. 
Productive publics, a fundamental building block of the ethical econ-
omy, are voluntary associations of strangers, who are united by their 
devotion to a common project or pursuit, like open source software, 
urban agriculture or Ducati motorcycles. In recent years such produc-
tive publics have become an important source of value creation, both 
inside and outside corporate organisations. (Arvidsson and Peitersen 
2013, 49)
Arvidsson and Peitersen depart from Gabriel Tarde’s concept of ‘publics’ to 
distinguish between publics and communities. Whereas the term ‘community’ 
signifies a social structure consisting of dense webs of interpersonal interac-
tion and a durable attachment to a shared identity, the term ‘public’ refers to 
an association of strangers, united by an affective attachment to a common 
thing or representation, be it a brand, an artist or an idea (Arvidsson and Peit-
ersen 2013, 66–71; Arvidsson 2013, 374). Publics are temporary and transitory 
forms of association and, therefore, weaker and less enduring than communi-
ties. They are self-organised entities governed by a particular discourse centred 
around a common set of values. Publics sustain communalities without com-
munities. They are held together by what Cornelius Castoriadis and Charles 
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Taylor call a social imaginary, that is, a general affective representation corre-
sponding to a symbolic signification, be it socialism, capitalism, Christianity, a 
brand, a group, and so on. 
The term ‘publics’ resembles the term ‘multitude’ introduced by Hardt and 
Negri (2004) to denote the spontaneous coalescence of dispersed subjectivities, 
collectivities and movements around the creation of common wealth. Arvidsson 
and Peitersen use both terms interchangeably to refer to the socialisation of 
production from the 1970s onwards, marking the era of post-Fordism. Infor-
mation and communication technologies have permitted the displacement of 
large factories and vertically integrated corporations by networks of small pro-
ducers scattered across the globe, and the subsequent diffusion of social capital, 
blurring productive and non-productive activities both inside and outside the 
corporation (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013, 29, 49). 
Inside the corporation, social media and mobile devices have supported the 
creation of inter- or intra-firm networks of productive publics that facilitate 
knowledge sharing and collective innovation processes among employees. 
The key to gaining competitive advantage has shifted from merely increas-
ing  productivity to facilitating the flow of knowledge within organisations. 
 Accordingly, a brand is not only a symbol of a product, but also a common 
ethos, uniting employees, consumers, managers and investors around a com-
mon purpose. Companies such as Apple, Google and IBM depend on social-
ised innovation communities for their business models. The strategic source 
of profits and competitive advantage moves from material production per se 
to the capacity for brand innovation and flexibility (Arvidsson and Peitersen 
2013, 31–32).
At the intersection of corporations and civil society, the rise of productive 
publics is driven by the delinking of identity from rigid structures and hier-
archies, as evidenced in the so-called participatory culture: consumer tribes 
or ‘brand communities’; fan culture, mods, hippies, hipsters, artists and bohe-
mians introducing street fashion and new artistic styles; prosumer practices 
and a DIY movement leading on the hackers of the open source movement; 
the expansion and intensification of political activism and new social move-
ments; an emerging social entrepreneurship and global solidarity movement; 
new forms of spirituality and body practices such as yoga, jogging, macrobiotic 
foods and a host of alternative lifestyles. In short, the rise of social production 
is a reactivation of civil society, sparked by networked media along with higher 
rates of education that generates a multitude of expressions, competencies and 
knowledge skills (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013, 72).
The ontological relativism of postmodernism combined with the outsourcing 
of capitalist production across the globe has resulted in the individualisation of 
‘produsage’ and the fragmentation of ethical horizons, both hailed by neoliber-
alism as hallmarks of freedom, pointing in the direction of more autonomous 
markets, in which everybody could become an entrepreneur. Digitisation has 
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transformed traditional capitalism into cognitive capitalism, where information 
and knowledge have become the primary resources of value. Financialisation, 
finally, is supposed to democratise investment and, therefore, boost productiv-
ity and inclusive growth. 
However, like Bauwens and Kostakis, Arvidsson and Peitersen argue that 
productive publics create a diverse order of worth, a multitude of values, which 
cannot be monetised as such, thus causing a crisis of value for both capitalism 
and the commons. Corporations attempt to accommodate this diverse order 
of worth by turning ethics, sustainability and social responsibility into market-
ing opportunities, while investing in user-led innovation projects that directly 
include consumer creativity in the corporate value chain. Yet finance lacks a 
common standard to measure this diverse order of worth. 
Arvidsson and Peitersen interpret this lack as an irrationality featuring both 
in Marxist and neoclassical economics, since neither the labour theory of value 
nor the subsumption of value under price can account for an objective measure 
of value. A surplus of value permeating both capitalism and the commons con-
stantly escapes monetisation. The value crisis is not only economic, but ethi-
cal and political. Following Habermas, Arvidsson and Peitersen (2013, 5–6) 
describe a legitimisation crisis, which reduces economics, ethics and politics 
into a more or less corrupt bargaining between particular interests or the naked 
exercise of raw power. 
3.7.1 Revisioning Value in Terms of the General Sentiment
Let us take a step back and consider first what is value. In economics, there are 
two basic answers: the Marxist/classical and the neoclassical. Classical econo-
mists such as Ricardo, Marx and Smith defined value in terms of the time spent 
in the production of one unit. A car is more expensive than a chair, because 
of the larger amount of time invested in its production. On the other hand, 
neoclassical economics subsumes value under price on the grounds that any 
attempt to assign an objective measure to value is metaphysical (Arvidsson and 
Peitersen 2013, 10–12). Market prices by definition reflect all the information 
necessary, transforming uncertainty into calculable risk. 
Arvidsson and Peitersen consider both approaches outdated. The classical 
theory is today obsolete for two basic reasons: first, labour costs are a small 
share of total production costs (for example, machinery, logistics, patents, 
intangibles) and, second, the production of intangible assets, that is, brand 
innovation and flexibility, does not exhibit a linear relation to the amount of 
time invested in production per unit. Non-linearity translates into the auton-
omisation of finance compared to real production (Arvidsson and Peitersen 
2013, 37–38). The becoming complex of labour is evident even within Marx-
ist thought, where the so-called ‘transformation problem’ remains unresolved, 
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namely how socially abstract labour, that is, the average labour time needed to 
produce a commodity, corresponds to empirically observable prices. The neo-
classical definition of value is also misleading, since the calculative frames of 
finance, employed to project the future performance of brands, products, cor-
porations and states, are to some extent speculative and corrupt.
Arvidsson and Peitersen combine key concepts from various thinkers to 
introduce a new value regime inherent in productive publics. To begin with, 
the evolution of collective intelligence corresponds to what Marx called the 
‘general intellect’, that is, publicly available knowledge and skills, which surpass 
the factory’s borders, undermining the very existence of capitalism by render-
ing traditional labour obsolete (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013, 35). Hardt and 
Negri argue that this is the case now in cognitive/information capitalism. They 
claim that the labour theory of value does not hold today. They reintroduce 
the transformation problem by the back door of Spinoza’s Ethics, to argue that 
value is the ‘power to act’, that is, the power to utilise all the resources available 
to the multitude for its own ends. Hardt and Negri (2000, 29) incorporate into 
their analysis the Foucaultian notion of biopolitics, according to which power 
expands from the factory into psyche, the body and the entirety of social rela-
tions. Biopolitics combine with Deleuze and Guattari’s poststructuralist notion 
of biopower to stress the social reproduction of bodies, values, relations and 
affects beyond the factory setting (Hardt and Negri 2000, 28).
Hardt and Negri build on the concept of ‘immaterial labour’ introduced 
by Maurizio Lazzarato and Paolo Virno to argue that value is immeasurable. 
Immaterial labour breaks down into two basic components: 1) the production 
and manipulation of affects, requiring (virtual or actual) human contact, labour 
in the bodily mode; and 2) the automation and commoditisation of cognitive 
knowledge by ICTs (Hardt and Negri 2000, 293). In short, immaterial labour 
consists in an affective/cognitive dimension expanding from material 
labour employed in the factory setting into society as a whole. As such, imma-
terial labour cannot be measured in time units, since it introduces a creative/
subjective/qualitative dimension capitalised par excellence by finance. 
Tiziana Terranova (2004) draws on the tradition of Italian ‘autonomist’ 
Marxism to coin the term ‘free labour’, which represents the most extreme 
development of the capitalist ‘subsumption of life’, along with being the most 
promising candidate for the negation of the capitalist order overall. To address 
the inadequacy of the labour theory of value to account for the capitalist ‘sub-
sumption of life’, a number of Marxist and post-Marxist observers call for the 
cyber- communism of a value-free system of production and distribution, 
imagining a ‘circulation of commons’ of non-proprietary resources that are 
freely and openly available for appropriation (Dyer-Witheford 2006; Bauwens 
2005). Bauwens and Kostakis’s work could be considered an exemplary version 
of the circulation of the commons alongside post-capitalist production.
Arvidsson (2009) holds that the value crisis of contemporary capitalism does 
not entail the ‘end of value’ and the miraculous transition to cyber-communism, 
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but, more likely, it opens up the possibility of alternative standards of value, 
since immaterial and free labour circulate in productive publics. Arvidsson 
and Peitersen consider the term ‘labour’ outdated, given the non-linearity 
between productivity measured in time units and prosumer practices in pro-
ductive publics. They do not suggest that labour has ‘disappeared’ or ‘no longer 
counts’, but that it insignificantly relates to quanta of time, since most profit is 
generated in finance. 
To further demonstrate their theory, Arvidsson and Peitersen (2013) com-
bine Aristotle’s ‘ethics’ with Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘action’. Arendt (1958) 
distinguishes between labour, work and action. Labour is the human activity 
motivated by necessity, whereas work is action driven by self-expression and 
will. Action, finally, is the construction of a common world together. There-
fore, participation in productive publics should be understood as a combina-
tion of work and action. Whereas the value of labour is set according to the 
fixed external parameters of time or productivity, the value of work and action 
is set according to the reputation of the participants in a particular public. 
 ‘Reputation is an inter-subjective measure of excellence, the criteria of which 
are themselves inter-subjectively elaborated: they depend on the “orders of 
worth” that are contained in the ethos of a particular public’ (Arvidsson and 
Peitersen 2013, 88). For Aristotle, on whose thought Arendt builds, action 
relates to  virtue, that is, the ability to adapt and live well with others. It is not 
enough, therefore, for a craftsman to perform excellent work, but she needs 
also to exhibit the  virtuous character of the social individual, always seeking 
moderation between two extremes of action (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013, 
90). Ethics is not primarily about choosing ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in terms of a Kantian 
universal moral standard. Rather it is about finding ways for free men to con-
struct a viable community (polis). 
Accordingly, Arvidsson and Peitersen (2013, 91) conceive of reputation in 
productive publics as combining both the excellent skills of the participants 
and their virtue to act in ways that reproduce the vitality of the public. For 
example, in FOSS development, software developers are judged not only by 
their ability to write ‘beautiful code’, but also to solve conflicts, socialise new 
members and contribute to the reproduction of the public in general. Simi-
larly, participation in productive publics is not conditioned exclusively by self-
interest, but by the desire to create meaningful ties with others. With Aristotle 
in mind, Arvidsson and Peitersen use the term ‘philia’ to refer to the socially 
recognised self-realisation of the participants in productive publics. Reputa-
tion, thus, builds upon an ethical capital that can be redeemed in a variety of 
ways (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013, 106). But still there is a lack of a common 
standard to measure reputations circulating in different publics and compare 
them against each other.
Arvidsson and Peitersen draw on Negri (1999) to argue that the universal 
measure of value in the new reputation economy of productive publics could 
be the affect circulating through social media and monetised by finance. Social 
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media introduce an objectification of ‘networked’ subjectivity by measuring 
public affect and providing reputation metrics through data-mining techniques 
such as network and sentiment analysis. Finance produces value by transforming 
affect into a convention based on an interpretation that reduces complexity. 
Value is the affective investment of the public (employees, prosumers,  investors, 
activists, citizens) in the intersubjective creation of ‘truth, beauty and utility’, 
as embedded in the economy. Thus, affect could become the new general 
equivalent of value in the form of the ‘general sentiment’, which consists in 
aggregations of subjective affective investments that derive from a multitude of 
different actors. ‘A new standard like the general sentiment would further con-
tribute to connecting such diverse publics into a “networked multitude,” able 
to set its own values and, as a consequence, make the process more rational’ 
(Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013, 127–128). 
3.7.2 The Politics of Productive Publics
Arvidsson and Peitersen do not expect the prices of assets simply to reflect the 
general sentiment. The relation of pricing decisions and the general sentiment 
depends on the political design of the technological infrastructures that are to 
sustain the productive publics. The general sentiment is merely a bottom-up 
sensor of civil society’s ethical pluralism that presumably contains the seeds of 
a new rationality, culminating in a new ideal speech-act situation, as Habermas 
would have it. Following Habermas, Arvidsson and Peitersen demonstrate a 
technologically updated affective transformation of the public sphere, which 
aims to bring together politics, civil society and capitalism under a more 
rational, ethical and democratic negotiation of value.
Arvidsson, Bauwens and Peitersen (2008, 17–18) envision three different 
scenarios for the future development of the ethical economy, which could be 
considered either separately or in tandem. The first scenario comes in two ver-
sions. The first is pretty much the perpetuation of the present state of affairs, 
where the ethical economy represents a niche within a predominantly capitalist 
economy. The second version corresponds to a form of ‘information feudalism’, 
where corporations use all legal and technical means to reinforce their rights 
to immaterial production and data usage. In this version, the ethical economy 
is used as a source of free or cheap labour, as in the case of platform capitalism.
In the second scenario, the ethical economy would have become sustainable 
perhaps through a basic income scheme, extended public funding, friendly 
capital or through the proliferation of collaborative practices. But still, the ethi-
cal economy would be subordinate to a dominant capitalist economy. 
In the third scenario, the ethical economy becomes the dominant system. 
Ethical-market formats such as social entrepreneurship, platform cooperativism 
and global–local cyber-collectives have moved to centre stage and capitalism 
shrinks to the production of mostly scarce material goods. This scenario 
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 presupposes that the ethical economy has obtained a competitive advantage 
over capitalism, having transformed into a more sustainable socio-economic 
model compared with for-profit enterprises. 
This transition, however, requires the establishment of an institutional infra-
structure that could support a more ethical, rational and democratic way of 
reconnecting the economy to society. To this end, Arvidsson and Peitersen (2013, 
125–131) introduce the politics of standards whereby the widespread capacity 
to construct technological interfaces would be anchored in the  transparent rep-
resentation of the dynamic and universal expression of the  ‘networked’ multi-
tude of publics who contribute to the formation of the general sentiment. They 
take a stand for an open and neutral Internet to be defended by traditional 
parliamentary politics that can secure the kinds of legal frameworks neces-
sary to facilitate the construction of the new public sphere. Like Bauwens and 
Kostakis, they call for the adoption of open protocols, open supply chains 
and open book accounting. Yet Arvidsson and Peitersen acknowledge the fact 
that the neutrality of the Internet is currently under threat from political and 
commercial forces that are planning to impose biased standards in favour of 
their commercial interests. Besides, social media platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter have little interest in providing open access to data on their traffic. 
Furthermore, current plans for the next generation of the Internet of Things 
tend to privilege closed standards. To prevent this, Arvidsson and Peitersen 
advocate for traditional political lobbying and activism to safeguard network 
neutrality and regulate social media companies. Their ultimate goal would be a 
global New Deal around sustainability and social responsibility.
3.7.3 Critique of Productive Publics
This reformist approach is not enough, however, to support the commons. Civil 
society is by and large colonised by the system, as Habermas would have it, 
or mesmerised by the rational mastery of capitalism, in the words of Casto-
riadis. The romantic reconciliation of affect with the Enlightenment commit-
ment to rationality and measurement bears little resemblance to the current 
status of the commons, which are largely co-opted by capitalism. Platform 
capitalism revolves around a group of corporations that control informa-
tion and have gained disproportionate market power, with the economy as a 
whole  experiencing a gaping inequality in the last decades, exacerbated during 
the post-crisis period by state policies such as fiscal retrenchment and quantita-
tive easing (Stiglitz 2016). And while it is perfectly reasonable to level the play-
ing field by distributing value among economic actors, Arvidsson and Peitersen 
cannot rely on a vague mix of lobbying, activism, grassroots spontaneity and 
corporate social responsibility. By blindly integrating the commons into the 
hybrid of productive publics, the latter encompassing ‘corporate communities’ 
with civil society initiatives, not only do Arvidsson and Peitersen neglect the 
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immense power asymmetries and income inequalities prevalent in capitalism, 
they also hide the exploitation inherent in both waged and unwaged offline and 
online activity. By advocating the financialisation of affect through the use of 
social media, they expand economism across the social factory. Rather than 
rendering affect the primary sensor of society, they render quantification the 
primary indicator of affect, thereby perpetuating the alienation of humankind 
via the calculative logic of capitalism. Put simply, they reproduce the neoclassi-
cal dictum that value equals numbers. 
Arvidsson and Peitersen bypass the fact that we are already experiencing a 
state of ‘information feudalism’, where firms and corporations make billions 
out of monetising users’ personal data and online activity. As mentioned 
earlier, Fuchs holds that the use value produced in social networking and 
search engines transforms into a surplus value for the social media corpora-
tions,  sustaining new forms of exploitation in the contemporary information 
economy. Exploitation expands from social media companies to capitalism 
as a whole, since digital labour comprises waged and unwaged labour, span-
ning across the globe (Fuchs 2014). From slave mineral workers working at 
 gunpoint in Africa and workers at Foxconn working long hours and unpaid 
overtime, to assemblers in Silicon Valley who are exposed to toxic substances 
and software engineers at Google who are highly stressed and overworked, pro-
letarians evolve into cybertarians, precariats, underpaid workers and prosum-
ers, subordinated to the few highly paid executives and freelancers benefiting 
from skills-biased technological change. The contemporary proletarianisation 
of the global workforce is encapsulated in Dyer-Witheford’s (2015) concept of 
the global cyber-proletariat. 
Rigi and Prey (2015) engage in the discussion to criticise both Arvidsson 
and Fuchs. Following Marx, they argue that information, knowledge and affect, 
when not exchanged with capital (as in the case of software, services, teach-
ing, nursing, etc.), do not produce exchange value, since they can be repro-
duced at near-zero cost. Therefore, information, knowledge and affect have 
only use value, which can be commoditised in the form of monopoly rent as 
in the case of personal data extracted by corporations from social media and 
search engines. When Fuchs states that Internet users produce surplus value 
exploited by corporations, this is due to a misunderstanding of Marx. The same 
holds true for Arvidsson who claims that labour time is irrelevant in the case of 
social media, since most of their value derives from the production of affective 
relations – the so-called philia – commoditised in the form of rent and finance 
capital. But profit in the form of rent, Rigi and Prey argue, is a transformation 
of surplus value from other sectors of the economy and, therefore, labour time. 
Marx’s labour theory of value is indispensable for understanding digital labour, 
given that surplus value transforms into profit, rent and interest. Therefore, 
the immaterial labour of the multitude upon which both Fuchs and Arvidsson 
build their arguments cannot but produce measurable common wealth either 
in the form of direct exchange value or rent extraction. 
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Rigi and Prey, however, do not clearly see that the Marxian concept of labour 
as commodity underestimates the basic contradiction of capitalism, that is, 
the division between directors and executants. Bowles and Gintis (1980) and 
Castoriadis (1988, 242–258) have shown that labour is a field of class struggle 
structured by the social relations of capitalist production. Neither labour power 
nor prices can be determined by an ‘objective’ economic law. Capitalism is not 
a strictly rational economic system, since there can be no rigorous economic 
science. The determination of capital and labour costs is a complex function 
of numerous indeterminate variables such as ideology, speculation, technical 
change, consumer choice, politics, and so on. Capitalism is the realm of con-
tinuous bargaining and power games between buyers, sellers, companies and 
governments. Thus, the development of the capitalist economy is pretty much 
unaffected by production costs, market equilibria or perfect information, since 
price signals reflect uneven supply and demand. In other words, power, as the 
force to make people do or not do what they otherwise would not do or do, is 
the primary determinant of value produced by labour and exploited by capital. 
The political, thus, comes into play in terms of class struggle, conflict, antago-
nism and power structures.
Capitalism is an evolving system whose main factor of transformation is class 
struggle. While Arvidsson and Peitersen recognise the potential of the com-
mons to subvert the capitalist order, they hesitate to do so. Affection, grassroots 
democracy, transparency and self-realisation remain empty shells if not accom-
panied by the abolition of the distinction between directors and executants 
and the establishment of the self-instituting power of the people exercised 
beyond the bureaucratic hierarchies of corporations and states. If the main 
issue at stake is the elimination of the repressive reality of capitalism, the reduc-
tion of necessary working time to a minimum and the maximisation of ‘free’ 
time, the eroticisation of society and the body and the shaping of society and 
humans by Eros, and the emergence of affective social relations, then politics 
should rather integrate economic value into the social imaginary of peer-to-
peer relations. To this end, concrete policies need to build on best collaborative 
practices to subsume the economy under democratic self-management.
3.8 Digital Distributism
Douglas Rushkoff ’s work could be read both as a critique and an optimisation 
of Arvidsson and Peitersen’s productive publics, as he provides a more nuanced 
illustration of the interlinking between technology and economy. He concurs 
with Bauwens and Kostakis’s thesis that corporatism is caught up in a growth trap 
inasmuch as it aims at infinite growth on a finite planet. Rushkoff reiterates the 
claim that we are today on the verge of a structural breakdown, as  corporatism 
– backed by digital industrialism – runs out of places from which to extract 
value for growth. This last statement reasserts Harvey’s (2010, 30) observation 
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that 3% growth in perpetuity is running into serious environmental, market, 
spatial and profitability constraints. At the same time, financialisation has led to 
a significant disconnect between capital and real value. As a result, Schumpeter’s 
creative destruction process may turn into a destructive destruction, pushing 
corporatism towards hybrid business models that favour a more sustainable and 
social approach to enterprise (Rushkoff 2016, 100). Rushkoff (2016, 98) wonders 
whether this is a cycle repeating itself or a unique and unprecedented challenge 
to our economic operating system. This consideration is all the more important 
in the case of digital industrialism, which aims at putting humans out of the 
equation, with the danger of a permanent consumer shortage. 
Industrialism dates back to the end of feudalism and the birth of capitalism, 
which was financed by the aristocracy to usurp the power of the bourgeoisie 
(Rushkoff 2016, 18–22). By ‘bourgeoisie’ Rushkoff refers to the middle class 
of merchants, craftsmen and the petty bourgeois of small peasant proprietors, 
who sprang up in the medieval burgesses. Industrialism’s primary intent was 
to subvert the rise of the middle class, the guilds and their peer-to-peer mar-
ket system through the introduction of mass production, which disempowers 
craftsmen by disconnecting them from their skills and value creation. Capital-
ism is the product of the revolution of the rich against the rising middle class.
3.8.1 Digital Industrialism and Artificial Intelligence
Digital industrialism is to some extent the continuing proletarianisation of 
large segments of society by new technological means. The digital market-
place works on a power-law dynamic, creating a winner-takes-all disparity. The 
rule is that roughly 80% of sales come from 20% of products. When a bricks-
and-mortar CD store plays a particular song that also takes the form of an 
online recommendation on a website, this recommendation leads to increased 
sales, which reproduces a feedback loop of the same or similar songs. People 
tend to choose what other people have chosen first, and this consumer behav-
iour is then amplified by machines at the expense of all other choices. This is 
not merely a distortion promoted by the biggest distribution platforms, from 
Amazon and iTunes to Spotify and Netflix, as Rushkoff (2016, 28–30) suggests, 
but is a masterfully orchestrated manipulation of taste by the marketing depart-
ments of corporations, aiming to reproduce the likes of the ‘mainstream’ com-
mercial platforms, which in turn sell ‘mainstream’ consumers to advertising 
agencies. It is the self-perpetuating spiral of mass culture serving the interests 
of a liberal oligarchy, masked by the illusion of pluralism and freedom of choice. 
By this I do not intend to diminish the rapid expansion of creativity during the 
last decades, supported by the Internet. I merely want to stress its unfair dis-
tribution by mass media. The Internet follows suit by training people to accept 
the two or three choices at the top of popularity lists. The 80/20 ratio applies 
to every creative industry, from books, music and movies to smartphone apps.
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Digital industrialism is crowdsourced to prosumers who produce an economy 
of likes by surfing the Internet, pushing buttons, and creating reviews, com-
ments and the like. Big data turns the Internet into an advertising real estate. 
Big data fuels the customisation of demand by advertisers and marketers, who 
count on analytics to successfully predict buying intentions. The Internet and 
social media serve as agencies of attention and reputation. But only celebrities 
and superstars can handsomely redeem their accumulated reputational cur-
rency through social branding. Everyone else is a mere appendage of big data 
production, benefiting from the services provided by search engines and social 
media in exchange for giving up their privacy. Not only does digital industrial-
ism replicate the core division of industrial capitalism between directors and 
executants, it further colonises time and space by turning human data into a 
commodity reproduced by users themselves. As a result, people are reduced to 
a manageable mainstream set of trends, categories and numbers, unwittingly 
contributing to the dehumanisation of artificial intelligence. 
Artificial intelligence is a branch of computer science that produces techno-
logical advances in machine learning, pattern recognition, image classification, 
speech recognition, problem solving and knowledge engineering, with a vast 
range of applications in the fields of robotics, Internet searching, online adver-
tising, e-commerce, fraud detection, medical diagnosis and implants, finan-
cial advice, tax preparation, customer service and genomic sequencing, among 
other things (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, xii, xiii, 91). Digital industrial-
ism’s next stage is full automation engineered by the merging of big data with 
artificial intelligence on the Internet of Things infrastructure. The neocoloni-
sation of big data is accompanied by the education of artificial intelligence by 
the crowd itself through machine learning. Corporations use crowdsourcing to 
constantly feed the algorithms with self-perpetuating learning patterns. Precar-
ious freelance workers across the globe unknowingly contribute to their substi-
tution by machines. Rushkoff (2016, 51) argues that most of the technologies 
we are currently employing replace far more jobs than they create. The reason 
is that jobs not yet subject to automation – that is, jobs requiring human main-
tenance, affection and creativity such as art, education, healthcare and social 
services – are not supported by venture capital, since they are considered costly 
and unscalable. 
3.8.2 Technological Unemployment
Based on economic theory and two hundred years of historical evidence, main-
stream economics holds that technological unemployment is only temporary 
and not a serious problem, since it creates in aggregate more jobs that those 
it destroys (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, 173–175). Technological advances 
increase labour productivity, profits, wages and demand for labour, especially 
for workers whose labour complements technology. Technology also reduces 
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the costs of production and, by extension, the prices of products and services, 
thus increasing the purchasing power of workers (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014, 143). 
Whether or not this will be the case in the near future depends on what econ-
omists call ‘elasticity of demand’, that is, the percentage increase in demand 
for each percentage decline in price. For example, halving the price of artifi-
cial light did not double the demand for electricity, resulting in a fall in the 
total revenues for the lighting industry. Also, the increase of productivity in 
agriculture and manufacturing via technological innovation led to lower prices 
and improved quality, but did not increase employment and the demand for 
agricultural and manufacturing products. The general rule of the economy 
is that elasticity equals exactly 1%: an increase of 1% in productivity will be 
matched by an identical increase in demand. Occasional inelasticity is offset by 
the  freeing up of money to be spent elsewhere in the economy so that overall 
employment is maintained. 
Eric Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (2014, 131–146) have shown that 
automation results in the decoupling of productivity from employment, thus 
exacerbating unemployment in the late 1990s. Algorithmic machines tend all 
the more to replace routine jobs in services, software, media, manufacturing, 
finance, music, retailing, trade, and so on. Skills-biased technological change, 
that is, the increasing demand for IT skills, decreases the demand for low-
skilled labour, pushing wages lower, thus increasing the gap between highly 
and less educated workers. Physical capital (machinery) substitutes for labour, 
thus increasing the gap between the profits of capital-owners and the share of 
income going to labour. 
Talent-biased technological change produces ‘winner-takes-all’ markets for 
the 0.1% of CEOs and superstars, widening income inequalities all the more 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, 134–162). The CEO-to-worker pay ratio in the 
US rose from 46:1 to 331:1 between 1983 and 2013, while median income has 
stagnated for the last four decades and the minimum wage is lower than it was 
sixty years ago (Stiglitz 2013). The question then is which history’s data should 
we take into account: the two centuries ending in the late 1990s showing that 
technological unemployment is temporary, or the twenty years since then?
Skills-biased technological change cannot explain either why highly skilled 
workers have moved into lower-skilled jobs nor why even highly skilled workers 
are not paid well (Stiglitz 2016, 9). Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century 
alludes to an inherent flaw of capitalism that favours a small minority at the top. 
He demonstrates that the return on capital is greater than economic growth, 
thus leading to ever-increasing inequality. Wealth grows faster than income. 
This is confirmed by a recent report by Oxfam, illustrating that the wealth of 
the richest 62 people on the planet rose by 45% in the five years between 2010 
and 2015, while the wealth of the bottom half fell by 38% (Oxfam 2015). Stiglitz 
(2016, 12–13) suggests that the explanation for economic inequality is more 
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nuanced due to the complex dynamics of financialisation, demographics, glo-
balisation, technological change and urbanisation. 
From a neoclassical economics viewpoint, unemployment and income ine-
qualities are considered a structural indicator of meritocracy and an additional 
incentive for the overall improvement of the economy. But so far the experi-
ment of neoliberalism has failed. Low interest rates and quantitative easing 
have poured more money into the economy in the last decade, but this is not 
trickling down into the real economy through investment or loans to small 
and middle-sized businesses that could create employment and increase wages. 
Money instead circulates in the form of rent at the top of the finance sector via 
share buybacks, stocks, commodities, private equity and derivatives, inflating 
asset bubbles while deflating the economy at the bottom (Stiglitz 2013).
3.8.3 Digitisation, Finance and the Start-up Economy
Digitisation was supposed to democratise finance (Rushkoff 2016, 169–183). 
The Internet would spread financial information and make markets more trans-
parent and resilient, empowering individual investors to cut out the middlemen 
(the banker and the broker) and keep more autonomy and cash for themselves. 
Yet studies show that increased access to trading tools and market data often 
creates the illusion of market competency and encourages poor decision mak-
ing (Rushkoff 2016, 177). Do-it-yourself traders simply cannot compete with 
market specialists and analysts, who have, among other things, access to inside 
information. The game is to some extent rigged. The digitised marketplace does 
not rely so much nowadays on brokers or specialists, but on high-frequency 
trading executed by highly sophisticated algorithms, often employing several 
price manipulation schemes such as ‘pump and dump’, ‘front-running’, ‘wash 
trading’, ‘spoofing’, and so on. Investing has turned into a game between algo-
rithms exploiting trading protocols. While long-term investors intend to grow 
money by assessing the true value of companies, algorithms seek to profit from 
volatility. The mix of rational and speculative high-tech investing creates a 
non-linear, chaotic system that often propels unpredictable anomalies called 
‘bubbles’, like the one of 2008. Ruskoff (2016, 184) rightly argues that instead 
of integrating the marketplace, digitisation generates derivative systems that 
create synthetic growth through recycling sheer churn. 
Finance’s synthetic growth integrates the hypergrowth logic of the start-up 
economy, expanding winner-takes-all markets, where early-stage technology 
investors are the rare big winners who offset the dozen or more losers  (Rushkoff 
2016, 184–195). The goal is a multi-million dollar exit through acquisition or 
IPO, which can then be reproduced ad infinitum. Start-ups ignite a vicious 
cycle where previous years’ assets are converted into stockpiles of dead assets. 
Rather than engineering a new technology, they are actually reallocating 
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 capital. Digital entrepreneurs end up becoming the next generation of ven-
ture capitalists. Companies that have grown too wealthy and unwieldy follow 
suit by turning to the acquisition of start-ups. Thus, value has been converted 
into an enormous amount of waste in the casino capitalism of short-termism. 
The seeming democratisation of investment through crowdfunding parasitic 
platforms such as Kickstarter simply exacerbates winner-takes-all extremes. 
Pouring more money into the bottom of the pyramid does not result in more 
successful start-ups. It simply adds to the value extracted by those on top of 
the pyramid (Rushkoff 2016, 196–202). One could argue in a Schumpeterian 
fashion that innovation is a process of trial and error benefiting the few lucky 
and competent ones. But still, the social darwinism of innovation feeds on a 
loop of inequality, short-termism and waste. 
3.8.4 Installing Digital Distributism
Rushkoff stresses that technology is not a bug in the system. Capitalism is not 
succumbing to automation. The latter simply adds to the initial programming 
of capitalism by early bankers to make more money through debt-based, inter-
est-bearing, bank-issued central currency, which evolves nowadays into fiat 
money biased towards perpetual growth. Digitisation is an algorithmic mul-
tiplier embedded within the gigantic ledger of finance. Profit begs for more, 
bubbles burst and the boom–bust operating system reboots the next creative 
destruction. 
Rushkoff (2016, 77–81) warns that the next time will not be a cyclical down-
turn, with corporations attempting to compensate for the disruptive impact 
of digital technology. This is not another creative destruction but a structural 
breakdown, as corporatism − backed by digitisation − runs out of places from 
which to extract value for growth. Big data capitalism is not going to save the 
day, since marketing and advertising accounts for less than 5% of gross domes-
tic product (GDP). ‘Eventually, social branding has to run out of fodder. As 
more and more markets lose all revenue potential except what they can make 
as social media marketing platforms, who is left to buy all this marketing 
and consumer data?’ (Rushkoff 2016, 37). Rushkoff ’s (2016, 105) core argu-
ment is that the equivalence between growth and progress is not only artificial 
but unsustainable in a contracting marketplace and on a planet with limited 
resources. He projects that automation is likely to produce a consumer short-
age that may force corporations to recode their operating systems and learn 
to scale down by adopting hybrid business models such as open sharing and 
 collaboration models, ‘inclusive capitalism’, the ‘benefit corporation’, the ‘flex-
ible purpose corporation’ and the ‘low-profit limited liability company’ (2016, 
106–121). Rushkoff considers the not-for-profit model as the fittest for the 
future of an enterprise in a digital landscape. 
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The Mozilla Foundation is the best example of a digital not-for-profit com-
pany (Rushkoff 2016, 127–128). The success of the company is based on its 
widely used open source technologies supporting the Firefox web browser in a 
field dominated by platform monopolies such as Microsoft and Google. Mozilla 
is made up of two entities: Mozilla Foundation, a non-profit, and Mozilla Cor-
poration. Mozilla Foundation oversees the corporation, which is responsible 
for Mozilla’s software development, marketing and distribution. The corpora-
tion also collects the revenue generated by Firefox, but it has no publicly traded 
stock, no dividends and no shareholders. All profits are redirected back to the 
Foundation’s social mission to promote the development of public access to and 
adoption of the open source Mozilla web browsing and Internet  application 
software. By distributing profits within the non-profit instead of delivering 
them to shareholders as capital gains, Mozilla is able to maintain its network of 
volunteers and 500–1,000 paid employees. Capital is, thus, in the service of its 
employees and customers, not vice versa. 
The ultimate goal of capitalism’s structural adjustments towards more 
 sustainable and socially responsible business models would be the prioritisa-
tion of value creation and money circulation by distributing currency to more 
people and enterprises. Blockchain, local and cooperative currencies, credit 
and time banks are all formats that could facilitate recycling rather than hoard-
ing (Rushkoff 2016, 124–167). Investors would then turn to bounded investing 
such as union pension funds, affordable housing investment funds, commu-
nities, interest groups and a mutually supportive range of businesses, where 
money ends up circulating rather than being sucked up by a company foreign 
to the ecosystem. Bounded investment is less dependent on growth than it is 
on sustainability. 
Rushkoff identifies direct public offering (DPO) as the most promising finan-
cial structure that allows small and medium-sized businesses to raise invest-
ment capital from any number of accredited or unaccredited investors as long 
as they align with the social mission of the business. Unlike an IPO, a DPO 
takes effect on the state level, meaning that it is not subject to an expensive 
and arduous vetting process; and unlike crowdfunding, a DPO offers equity and 
dividends instead of a payout on exit. A DPO provides the legal framework 
through which a business can raise money from investors, suppliers, employees 
and consumers, constituting a multi-stakeholder cooperative serving the goals 
of the community instead of capital. 
The coalescence of traditional cooperatives with platform cooperatives under 
the digital commons would be both a response to predatory capitalism and an 
attempt to tackle the sustainability crisis and technological unemployment. The 
objective would be to transform work from waged slavery to self-realisation, 
self-investment and co-ownership of the means of production (Rushkoff 2016, 
212). Resistance to digital industrialism may look like reclaiming communism, 
but it merely points to the reclamation of the commons on the model of digital 
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distributism, which utilises technology to create self-sustaining, highly recip-
rocal, peer-to-peer, worker-owned and community-defined marketplaces. As 
Rushkoff puts it: 
Digital industrialism sought to extract value from the system using new, 
digital means: digital distributism seeks to use those technologies to  
distribute new capabilities to small businesses and real communities. 
Digital industrialism accepts growth as a condition of nature; digi-
tal distributism strives towards a dynamic steady state. Where digital 
industrialism pushes corporations even further from value creation, a 
more distributed approach to digital business embraces and enriches 
broader constituencies of stakeholders. Where an industrial approach to 
networking yields the platform monopolies of Uber and Amazon, a dis-
tributed one yields worker-owned cooperatives at a level of complexity 
and security unimaginable before digital technology. Where the digital 
industrialist’s financial strategy is to extract money through increas-
ingly abstracted derivatives, a more distributist vision would promote 
the  circulation of money through low-friction, peer-driven currencies. 
Where digital industrialism seeks to use technology to expand mar-
kets forever, digital distributism seeks to recycle the same money again 
and again by investing and spending it in the bounded communities of 
the real world. Where digital industrialism asks the economy to grow 
 infinitely for its own sake, digital distributism aspires to sustainable 
prosperity. (2016, 226) 
By ‘digital distributism’ Rushkoff (2016, 231) refers neither to any sort of social 
democratic wealth distribution through state mechanisms nor a libertarian 
decentralisation, where alternative power centres spring up on the periphery. 
Rather it signals a diffusion of power across the network in such a way that 
value, energy and resources become available to anyone in communal terms. 
But, as with Rifkin, Rushkoff ’s optimism is not supported by the facts. Plat-
form capitalism is dominant in the digital plateau and pregnant with the worst 
 nightmares of surveillance capitalism. Most importantly, what Rushkoff is 
missing in his anarcho-communist crescendo is the significant role the state 
could assume in the creation of a commons-orientated sociopolitical transi-
tion. Central policies are the sine qua non for any radical politics to counter 
neoliberalism.
Rushkoff ’s analysis sheds ample light on the current digital landscape. 
It offers an illuminating view of the technological battleground of class struggle 
while offering substantive weaponry for the commons to subvert the neoliberal 
hegemony. Digital distributism can significantly support the commons, if inte-
grated into a holistic, post-hegemonic, commons-orientated strategy seeking 
to decentralise power via horizontally and vertically coordinated mechanisms. 
The Reformist Commons 125
3.9 Envisioning Real Utopias
Erik Olin Wright’s work reads as a sociological and political contribution to 
the commons, freeing up institutional space for strategic action towards a 
 commons-orientated transition. It represents one of the most recent attempts 
to formulate an emancipatory social science aimed at the socialist transforma-
tion of society. The normative principle of this transformation is a radical dem-
ocratic egalitarian approach to justice, according to which all people should 
have equal access to the necessary material and social means to live flourish-
ing lives (social justice); and the necessary means to participate in collective 
decisions affecting their lives as members of a community (political justice) 
(Wright 2009, 7–8). Freedom is the power to make decisions over one’s life, and 
democracy is the power of integrating freedom in collective decision making. 
Wright (2009, 73) defines power as the capacity of actors to generate effects in 
the world. He holds that freedom presupposes equality as the capacity of all 
people to participate in collective decision making. Wright’s egalitarian under-
standing of freedom is both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’, since the liberal ideal of 
freedom as non-interference combines with the capacity of all people to par-
ticipate in democratic processes (Wright 2009, 12). 
3.9.1 Critique of Marxism
Evidently, Wright’s work bears some striking similarities with Castoriadis’s pro-
ject of individual and collective autonomy (Papadimitropoulos 2018c). He, too, 
has developed a systematic critique of both Marxism and capitalism,  arguing 
that Marx proposed a highly deterministic theory of the demise of capital-
ism and a relatively voluntaristic theory of the construction of its alternative 
(Wright 2009, 64). Like Castoriadis, he identifies a number of essential prob-
lems with traditional Marxism.
Marx’s crisis theory is predicated on the following premises: 1) labour is 
the source of value and, therefore, profit; 2) competition forces capitalists to 
replace labour with machinery; and 3) the rate of profit falls. But Marx’s law of 
the falling tendency of the rate of profit seems inadequate, since crises within 
capitalism do not appear to have an inherent tendency to become ever more 
intense over time. Capitalism learns to adapt and reform. The labour theory of 
value, on which Marx’s theory of crisis intensification is based, seems no longer 
sustainable, at least in its full extent. ‘While the idea of labour as the source 
of value may be a useful device for illustrating the idea of the exploitation of 
labour, there is no persuasive reason for believing that labour and labour alone 
causally generates value’ (Wright 2009, 66). Thus, for the moment there is no 
good reason to suggest that the internal contradictions of capitalism make it 
unsustainable in the long run.
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Class structures have become more complex over time, rather than pro-
gressing into a homogenising proletarianisation (Wright 1985; 2005; 2009, 
65–67). We are rather witnessing today the inter-mobility and fragmentation 
of the working class: the rise of labour aristocracy and freelancers; the opposi-
tion between unionised and non-unionised workers; the conflicting interests 
of different wage categories; the contradictory positions of workers who are 
exploited by their employer, but may also be running a small business, poten-
tially exploiting other workers. Workers now possess the skills of both capitalists 
and managers. The collective capacity of the working class to challenge capital-
ism seems not only to decline within mature capitalist societies, but to replicate 
the division of directors and executants among the workforce (Wright 2009, 
67). Ruptural strategies of social transformation, even if they were  capable of 
overthrowing the capitalist state, do not seem likely to provide a social-political 
setting for sustaining democratic experimentalism. Like Castoriadis, Wright 
(2009, 69) holds that the empirical cases of ruptures with capitalism (for exam-
ple, the Eastern Bloc regimes) have resulted in authoritarian state-bureaucratic 
regimes rather than true democracies.
3.9.2 A Socialist Transformation Strategy
Wright (2009, 26–34) points out that the relations of domination within capi-
talist workplaces constitute pervasive restrictions on individual autonomy and 
self-direction, thus blocking the full realisation and exercise of human poten-
tials. Exploitation, alienation of labour, large economic inequalities, the uncon-
trolled social externalities of technological change and profit-maximising 
 competition perpetuate eliminable forms of human suffering, thus impeding 
the universalisation of the conditions for expansive human flourishing.
Wright (2009, 37–43) locates six sources of inefficiency in capitalism: 1) the 
underproduction of public goods; 2) the underpricing of natural resources; 
3) negative externalities; 4) monitoring and enforcing market contracts; 5) pathol-
ogies of intellectual property rights; and 6) the costs of inequality. He condemns 
consumerism on both moral and environmental grounds, arguing that capitalist 
commodification threatens human values such as child care, product safety, the 
arts, community, religion and spirituality (2009, 47–57). Lastly,  corporate influ-
ence limits democracy and fuels militarism and imperialism.
In contrast to both capitalism and traditional Marxism, Wright develops 
a socialist transformation strategy. He initially distinguishes between three 
forms of power: economic power exercised over economic resources, state 
power identified with rule making and rule enforcing over territory, and 
social power consisting in voluntary collective action. He then attaches these 
three powers to capitalism, statism and socialism respectively (2009, 73–74). 
He further makes a distinction between ‘power’ and ‘ownership’. The former is 
the capacity to direct the means of production, and the latter is the right over 
property and surplus. Capitalism, statism and socialism differ in terms of the 
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ownership of the means of production and the type of power exercised over 
economic activities (Wright 2009, 76). But they can combine according to mul-
tiple settings of ownership and power.
In contrast to traditional statist versions of socialism, Wright’s (2009, 80) 
socialist transformation strategy is grounded on the distinction between state 
and social power, state and social ownership, and the possibility of partnerships 
between the market and socially owned and controlled enterprises. Capitalism, 
statism and socialism should be then considered as coordinating variables 
of socialist transformation, geared towards three principal directions: 
1) social empowerment over the way the state affects economic activity; 
2) social empowerment over the way capitalism shapes economic activity; and 
3) social empowerment directly over economic activity (Wright 2009, 82). In 
short, socialism points to the empowerment of civil society over the state and 
the market. To this end, Wright (2009, 86–92) illustrates seven pathways:
1. Statist socialism: in contrast to central planning, statist socialism would 
be orientated towards deepening the democratic quality of the state, aim-
ing to open a genuine pathway to social empowerment.
2. Social democracy: in contrast to state regulation favouring capital, social 
democracy would regulate capital in ways that enhance social power.
3. Associational democracy: in contrast to associations being heavily manip-
ulated by elites and the state, associational democracy would promote 
open and deliberative decision-making processes, highly representative 
of civil society interests. In associational democracy, labour unions, busi-
ness associations, organisations or civic groups would directly engage in 
various aspects of political decision making and governance.
4. Social capitalism: in addition to associations of workers or unions 
exerting power over corporations through co-determination of funds, 
bargaining over pay and working conditions, and so on, the union move-
ment could create venture capital funds, controlled by labour (as in 
Canada), to provide equity to start-up firms that satisfy particular social 
criteria. Consumer-orientated pressure on corporations would be an 
additional form of civil society empowerment over economic power. Fair 
trade and equal exchange movements aiming to connect consumers and 
producers by building alternative global economic networks could also 
disrupt the economic power of multinational corporations.
5. Social economy: voluntary associations, NGOs, co-ops, community-based 
organisations, all subsidised through donations, charities, grants and 
taxes, would directly organise economic activity (for example,  Wikipedia, 
the Quebec economy). An unconditional basic income provided by the 
state through taxation could furthermore enhance social economy.
6. Cooperative market economy: instead of worker-owned cooperative firms 
operating in isolation and thus forced to bend to capitalist  competitive 
pressure over time, worker-owned cooperative firms would be incor-
porated into a cooperative market economy that could provide finance, 
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training, problem-solving services and all kinds of mutual support (for 
example, the Mondragon cooperative and the Mozilla Foundation).
7. Participatory socialism: the combination of statist socialism (1) and the 
social economy (5) with the mission of jointly organising the production 
of various goods and services. The state becomes more pervasive by get-
ting directly involved in the organisation and production of economic 
activity. Social power expands from its participation in representative 
democracy into the productive activity itself.
Wright puts forward a pluralistic and heterogeneous socialist transformation 
rooted in a centrally coordinated decentralisation of power. But contrary to 
Castoriadis who was against any type of state- or market-driven reformism, 
Wright’s socialist transformation strategy is premised on the radical democra-
tisation of both the state and economy by civil society. Four of the seven path-
ways to socialism involve the state. Yet for socialism to be fully realised, Wright 
holds that state and economic power have to be subordinated to social power 
on the model of economic democracy (Wright 2009, 92).
3.9.3 Social Empowerment over the State
Social empowerment over the state would include a combination of pathways 
(1), (2), (3) and (7). In contrast to Castoriadis, Wright (2009, 108–109) claims 
that a radical egalitarian democracy does not require direct democracy to 
replace representative democracy, but the deepening of democracy in all three 
varieties of democratic governance (direct, representative and associational). 
He introduces participatory forms of direct democracy that could create coun-
tervailing power against the privileged groups and elites lobbying for state 
power. The design principles of this power are the following: bottom-up partic-
ipation, pragmatic orientation, deliberation, and state-centred decentralisation 
to local units of action such as neighbourhood councils, local school councils, 
workplace councils, and so on. Participatory democracy differs from spontane-
ous activist efforts or projects led by non-governmental organisations or social 
movement groups, since it aims to change the central procedures of state power 
rather than occasionally influencing them. Wright cites as an example of par-
ticipatory democracy the municipal participatory budgeting applied in the case 
of Porto Alegre in Brazil. 
To enhance the democratic quality of representative democracy, Wright 
introduces proposals for egalitarian public financing of politics, and randomly 
selected citizen assemblies. He also claims that political institutions can be 
designed in such a way as to enable secondary associations – labour unions, 
business associations, organisations or civic groups – to play a positive role in 
deepening democracy. Centralised administrations are good at imposing uni-
form rules over homogeneous contexts, but when addressing heterogeneous 
economic and social conditions, centralised command and control processes 
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are much less effective (Wright 2009, 127). One-size-fits-all regulations are 
rarely satisfactory, for example, in the context of environment and workplace 
safety, given that ecologies and workplaces are diverse and complex. Associa-
tions could solve this problem and complement public regulatory efforts by 
gathering local information, monitoring behaviour and promoting cooperation 
among private actors. Instead of associations providing external pressure by 
lobbying politicians and agencies for specific rules, they would be included sys-
tematically in the central tasks of governance: policy formation, coordination of 
economic activities, monitoring, administering and enforcing regulations.
The possibilities of an expanded and deepened associative democracy are not 
limited to the role of encompassing associations in neo-corporatist, peak-level, 
public policy formation. Associative democracy can also function at the local and 
regional level to solve problems, and design and implement detailed rules 
and standards of various sorts. Associations must be relatively encompassing, 
representing a substantial proportion of the relevant social category; second, 
the association leadership must be accountable to its membership through 
meaningful internal democratic processes; and third, the associations must 
have significant powers to sanction members. Wright (2009, 127–133) cites the 
example of Quebec in Canada, which is an exemplary showcase of deepening 
the associational dimension of democracy in the domains of skill formation 
within regional labour markets, habitat conservation for endangered species, 
child and elderly care, cooperative housing, education, energy production, 
and many more.
3.9.4 Social Empowerment over the Economy
Social empowerment over the economy would develop in the direction of mar-
ket socialism, combining pathways (4), (5), (6) and (7) (Wright 2009, 135–189). 
Wright employs the term ‘social economy’ to specify economic activities that 
spring from civil society. Two prominent examples are Wikipedia and the Que-
bec social economy. Starting from the Quebec experience, Wright suggests 
four institutional designs to advance social empowerment: 1) state subsidies 
targeted at the social economy, 2) the development of social economy invest-
ment funds, 3) governance through associational democracy and 4) participa-
tory democratic forms of organisation. By ‘social capitalism’ he refers to a wide 
range of institutional mechanisms and social processes that directly impinge on 
the exercise of capitalist power. Some examples he mentions are labour solidar-
ity funds and share-levy wage earner funds, both pushing capitalism towards a 
structural hybrid within which social power has greater weight. Finally, a coop-
erative market economy consists of an association of worker-owned firms such 
as Mondragon in Spain and the Mozilla Foundation.
A number of scholars have built on the work of Wright to introduce concrete 
proposals for democratising finance. Hockett (2019, 516–522) calls for the 
creation of a National Investment Council (NIC) that would provide funding 
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for national development projects in the sectors of clean energy and transport 
infrastructure. This could be done partly by aggregating funds and partly by 
issuing and purchasing bonds. The NIC would be coupled with Federal Reserve 
reforms that would aim to induce public participation in finance by affording 
every citizen, firm and unit of government a deposit-cum-transaction account. 
The first effect would be to end financial exclusion and marginalisation for 
poor and non-white people. The second would be the more effective control 
of inflation and deflation. Instead of banks using federal funds to speculate on 
commodity and other markets, thereby routing funds away from individuals 
and businesses and inflating commodity prices such as foodstuffs and fuel, a 
‘QE for the people’ would channel money in more socially beneficial direc-
tions. A Fed-administered digital dollar backed by Blockchain and accessed via 
smartphones would further afford greater financial inclusion. Another tool for 
preserving optimal credit allocation and price stability would be a price stabi-
lisation mechanism that would limit volatility through Fed price modulation 
(shorting and purchasing activity) with regard to more systematically signifi-
cant prices than just interest rates, such as labour costs, commodity prices, fuel 
prices and others.
Block (2019) puts forward a synthesis between socialist theory and radi-
cal financial reform. Ηistorically, classical Marxists argued that financial 
reforms were unlikely to alter the system as long as private property pre-
vailed. They were reluctant to engage in deficit financing or other unorthodox 
policies. They, therefore, adopted quite orthodox positions on issues of finance 
such as the return to the gold standard. Radical reformers, on the other hand, 
imagined the reallocation of credit in the economy through redistribution 
mechanisms such as ‘social credit’, time banks or stamped money. Block argues 
that financial mechanisms can today align these two traditions. Classical Marx-
ists need to acknowledge the relative autonomy of financial superstructure:
The logic of extracting surplus value at the point of production does not 
dictate a particular form for a society’s financial system. There is great 
diversity in the structure of financial institutions in different developed 
market societies, with some heavily relying on public sector financial 
entities and others demonstrating considerable regulatory effectiveness 
in keeping destabilising speculative finance in check. In short, state poli-
cies have been and continue to be critical in determining what a nation’s 
financial industry looks like. All of this suggests that reform initiatives 
in this sphere could be successful. (Block 2019, 539) 
A major obstacle to socialist reform has been the fear of capital flight and capi-
tal strike in the event of the implementation of policies that would threaten 
the interests of property holders. Capitalist reaction triggers an economic 
downturn that stirs up public disaffection and anti-leftist populism. Wright 
has coined the term ‘transition trough’ to describe periods of extreme public 
The Reformist Commons 131
discontent towards democratic socialist reforms. To address this potentiality, 
Block expands Hockett’s franchise model to a set of structural reforms that 
would weaken the power of capital to resist a broader programme of social-
ist transition. To begin with, the state could apply the public utility model 
by granting monopoly rights to firms and banks and further controlling the 
amount of profit they earn. This would discourage financial speculation, since 
trading could not exceed the government-set ceiling. A more radical option 
would be for the government to create in-house franchisees or non-profit insti-
tutions equipped with the ability to create money. Regulatory measures would 
be adopted to prevent unscrupulous trading and predatory lending. 
More radical reforms involve creating a national investment bank linked to 
a set of non-profit, decentralised financial institutions such as credit unions, 
public banks, community banks and non-profit investment banks to provide 
credit for underfunded activities such as infrastructure, clean energy, afford-
able housing and small and medium-size businesses (Block 2019, 535–537). 
The creation of a non-profit innovation stock market would further open up 
investment opportunities to the broad public and help high-tech start-ups, 
cooperatives and B corporations to raise capital for expansion. (Certified B 
Corporations are businesses that meet the highest standards of verified social 
and environmental performance, public transparency, and legal accountability 
to balance profit and purpose.) This way, decentralisation, diversity and com-
petition would weaken large commercial banks and corporations while setting 
up a more dynamic and sustainable economy:
This weakening would happen through an incremental shift of consumer 
savings from for-profit to nonprofit entities. Currently, something close 
to 90 percent of consumer bank deposits are with large commercial 
banks, but with the reinvigoration of credit unions and nonprofit banks, 
we could expect a large-scale shift of these deposits toward more locally 
institutions as consumers recognize the benefits of reinvesting in their 
communities. At the same time, savers would have attractive alterna-
tives to putting their retirement funds in mutual funds and common 
stocks. They would be able to shift to a variety of bonds issued by non-
profit investment banks or the public investment bank, and they could 
acquire mutual funds invested in the innovation stock market […] With 
less control over consumer deposits and retirement savings, giant insti-
tutions would have to shrink and make do with reduced flows of profits. 
This, in turn, would reduce the resources to invest in campaign contri-
butions and right-wing think tanks. It would become harder for them to 
push back against regulators and harder for them to stop the advance of 
their nonprofit competitors. (Block 2019, 547–548) 
Lenore Palladino (2019, 573–591) proposes that the ‘parallel credit system’ be 
coupled with a ‘parallel equity system’. Palladino attempts to address wealth 
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inequality by claiming not only access to credit but also to equity for all  citizens. 
Since business cycles and macroeconomic risk are likely to trap individu-
als in a cycle of unaffordable debt repayments, he proposes the creation of a 
 Public Investment Platform that would directly connect individuals to lending 
or investing opportunities. It would serve as a crowdfunding platform for small 
companies offering debt or equity securities at little or no cost to the public. 
It would provide a ‘public option’ for wealth creation that would compete 
directly with the private sector and reduce the concentrated power of the 
‘shadow banking system’, which consists of hedge funds and private equity 
funds involved in risky activities. The Public Investment Platform would be 
joined by a ‘public investment account’ that would give a small sum of capital 
to all citizens in accordance with family net wealth, which would be used as a 
wealth-building fund. 
Michael McCarthy (2019, 611–633) completes the puzzle of reforms by 
 instigating the creation of sovereign wealth funds and inclusive ownership 
funds. The former would be established by governments through a combina-
tion of mechanisms such as levies (taxes and fees on consumption, payroll and 
capital), leveraged purchases (borrowing at low interest rates to invest at higher 
rates), ring-fencing existing assets (by transferring existing assets into it) and 
new money creation. The latter would be adopted by companies with the aim 
of allocating shares to their workers and increasing their decision-making 
power in daily management. Workers would also receive dividends, part of 
which could be channelled to a public fund to pay for welfare benefits and 
public services.
This whole set of proposals combines Wright’s (2009, 191–240) ‘symbiotic’ 
and ‘interstitial’ transitional paths towards socialism. In contrast to a ‘ruptural’ 
path of the kind that the former Eastern Bloc experienced, a symbiotic path in 
the form of a parallel credit system avoids a direct confrontation with capital-
ist class power, while an interstitial one in the form of a parallel equity system 
makes relatively small transformations that generate a qualitative shift in class 
dynamics. While the symbiotic path occupies empty spaces in the dominant 
financial system, the interstitial path paves the way for a more transversable 
break with the dominant financial order. The ultimate goal would be the grad-
ual transformation of the private sector into a public one. 
This transition would probably not be an easy one. Capital flight and capital 
strike would lead to the forgoing of new investments, layoffs, the weakening 
of demand, deflation and economic recession (Block 2019, 547–551). Govern-
ments would not be able to offset capital flight by increasing borrowing due 
to the hostility of international banks and global organisations. Governments 
would be forced instead to impose capital controls and raise interest rates, aim-
ing to prevent capital outflows. A currency crisis would follow, with the tight 
monetary policy slowing down economic activity. 
However, the proposed reforms might be able to withstand the currency 
pressure. The central countervailing measure for this would be the expansion 
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of the non-profit sector to offset the capital boycott (Block 2019, 547–551). 
The combination of capital controls and increased international borrowing by 
large non-profit banks might be sufficient to avoid a currency crisis and stabi-
lise the economy. Governments would then have gained the political legitimacy 
necessary to deepen the financial reforms and extend democracy into economic 
decision making. Wealth and income redistribution, the strengthening of labour 
rights, the combatting of racial and gender inequality, improved environmen-
tal regulations and increased democratic participation in governance could all 
be supplementary to financial reforms. Finally, education is a critical factor in 
the provision of adequate economic and technological literacy to the people.
3.9.5 Critique of the Reformist Approach
Overall, the problem with this reformist approach is that it deals with the periph-
ery of the capitalist system, thus leaving untouched the core of capitalist produc-
tion. To abolish the capitalist system from within, it is essential to alter the mode 
of capitalist production on the model of commons-based peer  production. 
Credit and equity reforms need to comply with the self-management of the 
economy and society as a whole. This does not equate to a state-centred leftist 
approach aiming to nationalise the banks and the means of production. It rather 
points to a holistic, post-hegemonic strategy that seeks to connect the democra-
tisation of finance with a decentralised, commons- orientated transition. 
Wright seems more apprehensive of the radically transformative role of civil 
society. He conceives of the state, capitalism and civil society as coordinating 
variables of his socialist transformation, since society as a whole is a hybrid 
structure comprised of potentially interchangeable overarching powers: eco-
nomic, state and social. While it is analytically useful to distinguish capitalism, 
statism and socialism according to the power dominant each time, none of 
them constitute purely independent powers. The same applies to all units 
of analysis within each power, be it a firm, a government, a labour union, an 
association or a cooperative, where complex configurations of capitalist, statist 
and socialist elements combine. Thus, Wright notes: ‘This has critical implica-
tions for our understanding of the problem of transformation: emancipatory 
transformation should not be viewed mainly as a binary shift from one system to 
another, but rather as a shift in the configuration of the power relations that 
constitute a hybrid’ (2009, 226).
Wright’s core argument is that the realisation of a radical egalitarian 
 democracy presupposes the social empowerment of civil society over the 
state and the economy. He thus brings to the fore the self-instituting power 
of the people as the main tool of socialist transformation. He incorporates 
the  self-instituting power of the people into a flexible strategic pluralism based 
on multiple pathways of social empowerment, embodied in a variety of struc-
tural transformations. 
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Wright (2009, 93–95) anticipates a number of potential critiques of his trans-
formation strategy. An initial point of criticism is that models of participatory 
democracy are non-functional, since people are too apathetic, ignorant or busy 
to participate. Secondly, a multitude of associations, networks and communi-
ties does not guarantee the creation of the social power necessary to effectively 
control the state and the economy. On the contrary, this could lead to con-
flicts of interest or, conversely, as conservative critics of socialism have argued, 
to the tyranny of the majority. Thirdly, according to the critique posed by the 
 revolutionary socialists, a socialist transformation is not feasible in a society 
dominated by capitalism, as it will sooner or later confront the problem of com-
petition with the capitalist economy, and the dependence of the social economy 
on capitalism for financial resources.
To address these criticisms, Wright (2009, 93–95) argues that moving along 
the pathway of social empowerment is not a guarantee of success, but a more 
favourable terrain of struggle. He conceives the predictions of the revolution-
ary socialists as pessimistic, since they exaggerate the power of capital and 
they underestimate the social spaces available for social innovation. Wright 
(2009, 114) reminds us that when there are opportunities for people to get 
involved in decision making that directly affects their lives, they do partici-
pate in  substantial numbers. However, self-institutionalisation could repro-
duce a reversed bureaucracy if based on rigid procedures that would obstruct 
or discourage people from participating, resulting in a parody of democracy. 
People are more likely to support an economic democracy on the models of 
platform and open cooperativism that can offer them a living along the lines 
of autonomy, co-ownership and self-realisation. A challenge remains further 
to calibrate the balance between centralisation and decentralisation in favour 
of the autonomy of both individuals and the commons. Wright provides one of 
the most holistic perspectives towards this goal. It is, however, more effective to 
fit Wright’s pluralism into a more coherent post-hegemonic strategy that aims 
to bring the different facets of the commons under a commons governance.
3.10 The Lack of the Political II
The reformist approach to the commons purports to advance the self- instituting 
power of the commons from a third institutional axis of civil society coexist-
ent with capitalism and the state into a counter-hegemonic power orientated 
against neoliberalism. It succeeds in bridging the gap between local and digital 
commons and transforming the common into a major force of social change. 
But still there is a significant lack of the political to counter the superpowers of 
states and corporations. 
Bollier recalibrates the liberal state towards the support of the commons 
rather than the capitalist market. He introduces a green governance model 
aiming to tackle climate change and protect the natural commons. 
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Rifkin introduces the collaborative commons as an alternative business 
model supported by the Internet of Things infrastructure, designed to remain 
open, decentralised and distributed, thus bringing together local commons and 
social movements with the digital commons, Internet start-ups and prosumers. 
Rifkin, however, produces a social democratic version of the commons that 
cannot but bear the contradictions of capitalism and the state, thereby putting 
a halt to the self-instituting power of the people.
Scholz attempts to take a more radical stance by elaborating on the model 
of platform cooperativism, applying algorithmic design to democratic self-
management, co-ownership and equitable distribution of value. Yet he seems 
to oscillate between a radical and a liberal approach.
Bauwens and Kostakis take a more radical stance by connecting coopera-
tives with the digital commons on the principles of commons-based peer pro-
duction, instantiated in their sub-model of Design Global–Manufacture Local. 
Open cooperativism seeks to create a post-capitalist alliance of ethical market 
entities, a partner state and the commons, with the aim of challenging neo-
liberal capitalism. This vision falters upon the lack of centrally coordinated 
macro-policies to apply the principles of the commons at a local, regional, 
national and international level. This obstacle could be overcome by a partner 
state embracing the principles of the commons more openly. Arvidsson and 
Peitersen  follow the post-capitalist vision of Bauwens and Kostakis, but they 
deviate in that they are attuned to a technologically ‘updated’ Habermasian 
transformation of the public sphere rather than a more radical approach to 
the commons that would steer the self-instituting power of the people against 
neoliberalism.
Rushkoff ’s model of digital distributism is more in line with the post-capital-
ist vision of Bauwens and Kostakis in that he envisages a hybrid economy that 
could force capitalism in the long run to adjust to the commons. The problem 
with Rushkoff ’s anarcho-communism is that, by excluding the state, he signifi-
cantly debilitates a commons-orientated transition. 
Wright provides probably the most holistic political alternative for the com-
mons by integrating the self-instituting power of the people into a strategic 
pluralism based on multiple pathways of social empowerment, embodied in a 
variety of structural transformations. It can function as an institutional multi-
format for the various reformist approaches of the commons exemplified by 
Rifkin, Scholz, Bauwens and Kostakis, Arvidsson and Peitersen and Rushkoff. 
Yet it would perhaps be more effective for the commons to fit Wright’s strate-
gic pluralism into a more cohesive post-hegemonic perspective that envisions a 
cross-regional, commons-orientated transition rather than scattered reformats. 
To this end, a multidisciplinary approach needs to combine politics, finance, law, 








The task of Part 3 is to critically review the anti-capitalist literature on the com-
mons, which comprises various interpretations of Marx’s work, among oth-
ers. The first section investigates the relation of the political and the common 
in a broad spectrum of continental political philosophy, ranging from post-
Heideggerianism and postmodernism to strands of autonomous Marxism 
and post-Marxism. It critically engages with Kioupkiolis’s critique of variants 
of post-Heideggerianism, autonomous Marxism and post-Marxism, as elabo-
rated in the work of Nancy (1993; 1997; 2000), Esposito (2010; 2011; 2012; 
2013), Agamben (1993), Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004; 2009) and Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985). Kioupkiolis (2019) expands the lack of the political in the anti-
capitalist commons to point to the crowding out of the self-instituting power of 
the people in several Marxist and post-Marxist interpretations of the common. 
He attempts to balance the tension between horizontalism and verticalism by 
elaborating a post-hegemonic politics of the common predicated on agonistic 
freedom and radical democracy. 
The second section focuses on the work of Dardot and Laval (2014) who, fol-
lowing Castoriadis, among others, have reintroduced the self-instituting power 
of the people in political discourse as the essential concept of the common. 
The third section illustrates a more concrete version of the common, artic-
ulated in the post-capitalist framework of Gibson and Graham’s work (1996; 
2006), which sketches out the philosophical and empirical preconditions of a 
community economy. 
The fourth section deals with the work of Dyer-Witheford (1999; 2006; 
2015), De Angelis (2017), and Caffentzis and Federici (2014), who build 
on the concept of the common as the self-instituting power of the people to 
introduce variants of autonomous Marxism, ranging from post-capitalism 
to anti-capitalism.
How to cite this book chapter:
Papadimitropoulos, V. 2020. The Commons: Economic Alternatives in the Digital Age. 
Pp. 139–214. London:  University of Westminster Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997 
/book46.d. License:  CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
140 The Commons 
The fifth section examines the conception of the common in the context of 
classical Marxist views such as those of Žižek (2008; 2010), Dean (2009; 2012), 
Harvey (2003; 2005; 2010; 2012), Mason (2015) and Fuchs (2008; 2011; 2014). 
Overall, the post-hegemonic politics of the commons should engage more 
critically with the techno-economic dimensions of contemporary class strug-
gle, fragments of which are illustrated by various strands of the common, most 
notably combined in Bauwens and Kostakis’s work. If the commons want to 
avoid occupying a marginal sub-space and reach a critical mass, it is essential 
to provide their members with a sustainable livelihood along ecological and 
democratic lines. To this end, a holistic post-hegemonic strategy needs to boot-
strap the spontaneity of the commons, nudged by broader democratic alliances. 
4.2 The Post-hegemony of Common Democracy 
The disruptive effects of the work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud on 
traditional and modern philosophy gave rise to various strands of post- 
foundational philosophy such as post-Heideggerianism, poststructuralism 
and post-Marxism, which consider the theoretical foundations of moder-
nity such as reason, the subject and God as metaphysical, and reject grand 
 narratives of history and society such as Hegelo-Marxism and Kantianism 
 (Marchart 2007, 2–14). Post-foundationalism should not be confused with 
anti- foundationalism or ‘anything goes’ postmodernism, since it does not seek 
to totally erase concepts such as totality, universality, essence and ground, but to 
weaken their ontological status. It does not turn into an anti-foundational 
nihilism or  existentialism, nor does it melt down into a postmodern pluralism 
where all meta-narratives evaporate into thin air. The ontological weakening of 
foundations does not imply the total absence of ground, but rather the impos-
sibility of a final ground. Freedom and historicity come into play to unfold the 
undecidability of being and, by extension, the necessity for political decision in 
the face of radical contingency. 
4.2.1 Politics and the Political
A common thread of thought within post-foundationalism builds on the dis-
tinction between the political and politics, originating in the work of Carl 
Schmitt (1996/1932, 26–27), who conceives of the political as the ontological 
ground that precedes all domains of the social. While politics corresponds to 
the narrow sense of the political, as constituted, for example, in the state, the 
political is the essence of society, located in the distinction between friend and 
enemy. The essential drive of society lies in the conflict and antagonism inher-
ent in the political, which, as such, retains a certain primacy over the social. 
For Castoriadis (1991b, 155), politics represents the ontological capacity of 
the political for self-management, which precedes conflict and antagonism, for 
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it is the instituting power of society itself that constitutes meaning. The politi-
cal is the ontological source of the deliberative power of politics to uphold the 
‘magma’ of the imaginary significations of society. (By ‘magma’ Castoriadis 
means the ontological status of society which constantly breeds new forms 
of meaning not reducible to a determinate set of rules or conditions. Indeter-
minacy thus is the ontological breeding ground of otherness and difference.) 
The political consists in the recurring constitution of the instituted power 
by the instituting power of the anonymous collective. There is no legitimate or 
rational source of meaning other than the self-instituting power of the people. 
Similarly, Claude Lefort (2000, 226) conceives of the political as the moment in 
which the symbolic form of society is instituted, while Ernesto Laclau (1999, 
146) approaches the political as the disruptive moment of the dislocation of the 
social and the founding moment of society’s institutionalisation.
Jean-Luc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito attempt to ‘com-
mon the political’ by substantiating the self-instituting power of the people 
against the economism of both Marxism and neoliberalism. They contemplate 
ways of overcoming both the fragmentations and exclusions of gated communi-
ties by envisioning collectivities that bring together a plurality of singularities 
without enclosing them in fixed models – ethnic, cultural, ideological, or any 
other. They approach politics on the basis of a fundamental sense of coexistence, 
clearing the ground for social openness, solidarity, plurality and autonomy.
However promising this may seem, a number of critiques have stressed the 
political limits of this existential thought (Kioupkiolis 2017; Marchart 2012, 
173–183; Elliot 2011; Wagner 2006; Dardot and Laval 2014, 14–15). Alexandros 
Kioupkiolis (2017, 284), in particular, has argued that Nancy, Agamben and 
Esposito remain stuck on an abstract level of philosophising, detached from 
any actual politics. He sets out to translate the existential ontologies of the 
common into more concrete politics by joining them to the political theory of 
hegemony and antagonism introduced by Laclau and Mouffe. 
Nancy’s theorisation was intended to refigure the political in light of a new 
ontological reflection on the common. Nancy (1991; 2000) takes his cues 
from Heidegger’s philosophy and its argument that being-with – Mitsein – is 
essential to existence itself – Dasein. Coexistence is an archetypical ontologi-
cal condition that predates ‘society’ and ‘individuals’. Community is devoid of 
any essence, since it encapsulates a relation among a plurality of singularities; a 
reciprocal action based on openness, diversity and change. 
In view of his ontology of being-with, the political consists in a social inter-
action in which singularities undergo consciously the experience of a non-
organic community. Nancy’s take on the common breaks with both traditional 
ideas of organic communities rooted in religion and ethnicity and the neo-
liberal dissolution of the community into an aggregation of individuals. The 
political implies freedom, equality, infinite justice and struggle, turning against 
atomisation, totality, homogenisation, sovereignty and the realisation of a fixed 
identity of soil, blood, community or the self. 
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Nancy endeavours to ‘common the political’, that is, to reconstitute politics 
according to his ontology of being-with. The task of politics would be to establish 
power on the basis of an incommensurable equal freedom, affirming the incom-
parable value of any singular being in relation to any other. Equality establishes 
the actualisation of incommensurable freedom, that is, the shared capacity 
for the creation of the novel beyond any pre-established framework. 
However, Kioupkiolis (2017, 289), among others, has shown that this idea of 
politics is deeply controversial on account of its ontological framing. It remains 
on a high level of abstraction, not easily translatable to concrete political 
praxis. Philosophism can even be politically debilitating in some respects. 
Nancy fails to grapple with the political in the sense of power relations, divi-
sions and antagonism. Missing is any in-depth engagement with questions of 
power, hegemony, antagonism and the forging of links among differences in 
order to construct collective subjects. 
Like Nancy, Esposito (2011; 2012; 2013) has set out to conceive of another 
politics in light of his rethinking of the community. Taking his bearings from 
Heidegger and Bataille, he approaches the community as an opening to the 
other and an escape from the self. As in Nancy, community is a relation that 
joins multiple subjects without tying knots of belonging around language, soil 
and ethnicity. The common is indeterminate and, therefore, undetermined by 
any essence, race or sex.
Esposito breaks new conceptual ground by juxtaposing communitas with 
immunitas. The word ‘community’ derives from the Latin communitas (cum + 
munus). Munus means obligation and gift. Community, thus, entails an obli-
gation, which exposes us to others in non-invasive ways. Exposure in its turn 
stimulates counter-processes of immunisation, that is, the retreat to the self. 
According to Esposito, immunisation is the present condition we live in, 
where we are experiencing political fundamentalism, nationalism, racism 
and fascism. Hence, politics should foster community and freedom to coun-
teract immunisation. Difference should be affirmed as the bond that holds us 
together,  connecting a diversity of singularities rather than exclusionary identi-
ties. Esposito admits that it is not an easy task to transform this philosophical 
formula into actual practice. Most importantly, he does not offer a way out. 
Philosophical abstraction besets Esposito’s theorisation of the political and the 
community (Kioupkiolis 2017, 291). 
In his Coming Community (1993), Agamben, too, takes up the themes of 
the political and the common to outline the politics of a community-to-come, 
where singularities act in common without holding on to any fixed identity. 
Pure singularities are indeterminate, variable and open to new possibilities. 
A community of singularities features a commonality and solidarity devoid 
of any essence and determinate content. It points to an open space of common 
appearance, action and co-belonging that cannot be represented by the state. 
Hence, the coming politics will no longer be a struggle for control of the 
state, but the opening up of spaces for singularities to freely coexist and  interact. 
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 However, like Nancy’s and Esposito’s, Agamben’s politics of a ‘community to 
come’ remains vague and elusive. Kioupkiolis sums it up: 
Nancy, Esposito and Agamben remain stuck on the abstract level of a 
‘fundamental ontology’ of being-together. They construe the ‘common’ 
as an ontology of co-existence detached from any actual politics. They 
do not wrestle with topical issues of democratic politics, such as the 
dominant forms of power and the specific modes of collective action 
which would uphold democracy in our times. (2017, 284)
4.2.2 Verticalism: Laclau and Mouffe
These valid criticisms notwithstanding, Kioupkiolis (2017, 293) makes the case 
that post-Heideggerian thought on community can be repoliticised in ways 
which rescue its value for contemporary politics. To this end, he embarks on 
politicising the common. A first move in this direction is to politicise ontology 
by recasting it as partial and value-laden. Ontology cannot lay claim to uni-
versal validity, since it is replete with conflict and antagonism. Therefore, the 
ontology of being-singular-plural is not a fundamental fact of the world, but a 
value to be pursued. It is not an already existing reality, but a call for democratic 
politics that need not be totalising but open, collective and deliberative. 
Kioupkiolis (2017, 294–296) links the idea of community sketched out 
by Nancy, Esposito and Agamben with a variety of organisations and social 
movements, which have surged forth in the last decades, including local and 
digital commons. The commons exemplify the idea of community put forth 
by Nancy, Esposito and Agamben: an open relation among a plurality of singu-
larities; a dialogue of plural voices; reciprocal action exposed to diversity and 
change; a practice of sharing; and politics beyond the sovereignty of capitalism 
and the state.
Kioupkiolis (2017, 296–302) further connects community politics with the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), who combine the plurality of being in com-
mon with the politics of hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe integrate often opposing 
elements from multiple philosophical strands: poststructuralism, psychoanaly-
sis, analytical philosophy, Marxism and liberalism. One could plausibly read 
their work as a critical dialogue with Schmitt from within a postmodern and 
post-Marxist perspective. Laclau and Mouffe set out to reconfigure Gramscian 
hegemony by attuning it with post-Fordism and critiques of essentialism and 
economism. From their standpoint, hegemony signifies the representation of 
a totality by a particular discursive articulation of power, which is radically 
incommensurable with it (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, x). The hegemon need not 
be a revolutionary party or the working class, but any discursive field that takes 
on community-building action. 
By ‘discourse’ Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 91–101) mean the structured total-
ity resulting from any articulatory practice. Discourse signifies a decentred 
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structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed (Laclau 
1988, 254). The discursive formation cannot be unified in the experience or 
consciousness of a founding subject (Kant), nor in the progressive unfolding 
of reason (Hegel), nor in the logical coherence of its elements (structuralism). 
Subject positions are diverse and dispersed within a discursive formation. The 
type of coherence Laclau and Mouffe attribute to the discursive formation is 
close to what Foucault (1969) formulated as regularity in dispersion. Whereas 
Foucault maintained a distinction between discursive and non-discursive prac-
tices, Laclau and Mouffe expand discourse to every object of reality. Yet the fact 
that every object is constituted as an object of discourse dissociates from the 
realism/idealism opposition. As Laclau and Mouffe put it:
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, 
in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But 
whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural 
phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field. (1985, 94) 
At this point, Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis meets up with a number of contem-
porary currents of thought – from Heidegger to Wittgenstein, Althusser and 
Derrida – that have insisted on the impossibility of fixing ultimate meanings 
due to the ontological primacy of difference and the subsequent overdetermi-
nation of meaning by (all) other meanings. Therefore, only partial fixations 
of meaning(s) exist. Borrowing from Lacan, they call the privileged discursive 
points of these partial fixations nodal points, that is, privileged signifiers that fix 
the meaning of a signifying chain. 
Hegemony is the precarious articulation of the particular and the universal 
through a nodal point or master signifier. The dialectic interplay of particular-
ity and universality introduces chains of equivalence amid conflicting alter-
natives. A chain of equivalence forms a common axis that connects different 
demands and projects by configuring the community and assuming the role of 
its representative. Hegemony, thus, entails the drawing of frontiers, exclusions 
and processes of concentration of power around common identities and repre-
sentations. Representatives are considered necessary due to growing fragmen-
tation and social complexity. 
From a deconstructive perspective, hegemony is a theory of decision taken 
in the ontological terrain of antagonism, plurality, contingency and undecid-
ability (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, xi). Antagonism reflects the conflict between 
‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, whereby the presence of the latter negates the identity of 
the former and vice versa (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 101–131). Antagonism is 
always present, since plurality generates disagreement and undecidability in 
the field of politics and justice. 
Although for both post-Heideggerians and Laclau and Mouffe plurality is 
constitutive of community and the political, Laclau and Mouffe contradict the 
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notion of plurality found in the work of Nancy, Esposito and Agamben as pure 
multiplicity. For Laclau and Mouffe, plurality essentially entails antagonism, 
conflict and division, which call for hegemony and articulation to establish 
precarious social formations. A randomly dispersed plurality of the common 
is unlikely to bring about broader social change as it stumbles upon fragmenta-
tion, conflict and vested interests. To achieve a minimum of convergence among 
diverse struggles and reach a critical mass, the commons need to endorse the 
politics of hegemony, which articulates wider political communities through 
chains of equivalence sustained by a modicum of collective identity (Kioupkiolis 
2017, 297–298).
The hegemonic conception of the plural common converges partly with 
the thought of Nancy, Esposito and Agamben, since, for Laclau and Mouffe, 
what holds a radical democratic community together is not a substantive 
notion of the common good, but the shared values of freedom and equality. 
Radical democracy is plural, open and inclusive, maximising the autonomy 
of differences by expanding equality among all spheres of society. Each social 
struggle should accede to the maximum possible space to freely assert itself, 
while  sharing a common identity promoted by egalitarian principles. Radical 
democracy comes to address the crisis of representation, which plagues lib-
eral democracies, by escaping the pseudo-dilemma between neoliberalism and 
communitarianism, that is, between economic individualism and concepts 
of community based on tradition, language, ethnicity, religion and family. 
It does so by breaking with the post-political consensus of the ‘centre’ (Gid-
dens 1994; 1998) and the concomitant topology of extremes by rendering all 
political positions equally vocal. Put differently, it aims to rearticulate left- and 
right-wing politics around the reconciliation of equality and freedom. Radi-
cal democratic politics manifests in various social struggles: urban, ecological, 
anti-fascist, feminist, anti-racist, ethnic, regional or that of sexual minorities 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 143). 
From a radical democratic stance, the common promotes the horizontal artic-
ulation of a multiplicity of spaces, social relations, movements and democratic 
practices that retain their partial autonomy with regard to the vertical politics 
of hegemony. Kioupkiolis (2017, 300), further identifies a tension between the 
vertical politics of hegemony and horizontal articulations of autonomy such 
as the commons. Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 133–177) attempt to mitigate this 
tension by envisaging a left-wing populism that integrates the common into a 
counter-hegemonic chain of equivalence, articulated against right-wing pop-
ulism and the post-politics of neoliberalism. In this framework, autonomy is 
not opposed to hegemony, but is part of the wider hegemonic operation of 
radical democracy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 128, 151).
Kioupkiolis (2017, 300) insists that Laclau and Mouffe have not system-
atically worked through this tension to reduce the risk of hegemonic politics 
overshadowing the autonomy of the commons. Laclau and Mouffe neglect the 
fact that the political plays out in both conflict and consensus, antagonism and 
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solidarity. The ontology of ‘being-many-against’ is coexistent with the ontology 
of ‘being-many-together’. Most importantly, the identification of the political 
solely with antagonism and conflict reproduces a reversed essentialism that 
sneaks into the politics of hegemony in the form of the reification of hierarchy. 
To further illustrate this tension, Kioupkiolis (2010) contrasts the verticalism of 
Laclau and Mouffe with the horizontalism of Hardt and Negri.
4.2.3 Horizontalism: Hardt and Negri
Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004; 2009) suggest that capitalism now confronts 
not so much a working class as a ‘multitude’ of dispersed subjectivities, col-
lectivities and movements springing up across the globe from post-Fordism 
onwards. The multitude creates common wealth through ‘immaterial labour’ 
that involves the biopolitical communicative and affective dimensions of 
networked production. With the aid of ICTs, biopolitics covers all aspects of 
the extended social factory by virtue of the rhizomatic function of immate-
rial labour which interconnects all social activity, from production to repro-
duction. Rhizomatic articulation replaces the antithetical binary of identity/ 
difference with the complementary bind of singularity/community, which 
 produces nodes through horizontal interactions of autonomous units. Thus, 
the Deleuzian ‘rhizome’ of the multitude features as an alternative to both hier-
archy and the postmodern anarchy of dispersed differences.
Hardt and Negri (2009, viii) were the first to dissolve the misconception of 
the commons as certain properties or natural resources, introducing the notion 
of the common in the singular. The common represents the spontaneous 
 production of common wealth by a multitude of dispersed collectivities. The 
common expands from the material world – natural resources – to the social 
reproduction of knowledge, language, information, affect and so forth. In con-
trast to Laclau and Mouffe, the common does not arise from the subordination 
of differences to an overarching particularity, nor is it limited to a horizontal 
space of autonomy within the broader articulation of hegemony. The common 
spans a distributed network that encapsulates the dynamic interaction of sin-
gularities. Interaction is coordinated by the swarm intelligence of the network 
via autonomous nodes through which connections unfold horizontally. 
The distributed network enacts a new institutional logic, whereby the multitude 
is established as a constituent self-instituting power driven by the biopolitical 
reproduction of the community. The Internet and the open source movement 
are paradigmatic cases of the networked community. Hardt and Negri (2012, 
71–72) envisage the digital subversion of capitalism by the self-instituting 
power of the multitude, which prefigures the advent of an ‘absolute democ-
racy’ beyond authority, antagonism and exclusion. Absolute democracy would 
instantiate a collective governance of common wealth through the direct par-
ticipation of all citizens. 
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Laclau (2001) and Mouffe (2008) hold that the spontaneism of the multi-
tude slides into a quasi-teleological ‘immanentism’, that is, a positivism of social 
change that begs the question. A reversed essentialism slides into the work of 
Hardt and Negri in the form of the economism of the multitude that consti-
tutes an ontological template of organisation already prefigured and embed-
ded in social dynamics. But the lack of a concrete programme and centralised 
coordination means that it would do little to unsettle the present balance of 
power. The nomadism of the multitude cannot translate into an effective politi-
cal counter-power capable of challenging the hegemony of capitalism. 
4.2.4 Beyond Verticalism and Horizontalism:  
Commoning the Political
Absolute democracy is not feasible on both practical and political grounds. The 
complexity and the magnitude of contemporary societies, along with the politi-
cal right to abstain, indicate the necessity of representation. Marina Prentoulis 
and Lasse Thomassen (2013, 181) have stressed that direct democracy una-
voidably involves some inequality and hierarchy. The very realisation of equal-
ity presupposes some representational space. Therefore, there is no democracy 
without representation, no horizontality without verticality, no equality with-
out inequality. Hierarchy and representation are operative in the ‘networked 
systems’ of various mobilisations today in the form of ‘distributed leadership’, 
stretching from the digital commons to social movements (Nunes 2014, 33–40). 
Distributed leadership suggests the rotational feature of leadership. 
On the flipside, to stipulate that representation is intrinsic to politics, as 
Laclau and Mouffe presume, is to endorse ontological theses with a strong 
pretence to universal validity (Kioupkiolis 2010, 145). While various aspects 
of representation are necessary or appropriate for radical democracy, hegem-
onic representation is not. The essentialist leanings of the politics of hegemony 
can be partly attributed to its failure to grasp the innovative potential of creative 
agency inherent in the multitude. Hardt and Negri locate creative agency in 
history, inscribe it in social indeterminacy and anticipate its full play in future 
democracy. A democracy, instead, reformed along Laclau and Mouffe’s lines, 
may be less supportive of freedom and equality. On the other hand, the ontol-
ogy of a quasi-teleological vis viva substantiated in the form of the multitude 
fails to grapple with macro-structures. It is, thus, debilitating for actual politics. 
Kioupkiolis (2019) intends to discharge the various tensions between verti-
calism and horizontalism. He endeavours to remedy the ‘lack of the political’ 
in the anti-capitalist commons by recalibrating Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemony 
to tilt towards the commons and not the other way around. To prevent 
the absorption of the commons by the bureaucratic institutions of the state or the 
market, he holds that hegemony and the commons should perform with 
 different strengths at different levels of the political. Hegemony should work 
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outwards: against advocates of oppression, exclusion, homogenisation, injustice 
and inequality. The commons should work inwards: within the multiple organisa-
tions and social movements that abide by the principles of freedom and equality. 
Kioupkiolis (2010; 2017, 301–302; 2019) draws on the work of Castoriadis 
and Foucault, among others, to integrate the two-way political transformation 
of the common into a post-hegemonic trajectory that transcends the dichot-
omy between horizontalism and verticalism. Hegemony persists within the 
horizontal multitudes of glocal commons, belying any notion of pure autono-
mous counter-strategy. Post-hegemony, instead, strives for autonomy, limiting 
hegemony to the minimum. It advances horizontalism against any residual 
verticality. Post-hegemony applies the following principles: 1) representation 
should emanate from the bottom through decentralised decision making based 
on openness, transparency and diversity; 2) accountability and revocability 
of representatives would secure democratic control by and for the commons; 
3) regular rotation of roles and responsibilities should be exercised with the 
aim of empowering all the people with relevant skills and knowledge; and 
4) self-management would thereby instil an ethical self-transformation through 
a subjectivation that would induce both individual and collective autonomy.
This new form of collective self-rule in effect prefigures a common  democracy 
that practises political representation, government and self-transformation at 
its social roots (Kioupkiolis 2019, 203–204). Given that plutocrats and political 
elites are unlikely to give up their privileges through peaceful dialogue and elec-
tions, common democracy should advance deep readjustments in structural 
asymmetries of power through social struggle. Confrontation or collaboration 
with the state or maximum distance from it can variably represent the best 
option in different situations (Kioupkiolis 2019, 207). Common democracy 
calls for pragmatic hybrid politics, including new citizens’ parties, participa-
tory budgeting, civic initiatives and municipal confluences such as the Bologna 
Regulation for the Commons, Podemos and Barcelona en Comú. 
Kioupkiolis aims to politicise the common by commoning the political, that 
is, by attuning hegemony to a post-hegemonic, non-hierarchical, open and 
pluralistic logic of the commons. Yet by politicising the common, Kioupkio-
lis runs the risk of fetishising the political, thus reproducing the essentialism 
he wishes to abolish. The political assumes primacy vis-à-vis the social, but it 
does not fully identify with it. The radical imaginary breeds the political and 
germinates into the social imaginary. The interpenetration of the radical 
and the social imaginary shakes the bottom-up axis of post-hegemonic recali-
bration. It instils a free flow of horizontal social interaction. Perhaps what I am 
suggesting here is a looser sense of the political, without resorting to any sort of 
radical anarchism or intersubjectivism. Practically, this would translate into the 
spontaneous mutual coordination of individuals and collectivities; the smooth 
compatibility between subjectivities and the common rather than a determined 
political process.
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Kioupkiolis has succeeded in filling the gap of the political from within 
the commons. Post-hegemony can, indeed, be instructive as to how to pro-
duce chains of equivalence between alternative formations of community and 
governance; how to connect local and global commons; how to bring together 
and coordinate dispersed, small-scale civic initiatives; how to relate to estab-
lished social systems and power relations in the market and the state, and 
so on. One could further consider post-hegemony as the political substratum 
of Bauwens and Kostakis’s model of open cooperativism, combined to create 
a counter-hegemonic power against predatory capitalism and the state. What 
is still missing on both sides of the common are concrete policies for the 
commons to reach a critical mass. For the commons to become a sustainable 
model that can challenge capitalism, they need to provide a steady income to 
their members and gain broad civil trust, support and involvement. This 
task points to the creation of a social economy built around the commons. The 
role of the state and institutions here is pivotal to support the commons in 
various ways.
4.3 The Self-instituting Power of the Common
The work of Dardot and Laval can be read in conjunction with the attempt of 
Kioupkiolis to politicise the commons. Dardot and Laval take their cues from 
Marx, Foucault and Castoriadis, among others, to construe a new political 
theory of the commons. Like Hardt and Negri, they endorse the singular ‘com-
mon’ (2014, 56, 189–190). The common is not a good but a collective activ-
ity that engenders common goods under the constituency of a new collective 
subject. Like Hardt and Negri, moreover, the common is orientated against 
the current neoliberal hegemony by bringing to the fore the contradictions of 
capitalism and the state with regard to the commons. But whereas Hardt and 
Negri conceive of the common in terms of the multitude, which is supposedly 
apt to challenge neoliberal capitalism, Dardot and Laval (2014, 57) hold that 
local and digital commons are fragmented, divided and effectively subsumed 
under  neoliberal capitalism. They, thus, embark on creating a new political 
conception of the common in a mission to put forward a collective agency for 
the commons. Their political intent is to juxtapose the counter-power of the 
 common against the superpowers of the state and market capitalism.
Dardot and Laval’s concept of the common is based on the interplay of power, 
law and institution. They understand power in the same vein with Foucault 
and Castoriadis as a productive force of social relations emanating from below. 
The commons do not spring up spontaneously from cooperation, as Hardt and 
Negri claim, but they must be actively striven for, fabricated and instituted. 
The same accounts for the collective subject of social change, which calls for a 
drastic transformation of dominant logics and habits among the vast majority 
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(Dardot and Laval 2014, 397). It pertains to the creation of a novel anthropo-
logical type, as Castoriadis would have it. 
They thus turn to Castoriadis to demonstrate the common as the self- 
instituting power of the people. The common identifies with the self-instituting 
power of the social imaginary of the anonymous collective that creates new 
significations, norms and laws, forms of living, production and reproduction. 
The common advances the conscious collective praxis of instituting, which 
would be ongoing and reflective, thereby constantly challenging instituted 
norms and laws. This is to be distinguished from Hardt and Negri’s constitu-
ent power, which accounts for the revolutionary moments in which a polity 
is founded. 
From this vantage point, the current political struggles of the commons 
are sources of law making, aiming to establish the institutions necessary for 
the commons to escape the hold of capital and the state (Dardot and Laval 
2014, 227). The politics of the common is not reserved to the experts of the 
state or the party, but extends egalitarian decision making to all domains of 
society. Thus, the common sets its face against representative democracy by 
practising participatory models of self-governance in pursuit of common ends 
(Dardot and Laval 2014, 455). The final gesture of politicising the common 
by Dardot and Laval (2014, 456–568) is the formulation of a set of propositions 
that would bring the law of the common into effect: 
1. The politics of the common will not emerge from some sort of spontane-
ous encirclement of capitalism from the outside, nor from mass desertion. 
It is necessary to construct the politics of the common in all social spheres 
and on every scale, from the local to the global. 
2. There can be no politics of the common without a rethinking of property 
rights concerning land, capital and intellectual ownership. The common 
assumes the inappropriability of things and, thus, the common right of 
use. Traditional ownership rights grant owners absolute use of their prop-
erty and, therefore, imply no accountability before others. In contrast, the 
user of what is in common is tied to other users by the co-production of 
the rules that govern the common use. Rather than seeking to develop 
a form of property right that broadens ownership to include everyone, 
there must be a right of use that can be mobilised against property rights. 
Rights of use, then, rather than rights of property must be the juridical 
axis for the transformation of society. For there to be common and not 
simply shared things, there must be co-activity. 
3. Labour in the neoliberal enterprise is the product of forced cooperation. 
The enterprise demands the active mobilisation of the workers while 
reducing them to simple operatives. The common, instead, is the route to 
the emancipation of labour via the establishment of workplace democracy.
4. Workplace democracy will be the institutional epicentre of the ‘common 
enterprise’, which contrasts both capitalist and state control.
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5. The ‘common enterprise’ must expand into much broader collective asso-
ciations to avoid being co-opted by market capitalism.
6. Collective associations must establish social democracy not in the form of 
the social (welfare) state that negates the common as the co-activity of the 
members of society, but as the return of the institutions of reciprocity and 
solidarity to the democratic control of society.
7. The state, thus, should transform into institutions of common participa-
tory self-management.
8. The common should entail the institutionalisation of global public goods: 
(overused) globally indivisible goods (the ozone layer, the climate); 
(underused) man-made global public goods (scientific knowledge, the 
Internet); and goods that result from integrated global policy (peace, 
health, stability).
9. The common should evolve into a non-statist, decentralised federation of 
self-governing local communities.
Dardot and Laval’s proposals sharpen our political understanding of the com-
mons. They serve to draw out the politics of egalitarian, alternative commons 
and to nudge collective action in positive directions. Yet Kioupkiolis (2019, 95) 
argues that Dardot and Laval’s politics of the common still reads largely as a 
wish list and a proclamation of principles and end goals of political action. 
What receives scant response in their work is the obvious and urgent question: 
How do we get there? How could we put all these propositions into prac-
tice, starting from the disabling circumstances that Dardot and Laval astutely 
lay out? The same criticism, however, can be levelled at Kioupkiolis’s post- 
hegemonic politics. What prevents Dardot and Laval and Kioupkiolis from 
answering these questions is the absence of the more practical horizon of a post-
capitalist transition, engineered by relevant techno-economic tools. Bauwens 
and Kostakis’s counter-hegemonic model of open cooperativism could be a sig-
nificant fix in articulating a more practical instantiation of the common as the 
self-instituting power of the people. The latter needs to integrate into a broader 
post- hegemonic political strategy aimed at putting forward concrete policies 
that will help the commons reach a critical mass. 
4.4 The Community Economy
Gibson and Graham attempt to connect theory with praxis for the purpose of 
constructing a community economy. They draw on multiple sources to support 
this venture. Among others, they combine Louis Althusser’s concept of overde-
termination with Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist theory of hegemony to 
deconstruct capitalism and bring together a diverse alternative economy under 
a counter-hegemonic, post-capitalist project capable of transforming capital-
ism into the commons. 
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4.4.1 Overdetermination and Hegemony
Althusser (1972) appropriated from psychoanalysis the term ‘overdetermina-
tion’ to counter the essentialism inherent in the Marxian philosophy of  history 
and political economy, which is predicated on the axiom that the structure of 
the economy encapsulates the essence of society, as crystallised in the means 
and relations of production (Gibson-Graham 1996, 26–29). By contrast, over-
determination asserts that every ontological site or process is constituted at 
the intersection of all others. Economy is one among many sites of society 
overdetermining and overdetermined by all others. Overdetermination reveals 
an ontological emptiness without a core essence. It signifies the openness or 
incompleteness of every identity; the ultimate unfixity of every meaning; the 
acentric totality of society that is not structured by the primacy of any social 
element or location. Society cannot be reduced to the conventional dialectics 
of A/non-A, supposed to explain the irreconcilable contradictions of capital-
ism. Instead, overdetermination unfolds on the ontological basis of difference 
and heterogeneity. 
Gibson and Graham approach capitalism not as an essential or fixed entity, 
but as a differentiated multiplicity that bears a plural identity. If there is no 
essence or coherent identity of capitalism such as capital accumulation or 
exploitation, recontextualising capitalism in a discourse of economic plurality 
destabilises its presumptive hegemony and multiplies the possibilities of alter-
ity (Gibson-Graham 1996, 15). 
Gibson and Graham deconstruct the classical Marxist notion of class with 
the aim of construing an alternative economy based on the proliferation of dif-
ferences across all fields of the social. In classical Marxism, subjects are social 
classes, whose unity is constituted around interests determined by their posi-
tion in the relations of production, which are reduced to two fundamental and 
contradictory classes or positions: capitalists and workers. The uneven power of 
capitalists accounts for the exploitation of workers, manifested in the appropri-
ation of surplus labour, that is, labour beyond what is necessary for the worker’s 
reproduction. Capitalism’s essence is capital accumulation via exploitation. 
Gibson and Graham draw on the work of Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff 
(1987) who elaborate a theory of economic difference, which is not reduced 
to the contradiction between the capitalists and the workers (Gibson-Graham 
1996, 17–19). In the discursive space of diverse class positions, individuals 
may participate in a variety of class processes over time, potentially possessing 
multiple and shifting class identities. In the words of Mouffe (2005), identity is 
hybridised and nomadic. The term ‘woman’ has a different meaning in the con-
text of ‘marriage’ and ‘private life’ than in the context of ‘feminism’ and ‘lesbian’. 
Class processes of exploitation and surplus distribution may also include places 
outside the factory or the capitalist firm such as households, churches, schools, 
communities, cooperatives and other sites of (non-)economic activity. 
The Anti-capitalist Commons 153
The different forms of class processes are merely part of an ‘economy’ 
that encompasses innumerable other processes – exchange, speculation, 
waste, production, plunder, consumption, hoarding, innovation, com-
petition, predation – none of which can be said (outside of a particular 
discursive or political context) to be less important than exploitation. 
(Gibson-Graham 1996, 20)
Gibson and Graham’s core argument is that contemplation of the variety 
of forms of exploitation and surplus distribution might enable the under-
standing of capitalism as a field of difference pregnant with post-capitalist 
possibility. Through the theoretical lenses of overdetermination and hegem-
ony, they see the economy as a diverse space of recognition and negotiation 
capable of articulating a counter-hegemonic chain of equivalence under a 
community economy that can bring together the cooperative movement and 
the solidarity economy with the aim of challenging the current hegemony of 
neoliberalism.
4.4.2 Class and Second-wave Feminism
One of the driving forces behind this initial deconstruction has been the 
 second-wave feminism inspired by the critique of Marxism and capitalism. 
By dislocating the economy from its ‘base’ and relocating it in the class positions 
dispersed across the totality of the social, the field of reproduction of labour 
power, which was totally neglected by Marx, now comes to the fore. Women 
engage in a non-class process of ‘reproducing’ the capitalist workforce through 
cleaning, nurturing, clothing and feeding, thus fulfilling the needs of capitalist 
production (Gibson-Graham 1996, 64). Women have been historically subser-
vient to patriarchy, that is, a system of rules and practices of gender domination. 
The struggles against capitalism, patriarchy and gender oppression, combined 
with the legitimisation of discourses of rights, is due to the rise of identity  politics, 
which takes two opposing directions. On the one hand, it  crystallises the critique 
of capitalism and classical Marxism by poststructuralism and  post-Marxism in 
terms of difference and subject positions stretching across the social. On the 
other hand, it signals the feminisation of the labour market and the rise of 
 individualism, marking the dominance of neoliberalism following the eco-
nomic crisis of 1973 and the subsequent decline of social democracy. Feminism, 
thus, splits basically into a socialist and a neoliberal version, among others.
Gibson and Graham integrate feminism into a post-Marxist and post- capitalist 
perspective. In contrast to the classical Marxist tradition, which considers the 
working class as the collective agent of fundamental change and, therefore, 
the subject of history, Gibson and Graham (1996, 52) follow Resnick and Wolff 
(1987) in their definition of class as the social process of producing, appropri-
ating (more commonly known as exploiting) and distributing surplus labour 
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along both capitalist and non-capitalist domains. Gibson and Graham (1996, 
49–51) invoke the influential work of Wright on the concept of class to illustrate 
the proliferation of intermediate and occasionally contradictory class locations. 
A worker, for example, who is exploited by a capitalist enterprise can also own 
a small business, potentially exploiting other workers. She or he can also be a 
freelancer, investor and member of a co-op, potentially at the same time. 
Gibson and Graham (1996, 55–59) theorise class as an overdetermined 
social process lying at the intersection of all social dimensions − economic, 
 political, cultural, natural. They understand society as a complex disunity in 
which class may take multiple and diverse forms. Primitive communist, inde-
pendent, slave, feudal, capitalist and communal class processes often coexist. 
The household, for example, features a ‘feudal’ domestic class process in which 
one partner produces surplus labour in the form of use values to be appropriated 
by the other. The state may also be a site of exploitation, as well as  educational 
 institutions, self-employment, labour unions and other sites of production 
not necessarily associated with class. Thus, class struggles do not take place at 
a particular location in a social structure by fixed identities, but wherever 
surplus labour is produced, appropriated and distributed. This complex 
 understanding of class suggests a range of non-capitalist class alternatives that 
could arise out of momentary and partial identifications between subjects 
 constituted at the intersection of very different class and non-class processes 
and positions.
Traditional Marxism has focused on class relations of exploitation, whereas 
issues of distribution have often been relegated to the social democratic poli-
tics of reform. The privileging of exploitation over distribution stems from 
the essentialist reduction of economic totality to the core economic relation 
between capital and labour and the appropriation of surplus value, both of 
which would be eliminated by the socialisation of the means of production by 
the socialist state. From this standpoint, social democratic reforms could not 
touch on the core of the capitalist exploitation and could not, therefore, trans-
form the economy.
Contrary to this essentialist viewpoint, Gibson and Graham (1996, 175–176) 
introduce a class transformation based on a class politics of distribution by 
bringing into existence or strengthening non-capitalist processes of surplus 
appropriation. They envision a diverse economic landscape in which non-
capitalist class processes transcend the unsustainable materialistic growth 
of capitalist class processes by initiating sustainable growth along with non-
growth (1996, 177–179). The achievements of second-wave feminism have 
given  Gibson and Graham the confidence to identify with a broader movement 
that is actively retheorising capitalism and reclaiming the economy through 
an alternative economic activism aimed at globalising localised politics. Some 
examples are local movements for stakeholders’ rights, aboriginal land rights 
and sustainable development.
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4.4.3 A Weak Theory of a Community Economy
To further this movement, Gibson and Graham (2006, 1–8) introduce a weak 
theory of social transformation that does not purport to produce an  exhaustive 
knowledge of the ‘real’, but to enact the ‘possible’ by opening up spaces for 
freedom and decision. Weak theory has first and foremost to confront the 
paranoia, melancholy and moralism of the traditional left – that is, nostalgia 
for the lost ideals of a failed revolution along with scepticism about any alter-
native that slightly deviates from those ideals. Weak theory needs to engage 
affect and emotions into practices of what Nietzsche called self-artistry or self- 
overcoming, and Foucault called self-cultivation or care of the self. Instead of 
hanging on to the mastery of ‘pure’ theories, activism would rather draw on the 
pleasures of friendliness, trust, conviviality and companionship and indulge in 
playfulness, experimentation, enchantment and exuberance. Practising weak 
theory allows us to de-exoticise power and create alternative discourses of sub-
jectivation and collective action. 
Gibson and Graham (2006, 53–60) combine Foucault’s ethics (1985) with 
Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist theory of hegemony to develop an eco-
nomic language for a politics of counter-hegemony, aiming to orient economic 
meaning and activity around non-capitalist points of subjectivation. They 
intend to dislocate the hegemony of capitalocentric discourse by articulating 
the language of economic diversity already existing alongside and within cap-
italism. Their purpose is to reconstruct and further induce collective action 
around the commons. To do so, they conceptualise economic language in 
terms of different kinds of transactions, labour and enterprises (2006, 60–72). 
The  criterion Gibson and Graham use to illustrate difference is the produc-
tion, appropriation and distribution of surplus in a capitalist, an alternative 
and a non-capitalist format within a diverse economy (Figure 4.1). They thus 
distinguish between market, alternative and non-market transactions; paid, 
unpaid and alternatively paid labour; capitalist, alternative and non-capitalist 
enterprises. What is usually regarded as the ‘economy’ – wage labour, market 
exchange of commodities and capitalist enterprise – comprises but a part of 
produced, exchanged and distributed value.
4.4.4 Transactions, Labour, Surplus
In capitalist market exchange, transactions follow the law of supply and demand 
in the commensurability of goods and services, voluntarily established by 
rational, self-interested producers and consumers. But markets are rarely vol-
untary, free and rational. They are naturally and artificially protected, monopo-
lised, regulated and niched. Transactions are thus governed by context-specific 
power relations. Alongside capitalist market exchange, there is a huge variety 
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and volume of non-market transactions such as goods and services shared in 
the household, provided by nature, given away by people and organisations, 
allocated by the state or traded within and between communities according to 
rituals of exchange. Alternative market transactions take place in the informal 
and underground markets in which goods and services are traded according to 
local and personalised agreements; in the exchange of commodities between 
and within worker cooperatives, where prices are set to sustain the cooperative; 
in the ethical or ‘fair’ trade of products, where producers and consumers agree 
on certain price levels; in local trading systems and currencies that foster local 
interdependency; and in the marketing of public goods and services produced 
by the state.
Figure 4.1: Diverse economies iceberg by Community Economies Collective 
(licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 Interna-
tional Licence).
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Labour also comes in different forms and compensations. Customary wage 
labour concerns the selling of labour power by workers/employees to employ-
ers in return for a monetary wage set at the level of context-specific markets. 
But there is also alternative paid labour. Worker cooperatives pay a living wage 
set by the cooperative. Workers in both capitalist and non-capitalist enterprises 
may receive capital payments according to their stake in the enterprise. Self-
employed workers are paying themselves a wage. Others labour in return for 
payments in kind such as farmers, migrants and residents of a community. 
There is also the voluntary and unpaid labour performed in the household, the 
family and the neighbourhood or in the wider community. Yet many would 
say that this labour is compensated either in the form of money paid by a life 
partner or in the form of love, emotional support, protection, companionship, 
the sense of self-worth and reputation. 
The main locus for the production, appropriation and distribution of sur-
plus is the capitalist enterprise, where surplus is distributed towards expansion 
or to shareholders and managers. However, there are many alternative ways 
in which surplus is distributed both within or alongside the capitalist enter-
prise. ‘Green’ capitalist firms distribute part of their surplus to environmental 
 concerns (for example, clean-up, investment in recycling technology and envi-
ronmental monitoring). ‘Socially responsible’ capitalist businesses might com-
mit to increasing workers’ ownership of the firm or distribute surplus to social 
and community projects (for example, scholarships for local youth or provision 
of community infrastructures or services). State capitalist enterprises distribute 
surplus for the public benefit. Non-profit enterprises are by law not allowed to 
retain or  distribute profits. In worker cooperatives, producers set their own wage 
and distribute a communal surplus. Self-employed producers set the surplus 
themselves and decide how to distribute it. In feudal agricultural establishments 
across the ‘developing’ world, surplus product is appropriated by the landlord. 
In many households, domestic work is performed by women and could be seen 
to be appropriated and distributed by a patriarchal household head.
Gibson and Graham (2006, 71) acknowledge that between the aforementioned 
economic practices intervene diverse forms of power such as co-optation, 
seduction, capture, subordination, cooperation, parasitism, symbiosis, conflict 
and complementarity. To address this alienation, Gibson and Graham (2006, 78) 
introduce the community economy, which could act as an empty signifier and, 
thus, concentrate economic power around a new nodal point, constituting a 
chain of equivalence for different forms of subjectivation and collective action. 
To do so, they deploy Nancy’s concept of community as a form of ‘being-with’ 
along with the Foucaultian creation of new forms of subjectivities through 
embodied practices of ethical self-transformation (2006, 81–88). They attempt 
to resignify the discourse of the community economy accordingly, placing at 
the foreground of ethical deliberation and decision four key coordinates: neces-
sity, surplus, consumption and the commons. 
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4.4.5 Necessity, Surplus, Consumption and the Commons
Necessity involves decisions about how much time to spend in production and 
in cultural and community practice, how much is a ‘living wage’, how much of 
the surplus to set aside for individual and community needs. Necessity var-
ies across income strata, international boundaries, rural and urban contexts, 
different lifestyles, thereby rendering an ethical discourse indispensable to 
account for the various forms of interdependencies (trade-offs and flow-ons) 
that are enacted by relevant decisions on the part of the community. Decisions 
about necessary labour affect accordingly the production, appropriation and 
distribution of surplus among the individuals and the community.
Surplus distribution can be exploitative as in the case of appropriation by 
non-producers (as in the case of capitalist, feudal or slave class processes) 
or non-exploitative in the case of producer appropriation (in an independent or 
communal class process). In the diversity economy, surplus distribution takes 
heterogeneous forms. Save for the impossibility of aggregating incommensura-
bles, Gibson and Graham envisage an (un)quantifiable surplus to be  distributed 
according to the ethical decisions of the community. Relevant questions to be 
examined are the following: Who is to be included in the decision making over 
the rate of appropriation of surplus and its distribution? Under what conditions 
could surplus appropriation not be considered exploitative? How might non-
producers have a say in the decision making? What are the social destinations 
of surplus distribution? 
Decisions over necessary labour and surplus distribution have a direct impact 
on the level of consumption. In contrast to mainstream key economic indica-
tors such as investment/expenditure ratios, debt-saving ratios, ratios of luxury 
expenditure to necessity expenditure and so forth, decisions of the community 
economy over how social surplus is to be distributed will aim to counterbalance 
productive versus non-productive activities, as Marx put it – that is, activities 
directly involved in production and activities that consume social surplus in 
replenishing the commons, such as finance, management, and so on.
The commons, thus, refer to commonly used or distributed resources/
infrastructures – whether agricultural land, a gene pool, the atmosphere, a 
 wilderness, a database, a fishery, the Internet, community facilities and sup-
port systems or even the whole set of relationships comprising a community 
economy – that provide direct input into social and physical well-being and 
reproduction. A crucial decision, therefore, concerns the management of the 
two-way flow between the commons and the surplus-generating machine of 
production. In other words, a balance needs to be struck between the commons 
and the alternative economy.
4.4.6 The Cooperative Enterprise: The Mondragon Case
Gibson and Graham consider the cooperative enterprise to be the best model 
to strike this balance. However, cooperativism has faced acute criticism. The 
The Anti-capitalist Commons 159
traditional left has argued that the cooperative movement is insignificant and, 
therefore, cannot challenge the dominance of capitalism (Gibson-Graham 
2006, 109–111). This would require instead a socialist centralised state along 
with a revolutionary movement. In the view of the revolutionary socialists, 
cooperative ownership of the means and output of production does not resolve 
many of the thorny issues associated with the distribution of the proceeds 
of labour, which include economic rent, that is, payment for land and other 
non-labour requirements of the production process that influence the price/
value of the produced product. In addition, cooperativism has been economi-
cally inefficient and prone to group individualism, conflicts of interest and sec-
torism. Cooperatives are politically conservative and uninterested in solidarity 
with more political struggles, hence the need for centralised governance of the 
interdependencies of the various economic sectors.
Gibson and Graham (2006, 111) counter-argue that the essentialism of the 
traditional left rules out alternative options by offering a limited typology of 
organisations and practices for overcoming capitalism. They invoke the Mon-
dragon experience as a prominent example of the cooperative movement in 
Spain (2006, 101–102). Mondragon came into being in the 1950s under the 
guidance of a Catholic priest, Father Arizmendiarrieta, who inspired a sense of 
group solidarity in the Basque region, where the first cooperative enterprises in 
Spain were pioneered. The success of the cooperatives lies, first, in their choice 
not to heighten local competition and, second, in price protection through high 
tariffs imposed by the Spanish state on industrial imports. Focus on local mar-
kets led to the proliferation of cooperatives and the parallel  building of back-
ward and forward linkages among local cooperatives, which then expanded by 
developing new markets outside the cooperative system. Today, the Mondragon 
Cooperative Corporation (MCC) involves over one hundred cooperatives, 
employing more than 30,000 worker-owners in a broad spectrum of sectors, 
including manufacturing, retail, finance, education, healthcare and insurance. 
Admission to membership and governance is open to all democratically, on 
the principle of ‘one member–one vote’. Each cooperative is set up with a num-
ber of elected councils that see to day-to-day governance and carry out the deci-
sions made by the annual General Assembly of all councils. The council is made 
up of general members and a co-op manager appointed for a four-year period. 
Self-management is based on the free flow of information, access to training, 
internal promotion, consultation and negotiation about all  decisions, includ-
ing the distribution of surplus, the setting of wage and price levels, investment, 
consumption, innovation, and so on. Democratic participation, thus, cultivates 
ethical subjects capable of decision making.
Wages are pegged to a base wage comparable to the base wage outside the 
Basque region. Wage differentials are minimised to a ratio of 1:6 between 
the bottom worker and the top manager. The decision to set wage levels at the 
level of the community and not the individual cooperative prevents the driv-
ing of wages down below the community-wide level or the jeopardising of 
the  production of surplus by raising wages above this level. It therefore  values 
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community sustainability over personal consumption. 10% of annual prof-
its are allocated to social or charitable institutions, as enforced by Spanish 
law, and the remaining 90% of the surplus is saved to be reinvested in enter-
prise  development. Members may draw on the interest accumulated in their 
accounts, but they cannot touch the principal until they retire or resign. This 
allocation of surplus to ‘forced saving’ has subordinated personal economic 
gain to the expansion of the cooperative system. The centrally administered 
investment fund is a monetary form of commons utilised to create more co-ops 
and employment.
Innovation is vital for the cooperatives to remain competitive with respect to 
capitalist enterprises. There is a strong emphasis on efficiency, high productivity, 
market expansion, new business growth and market development. Job classifi-
cations and individual performance goals are important, as they translate into 
the level of wages and dividends paid to the worker-owners. But automation 
does not result in unemployment, since workers are employed by other cooper-
atives or retrained to work in new production processes and paid a maintenance 
wage. This cost is met by reallocation of surplus at the level of the individual 
cooperative, supported also by the common funds of the Caja Laboral bank.
The cooperative principles of the MCC have produced a cultural commons fos-
tered periodically through the guiding principle of equilibrio, intended to strike 
a balance between conflicting interests and confront the dangers of exclusivism 
and group individualism (Gibson-Graham 2006, 105). However, the expansion 
of the MCC through the appropriation of surplus from non- cooperators has 
resulted in participating in both exploitative and non-exploitative practices. 
Thus, the MCC is succumbing to group individualism. Gibson and Graham 
(2006, 123) admit that this hybridisation is threatening the very identity of the 
MCC. However, notwithstanding the pitfalls and shortcomings, they hold that 
the success of the MCC thus far offers important empirical evidence against the 
degeneration thesis of the traditional left (2006, 124). It can thus function as an 
example of the ‘community economy’ that adequately addresses the core con-
cerns of necessity, surplus, consumption and the commons.
Gibson and Graham (2006, 165–196) conceive of the Mondragon  experiment 
as one among many projects, initiated by NGOs and collective finance schemes 
in concert with local, national and international communities, provincial and 
municipal governments, that altogether could create a counter-hegemonic 
community economy against the neoliberal narrative of corporate growth. 
In contrast to the myth of trickle-down economics, the community economy 
 generates bottom-up, interdependent dynamics of affection, cooperation and 
solidarity capable of replacing capitalism with the commons. 
4.4.7 Critique of the Community Economy
Cooperatives are at a critical crossroads today. There is, indeed, a whole range 
of emerging areas of development, including local food systems, organic 
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 farming and agricultural co-ops, social care, child care, healthcare and com-
munity  services, affordable housing, environmental stewardship, solar and 
wind energy, cooperative capital and solidarity services, all showcased in Que-
bec, Japan, Germany, the US, the UK, Greece, Italy (Emilia Romagna) and 
Spain (Catalan Integral Cooperative). In addition, the Internet has given rise 
to  platform cooperativism across the globe. The digital commons can further 
support the transformation of platform cooperativism into open cooperativism 
between the commons, ethical market entities and a partner state, all sharing 
common knowledge and practices.
However, Gibson and Graham’s theoretical reconstruction of the community 
economy contains a degree of wishful thinking. Major problems and challenges 
are yet to be solved. Incompleteness of representation, internal conflicts of 
interest and bias towards exclusion undermine the democratic role of coopera-
tives (Simon 2019, 557–571). There is a tendency for established cooperatives 
to become large organisations, many of them operating transnationally across 
Europe and internationally, such as Mondragon, some of the large Italian mul-
tinational co-ops, international cooperative banks and insurance companies 
(Restakis 2010). The challenges of growth and the demands of capital most 
often push towards demutualisation and disconnection from membership and 
local communities. More and more large co-ops are concerned with maintain-
ing their positions and growing. Consequently, their political role evaporates; 
they do not envision themselves as organisations with a political and social 
mission, thus disregarding their cooperative identity. Too many co-ops are 
unwilling to share their branding and marketing with other co-ops within the 
movement to convey a collective cooperative idea. Cooperatives are, thus, often 
absorbed into the capitalist system, turning into private, for-profit, shareholder-
owned corporations. This is evident, for example, in the agricultural sector in 
Canada and Ireland during recent years (Restakis 2010).
Therefore, there is an increasing polarisation and inequality within the 
cooperative movement, and an increasing divergence of interests and culture 
between the very large and successful cooperatives and the emergent small and 
medium-sized cooperatives, with innovative ideas and forward thinking, which 
remain at the margins. Small and medium-sized co-ops face a whole set of chal-
lenges: problems with access to capital and training; lack of entrepreneurial 
and managerial skills; the absence of institutional support from governments, 
larger co-ops and NGOs; and the existence of gated communities unwilling to 
share and cooperate with each other.
4.4.8 Affect, Sexuality, Reproduction
Conclusively, the argument that affect is indispensable for ethical practice and 
interlayered with thought highlights the crucial role of empathy within a com-
munity-orientated economy. In contrast to Arvidsson and Peitersen, who mon-
etise affect, Gibson and Graham demonetise affect and render it the  political 
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criterion par excellence for managing the economy. Affect should indeed not 
be subordinate to analytical logic. As Castoriadis (1987, 278) has noted: ‘As 
much as the colour is an equation, to the same extent the dream is the meaning 
of the dream.’ Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything 
that can be counted counts. Rather than relying on a cost–benefit analysis to 
orient policy, the community economy would employ a common stock of affect 
to address unemployment, poverty, job alienation, solitude and the like. To do 
away with individualism, nihilism and cynicism, it is necessary to reinvent 
humanism by rendering affect a central political category.
Yet the identification of affect with labour reproduces the economism it 
aspires to abolish. It is one thing to resignify a diverse economy in terms of 
affect, and another thing to identify affect with the economy. Art, culture, 
enjoyment, entertainment, friendship, sexuality and love intersect with the 
economy, but that does not qualify them as economic categories. The per-
sonal is political to the extent that a free space is recognised within the private 
and public sphere, untouched by economic categories, even when otherwise 
named. Economism is renamed to the extent that affection, subjectivation and 
self-realisation revolve around necessity and not the other way around. Marx 
himself was acutely cognisant that freedom transcends the field of necessity.
The inclusion of affect and reproduction into the community economy, while 
enormously important, silences the role of sexuality, by identifying the latter 
with affection. Sexuality remains by and large a taboo for society in general and 
for the commons in particular. Sexuality is suppressed by the conjunction of 
capitalism and neoconservatism, converting either into labour power or into 
an unspoken pleasure hidden in the private ‘chatrooms’ of monogamy, prosti-
tution and pornography. 
A discourse on the importance of reproduction in the community economy 
focused solely on affection often tends to identify sexuality with a compulsive 
sentimentalism producing the reversed sexual suppression of an economically 
and politically diverse neo-puritanism. Sexual desire and even sexual dis-
course alone are often synonymous with sexism. Rather than sexuality being 
the natural coefficient of affection, it has turned into a commodity subject to a 
cost–benefit analysis, an auction, a transaction, a deal, a negotiation, a neolib-
eral gender and class struggle. But between neoliberalism, sentimentalism and 
sexism lies the vitality, spontaneity, pleasure and health of the body and the 
senses, incorporated into the organic reproduction of society. Feminists, gay 
movements and various singularities and commonalities have demonstrated 
in recent decades that the struggle against domination presupposes the affec-
tive expansion of freedom into the creation of new values, forms of life and 
types of relationships. Issues regarding the role of sexuality, affection and gen-
der equality in the reproduction of a commons-orientated economy need to be 
addressed by a broader, holistic, political perspective that combines concrete 
policies into a post-hegemonic multi-format strategy. 
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4.5 Autonomous Marxism and the Common
This section examines the common in the context of autonomous Marxism, 
which has a deep and wide genealogy, ranging from strands within council 
communism and anarcho-communism to the activities of the group Socialisme 
ou Barbarie, founded by Castoriadis and Lefort (Cleaver 1979). Of particular 
centrality within this orbit of thought is a cluster of theorists associated with the 
operaismo movement of the 1960s and 1970s, including Maria Rosa  Dallacosta, 
Mario Tronti, Paolo Virno, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Dyer-Witheford 
1999, 129). What makes the operaismo movement a distinct branch of autono-
mous Marxism is the insight that new modes of knowledge and communica-
tion, produced by the post-Fordist deployment of ICTs, operate not only as 
instruments of capitalist domination, as proclaimed by the Frankfurt School, 
but also as liberatory resources of anti-capitalist struggle (Dyer-Witheford 
1999, 130, 248). 
This line of argument integrates postmodern and post-Marxist elements into 
a neo-Marxist perspective to emphasise not the irreversible, self-contradictory 
power of capital, as declared by orthodox Marxism, but class struggle as the 
main driver of social change. This section focuses on the work of Nick Dyer-
Witheford, Massimo De Angelis, George Caffentzis and Silvia Federici.
4.5.1 The Circulation of the Common
Following the current of autonomist Marxism, Dyer-Witheford (1999; 2015) 
builds on the concept of the common, introduced by Hardt and Negri, to 
advance the circulation of the common against the circulation of capital. Dyer-
Witheford (1999, 248) continues on the operaismo line of argument to ren-
der technology the main terrain of class struggle, reprogrammed to install the 
circulation of the common against the circulation of capital. He puts forward 
a particular version of autonomous Marxism, attuned to resonate against a 
 neoliberal or bourgeois interpretation of technology, the latter gathered under 
various terms such as ‘post-industrialism’, ‘the knowledge society’ and the 
‘information revolution’. 
The ‘information revolution’
Often former Marxists, a number of theorists such as Peter Drucker (1968), 
Daniel Bell (1973), Alvin Toffler (1980) and Nico Stehr (1994) pre-empted 
the end of class struggle, hailing the coming of the information revolution, 
which is supposed to install a technical fix for the contradictions of capitalism 
(Dyer-Witheford 1999, 26–64). Post-industrialism marks the transition from 
industrialism to the information society, where the increasingly  systematised 
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relationship between scientific discovery and technological application makes 
theoretical knowledge the central wealth-producing resource of society. 
 Industry is succeeded by information. Automation progressively liquidates 
labour, thus either rendering work redundant or creating intellectual and ser-
vice jobs devoid of toil, drudgery and alienation. Management is now replaced 
by the technocracy of high-tech and artificial intelligence, introducing new 
dimensions of autonomy and job satisfaction. Digitisation culminates in the 
perfection of the market or even its transcendence. Capitalism eventually pro-
duces social welfare through better communication and information, yielding a 
self-regulatory ethical pluralism reflecting consumer society. Democracy gives 
way to post-democracy (Crouch 2004), where the post-politics of consensus 
and bargaining (Giddens 1994; 1998) replace democratic politics. Finally, life 
itself mutates into the synthetic life of cyberspace and artificial intelligence, 
transforming nature to the benefit of human needs. 
Dyer-Witheford juxtaposes the optimistic versions of ‘better capitalism’ or 
‘beyond capitalism’ with a reinvented Marxism produced by the critical appraisal 
of various Marxisms. He reminds us that the complexity and  ambivalence of 
Marx’s own writings on technology have given rise to different perspectives on 
the relation of machines to social change (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 114). There 
is a polarity in Marx’s machine writings (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 83–84). At 
one pole, technology is an instrument of capitalist domination. On the other, 
it is a means for the liberation of the working class from the strains of capital. 
Depending on how much emphasis is put on each pole, different future scenarios 
exist. Dyer-Witheford focuses on three main points of reference: 1) scientific 
socialism, 2) neo-Luddism and 3) post-Fordism. 
Scientific socialism
Scientific socialism, also referred to as classical or orthodox Marxism, extends 
a line of Marxist thought which conceives of technological development as an 
autonomous motor of history, heading straight to the dissolution of capital-
ism and the triumph of socialism (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 78–79). At a  certain 
stage in this trajectory, the technological means of production come into 
 conflict with the relations of production, thus igniting social revolution. Dyer- 
Witheford (1999, 84) picks up the work of Ernest Mandel as perhaps the most 
sophisticated recent example of this school of thought, which also represents a 
magisterial attempt to counter the presumed supersession of Marxism by the 
‘information revolution’. Mandel argues that there have been three fundamental 
stages in capitalism: market capitalism, monopoly capitalism and late capital-
ism. The central feature of late capitalism is the increasing level of automation. 
Far from representing a post-industrial society, late capitalism consists in the 
full industrialisation of the economy. The economic centrality of scientific and 
technological knowledge does not mark an unprecedented historical epoch, 
but simply represents the specific form of bourgeois ideology in late capitalism. 
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Capitalist ideology is masked under the veil of the acclaimed omnipotence of 
technological rationality. 
Mandel maintains the Marxian argument that new technologies bring cap-
italism closer to its inevitable collapse. The centrepiece is the falling rate of 
profit, consequent on the rising organic composition of capital. Recall that, in 
the Marxist theory of value, profit is the outcome of the exploitation of living 
labour through the production of surplus value (S). The rate of profit is the 
ratio between surplus value and total capital, S/(C+V), where C stands for con-
stant capital (raw materials and means of production) and V for variable capital 
(labour power). The ratio between constant and variable capital is the organic 
composition of capital. According to Marx, competition forces capitalists to 
increase via automation the ratio of constant to variable capital. But the more 
automation expels workers from production, the more the rate of profit falls, 
causing faltering investment, class conflict and revolutionary crisis.
Many theorists see this projected inevitability as a special case prevalent only 
under certain conditions. They invoke the counter-tendencies, some of them 
identified by Marx himself, against the falling rate of profit: falling costs of the 
means of production, the absorption of surplus capital in the production of 
new physical infrastructures, monopolisation and the opening of new areas 
of exploitation with a low organic composition, accelerating circulation 
(through advertising, marketing and innovation) and the integration of the 
world market via telecommunications (Harvey 2010, 94). 
David Harvey (2010, 89–101) asserts that Marx’s account of the falling 
rate of profit is unduly simplistic. Castoriadis (1988, 249–253) notes that the rate 
of profit can fall, increase or remain the same, other factors being variable. For 
example, automation not only lowers the prices of commodities and labour, 
but may also lower the price of automating machinery, permitting an increase 
in the technical composition of capital – more machines relative to workers 
– while leaving untouched the overall value composition. Dyer-Witheford 
(1999, 90–91) contends that such possibilities are significant enough to cast 
doubt on Mandel’s teleological certainty. For him, this is not to confirm the 
post-industrialists’ dream of unimpeded market expansion, but to see capitalist 
crisis as contingent upon social struggles over the scope, scale and velocity of 
commodification rather than being guaranteed by capital’s own contradictory 
logic. As he puts it: ‘the more immediate problem and opportunity is that posed 
not by the composition of capital and the rate of profit, but by the composition 
of class, on which depends the rise or fall in what could be termed “the rate of 
struggle”’ (Dyer-Witheford 2015, 28).
Neo-Luddism
Neo-Luddism, the second Marxist interpretation of technology, dates back to 
the work of the Frankfurt School and authors such as Max Horkheimer, Theo-
dor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, who introduced the notion of technology 
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as domination, which actually revives the nightmarish aspects of Marx’s writ-
ings on technology. They stress the manipulative and oppressive character of 
technological rationality, eventually serving the needs of capital. The analysis 
of technology-as-domination split during the 1970s and 1980s into two streams: 
one focused on the labour process, the other on mass media (Dyer-Witheford 
1999, 94–98). Contrary to the optimism of post-industrialist theorists, authors 
such as Harry Braverman and David Noble have claimed that the computer-
ised labour process is simply an extension of Taylorist anti-human authority 
to the level of cyberspace (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 94–96). On the mass media 
front, scholars such as Herbert Schiller, Vincent Mosco, Dallas Smythe and 
Nicholas Garnham have deepened Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of the 
‘culture industry’ as a means of ideology perpetuation and mind manipulation 
(Dyer-Witheford 1999, 96). While information society theorists argue that the 
proliferation of ICTs democratises opinion formation, Schiller counter-argues 
that the giant media corporations filter the flows of information to intensify 
the commodification of social relations, excluding anything that is against the 
interests of owners and advertisers (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 97–98). 
The critique of technology-as-domination cuts much deeper than the neu-
trality thesis adopted by both information theorists and scientific socialists 
(Dyer-Witheford 1999, 97–102). The neutrality of technology is an illusion, 
given that the algorithmic setting of machines and computers embodies social 
choices and political intentions. Therefore, it does not suffice to apply technol-
ogy in the service of socialist ends instead of capitalist ones, as scientific social-
ists have it. Neo-Luddites call, instead, for resistance. But they do not go so far 
as to advocate the redesign of technology in favour of the circulation of the 
common. They are thus limited to a self-defeating diagnosis by overestimat-
ing capital’s capacity to command labour with dead labour (Dyer-Witheford 
1999, 103). Recall that, for Marx, dead labour is labour embodied in machines. 
 Neo-Luddites recede into a radical pessimism, evoking dystopian visions of 
indoctrination, surveillance and robotisation. However, in their justified 
attacks on the automatism of both information theorists and scientific social-
ists, they have reinvigorated Marx’s vision of technology as a contradictory pro-
cess, yielding countervailing possibilities for contending agencies. This latter 
strand is extended by theorists as diverse as Bauwens and Kostakis, Rushkoff, 
Hardt and Negri, Johan Söderberg and Dyer-Witheford himself. 
Post-Fordism
Post-Fordism, the third Marxist strand relevant to technology, aggregates a 
diversity of theoretical positions converging on the technological  reconciliation 
of workers with capital (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 104). From this viewpoint, 
 post-Fordism comes close to the positions of information society theorists. 
Specifically, the French ‘Regulation School’ of political economy understands 
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capitalism as a mode of production evolving through different ‘modes of regu-
lation’ such as Fordism and post-Fordism (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 104–108). 
Fordism integrated a Taylorist division of labour with intense mechanisation. 
As such, it marked capitalism’s post-Second World War ‘golden age’, put for-
ward by Keynesian policies. Post-Fordism represents capitalism’s response to 
the multifaceted crisis of the 1970s. It signals a new era of capital accumulation 
driven by the deployment of ICTs to disaggregate Fordist mass production and 
cheapen labour by outsourcing it across the globe. From the perspective of the 
‘Regulation School’, this capitalist restructuring was accompanied by flexible 
specialisation, Japanese management and Swedish humanised workplaces, fea-
turing various models of labour/capital cooperation, which could culminate in 
the future in a high-tech ‘new deal’ between capital and workers.
Many Marxists entirely reject the categories of Fordism and post-Fordism as 
mystifications of capitalism’s inhumane development. Yet for Dyer-Witheford 
(1999, 112), this is not a reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Theo-
rists who use the category of post-Fordism have often been more alert to the 
capital restructuring in the early 1970s than their more orthodox Marxist crit-
ics. Yet several versions of post-Fordism underplay conflict and class struggle 
within this capital restructuring. Ultimately, they go along with a post-Marxist 
politics that claims to go ‘beyond’ capital and class. Dyer-Witheford (1999, 13) 
criticises, in particular, the post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe on the grounds 
that it dissolves the distinction between capital and class into the populist plu-
ralism of social movements. However, he is mistaken to assume that Laclau and 
Mouffe’s project is not radical enough to challenge capitalism, since their goal 
is, precisely, to form a counter-hegemonic political alliance against neoliberal-
ism. Interestingly, I argue later on that this alliance might fill the gap of the 
political in Dyer-Witheford’s own circulation of the common. 
Cycles of struggle: The socialised worker
After having brought to light the deficiencies of all three Marxist approaches to 
addressing the challenges put forward by information theorists, Dyer- 
Witheford (1999, 127–514) elaborates a critical version of autonomous 
Marxism that builds upon class struggle supported by ICTs. To analyse class 
struggle, autonomists use the concept of class composition, which consists in 
the decomposition and recomposition of the cycles of struggle between labour 
and capital. 
The autonomists identify three major cycles of struggle in the twentieth cen-
tury, revolving around the professional worker, the mass worker and the social-
ised worker (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 143–169). Taylorism eroded the craft skills 
of the professional worker of early capitalism, transforming him into the mass 
worker of the Fordist assembly line, thus furthering what Marx called the for-
mal subsumption of the worker to the needs of capital. The mass worker reacted 
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through the strengthening of unions, the negotiation of a social wage,  including 
welfare, unemployment benefit, pensions, health insurance, and so on, and the 
eruption of social movements, including women, students, and black and 
immigrant communities in the 1970s. Capital responded with the post-Fordist 
restructuring of the factory base through automation and the globalisation of 
manufacturing, backed by the neoliberal policies of Reagan and Thatcher.  Capital 
succeeded, thus, in splitting up the production cycle and dispersing the workers 
once organised under working teams. What followed was the dismantling of the 
unions and the welfare state, with repercussions that resonate up to the present. 
Capital’s informational restructuring gave rise to the subject of a new cycle of 
revolutionary struggles: the socialised worker. Negri (1988, 90) uses the term 
to refer to the expansion of the working class to society through the commodi-
fication of reproduction, communication and consumption, which intensifies 
the circulation of capital via the technologically advanced circuits of advertis-
ing, marketing and finance. The feminist wing of autonomous Marxism, rep-
resented by the work of Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, has argued 
that the reproduction of labour power within the social factory occupied a cru-
cial but neglected role (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 135). Marx downplayed the role 
of gender, as represented by the unpaid labour of women. The socialisation of 
labour blurs waged and non-waged labour. The activities of women, students, 
consumers, shoppers and viewers are now directly integrated into the produc-
tion process, actualising what Marx called the real subsumption of society into 
capital. The concept of the socialised worker is in fact a synthesis of ‘old work-
ing-class theory’ with the rise of ‘new social movements’ through the spectrum 
of a neo-Marxist perspective that combines the postmodern element of differ-
ence with the Marxist element of class struggle. 
Autonomous Marxism analyses capitalism as a collision of two opposing vec-
tors: capital’s exploitation of labour and workers’ resistance (Dyer-Witheford 
1999, 138). The role of technology is twofold: it can be utilised as an instru-
ment of capitalist domination, shattering scientific socialism’s myth of auto-
matic  scientific progress, while functioning as a site of class struggle. Unlike 
the Frankfurt School theorists, autonomist theorists do not find the scope 
of the social factory grounds for despair, since now the expanded network of 
social relations refracts into a multiplicity of points of conflict with capitalist 
domination. If capital interweaves technology and power, this weaving can be 
redone to the benefit of class struggle. Technoscience, Negri (1989, 85–86) sug-
gests, becomes the main site for the reappropriation of power. 
The global cyber-proletariat
Dyer-Witheford (1999, 248–262; 2015) uses the autonomist concept of ‘cycles 
of struggle’ to update class composition in the digitised era. He focuses on 
cyberspace, where ICTs appear not just as instruments for the circulation of 
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commodities, but simultaneously as channels for the circulation of struggle. 
In this newly socialised space of capital encompassing all sites of the social fac-
tory, the cybernetic spiralling of the capitalist vortex multiplies the sites of its 
disruption, destabilisation and destruction. As Dyer-Witheford puts it:
Our travels along capital’s data highways have discovered rebellions at 
every point: people fighting for freedom from dependence on the wage, 
creating a ‘communication commons’, experimenting with new forms of 
self-organisation, and new relations to the natural world. Such move-
ments are incipient and embattled, yet undeniable. Indeed, without in 
any way diminishing the magnitude of the defeats and disarrays suffered 
by counter-movements over the last twenty years, I suggest that there 
are now visible across the siliconised, bioengineered, post-Fordist land-
scape the signs of a strange new class recomposition. (1999, 261) 
Dyer-Witheford (2015, 32) distances himself from Hardt and Negri’s concept of 
the multitude, and focuses on proletarianisation, understanding the latter as a 
contradictory process both of and against capital. He draws on several authors 
who have built on Marx’s (2008/1848, 33) definition of the proletariat as 
the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of 
their own, are reduced to selling their labour power for subsistence. Karl Heinz 
Roth (2010) uses the term ‘global proletariat’ to refer to the displacement of 
agrarian populations from the land by biotech corporations; the consequent 
engagement of vast surplus populations in the electronic supply chain and 
in the diffuse ‘service sector’; the mobilisation of women both for waged 
and unpaid domestic labour; and the escalation of unemployment, underem-
ployment, insecure labour and unpaid work. Ursula Huws (2003; 2014) coined 
the term ‘cybertariat’ to emphasise the precarious nature of digital labour such 
as neo-Taylorised clerical, data entry and office work, crossing with unpaid 
labour at home. Huge numbers of jobs in the digital economy fall under this 
term inasmuch as they are routine, subordinate and poorly paid.
Dyer-Witheford (2015, 133–138) introduces the term ‘global cyber- 
proletariat’ to cover all these diverse aspects of proletarianisation, ranging from 
the physical exploitation of workers in coltan mines and electronics factories 
in Africa and China to women’s unpaid domestic labour and the digital labour 
of prosumers on the Internet. Proletarianisation goes hand in hand with de- 
proletarianisation, that is, the expansion of professional and intermediate strata, 
and of capital’s managerial sector, staffed by the boom of university and college 
‘edu-factories’ (Dyer-Witheford 2015, 126). Yet the rise of the middle class is 
haunted by re-proletarianisation in times of crisis, generating both right- and 
left-wing populism (Dyer-Witheford 2015, 141). Most importantly, the expan-
sion of both proletarian segments and intermediate strata with their contradic-
tory locations is subordinated to capital’s info-tech oligarchy of the ‘1 per cent’ 
(Dyer-Witheford 2015, 141–143). To provide some indicative  figures: by 2013, 
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the richest 1% of the world controlled $110 trillion, or 65 times the total wealth 
of the poorest 3.5 billion people; of 3 billion workers globally, only 1.6 billion 
receive a wage or salary; the other 1.5 billion are engaged in subsistence activi-
ties, living on less than 2 dollars per day (Dyer-Witheford 2015, 134, 142).
Proletarianisation and de-proletarianisation are traversed by new imperialist 
world conflicts, new economic crises and migrant flows, ‘upward and down-
ward’ moving proletarians and realignments of capital. In this constant flux of 
the capitalist vortex, class composition is both fractal and fractioned;  fractioned 
insofar as it varies sharply from region to region, fractal in that it is fractured into 
multiple points of class struggle across the globe, with each one often  bearing 
different but overlapping regional and national features (Dyer- Witheford 2015, 
129). Capitalism does not progress into better capitalism by virtue of an ever-
expanding middle class, as the information theorists would have it, but evolves 
into digital capitalism, which applies automation in all domains of the social 
factory to transform the labour process into a new type of fixed capital that 
sustains the cycle of production, circulation and finance (Dyer-Witheford 2015, 
33). Digital capitalism propels its moving contradiction − the simultaneous 
induction and expulsion of labour − into a new circulation of struggle.
The circulation of the common
Marx deemed the cellular form of capitalism to be the commodity. He famously 
modelled the circulation of capital in the formula: M-C (LP/MP)…P…C΄-Μ΄. 
Money (M) buys the commodity (C), that is, labour power (LP) and the means 
of production (MP), to produce (P) new commodities (C΄) that are sold for 
more money (M΄) divided into costs, profit and reinvestment.11 Dyer- Witheford 
(2006) reverses Marx’s formula to generate from the circulation of struggle the 
circulation of the common. The commodity is a good produced for exchange 
between private owners. The common is a good produced to be shared among 
collectivities. Dyer-Witheford calls these collectivities associations, whether 
tribal assemblies, socialist cooperatives or open source networks. If C stands 
for the common and A for association, the circulation of the common consists 
in the following formula: A-C…P…C΄-P΄ repeated ad infinitum. Associations 
organise shared resources to produce more shared resources, which in turn 
provide the common wealth for the formation of new associations. 
Dyer-Witheford (2006) distinguishes three sub-circuits within the  circulation 
of the common: the terrestrial commons (that is, the customary sharing of nat-
ural resources in traditional societies), planner commons (that is, command 
socialism and the liberal democratic welfare state) and networked commons 
(that is, the free associations of open source software, peer-to-peer networks, 
grid computing and the numerous other socialisations of technoscience). He 
envisions a twenty-first-century communism as a complex unity of terrestrial, 
planner and networked commons. The terrestrial commons  correspond today 
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to the need to preserve the biosphere from a predatory capitalism responsible 
for climate change. The great message of the green movement is the imperative 
of new habits and norms in production and consumption. Interestingly, Dyer-
Witheford is one of the few authors to explicitly address the issue of sexuality in 
relation to the creation of a new subjectivity. He calls for a shared corporeality, 
stretching from safe sex to recycling, emissions and cloning. 
As such, the terrestrial commons develop alongside the planner commons. 
Dyer-Witheford (2006) contrasts this with the libertarian utopia of sponta-
neous, decentralised, individualised coordination. He deems it impossible to 
address global poverty and climate change without an ethic of public ownership 
and planned resource allocation at all levels, municipal, national and global. 
The planner commons encapsulate a radical democratic regime based on a de-
statification that devolves administrative power to a multiplicity of associations. 
As he puts it: ‘The role of government is redefined as supporting collective ini-
tiatives rather than substituting for them, diffusing rather than concentrating 
control, nurturing social transformation from the bottom up rather than engi-
neering it from the top down.’ (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 209) The terrestrial and 
the planner commons are info-mediated by the networked commons of ICTs. 
The digital commons produce a post-scarcity software economy in which col-
laborative creation and shared use generate more robust and abundant goods. 
Peer-to-peer networks of micro-fabricators, designers, activists, prosumers and 
all sorts of citizens constitute the networked socialisation of co-production and 
co-governance. Networked horizontalism shares the means of production and 
governance along the currents of the terrestrial and planner commons. 
With regard to ICTs, communication commons could provide extensive 
opportunities for citizen involvement in technological research, development, 
design and strategy. Publicly funded organisations and programmes could 
assist communities to conduct research and develop technologies shaped to 
their needs, while monitoring, testing, evaluating and debating the conse-
quences of specific lines of R&D both at universities and corporations. Contra 
the corporatisation of technoscience, the networked commons can contribute 
to the commonification of scientific research and knowledge along demo-
cratic and ecological lines. Thus, the circulation of the common could sustain 
the  circulation of struggles towards a new cooperativism, which links worker 
cooperatives with the commons (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2010). 
Critique of the circulation of the common
Dyer-Witheford’s circulation of the common is much in line with Bauwens and 
Kostakis’s model of open cooperativism, with the exception that he remains 
mute as to the relation of the common to the market. He alludes to the complex 
interdependencies and possible contradictions of the three circuits of the com-
mons. He lacks, however, a political appraisal of the critical  interconnections 
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both within and outside the commons. He posits the circulation of the com-
mon against the circulation of capital. But he does not touch on the grave 
dependence of the commons on capital and the state. How can the commons 
compete with the superpowers of corporations? Once again, the absence of 
concrete policies to mobilise a critical mass to join the commons is telling. 
For this reason, post-hegemonic holism helps articulate a chain of equivalence 
between sociopolitical power and the advance of the common against the cur-
rent neoliberal assault. The coalescence of relevant economic and sociopolitical 
powers is indispensable to creating the institutional,  monetary and legal tools 
for the empowerment of the people against the subordination of the common 
to predatory capitalism and the state.
Dyer-Witheford offers one of the most detailed and nuanced analyses of class 
composition in the digital age, of which just a brief outline has been  presented 
here. He contributes to the renewal of neo-Marxist thought by promoting the 
circulation of the common against the circulation of capital. But let us play 
devil’s advocate here and consider for a moment a plausible counter-argument. 
Let us assume that there is a considerable part of the middle class, either sala-
ried professionals or freelancers, particularly in the USA, Northern Europe, 
Canada and Australia, with an average annual salary in the range of $35,000 
to $65,000,12 who are more or less satisfied with their job and their current 
standard of living. Let us take here the example of a coalminer in Australia, 
who earns $65,000 a year and might also own a block of rental units and a 
portfolio of shares in leading companies or have a share in another small busi-
ness. Potentially his wife also has a part-time job or contributes to the family 
business, and they live happily together with their children. It is highly unlikely 
that they would condescend to a potential diminution of their salary if that 
was the cost of exiting the capitalist economy and entering the commons. How 
are these groups of professionals going to be convinced or incentivised to join 
the circulation of the common? What if capitalism progresses into a regulated, 
ethical, green cyber-capitalism, alleviating its periodic crises? What would 
then be the purpose of the commons apart from constituting a marginal socio- 
economic system subordinate to capitalist operation? 
The discussion should not focus on whether capitalism is suicidal or not, 
but on the comparative institutional advantages of the commons with regard 
to the core structural contradiction of capitalism, that is, the division between 
directors and executants. One of the main challenges lying ahead for the com-
mons is how to transform the cynical, individualistic, self-interested maxim-
iser of our current capitalist societies into a homo cooperans. This involves the 
task of nudging a novel anthropological type that combines the liberal ideals 
of  freedom and pluralism with the right to equality and economic democracy. 
Post-hegemonic holism expresses precisely the need to radically transform the 
core structure of society by cross-fertilising top-down and bottom-up com-
mons strategies into cross-regional policies that span the entire psyche and 
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body of the social. The ultimate goal is to transform capitalism into the post-
capitalism of the commons.
4.5.2 Omnia sunt communia
De Angelis (2017) offers another formulation of the circulation of the com-
mon against the circulation of capital. Drawing on systems theory, cybernetics 
and autonomous Marxist-feminist political economy, he approaches the com-
mons as social systems in which resources are pooled by a community of sub-
jects engaging in commoning, that is, the self-governing and reproduction of 
the community and its resources (2017, 119). The commons are tripartite sys-
tems consisting of the following elements: 1) the common-pool resources or 
common wealth, 2) the community and 3) commoning. Silke Helfrich (Bollier 
and Helfrich 2012) has emphasised the praxis of commoning as a social pro-
cess: the commons is neither the resource nor the community that determines 
protocols for its stewardship, but the dynamic interaction between all these 
elements. De Angelis, too, highlights the relational/contextual character of the 
commons. It is the social relations of commoning and governing the commons 
that give to a good the meaning of a common good. As he puts it:
The limit to what can be considered a common good is entirely contex-
tual and political, depending on the political boundaries, imaginative 
capability and involvement in doing in commons that a community can 
give itself […] Starting from the position that we should not confuse 
the commons with resources held in common, I approach commons as 
social systems in which resources are pooled by a community of sub-
jects who also govern these resources to guarantee the sustainability 
of the resources (if they are natural resources) and the reproduction of 
the community, and who engage in commoning, that is, doing in com-
mons that has a direct relation to the needs, desires and aspirations of 
the community. (2017, 63, 90)
De Angelis’s approach to the commons differs from Ostrom’s in that the ana-
lytical distinction of the latter between limited common-pool resources and 
open access commons may not entail a categorical exclusion but an unavoid-
able interrelation. De Angelis (2017, 146) portrays a post-capitalist vision of 
commons-based peer production in which the commons is the main socio-
economic and political system, and open access is a necessary subsystem within 
the commons, allowing for the reverse co-optation of capitalism and the state. 
Open access is a loophole of state and market operation into the circulation 
of the common and vice versa. This point is crucial in theorising the relation of 
the commons to capitalism and the state and can be further analysed through 
De Angelis’s critique of Marx. 
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From the circuit of capital to the circuit of the common
In chapter 4 of Capital, Marx identifies two formulas for the circulation of 
 commodities: C–M–C and M–C–M΄, where C stands for commodities, M 
stands for money and M΄ for more money than originally invested, includ-
ing profit. C–M–C represents the simplest form of circulation of commodi-
ties, as manifested by merchants and petty traders, and M–C–M΄ is the general 
formula of capitalism, wherein money is invested into the production of com-
modities to generate profit. Capital accumulation fuels the cycle of capitalist 
growth ad infinitum. 
De Angelis criticises Marx for largely focusing on capital, thereby neglect-
ing the role the commons play in social reproduction, since capital has fed off 
the commons since its inception. De Angelis’s goal, instead, is to subsume the 
circuit of capital to the circuit of the commons (Figure 4.2). To do so, he draws 
on the work of radical feminists such as Silvia Federici (2012) to represent the 
work of reproduction as a sub-circuit of the capital circuit (De Angelis 2017, 
188, 189). In the capital circuit at the bottom of Figure 4.2, money (M) buys 
labour power (LP) and the means of production (MP) come together in pro-
duction (P) as commodities (C) to produce new commodities (C΄) and money 
(M΄). In the reproduction circuit at the top, the money obtained in exchange 
for labour power (LP) is used to buy commodities (C) that are processed in the 
household through labour (P*), which reproduces physical and psychological 
labour power (LP*) to be sold again to capital. Thus, the unpaid labour in the 
household and numerous other sites of social interaction reproduces the labour 
power of capital. To the extent that patriarchal relations are dominant, the great 
bulk of reproduction labour is performed by women. Both paid and unpaid 
labour are part of capitalist production, expanding capital’s work period to 24/7 
long before post-Fordism. 
De Angelis (2017, 192–194) zooms out of the specific reproduction of labour 
power and regards the top circuit in Figure 4.2 as applicable to any commod-
ity according to the formula C–M–C. He integrates the formula C–M–C into 
the commons circuit, thus aiming to subsume capitalism into the commons. The 
formula C–M–C describes not only the general metabolism of the reproduc-
tion of labour power, but also the circuit of production of commodities involv-
ing the self-employed, petty producers, craft people, small organic farmers, 
associations, and so on. For De Angelis, the circuit C–M–C is but a moment of 
social reproduction. Thus, it is integrated into the commons circuit (Figure 4.3), 
where Cs stands for the commons, CW for common wealth and A for an asso-
ciation or the community. Common wealth is divided into the non-commodity 
form (NC) pooled together within the sphere of the commons and the com-
modity form (C) acquired from within the market economy. The commons 
enter the market economy either as a buyer – on the left-hand side of the 
 formula – or as a seller – on the right-hand side of the formula – or receive 
money as a transfer from an outside source (the state or another organisation). 
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Whereas money in capitalism is an end in itself, in the commons it is a means 
for the social reproduction of the commons. 
De Angelis’s (2017, 312) core argument is that the commons need to develop 
a relational stance towards capitalism and the state with the aim of structurally 
coupling them from a position of power and changing them in favour of the 
commons. To this end, he introduces the mechanisms of ‘boundary common-
ing’ and ‘structural coupling’ (2017, 265–355). Whereas the former describes 
the internal cooperation between different commons, the latter entails the 
making of external deals with capital and the state, allowing the commons 
to expand within capitalism and reach a critical mass through a ‘middle class 
explosion’. De Angelis hopes, thereby, to subvert capitalism towards a post-
capitalist commons.
Critique of the circuit of the common
By expanding Marx’s commodity formula into social reproduction as such, the 
latter incorporated into a 24/7 market economy, De Angelis, like Gibson and 
Graham, cannot avoid but fall into the trap of a reversed economism. By gen-
eralising the activity of labour to sociality by and large, there is no space left for 
free time. De Angelis fails to distinguish sufficiently between the economy and 
different societal activities.
De Angelis (2017, 64–74) has successfully conceptualised the interdependence 
between material and immaterial commons, highlighting the reproduction basis 
of the digital commons: food, care, energy, housing, education, social relations. 
Software and hardware need energy and minerals for their industrial  production, 
Figure 4.2: Coupling between production and reproduction circuits (from De 
Angelis 2017, 189).
Figure 4.3: The circuit of the commons (from De Angelis 2017, 193).
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while software developers themselves need to eat, rest and  reproduce. Once 
again, one cannot but notice the complete absence of  sexuality in De  Angelis’s 
discourse on reproduction, unless abstractly identified with social relations. 
Moreover, De Angelis does not offer a solution as to how the  immaterial produc-
tion of the digital commons can connect to  material  commons and reproduce 
common wealth in the long run. He develops a  tautological version of the com-
mons which is supposed to gradually outflank the state and capital by reducing 
the power of the latter to regulate the complexity and variety of the former. De 
Angelis begs the question, as he expects the commons to grow by creating the 
common wealth that will allow it to interlace, multiply and outpace the state 
and capital. The issue is, precisely, how to create the common wealth necessary 
for the multiplication of the commons given the grave dependence of the latter 
on the state and capital. From this standpoint, reformist strategies such as 
 Bauwens and Kostakis’s model of open cooperativism could significantly com-
plement De Angelis’s post-capitalist vision of the commons. 
Like Dyer-Witheford, De Angelis (2017, 180, 359–387) advocates a synergy 
with social movements. He, too, distances himself from the multitude of Hardt 
and Negri, considering it a fuzzy concept and, by extension, not consistent with 
issues of social justice, redistribution of wealth or the ecological transformation 
of social production. But De Angelis’s own approach is somewhat vague. He 
acknowledges the deep relation of the commons movement to law, politics and 
the media. Yet he does not provide any concrete proposal as to how this rela-
tion could develop in the interests of the commons. A post-hegemonic politics 
of the common could address this deficit by articulating a chain of equiva-
lence between various social movements and the commons, hypostatised into 
 relevant orthogonal policies and practices. 
4.5.3 The Reproduction of the Common
The work of George Caffentzis (2013) and Silvia Federici (2004; 2012) can be 
read in conjunction with De Angelis’s work. Caffentzis and Federici (2014) 
represent a more radical version of the commons, as they reject the ‘capitalist 
commons’ introduced by Bauwens and Kostakis for fear of the commons being 
co-opted by market mechanisms. Like De Angelis, they hold that the digital 
or immaterial commons cannot have an autonomous substance in their own 
right, as they depend for their reproduction on both capitalism and the mate-
rial commons. The digital or immaterial commons should connect, instead, to 
the material commons and form an alliance of anti-capitalist commons, ori-
entated against capitalism and the state. Caffentzis and Federici (2014, 101) 
regard the commons as ‘associations of free individuals’ established by way of 
commoning, that is, constitutive social practices of self-governance rooted in 
autonomy, equality, reciprocity, collective decision making and power from the 
ground up. 
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They do not, however, suggest any concrete solution as to how the commons 
can reproduce themselves under conditions of grave dependence on the state 
and capital. They advocate a continuous class struggle of the commons. Yet they 
do not indicate any specific form this struggle could take with respect to the 
state and capital. Interestingly, they point to the inherent contradictions of 
the commons, such as disorganisation, disempowerment, claustrophobia, 
patriarchy, xenophobia and gated communities. But they do not offer any 
 resolution of these contradictions. Most importantly, they do not see the poten-
tial inherent in technology to bridge the gap between material and immaterial 
production and help the commons reproduce themselves within, against and 
beyond capitalism and the state. 
Reproduction, unpaid labour, sexuality
The work of Federici (2012) is of particular importance, since it represents a 
feminist approach to the commons that brings to the fore the gender biases 
inherent in the social reproduction of capitalism. She develops a feminist cri-
tique of Marx:
At the center of this critique is the argument that Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism has been hampered by his inability to conceive of value- 
producing work other than in the form of commodity production and 
his consequent blindness to the significance of women’s unpaid repro-
ductive work in the process of capitalist accumulation. Ignoring this 
work has limited Marx’s understanding of the true extent of capitalist 
exploitation of labour and the function of the wage in the creation of 
divisions within the working class, starting with the relation between 
women and men. (2012, 92) 
Marx famously illustrated that the wage hides the unpaid labour that goes into 
profit. But the identification of labour with the wage also hides the extent to 
which family and social relations have become relations of production in the 
social factory of capitalism (Federici 2012, 35). Federici (2012, 33) holds that 
the family is essentially the institutionalisation of unwaged labour, of women’s 
wageless dependence on men and, consequently, the institutionalisation of an 
unequal division of power that has disciplined both men and women. Sexuality 
is a form of labour, serving the needs of capital. Sex is work for women, a duty 
that has been subordinated to the reproduction of labour power (Federici 2012, 
25). The economic dependence of women on men is the ultimate control over 
sexuality as work, rendering it one of the main occupations for women, with 
prostitution underlining every sexual encounter. For this reason, she holds that 
a wage paid to women would secure the economic independence of women 
with respect to men’s income.
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Federici considers the reproduction of human beings the foundation of every 
economic and political system and places the struggle against sexual discrimi-
nation in an anti-capitalist framework. She goes along with De Angelis and 
Caffentzis in arguing that the digital commons do not question the material 
basis of the digital technology of the Internet (2012, 142–146). She makes the 
case that digitisation and automation cannot robotise ‘care’ except at a terri-
ble cost for the people involved. However, she does not elaborate on what an 
 anti-capitalist framework would be like. She calls for the communalisation/ 
collectivisation of housework, rendering the ‘commoning’ of the material 
means of production the primary mechanism by which a collective interest 
and mutual bonds are created. Yet she does not explain how to reverse the 
 co-optation of the commons by capital. Federici does not see the link that 
the digital  commons can provide between material and immaterial production 
in transcending both the state and capitalist production.
Paradoxically, Federici (2012, 147) believes that it is women, historically the 
house-workers and house-prisoners, who must take the initiative to reclaim 
the house as a centre of collective life on which the economy is built. But by 
assigning the task of commoning/collectivising reproduction primarily to 
women, she concedes to a naturalistic conception of ‘feminity’, thereby repro-
ducing the gender biases she wishes to abolish. Federici eventually produces a 
generalised argument, resulting in a limited view on a rather nuanced  problem. 
Patriarchy reigns supreme partially due to women themselves often conde-
scending to a sexist distribution of labour, which attributes to both women 
and men ‘naturally’ predetermined gendered roles of femininity and mascu-
linity. This often produces a reverse exploitation that assigns to men the role 
of the ‘hunter’, the ‘provider’, the ‘protector’, the ‘macho’, and so on. Patriarchy 
often switches roles with matriarchy, either via direct oppression or indirect 
 sentimental compulsion, sexual strikes, passive aggression and other forms of 
gender struggle. Federici poses the problem as a gender struggle of women 
against men when it would be better addressed as a struggle of both men and 
women against bi-gender oppression and capitalist exploitation. To quote 
Simone de Beauvoir: ‘The point is not for women simply to take power out of 
men’s hands, since that wouldn’t change anything about the world. It’s a ques-
tion precisely of destroying that notion of power’ (Card 2003, 202).
The Foucaultian concept of power
Foucault’s analysis of power could be illuminating here, as he points to the mul-
tidimensional power dynamics that flow across the various social strata. Power 
is a form of governmentality that introduces a mode of action upon other 
actions. ‘To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of 
others’ (Foucault 1982, 790). Power is not the domination of one individual over 
another, of one group over another, of one class over another; it is not an attrib-
ute in the possession of some, with others being subject to it (Foucault 2003). 
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Power ‘comes from below’. It is intentional and productive, but impersonal and 
non-subjective inasmuch as it expresses a variety of anonymous aims and objec-
tives (Foucault 1978, 94–96). Power is relational, decentralised, multidirectional 
and mobile. But power is also transitionary. Power comes always with resist-
ance. Power produces resistance as anti-power, resulting in a relentless struggle 
of anonymous bodies, desires, thoughts, forces, energies, and so on. 
Yet what Foucault misses in his governmental analysis of power is the sad-
omasochism often lying in the initial contradiction of capitalism that forms 
the core structure of society: the division between directors and executants 
(Papadimitropoulos 2018d). The psychodynamics of slave and master variously 
reverberate across feudalism, colonialism, racism, fascism and capitalism. A 
contemporary analysis of power ought to take into account the capitalist division 
between directors and executants, which penetrates the social factory, exerting 
an asymmetric economic power of capital over class (Balibar and Wallerstein 
1991). Feminism often takes a neoliberal turn that perpetuates the vicious cycle 
of sadomasochism, with women reproducing men’s corporate power. Corpo-
rate fascism becomes bi-gendered, spreading across the social factory and often 
aligning with the extremes of political power: Nazism and Stalinism. 
Escaping the pitfalls of economism
Capitalism floods society and Federici unwittingly goes with the flow. It is one 
thing to consider the circuit of capitalist production expanding in the social fac-
tory by subsuming social reproduction as such, and another to identify labour 
with life as a whole. The latter entails the hidden assumption that time is money, 
that is, concealed labour, as Marx would have it. But still, can we imagine a free 
living space beyond money? The commons movement endeavours to address 
this question when it deviates from economism and envisages the abundance 
of the commons gradually overcoming the scarcity of market capitalism on 
the model of post-capitalism. Indeed, can we imagine a non-militaristic ver-
sion of a Star Trek society where scarcity will have become obsolete and human 
beings free to enjoy the abundance of the commons? The point I want to raise 
here is that we should allow ourselves to envision a space uncolonised by the 
economy; a space of playfulness, affection, sexuality, creativity, spontaneity 
and self- realisation; a space of unconditional freedom equivalent to the cul-
tural  expression of difference and plurality. The task of post-hegemonic holism 
would, then, be to further the emergence of commons-orientated subjects capa-
ble of supporting a post-capitalist economy based on the commons.
4.6 Communism and the Common
The argument so far has been that there is a significant lack of the political in 
all three camps of the common: the liberal, the reformist and the anti-capitalist. 
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They lack a critical political reflection that would translate into a set of concrete 
policies that could incite a critical mass to join the commons. The last stage in 
reconfiguring this argument is to oppose the post-hegemonic politics of the 
common to the communist horizon, which represent two radically different 
concepts of the common: the common as the self-instituting power of the peo-
ple and the common as the idea of communism. The first is horizontally articu-
lated, whereas the latter comprises a variation of classical Marxist themes of the 
common, some of them espousing the party as the main agent of communism, 
and others adopting more hybrid formats. 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the expansion of neoliberalism 
thereafter, several radical voices have cast doubt on non-statist horizontalist 
politics such as the Occupy movement and the Spanish and Greek Indignados, 
since they are considered to lack organisation, leadership and strategy, thus 
fading into a narrow, ephemeral and impotent reaction. Given the concentra-
tion of power in the capitalist elites, collective action that does not come to 
grips with state institutions is destined to failure (Juris and Khasnabish 2013, 
379, 385–386). Several such critics have, thus, revived the forceful politics of 
communism, reasserting the classic role of the state and the party for a potent 
revolutionary politics (Badiou 2009; 2010; Dean 2009; 2012; 2016; Žižek 2008; 
2010; 2013). 
The idea of communism encapsulates several values that throb at the heart of 
the commons such as common ownership, egalitarianism and collective self-
government. Yet at the core of the same tradition figure policies and practices 
that are at odds with the pluralism, openness and horizontalism of the commons 
such as the centrality of the state and the party, top-down direction, totalitarian 
control, authoritarianism, violence, terror and the idolatry of leaders (Kioup-
kiolis 2019, 96–97). Therefore, the signifier is not up for resignification, since it 
clashes head-on with the self-instituting power of the people, which has been 
elaborated here as the quintessential concept of the common. I go along with 
Kioupkiolis (2019, 97) who holds that communism makes no sense in a bid for 
a post-hegemonic politics that could win over large swathes of people. My twist 
is that central mechanisms are essential to any serious social change. To further 
illustrate this argument, I take up here three prominent proponents of the com-
munist idea, Slavoj Žižek, Jodi Dean and David Harvey. The chapter concludes 
with the more hybrid approaches of Paul Mason and Christian Fuchs.
4.6.1 The Idea of Communism
Žižek’s (2010, 217) political ontology takes its cues from Hegel, Marx and 
Lacan to reclaim a communist past of state and authoritarian politics, incar-
nated in the dictatorial power of the party. Žižek rejects any postmodern, post-
industrial and post-Marxist dynamics. His professed position is that what the 
left needs today is a Jacobin-Leninist party to impose the classic communist 
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principles of strict egalitarian justice, disciplinary terror, political voluntarism 
and trust in the people (Žižek 2010, 217, 219). 
Four antagonisms and the privatisation of the general intellect
Žižek (2010, 211) takes on Marx’s notion of communism not as an ideal, but 
as a movement which reacts to the actual social antagonisms of capitalism. He 
identifies four such antagonisms today (2010, 212–213): the looming threat 
of ecological calamity, the inappropriateness of the notion of property for so-
called intellectual property, the socio-ethical implications of new technoscien-
tific developments (especially in biogenetics), and new forms of apartheid, new 
walls and slums. 
The first three antagonisms revolve around what Hardt and Negri call the 
‘commons’: the commons of external nature plagued by pollution and over-
use, the commons of culture (language, communication, education, infrastruc-
tures) facing privatisation, and the commons of internal nature (the biogenetic 
inheritance of humanity) threatened by new biogenetic technology. The fourth 
antagonism – the gap that separates the excluded from the included – differs 
qualitatively from the others in that it reveals the proletarianisation setting the 
ground for the reaction against the enclosure of the commons, the latter mark-
ing out a new phase of separation of the people from the objective conditions 
of their lives (Žižek 2010, 214).
The central problem today, for Žižek (2010, 221), is how the late capitalist 
hegemonic role of ‘intellectual labour’, foreseen by Marx as the evolution of the 
‘general intellect’, affects Marx’s basic scheme of the separation of labour from 
its objective conditions, and of revolution as the subjective reappropriation of 
those conditions. Žižek (2010, 221) argues that Marx’s classic notion of com-
modity fetishism in which ‘relations of people’ assume the form of ‘relations of 
things’ has to be radically revised, since, in immaterial labour, the relations 
of people are themselves the very material of exploitation. As he puts it: 
Far from being invisible, social relationality in its very fluidity is directly 
the object of marketing and exchange: in ‘cultural capitalism’, one no 
longer sells (and buys) objects which ‘bring’ cultural or emotional expe-
riences, one directly sells (and buys) such experiences. (2010, 221) 
Žižek (2010, 224) argues that the contemporary production of multitude, 
rather than sowing the seeds of revolution, creates excess capital that initiates 
a new privatisation process by means of new enclosures. He admits that the 
expansion of the relations of production outside the factory setting requires a 
revision of Marx’s conceptual scheme (Žižek 2010, 224). He sides with Negri in 
claiming that exploitation is no longer possible in the classical Marxist sense. 
Marx did not envisage the possibility of the privatisation of the general intellect 
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itself. Exploitation today increasingly takes the form of rent. The result is not 
the self-dissolution of capitalism, but the gradual transformation of the profit 
generated by the exploitation of surplus labour into rent appropriated by the 
privatisation of the general intellect (Žižek 2010, 224–225). 
Whereas today’s intellectual workers are, superficially, not separated by the 
objective conditions of their labour (their PCs), they remain cut off from 
the social field of their work, from the general intellect, because the latter is pri-
vatised by capital in terms of intellectual property (Žižek 2010, 225). Capitalist 
competition is not strictly defined in terms of lower costs and higher levels of 
exploitation, but in terms of the monopolisation of the general intellect (Žižek 
2010, 225). The same holds true for natural resources (for example, oil, gas, 
etc.), the exploitation rate of which is set according to the rent paid to the own-
ers of the resource relative to its scarcity. This is par excellence the case with the 
United States, which remains the dominant financial power due to its reliance 
on the extraction of rents, either on the basis of its advantages in technological 
and financial innovation or from intellectual property rights.
Three fractions of the working class and the need for representation
For Žižek (2010, 225–226), the general intellect today splits into three frac-
tions of the working class: the enlightened postmodern hedonism and liberal 
multiculturalism of the intellectual class, the populist fundamentalism of the 
working class, and the more extreme forms of the outcast fraction. Capitalism 
has sought to control these fractions by putting workers in competition with 
each other along the lines of race, sex, ethnicity, religion, and so on. Examples 
of this social disparity are the wage gap between men and women, wage dis-
tinctions between blacks and whites as well as Hispanics and Asiatics in the 
United States, and so on (Harvey 2010, 62). Capitalism advances various forms 
of social darwinism, that is, the scientific propaganda of the survival of the fit-
test, imposed by elites on society over millennia so as to ‘divide and rule’. 
Žižek (2010, 226) calls for the unity of the proletarians under a revolutionary 
party that will take over the state and impose the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. 
The goal is to centrally transform the state to operate in a ‘non-statal way’ that 
feeds on the direct involvement of grassroots movements, the circumvention of 
the state apparatus and reliance on the collective will of the people (Žižek 2008, 
155). Communism is based on the tetrad of people–movement–party–leader 
(Žižek 2013, 188). People and movements are coordinated by the party and 
the leader. 
Žižek (2008, 337–80) is highly critical of the anti-statist left – from Simon 
Critchley to Hardt and Negri and Alain Badiou – who take a stand in favour of 
grassroots self-organisation. For Žižek, social activism, revolts and grassroots 
movements do not suffice to change the system, since they lack organisation, 
strategy and efficiency. Mass mobilisations of thousands of people  organising 
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themselves horizontally remain a minority movement in today’s societies; 
hence, the need for representation. People do not know what they want, and 
they, therefore, demand a master to guide them; hence, the centrality of the 
party and the leader (Žižek 2013, 189). 
Critique of ‘statist’ Marxism
Žižek is right to insist on the crucial role of proper leadership and the state in 
a communist revolution. However, the exercise of power from outside or 
above is at odds with egalitarian self-government and autonomy. Kioupkiolis 
(2019, 110) is right to counter-argue that parties, leaders and representatives 
should act as ‘vanishing mediators’ who empower society, enlarge the scope 
for collective self-activity, but make themselves gradually redundant. This is 
exactly the meaning of the commonification and ‘destatification’ of the state 
found in the work of Bauwens and Kostakis and Dyer-Witheford respectively. 
This is also the meaning of the post-hegemonic politics of the common put 
forward by Kioupkiolis. The common thread binding these approaches is the 
self-instituting power of the people articulated by Castoriadis and Dardot 
and Laval. 
Kioupkiolis (2019, 108) correctly holds that Žižek champions a communist 
conservatism insofar as he dreams of the worst nightmares of authoritarian 
communism – the state, the Party, the Leader/Master, disciplinary terror and 
political voluntarism. The resurrection of the gulag for outcasts and dissidents 
would not be appealing at all to the contemporary ‘liberal’ cognitariat, the 
highly educated, networked and impoverished middle-class youth and hip-
sters, even to the ‘populist’ working class who easily fall prey to authoritarian 
and racist versions of capitalism that promulgate the exclusion of immigrants. 
Žižek is right to argue that the identity politics of postmodern difference 
reproduces the mainstream values of individualism, profit, hedonism and com-
petition, recycling cynicism, nihilism and conformism in the vortex of cultural 
capitalism. Whence, I argue, comes the need to integrate postmodern differ-
ence into the pluralism of the commons. I go along with Žižek in advocating 
a holistic, transnational, centralised, leftist, counter-hegemonic alternative to 
capitalism. Yet this does not entail the abolition of democracy and the estab-
lishment of the dictatorship of the proletatiat by the hegemony of the party/
leader. Post-hegemonic holism rather stresses the need for a radical deepening 
of democracy on all levels of the social. A constructive elaboration on con-
temporary techno-social innovation built on the commons, as in the cases 
of platform and open cooperativism, bears the potential to open up a more 
democratic horizon rather than a revival of top-down Leninist-Stalinist com-
munism. In any case, the tension between verticalism and horizontalism in 
either a Marxist or post-Marxist perspective would rather advance grassroots 
self-governance. 
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4.6.2 The Crowd and the Party
Jodi Dean offers a deeper understanding of the contemporary technological 
landscape than Žižek. She endorses Žižek’s Lacanian Marxism to construe a 
communist political theory with the aim of politicising the left to subvert com-
municative capitalism.
Communicative capitalism
Dean draws on the work of Saskia Sassen (1996) and David Harvey (2005) to 
demonstrate the current convergence of networked telecommunications and 
globalised neoliberalism into a communicative capitalism that traps contem-
porary subjects into an intense circulation of information for the purposes of 
commodification and profit maximisation. Instead of technology rendering the 
market the site par excellence of democratic aspirations, communicative capi-
talism repurposes democratic ideals in ways that strengthen globalised neo-
liberalism. The high-tech fantasy of abundance, participation and wholeness 
dissolves into the circulation of content for the sake of circulation, generating 
the very negation of communication, that is, a communication without com-
municability (Dean 2009, 26). The instability of meaning in communicative 
capitalism corresponds to what Žižek terms the ‘decline of symbolic efficiency’. 
It designates the decline of meaning itself. 
The semblance of access, inclusion and participation propagated by commu-
nicative capitalism hides the underlying inequalities of the networks, produc-
ing a deadlock democracy incapable of bringing about a progressive political 
and economic change. Impressive popular spikes, eruptions and  spectacles in 
the media do not provide alternative practices of collective engagement, chal-
lenge corporate ownership of the telecommunications infrastructure or redirect 
financial flows towards the most disadvantaged. Instead, communicative capi-
talism seizes, privatises and monetises the social substance. As Dean puts it:
Instead of leading to more equitable distributions of wealth and 
 influence, instead of enabling the emergence of a richer variety in modes 
of living and practices of freedom, the deluge of screens and spectacles 
coincides with extreme corporatisation, financialisation and privatisa-
tion across the globe. Rhetorics of access, participation and democracy 
work ideologically to secure the technological infrastructure of neo-
liberalism, an invidious and predatory politico-economic project that 
 concentrates assets and power in the hands of the very, very rich, devas-
tating the planet and destroying the lives of billions of people. (2009, 23) 
The common and the commons
Dean uses Cesare Casarino’s distinction between the common and the com-
mons to illustrate both the potentials and impasses of the commons. Glossing 
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Hardt and Negri, Casarino and Negri (2008) distinguish between the common 
as the capacity of the general intellect and the commons as the concrete instan-
tiation of the common as in the cases of land, resources, language, technology, 
etc. Whereas the commons are finite and characterised by scarcity − the digital 
commons excluded − the common is infinite, as it comprises the surplus nature 
of creativity, language, affect, thought and communication. 
In line with Žižek, who pointed out the contemporary commodification and 
privatisation of the general intellect, Dean (2012, 136) pinpoints six fields of the 
expropriation of the common by networked communications: data, metadata, 
networks, attention, capacity and spectacle. Central to these fields is the ‘power-
law distribution’ introduced by Albert-Lázló Barabási (2003), that is, the 80/20 
rule that accounts for the winner-takes-all format of the new economy and 
the ‘long tail’. Networks do not exhibit a rhizomatic organisation as Hardt 
and Negri would have it, but display an asymmetric growth based on preferen-
tial attachment that gives rise to hubs and hierarchies. What Barabási, however, 
omits is that hierarchy does not come naturally, but stems from pre-existing 
power asymmetries constitutive of network infrastructures that channel the 
flow of attention accordingly; hence, media concentration and the subsequent 
mind manipulation by corporate elites. 
Interestingly, Dean (2012, 146–148) detects a contradiction between the abun-
dance of the digital commons and the scarcity of human capacity to  process all 
the information available to convert either into commons or  commodities. Shar-
ing in the commons does not always result in common wealth, and  production 
either in the commons or in communicative capitalism comes up against limits 
inherent to communication as such. The crux of Dean’s argument is that the 
common, finally, is co-opted by communicative capitalism (2012, 20). Hardt 
and Negri’s dream of the multitude overthrowing capitalism is simply  untenable, 
since it fails to build a concentrated political force capable of confronting the 
capitalist mode of production and replacing it with a communist one. Instead 
of perpetuating the division between the common and capitalism by transpos-
ing social change to the future subversion of capitalism, people ought to seize 
the division right here and now and turn it against capitalism. To promote 
this, Dean brings into the discussion the role of the communist party in the 
political struggle. 
Dead-end democracy and the psychodynamics of the party
Dean takes issue with Brown (2015) who argues that de-democratisation is the 
central force in the convergence of neoliberalism and neoconservatism. Brown 
makes the case that neoliberalism is undoing basic elements of democracy, thus 
inaugurating a new era of post-democracy, marking the substitution of poli-
tics by technocracy and economism. Dean, on the other hand, holds that the 
problem is not democratisation, but the failure of the left to juxtapose another 
politics against globalised neoliberal capitalism. Like Žižek, she asserts that 
the appeal to democracy is a dead end for left politics (Dean 2009, 94). The 
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left should not rely on the procedural form of democracy, but on the collec-
tive power of the people, the latter resonating with the party. Dean (2012, 20) 
observes that the goal of the party is the creation of a mode of production and 
distribution where the free development of each is compatible with the free 
development of all. She understands communism in the Marxian sense of a 
self-conscious collective action driven by voluntary cooperation that is not 
forced or out of control (2012, 157). 
Dean offers a psychodynamic approach to the party inspired by the crowd. 
She attributes to the crowd four unconscious features: the desire to grow, a 
state of absolute equality, the love of density and the need for direction (2012, 
75–101). Like Žižek, Dean holds that the crowd lacks organisation, endurance 
and scale. Therefore, it needs a party and a leader. She conceives of the party as 
the polymorphous and porous body of communism stretching across the entire 
field of society, focusing the inarticulate cries of the crowd into the collective 
will of communist politics (2012, 135). The crowd does not have a politics, but 
it is the opportunity for politics (Dean 2012, 11–12). She brings up the case of 
Syriza to demonstrate the dynamic relation between the crowd and the party 
(2012, 21–22). Syriza’s initial victories came from a broad alliance with social 
movements and local solidarity networks. Dean claims that despite Syriza’s 
betrayal of its supporters, it nevertheless signalled a political innovation that 
shifted the terrain of the possible. 
Critique of the left
Perhaps what one can infer from Syriza’s defeat is not its capitulation as such, 
but the moral derailment of the populist left along with its failure to offer a via-
ble alternative. If Syriza purports to be a radical left party, then it should aim at 
overthrowing capitalism rather than assuming another mild, centre-left, social 
democratic position. To do so, Syriza and the left in general should more gen-
erously endorse the commons and create the conditions necessary for a social 
economy based on the commons. This presupposes the design of concrete poli-
cies intended to clash head-on with capitalism, rather than employing gentle 
tactics and manoeuvres. 
As with Žižek, Dean’s argument is overly generalised, turning into a vague 
call for political struggle. Dean points to the creation of a collective mode 
of production and distribution, but she does not acknowledge the existence of 
commons-based peer production, which is alive and kicking. Dean lacks a firm 
understanding of peer production, thus leaning on a communist conservatism, 
notwithstanding the violent coefficients of Žižek’s state of terror. Rather than 
dismissing altogether horizontal forms of self-organising, it would be politi-
cally more beneficial to examine more closely the potential of technology to 
support a post-hegemonic politics of the common and drive both capitalism 
and the state towards a post-capitalist, commons-orientated transition. The 
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diversity of the crowd could then be absorbed into the pluralism of the com-
mons, perhaps bringing Marx’s ideal closer to reality. 
4.6.3 Historical Geographical Materialism
David Harvey carries on the Marxist legacy to offer one of the most compelling 
neo-Marxist analyses of contemporary capitalism. Harvey (2010, 40) seeks to 
answer the questions of how does capitalism survive, and why is it so crisis-
prone. The basic motor of capitalism is competition, which keeps the system 
running through a process of creative destruction that comes to rationalise an 
inherently irrational economic system, leading to reconfigurations, new mod-
els of development, new spheres of investment and new forms of class power 
(Harvey 2010, 11, 43). The system is destined to constantly push its limits and 
renovate to accumulate capital and survive. Harvey (2010, 47) identifies five 
potential barriers to capital accumulation: 1) insufficient initial capital; 2) scar-
city of labour and means of production, including natural limits; 3) inappropri-
ate technologies and organisational forms; 4) resistance by labour; and 5) lack 
of efficient demand. Crises break out in various historical and geographical 
settings due to the fluid character of capitalist development and the perpet-
ual repositioning of one barrier at the expense of another (Harvey 2010, 117). 
Credit and liquidity crises, stagflation, secular stagnation, over-accumulation, 
under-consumption, class struggle and profit squeeze are some of the forms of 
the capitalist crisis. 
Over-accumulation crises and spatio-temporal fixes
Central to the evolution of capitalism is technological innovation, which is 
a double-edged sword: it can destabilise and, at the same time, open up new 
paths of development for surplus capital absorption (Harvey 2010, 101). 
 Harvey goes along with Marx’s insight that technological change plays a key 
role in producing crises of one sort or another. As already noted, Marx argues 
that technology inevitably produces a tendency for the rate of profit to fall. 
Harvey (2010, 101) considers Marx’s argument an oversimplification. The 
most frequent form of the presumed tendency for the rate of profit to fall is 
the capital surplus absorption problem or capital over-accumulation, defined 
as a  mismatch between  surplus capital and surplus labour or a lack of oppor-
tunities for profitable investment. In this case, over-accumulated capital is 
 devalued or destroyed. Devalued capital can take many forms: abandoned 
factories, empty offices, unsold commodities, idle money, declining assets in 
stocks, shares, land, properties, etc. (Harvey 2010, 45–46). 
Capitalism resolves its over-accumulation crises through spatio-temporal 
fixes, engineered by the state–finance nexus (Harvey 2003, 89). Capital can 
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accumulate in two ways: it can exploit labour in production to create the  surplus 
value that sustains the basis of profit, or it can search for new opportunities 
across the globe for profitable reinvestment. In the second case,  capitalism 
progresses into an imperialism that arises out of a dialectical relation between 
two distinct but tightly intertwined sorts of power: state and capitalist power 
(Harvey 2003, 27–30). Capitalist imperialism consists in an often contradictory 
fusion of state-empire politics and the molecular processes of capital accumula-
tion in space and time. 
State power mobilises human and natural resources towards political, eco-
nomic and territorial/military ends, whereas capitalist power flows across and 
through states via the production process, trade, commerce, money, technol-
ogy transfers, currency and asset speculation. Whereas the statesman seeks a 
collective advantage that sustains or augments the power of their own state 
vis-à-vis other states, the capitalist seeks an individual advantage commensu-
rate with the accumulation of capital. Whereas the statesman is responsible to 
a citizenry or, more often, to an elite group, the capitalist is responsible only 
to shareholders. State power fuses with capitalist power inasmuch as the elite 
group that influences state policies identifies or aligns with capital, albeit in a 
contradictory manner. The endless accumulation of capital, for example, pro-
duces periodic crises within the territory of the state. Different state regulation, 
on the other hand, creates the basis for different versions of capitalism, uneven 
geographical development and geopolitical struggles. Therefore, to understand 
capitalist imperialism, one needs first to grapple with the theory of the capital-
ist state in all its diversity.
Different states create different imperialisms, as in the case of the French, 
Dutch, British and Belgian imperialisms from 1870 to 1945. Imperialist 
 practices, viewed from the perspective of capitalist logic, exploit the uneven 
geographical conditions under which capital accumulation occurs, such as the 
uneven patterning of natural resources and geostrategic advantages as well as 
the asymmetric exchange relations that facilitate the concentration of wealth 
and power in certain places rather than others (Harvey 2003, 31–32). This is 
precisely the case with modern European colonialism. 
Three stages of capitalist imperialism
The first major crisis of capitalist over-accumulation occurred in Europe in 
1846–50, forcing the bourgeois revolutionary movements to join capital under 
the banner of the modern nation-state, and altogether expand geographi-
cally across the globe (Harvey 2003, 42–49). Marx and Engels (2008/1848, 33) 
define the bourgeoisie as the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means 
of  production and employers of wage labour. The ruling class (landlords, the 
aristocracy, the king and the clergy) rejected the idea that the problem of over-
accumulation could be solved by internal reforms and redistribution among 
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the bourgeoisie and wage labour. To avoid the civil war that would emerge 
out of class struggle, it sought solutions through external trade and colonial/ 
imperial practices (Harvey 2003, 125). 
Social darwinism in the form of tribal nationalism and outright racism legiti-
mised the plundering of colonies and the extraction of tributes from ‘barbar-
ians, savages and inferiors’ who had failed to mix their labour with the land and 
progress accordingly (Harvey 2003, 42–45). Colonialism produced one of the 
most oppressive and violently exploitative forms of imperialism ever invented. 
Hannah Arendt (1968) correctly sees the fascism of Nazism as the apogee of 
the nationalistic monstrosity, marking the historical-geographical trajectory 
of European colonialism from 1870 until 1945. 
Imperialism is not a modern historical phenomenon. The geographical accu-
mulation of wealth and state power have gone hand in hand since the invention 
of money, private property and slavery (Karatani 2014). What is unique in the 
case of capitalist imperialism is the rise of the bourgeoisie, that is, the emer-
gence of the middle class of merchants who gradually asserted their money 
power to reconfigure state forms and assume a commanding influence over 
military institutions, administrative and legal systems (Harvey 2010, 48). Ulti-
mately, the rising bourgeoisie joined forces with feudal lords and monarchs to 
embark on colonising the globe. 
The second stage of capitalist imperialism took place in the post-war period 
from 1945 to 1970, when the political rule of the bourgeoisie operated under 
global US dominance and hegemony (Harvey 2010, 49–62). Against the back-
drop of the Cold War and economic stagnation following the Second World 
War, the United States decided to circulate its surpluses through Canada, 
 Australia, Western Europe and Japan, aiming to restabilise the global market 
and stimulate effective demand for its products. A new financial order was 
established by the Bretton Woods system that set up a fixed exchange rate by 
pegging all currencies against the US dollar, which, in turn, was pegged to the 
price of gold, fixed at $35 an ounce. At the time, US gold reserves made up two-
thirds of global gold reserves. 
Decolonisation followed suit to allow open trade to flourish and capital 
accumulation to accelerate. The whole enterprise was accompanied by a bat-
tery of institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, designed 
to coordinate economic growth between the advanced capitalist powers and to 
bring capitalist-style development to the rest of the non-communist world. 
That was a period of remarkably strong economic growth in the advanced capi-
talist countries, with the problem of over-accumulation contained until the late 
1960s by a mix of internal adjustments and spatio-temporal fixes within and 
beyond the United States (Harvey 2003, 58). In short, nationalist bourgeois 
imperialism, after 1945, took the form of Fordist capitalism, characterised by 
a Taylorist system of mass production and consumption, nationally regulated 
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economies, regulation of world trade and exchange relationships between cur-
rencies, and the emergence of welfare states.
This second stage in the global rule of the bourgeoisie ended with the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1970s, which was due to the fiscal crisis in the US caused 
by the rising costs of the military conflict in Vietnam. The US responded by 
printing more money, resulting in a world-wide stagflation of high unemploy-
ment and inflation, signalling another disconnect between idle capital and 
labour capacity. The new crisis of over-accumulation gave rise to neoliberalism 
 (Harvey 2003, 62–86). Gold was abandoned as the material basis of the mon-
etary system, and the flow of money was totally liberated from state controls. 
Threatened in the realm of production by Europe and Japan, the US reas-
serted its hegemony through finance. Financialisation now came to stimulate 
both demand and supply through credit, which is vital to productive invest-
ment and the reallocation of capital. ‘In the same way that capital can operate 
on both sides of the demand and supply of labour (via technologically induced 
unemployment), so it can operate through the credit system on both sides of 
the production-realisation relation’ (Harvey 2010, 115). Rather than relying 
on the state to stimulate demand, capital uses credit to boost production and 
 control the money flow. For example, the supply of credit to both property develop-
ers and homeowners fuelled a massive boom in housing and urban development 
in the US, followed by the mortgage crisis of 2008 (Harvey 2010, 115). 
The US banks in concert with the financial centres of London, Frankfurt and 
Tokyo were now given the exclusive right to recycle the vast quantities of petro-
dollars being accumulated in the Gulf region in the form of credit and all sorts 
of financial products such as stocks, bonds, options, derivatives, currency val-
ues, commodity futures, securitisation and the like. Speculation, thus, became 
the by-product of credit, and of what Marx calls fictitious capital, that is, capital 
detached from value produced in the real economy. 
Digitisation spread credit and speculation across the globe. Comput-
ers installed the post-Fordist model, which enabled capitalist restructuring 
in the field of production, thereby allowing capital to reduce costs (including 
the devaluation of labour) through outsourcing and offshoring (Harvey 2003, 
62–86). Computer networks allowed corporations to organise on a transna-
tional level by breaking down the production process into small units managed 
by subcontracted firms of corporations around the globe, distributed according 
to the location of the most attractive conditions for economic investment (low 
wages, low corporate taxes, weak unions, political stability, and so on). Fuchs 
describes post-Fordism as follows: 
The post-Fordist economy is a flexible regime of accumulation that 
is enabled by ICTs and is based on the outsourcing, decentralisation, 
and ‘flexibilisation’ of production: lean management, just-in-time 
 production, the flattening of internal hierarchies in corporations, small 
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organisational units in corporations, delegation of decision making 
from upper hierarchical levels to lower ones, decentralisation of organi-
sational structures, teamwork, strategic alliances, innovation networks, 
semi-autonomous working groups, network organisations, tertiarisa-
tion and informatisation of the economy, triadisation of international 
trade and of capital export, participatory management, a new phase of 
economic globalisation, diversified quality production, automation and 
rationalisation mediated by computerised ICTs. (2008, 110)
Globalisation is the post-Fordist nomadism of capitalism in space and time 
(Fuchs 2008, 111–112).
The global rise of multinational corporations was further supported by the 
neoliberal policies of Reagan and Thatcher, which resulted in the dismantling 
of the welfare state and the privatisation of public assets. Neoliberalism, finally, 
came to refer to the privatisation of everything and the socialisation of risk; so-
called socialism for the bankers (Harvey 2010, 10). This became amply evident 
in the mortgage crisis of 2008 when the state stepped in to bail out the bankrupt 
banks with taxpayers’ money to the tune of $700 billion. Neoliberalism, thus, 
produces a systemic ‘moral hazard’ in which banks do not have to suffer the 
consequences of high-risk behaviour (Harvey 2010, 11). 
To sum up, Harvey identifies three stages of capitalist imperialism: the bour-
geois imperialisms of 1870–1945, the post-war US hegemony of 1945–1970, 
and the neoliberal hegemony from 1970 onwards. Capitalist imperialism 
evolves through spatio-temporal fixes to crises of over-accumulation, engi-
neered by the state–finance nexus. Rather than being the enemy of capital, as 
many libertarians would have it, the state has functioned historically as the 
helping hand of capitalism, providing the institutional framework and manipu-
lating the molecular forces of capital accumulation. As Harvey puts it: 
Capital accumulation through price-fixing market exchange flourishes 
best in the midst of certain institutional structures of law, private prop-
erty, contract, and security of the money form. A strong state armed with 
police powers and a monopoly over the means of violence can guarantee 
an institutional framework and back it up with definite constitutional 
arrangements. State formation, coupled with the emergence of bour-
geois constitutionality, have therefore been crucial features within the 
long historical geography of capitalism. (2003, 89–90) 
Accumulation by dispossession
The central mechanism of capitalist imperialism has been what Harvey 
calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Harvey draws on Marx’s concept of prim-
itive accumulation, further expanded by Rosa Luxemburg in space and time, 
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to refer to the strategy of capital of releasing, co-opting and leveraging a set of 
assets (including labour power), often through fraud, robbery, plunder and raw 
violence, at very low (and in some instances zero) cost. 
The first instance of accumulation by dispossession was the primitive accu-
mulation described by Marx in terms of the commodification and privatisation 
of land, beginning in Britain; the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the 
conversion of common property rights into private property rights; the com-
modification of labour power; colonialism; the monetisation of exchange and 
taxation, particularly of land; slavery; the national debt bondage; and, finally, the 
credit system (Harvey 2003, 145). Primitive accumulation, in short, entails 
the appropriation of cultural, natural and social capital as well as confrontation 
and supersession (Harvey 2003, 146). Marx considered primitive accumula-
tion as a one-off event that sparked capitalist development. Rosa Luxemburg 
(2003/1913) showed instead that capital accumulation is an ongoing process 
that is essential to the reproduction of capitalism. 
Harvey (2003, 147–149) advanced the concept of ‘accumulation by dispos-
session’ from the shadowy position it held prior to 1970 to a central feature 
of  capitalist logic, manifested today in the sectors of finance, biogenetics, 
 agriculture, real estate, culture and public assets. He demonstrates the new wave 
of enclosures of the commons through land dispossession and debt peonage, 
the commodification of the world’s stockpile of genetic resources, the deple-
tion of the global environmental commons (land, air, water), the co-optation 
of cultural forms, histories and intellectual creativity, the privatisation of 
hitherto public property, and the reversion of common property rights to the 
private domain. 
Alongside accumulation by dispossession, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and then the opening up of China released hitherto unavailable assets for over-
accumulated capital to seize upon (Harvey 2010, 16). Capitalism evolves by 
opening new markets, while deploying more sophisticated methods of arbi-
trage (buying cheap and selling dear) to produce more money from money. 
Capitalism survives not only through spatio-temporal fixes that absorb capi-
tal surpluses into productive activity, but also through destruction spurred 
by speculation (Harvey 2003, 135). Ponzi schemes, structured asset destruc-
tion through inflation, asset stripping through mergers and acquisitions, debt 
incumbency that reduces whole countries to debt peonage, the raiding of pen-
sion funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses, credit and 
liquidity crises are all the (un)intended consequences of creative destruction 
(Harvey 2003, 147; 2010, 11). 
Creative destruction is the outcome of a zero-sum game, a trial-and-error 
process that promotes the survival of the fittest in the jungle of the market. 
Inequalities, power asymmetries, even unfairness and ruthlessness are all indi-
cators of a ‘meritocracy’ depicted as the natural law of the strongest; social 
darwinism at its best. This interpretation is miles away from the liberal ideal 
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of self-regulating free markets, which operate as sites of voluntary exchange 
based on private property rights and free trade, designed to foster technologi-
cal progress and rising labour productivity to satisfy the wants and needs of 
all. This utopian vision of a world of individual freedom and liberty for all is 
undermined, among other things, by capitalism’s basic condition of survival: 
credit-fuelled capital accumulation at a compound rate of 3%. Harvey (2010, 
112) argues that a 3% rate of capitalist growth is simply untenable, given that it 
requires 3% of reinvestment to keep up with future demand. 
To sum up, credit, privatisation, crisis manipulation, leveraging, speculation 
and devaluation of assets (including labour and land) are the neoliberal solu-
tions to the problem of capital over-accumulation, combined with the classic 
predatory practices of monopoly capitalism such as cartels, fixed pricing, tax 
evasion, bribery and the like. The whole system is supposed to be kept in check 
by state intervention through anti-trust policies, regulation and quantitative 
easing. But endemic corruption perpetuates economic crises, the repercussions 
of which resurrect the racism and nationalism that had once bound nation-
state and empire together (Harvey 2003, 188). Populism surges today under 
the banner of neoconservative neoliberalism. Populist politics is the natural 
outcome of capitalist crises, managed by elites to blame the inherent contradic-
tions of capitalism on immigrants. Capitalism retreats in times of crisis into 
racism and fascism to mitigate the rage of people and reboot the circulation of 
capital accumulation under nationalist terms. 
The contradictions of the commons
Resistance, however, escapes populist co-optation in the case of progres-
sive social movements and various struggles over dispossession, outlined by 
Harvey as follows:
The struggles of the Ogoni people against the degradation of their lands 
by Shell Oil; the long-drawn-out struggles against World Bank-backed 
dam construction projects in India and Latin America;  peasant move-
ments against biopiracy; struggles against genetically modified foods 
and the authenticity of local production systems; fights to  preserve access 
for indigenous populations to forest reserves while curbing the activi-
ties of the timber companies; political struggles against  privatisation; 
 movements to procure labour rights or women’s rights in  developing 
countries; campaigns to protect biodiversity and to prevent habitat 
destruction; peasant movements to gain access to land; protests against  
highway and airport construction; literally hundreds of protests  
against IMF-imposed austerity programmes – these were all part of a 
volatile mix of protest movements that swept the world and increasingly 
grabbed the headlines during and after the 1980s. (2003, 166–167)
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The effect of all these movements was to shift the terrain of political activity 
away from centralised state mechanisms into a less focused political dynamic 
of social action, spanning civil society. Yet Harvey (2003, 168, 177–179) detects 
some internal contradictions within the anti-capitalist social movements that 
cut to the heart of the commons. Localism, gated communities, vested inter-
ests, atavism, traditionalism and conservatism are some of the regressive ele-
ments of social movements that reverberate within the commons. The danger 
is to see all these social movements as by definition ‘progressive’ or, even worse, 
to place them under the homogenising and nebulous concept of Hardt and 
Negri’s ‘multitude’ that will magically rise up to power and extinguish capital-
ism (Harvey 2003, 169). 
The problem with socialism
Harvey (2010, 120) goes along with Marx who recognised some positive 
 elements within capitalist production. On the negative side, capitalism has 
produced abhorrent class violence and has caused world wars, increasing 
inequalities, severe environmental degradation, the loss of biodiverse habitats, 
spiralling poverty among burgeoning populations, neocolonialism, serious cri-
ses in public health, alienation, insecurity and anxieties. On the positive side, 
capitalism obliterated feudal relations and replaced a world of superstition and 
ignorance with a world of scientific enlightenment capable of liberating people 
from material want and need. Material living and well-being have significantly 
increased on average, travel and communications have been revolutionised and 
knowledge proliferates.
From this standpoint it could be said that primitive accumulation was 
a necessary though ugly stage through which the social order had to go 
in order to arrive at a stage where both capitalism and some alternative 
socialism might be possible […] It was, within the Marxist/communist 
revolutionary tradition, often deemed necessary to organise the equiva-
lent of primitive accumulation in order to implement programmes of 
modernisation in those countries that had not gone through the initia-
tion into capitalist development. This sometimes meant similar levels 
of appalling violence, as with the forced collectivisation of agriculture 
in the Soviet Union (the elimination of the kulaks) and in China and 
Eastern Europe. (Harvey 2003, 163, 165)
The problem with socialism, however, for Harvey, was precisely that it attempted 
to co-opt insurgent movements into the centralised mechanisms of the party 
that revolved around the aristocracy of labour. Socialism, thus, came at the cost 
of innumerable exclusions. Social movements such as feminism and environ-
mentalism remained outside the agenda of the traditional left (Harvey 2003, 
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170–171). What the left should do today, instead, is to directly attack class rela-
tions by incorporating social movements and civil society into a much broader 
politics of social change. Somehow the left must find a way to move beyond 
the amorphous concept of the ‘multitude’ without falling back into localism 
 (Harvey 2003, 179). This presupposes the incorporation of the commons into 
the macro-politics of the left, without the former losing their autonomy vis-à-
vis the state (Harvey 2011). 
Harvey abstains, however, from introducing any concrete policies through 
which the left could rise to challenge capitalism. Most importantly, he recycles 
a narrow, economistic, neo-Marxist analysis. The survival of capitalism does 
not merely depend on its capacity to achieve 3% compound growth. Capital-
ism can manoeuvre through crises and business cycles by hoarding or recycling 
profits into the spiral of creative destruction ad infinitum. Capitalism is not 
going to disappear simply by losing a big chunk of money. Harvey at times rests 
on the allegedly indissoluble contradictions of capitalism and loses sight of the 
central contradiction of capitalism, which is the division between directors and 
executants. Capitalism’s power does not reside in capital itself, but in its mode 
of production. To change the system from within, it is necessary to alter the 
mode of capitalist production into post-capitalist self-management.  Harvey 
supports activism, community and labour movements and clearly sees the 
advanced role of technology in both renovating and undermining capitalism. 
He welcomes automation and artificial intelligence, but he does not open up a 
clear path towards a socialist engineering of technological innovation (Harvey 
2019). This path presupposes a holistic, post-hegemonic strategy that redeploys 
centralised mechanisms to diffuse power to the crowd via concrete policies. 
4.6.4 Post-capitalism
Paul Mason (2015, xiv–xix) reiterates the narrative put forward by a number 
of authors so far that information technology has a revolutionary potential 
to pave the way for the transition from a capitalist economy of scarcity to a 
post-capitalist economy of abundance. As shown thus far, post-capitalism is 
modelled after a number of reformist and anti-capitalist variants of the com-
mons. Mason probably represents the most statist version of post-capitalism. 
He advocates a leftist social democracy or networked socialism with a strong 
emphasis on the role of the state in a commons-orientated transition.
The information argument
Mason (2015, xiii, 112) argues that capitalism is a complex and adaptive system 
that is losing its ability to adapt due to the essential features of information. He 
draws on a number of authors as diverse as Marx, Benkler and Rifkin (Mason 
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2015, 109–145) to claim that information technology has four specific effects 
that mainstream economics struggles to cope with: 1) the zero marginal cost 
effect; 2) the creation of massive positive externalities through network effects; 
3) the amplified asymmetry of information; and 4) the separation of work 
from wages.
Paul Romer showed in 1990 that the non-rivalrous nature of information 
drives the marginal cost of digital goods over time towards zero, thus erod-
ing profits (Mason 2015, 117–126). After the costs of production have been 
incurred in the product, the cost of reproduction is almost nil. The Deloitte 
consultancy group calculated that the falling price of information bandwidth, 
storage and processing power is exponential (Mason 2015, 165). Competi-
tive advantages and monopoly pricing are undermined by information’s free 
circulation. Napster, Gnutella, Bittorent, PirateBay, Kindle, iPad, Wikipedia, 
Wordpress and hundreds of software applications – some of them open source 
– have cost creative industry and the media (books, music, films, software, 
news, visual arts) billions of dollars. On the flipside, filesharing and download-
ing is beneficial not only to the millions of ‘pirates’, but to artists themselves, 
who earned very low royalties anyway. Now they can advertise their work for 
free and gain more money from concerts, presentations, exhibitions, and so 
on. Finally, high information content is added also to physical goods, sucking 
them into the same zero-price vortex as digital goods. For example, computer-
simulating stress tests on aircraft engineering significantly reduces the costs of 
production, thus pushing prices down, all other factors being equal.
Corporations respond by imposing ownership on information and extend-
ing copyright. They capture the positive externalities – or, in Marxian terms, 
the use value – of shareable information and enclose them with strict intel-
lectual property rights (Mason 2015, 131–133). Externalities such as pollution 
and shareable information are respectively negative and positive spillovers of 
production that are not embedded in the true costs and benefits of the prod-
uct or service. Info-monopolies such as Facebook, Google and Amazon base 
their business model on the positive externalities of network effects generated 
by Internet users, coupled with intellectual property rights. Kenneth Arrow 
showed that strong intellectual property rights result in the under-utilisation of 
information as in the case of info-monopolies. An economy that aims at the full 
utilisation of information cannot have a closed market or absolute intellectual 
property rights.
The networked economy and the end of capitalism
Mainstream economics assumes that free markets operating under  conditions 
of perfect competition and perfect information reach a state of equilibrium 
where the maximum possible social good is achieved (Mason 2015, 118). 
 Market failures and imperfections such as monopolies, patents, trade unions 
and price-fixing cartels are only temporary. Critics of mainstream economics 
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such as Joseph Stiglitz have claimed that the general assumptions of perfect 
information and efficient markets are wrong due to the asymmetry of infor-
mation between economic agents, and subsequent power imbalances (Mason 
2015, 120). Adverse selection, moral hazard and monopolies of knowledge are 
examples of asymmetric information.13 
Benkler has demonstrated that info-tech makes possible a non-market econ-
omy based on a demographic that pursues its self-interest through non-market 
actions (Mason 2015, 127–131). Info-tech supports the rise of a networked 
economy based on the spontaneous interaction of people using information 
pathways and forms of organisation that no longer respond to the dictates of 
the market and managerial hierarchies. Digital platforms and mobile applica-
tions allow for an increased sociality where non-monetary motivations come 
to occupy a larger space of non-market activity, thus shrinking the capitalist 
market. Mason (2015, 109–145) stresses that this is not a simple rebalanc-
ing between public goods and private goods, but a precursor of a transition 
towards a post-capitalist world of zero-priced goods, shared economic space, 
non- market organisations and non-ownable products. 
The networked economy creates an abundance of free and shared goods, 
where the law of supply and demand is inapplicable. Whereas in capitalism 
supply creates its own demand, with market-clearing prices matching supply 
and demand, production in post-capitalism is based on real-time and transpar-
ent computation of demand (Mason 2015, 160–164). Automation speeds up 
the post-capitalist transition by reducing necessary labour, blurring further-
more the distinction between work and leisure. It erodes the link between value 
and labour altogether (Mason 2015, 179). Capitalism responds by creating new 
needs and skills and commercialising every aspect of social life on the Internet 
and beyond (Mason 2015, 164). But, still, class struggle resists. 
Marx had already anticipated in the ‘Fragment on Machines’ a knowledge-
based route out of capitalism, in which the main contradiction is between tech-
nology and the market mechanism. Mason (2015, 144) traces two ways out 
of this contradiction: either a new form of cognitive capitalism emerges and 
consolidates firms, markets and networked collaboration, or a conflict takes 
place between the network and the market system that results in the abolition 
of the market system and its replacement by post-capitalism. Capitalism col-
lapses because it cannot exist alongside the shared knowledge produced by the 
general intellect. 
Information technology, far from creating a new and stable form of capital-
ism, is disintegrating it (Mason 2015, 112). Information does not produce an 
informational capitalism via another creative destruction that ‘updates’ capital-
ism, but breeds a peer-to-peer mode of production that tends to dissolve capi-
talism’s core structural contradiction between directors and executants. Mason 
(2015, xix) reproduces the autonomous Marxist argument that information 
gradually pushes that contradiction to its limits by contrasting the abundance 
of the network against the scarcity of the hierarchy. 
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Updating class struggle
Mason uses Marxist crisis theory to accentuate the role of the class struggle in 
the transition from capitalism to post-capitalism. For Marx, competition drives 
capitalists to replace labour with machinery, the result being the tendency of 
the profit rate to fall. Capitalism offsets this tendency by various counteracting 
tendencies. However, Marx believed that the counteracting tendencies eventu-
ally break down, leading to a cyclical crisis, the ‘snowballing effect’ of which 
brings capitalism to a halt. 
Mason (2015, 31–77) calls upon a variant of Nikolai Kondratieff ’s theory of 
‘long waves’ of capitalist growth to correct both Kondratieff and Marx. Con-
trary to Marx, who claimed that capitalism is doomed to failure, Kondratieff 
argued that capitalism generally adapts and mutates. He assumed that capitalist 
development has the form of fifty-year cycles consisting of twenty-five years of 
economic upswing followed by twenty-five years of downswing (Mason 2015, 
33). The cause of the long cycles, according to Kondratieff, lies in the economy, 
not in technology or global politics. Take-off is caused by capital accumulating 
faster than it can be invested, the effect being either the search for an expanded 
supply of money or the increased availability of new, cheaper technologies 
(Mason 2015, 37–38). 
The first long cycle began with the factory system in Britain in the 1780s 
and was terminated around 1849. The second long cycle involved the global 
deployment of railways, steam ships and the telegraph, ending sometime in the 
1890s. The third cycle took off with the harnessing of electricity, the telephone, 
scientific management and mass production and experienced its downswing 
during the Second World War. The fourth cycle was powered by transistors 
and factory automation, producing the longest economic boom in history. The 
peak was the oil shock of 1973, after which a long period of instability took 
hold. The fifth cycle supposedly began in the late 1990s, driven by the Internet 
and mobile communications. But it has stalled. The reason for this, according 
to Mason (2015, 47–48), is neoliberalism and the nature of information, which 
erodes capitalism from within. 
Schumpeter took Kondratieff ’s wave theory to develop a techno- determinist 
account of boom and bust (Mason 2015, 45). For him, capitalist cycles are 
not driven by the rhythm of investment, but by technological innovation that 
prompts the ‘creative destruction’ of old and inefficient models. Carlota Perez, 
a modern follower of Schumpeter, emphasises the response of governments at 
crisis points to invert Kondratieff ’s cause and effect: governments drive tech-
nology, and technology drives the economics (Mason 2015, 47). Mason gives 
a Marxian twist to all three. The problem with the Schumpeterian version of 
wave theory is that it is obsessed with innovators and technologies, and does 
not see classes (Mason 2015, 73). The same goes for Kondratieff and Perez: they 
do not see that class struggle drives capitalism into post-capitalism.
The Anti-capitalist Commons 199
Long cycles are not produced by just technology and economics, the 
third critical driver is class struggle. And it is in this context that Marx’s 
original theory of crisis provides a better understanding than Kondra-
tieff ’s ‘exhausted investment’ theory […] Kondratieff ’s account – which 
said that the fifty-year cycles were driven by the need to renew major 
infrastructure – was far too simplistic. Better to say each wave generates 
a specific and concrete solution to falling profit rates during the upswing 
– a set of business models, skills and technologies – and that the down-
swing starts when the solution becomes exhausted or disrupted […] The  
tendency of the rate of profit to fall, interacting constantly with  
the counter-tendencies, is a much better explanation of what drives the 
fifty-year cycle than the one Kondratieff gave. (Mason 2015, 77)
Mason employs Marx’s crisis theory only to deviate from it by upgrading the 
role of class struggle in the transition from capitalism to post-capitalism. Marx 
noticed that the fundamental flaw of capitalism, that is, the tendency of the 
profit rate to fall, is due to the main contradiction between the forces of pro-
duction (workers, machinery) and relations of production (owners of machin-
ery vs non-owners). The solution, however, does not rest on the passage from 
 private to communal property via the state, but on the transformation of the 
capitalist mode of production into a post-capitalist one. The main contradic-
tion of capitalism is not an issue of (state) ownership but of self-management. 
The solution is the abolition of the division between directors and executants 
and the establishment of self-management across all spheres of the social. 
Mason (2015, 177–181) contends that the agent of social change is no longer 
the working class, but the networked individual who occupies the social factory 
and whose lifestyle is not solidarity but impermanence. 
Classical Marxists, including Marx himself, underestimated the constitutive 
nature of political agency in the course of capitalism’s history, ranging from 
the spatio-temporal fixes of the capitalist state to class struggle itself (Mason 
2015, 75–76). Rudolf Hilferding dispensed with the thesis of the ‘snowballing 
crisis’ and conceived of capitalism as a state-directed, heavily monopolised and 
national system (Mason 2015, 59). But he mistakenly assumed that monopoly 
capitalism would lead to a long and stagnant crisis period that would give way to 
socialism. Rosa Luxemburg moved crisis theory to the post-colonial collapse of 
capitalism, caused by the lack of new markets. But she could not see at the time 
that capitalism could create new markets within existing markets (Mason 2015, 
61–63). The mistake of both was to consider monopolised state capitalism as the 
only pathway to post-capitalism (Mason 2015, 71). The dialectical progression 
from free market to monopoly and from colonisation to global war and revolu-
tion was simply a fallacy exposed in 1989, with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. 
The role of class struggle came to prominence through the autonomous 
Marxists after the 1970s. Information technology has triggered since then the 
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fourth and prolonged stage of state capitalism in the model of neoliberalism, 
supposed to produce a new wave of capitalist growth driven by ICTs. Infor-
mation capitalism, however, has not yet emerged or, at least, has stalled due 
to the stagnation of the last two decades (Mason 2015, 91–106). The current 
period presents an anomaly in Kondratieff ’s cycles or waves of global capital-
ist growth. This anomaly cannot be explained in terms of the classical Marxist 
theory that traces crises to one abstract cause. Mason (2015, 71–72) argues, 
instead, that the economic explanation must be concrete and take into account 
the real structures of capitalism: states, corporations, welfare systems, finan-
cial markets. Put simply, capitalism is a complex system consisting of multiple 
moving parts, the explanation of which requires a focused analysis on the parts 
in question each time. It therefore requires a poststructural analysis contingent 
on the evolution of capitalism and class struggle.
Envisaging post-capitalism
Neoliberalism offsets the tendency of the profit rate to fall by suppressing 
labour costs and massively expanding financial profits (Mason 2015, 71). The 
conundrum of rising profits alongside falling investment is explained by 
the fact that firms use profits to build up cash reserves as buffers against a credit 
crunch. They also pay down debt while distributing profit to shareholders 
through buy-back schemes. They are minimising their exposure to risk while 
speculating in the financial markets. The state, on the other hand, uses a mix-
ture of quantitative easing and austerity policies to boost growth. The result is 
secular stagnation. Neoliberalism is on life support. It is just 15 trillion dollars 
worth of balance sheet expansion, backed by zero interest rates. 
Information technology comes into play to install a post-capitalist model 
of production based on the networked economy that disrupts top-down cen-
tralised capitalism. Class struggle now occupies centre stage. Yet Mason (2015, 
273–274) argues that the post-capitalist transition will need the state to create 
the necessary framework, since the networked economy operating via peer- 
to-peer projects, collaborative business models and non-profit activities is typi-
cally small-scale. Class struggle is fragile. The top-level goals of a post-capitalist 
project should be the following (Mason 2015, 269–270):
1. The reduction of carbon emissions so that the world has warmed by only 
two degrees Celsius by 2050.
2. The socialisation of the finance system to prevent other boom–bust cycles 
that could destroy the world economy. This could combine controlled debt 
write-offs with a 10–15 year global policy of ‘financial repression’. It would 
include the restructuring of the banking system to favour  non-profit local 
and regional banks, credit unions and peer lending and a well-regulated 
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space for complex financial activities that rewards innovation and dis-
courages rent-seeking behaviour. 
3. The prioritising of information-rich technologies to address issues of 
social welfare (health, sexual exploitation, digital illiteracy).
4. The gearing of technology towards the automation of the economy with 
the aim of freeing up basic commodities and public services, rendering 
work voluntary and turning economic management primarily into an 
issue of energy and resources, not capital and labour.
The first step towards achieving these goals would be the creation of a global 
institute or network for simulating the long-term transition beyond capitalism 
based on current economic data. Ideally this would be an open source pro-
ject supported by the state that would draw on real-time data. Based on those 
data, the state should switch off the neoliberal machine and reshape markets 
to favour sustainable, collaborative and socially just outcomes (Mason 2015, 
271–272). However unrealistic this prospect, it marks out a holistic and cen-
tralised planning. The state should act as an enabler of new technologies and 
collaborative business models; it should suppress or socialise monopolies; pay 
everyone a basic income; allow patents and intellectual property to taper away 
quickly; coordinate and plan infrastructure; and ‘own’ the agenda for responses 
to the challenges of climate change, demographic ageing, energy security and 
migration (Mason 2015, 273–289). With energy and banking socialised, the 
short-term goal would be to progress the economy towards high automation, 
low work and abundant cheap or free goods and services (Mason 2015, 283). 
Money and credit would have a much smaller role in the economy and returns 
on investment would come in a mixture of monetary and non-monetary 
forms. The long-term goal would be the creation of an abundant gift economy, 
which prioritises use value over exchange value. The post-capitalist transition 
involves, thus, a mix of planning, state provision, markets and peer production.
Critics from different and contrasting sides have argued that Mason’s argu-
ment is naïve, optimistic, utopian, one-dimensional and techno-determinist 
(Fuchs 2016; Milanovic 2018; Mullin 2015; Pitts 2015). Some have claimed that 
information capitalism is already alive and kicking, as evidenced by the enor-
mous profits of info-monopolies (Fuchs 2016; Milanovic 2018). While this is 
true, it cannot exclude the possibility of the disruptive effects that info-tech 
might have in the long run. Some crucial questions to be addressed are the 
following: Can the positional power of info-monopolies be outcompeted by 
networked individuals? Can networked individuals self-organise towards this 
goal? Might the state support the self-organisation of networked individuals 
against neoliberal capitalism? The answer to these questions depends, among 
other things, on grassroots action, political volition and democratic delibera-
tion. Notwithstanding the pitfalls of an info-determinist approach with respect 
to the political, Mason’s post-capitalist vision actually represents one potential 
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version of future class struggle, the outcome of which will be determined by the 
interplay of a number of factors coming together at the crossroads of politics, 
technology and economics. 
4.6.5 The Critical Theory of the Commons
Christian Fuchs elaborates on the technological aspect of class struggle. He lays 
the groundwork for a contemporary critical theory of media and information 
studies, which reflects the emergence of commons-based peer production. His 
work could, therefore, read as a technological update of the critical theory of 
Frankfurt School.
The Frankfurt School
Critical theory originated in the work of Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx. In the 
twentieth century it came to refer specifically to the Frankfurt School, and more 
particularly the work of George Lukács, Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, 
Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse (Fuchs 2011, 11–26; 2016, 5–22). The 
Frankfurt School drew on the philosophical predicates of Hegel and Marx to 
engage with ideology critique, among other things. In the Marxian analytical 
framework, ideology is a partial, simplified and distorted representation of 
reality, reflecting the interests of capitalists, boiling down to capital accumula-
tion. It is reinforced by the neoliberal presumption that the essence of human 
nature is competition over the forces and relations of production. Marx (1975, 
175) unveils, among other things, the religious facet of ideology by considering 
religion as the opium of the people. Yet he focuses on the economic dimension 
of ideology, as manifested in the exploitative capitalist relations of production. 
Exploitation is the result of capitalist domination over the forces and relations 
of production. 
In Capital, ideology critique takes the form of commodity fetishism and 
alienation, where the social relations of production are perceived as economic 
relations among commodities and money. Money becomes a fetish, an end in 
itself rather than a force of production. George Lukács (1972/1923, 83) built 
on Marx’s concept of alienation to introduce the concept of reification, which 
reduces humans to the status of things. Max Horkheimer (1974/1947, 15) refor-
mulated Lukács’s concept of reification into the notion of instrumental reason, 
which transforms humans into automatic machines serving capital accumula-
tion. Capitalist ideology departs from the basis of economy to dominate the 
superstructure of society in terms of instrumental reason, which pervades 
science, politics, culture and the media. Herbert Marcuse (1964, 138) coined 
the term ‘technological rationality’ to describe instrumental reason. Capitalist 
ideology uses technology to create a one-dimensional human who employs a 
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calculative logic according to the rules of capitalist domination. Technoscience, 
thus, becomes a tool for capital accumulation.
Fuchs (2011, 58–72) adopts Marcuse’s dialectics to articulate his critical 
theory of media and information economy. Dialectics dates back to Heracli-
tus, Plato and Aristotle to reflect the contrasts inherent in the cosmos, thought 
and rational argumentation. In modern political philosophy, it is redeployed by 
Hegel and Marx to reveal the inner contradictions of capitalism. Marx (1867, 
744) observes that contradictions are the source of all dialectics. A contradic-
tion consists of two opposing poles that require and exclude each other at the 
same time. The tension between opposing poles can be resolved in a process 
that Hegel and Marx called ‘Aufhebung’ (sublation) and ‘negation of negation’: 
a new third quality that emerges from the contradiction between two poles. 
For Marx, the major contradiction of capitalism is between the forces and rela-
tions of production, that is, between capital and workers, or owners and non-
owners of the means of production. This contradiction is partly sublated in 
times of crisis by a creative destruction that reboots the capitalist system to 
restart a new round of capital accumulation. Its true sublation, however, can 
only be achieved by overthrowing capitalism and establishing socialism. 
Stalin’s attempt to establish socialism was based on a deterministic inter-
pretation of Marx’s dialectics according to which proletarian revolution and 
socialism are inevitable developments, following the dialectical and historical 
progress of capitalism into communism (Fuchs 2011, 54–55). Stalin’s dialectics 
was functionalist and structuralist, underestimating the role of human subjects 
in dialectical processes. Dialectics was mixed with a Protestant ethic to eventu-
ally produce a terrorist ideology. This distorted the humanistic element of Marx 
by resorting to a labour fetishism that reproduced the bourgeois morality of 
family, performance and hard work (Fuchs 2008, 347). The Marxian principle 
‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ was trans-
formed into ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his labour’ 
(Fuchs 2016, 15).
Marcuse sought to avoid deterministic dialectics by shifting the structural-
functionalist dialectic towards a human-centred dialectic (Fuchs 2011, 59). He 
reintroduced the Hegelian-Marxist dialectics of subject–object, where the sub-
ject transforms the object and vice versa. Society is shaped by the dialectic of 
freedom and necessity. Whereas necessity consists in the laws of nature, free-
dom is the capacity of humans to transform nature. In contrast to the objec-
tivism of positivism and the subjectivism of postmodernism, Marcuse takes 
up the Hegelian dialectic between essence and existence to inscribe a norma-
tive dimension on critical theory (Fuchs 2011, 39). Unlike positivism, which 
ascribes a neutral or value-free character to knowledge, and postmodernism, 
which dissolves into a culturalism of signs, symbols and representations, critical 
theory introduces a political perspective on knowledge (Fuchs 2011, 28–34; 
2016, 13–14). It understands theory and knowledge as a terrain of antagonism 
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and conflict without resorting to a post-Marxist classless analysis of the politi-
cal. Following young Marx, Marcuse conceives of cooperation as the essence of 
society, which contradicts the actual existence of competition (Fuchs 2011, 31, 
40–41). Contrary to the relativism of postmodernism, he posits that there are 
universal human characteristics such as sociality, cooperation and the desire 
for wealth, happiness and freedom. He interprets Marx’s work as an ethics of 
cooperation that needs to be liberated from capitalist ideology. Cooperation 
results in a categorical imperative that, in contrast to Kant, stresses the need for 
integrative democracy.
The dialectics of agency and structure
Fuchs (2008, 59) proceeds via Marcuse into a rereading of Marx, focusing on 
human practice and its application to contemporary society and technology. 
The dialectic of subject and object takes on the form of a dialectic of crisis 
and social struggle, the goal of which is the critique of capitalist domination and 
exploitation and its sublation by a classless society. To this end, he translates the 
Marcusean dialectics of subject and object into the contemporary dialectics of 
agency and structure (Fuchs 2008, 59–71). Human actors are conditioned by 
societal structures and vice versa. Fuchs builds on the social theory of Anthony 
Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu to conceive society as a dynamic and dialectical 
system consisting of three core subsystems: 
the economic system, in which values and property that satisfy human 
needs are produced; the political system, in which power is distributed 
in a certain way and collective decisions are taken; and the cultural sys-
tem, in which skills, meaning and competency are acquired, produced 
and enacted in ways of life. (2008, 215) 
Fuchs (2011, 46) adheres to Marx’s distinction between the base and the 
 superstructure of society. He considers the economic system the foundation 
of society that forms the necessary but not sufficient condition for the political 
and cultural system. The dialectics of agency and structure permits the refor-
mulation of the economy by the human actors involved in the political and 
cultural system. Fuchs focuses on information and the media: 
Media operate at the structural level of society, whereas information is a 
property of the actor level of society. Media are structural properties of 
society that enable and constrain human cognition, communication and 
cooperation (information processes). Human information processes are 
form-giving processes in society: in the threefold process of cognition, 
communication and cooperation, humans transform, create and recre-
ate social structures. Human knowledge is externalised by humans with 
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the help of media that store representations of this knowledge (sounds, 
images, writings, moving images, multimedia, etc.). Media are complex 
objectifications of human knowledge […] Information and the media 
are based on a subject–object dialectic that takes place within society: 
there is no subjective information (cognition, communication, coopera-
tion) without media structures, and there are no media structures (that 
objectify, i.e. represent, subjective knowledge) without human cogni-
tion, communication and cooperation. (2011, 90–91) 
Fuchs interprets the Internet as a technological catalyst of social struggle (Fuchs 
2008, viiii). He considers the media and information economy in contempo-
rary society as fields for the display of power and domination (2011, 5). He sees 
power in the Spinozan sense of ‘transformative capacity’, the capability to inter-
vene and alter or affect the outcome of politics in the broader sense (2011, 4). 
Power is a political structure; it can be defined as the disposition over 
means required to influence collective processes and decisions in one’s 
own interest. Domination is a specific form of power; it refers to the 
disposition over the means of coercion required to influence others, col-
lective processes and decisions. (Fuchs 2008, 67)
Domination establishes asymmetric power relations by force and violence 
(Fuchs 2008, 213). In the media and information economy, domination takes 
the form of a concentration of economic capital in a handful of corporations 
that manipulate public opinion, policies and consumer decisions to their own 
interests (Fuchs 2011, 5). ‘The centralisation of ownership and wealth results 
in a situation in which a few actors dominate national and international public 
opinion and have a huge influence on public institutions such as the media, 
education, politics, culture and welfare’ (Fuchs 2011, 110). Thus, the media 
transform into power structures and spaces of power struggle (Fuchs 2011, 6).
Fuchs (2014, 151) blends the autonomist Marxist argument regarding the cir-
culation of struggle with the dialectics of critical theory to argue that the devel-
opment of informational productive forces is itself contradictory and comes 
into conflict with the capitalist relations of production, as evidenced in the case 
of FOSS, the digital commons, cooperatives and social movements. Contrary 
to scholars such as Bell, Toffler, Drucker, Stehr and Castells, who speak of the 
emergence of a post-industrial society/knowledge society/information society/
network society, boosted by the development of ICTs, Fuchs (2014, 144) argues 
that what the last decades have experienced is not a new type of information 
society, but the transformation of industrial capitalism into digital capitalism 
driven by information and knowledge production. Contemporary society is an 
information society in terms of its forces of production. In terms of its rela-
tions of production, it remains a capitalist one (Fuchs 2014, 150). Fuchs (2014, 
144) sides with scholars such as Nicholas Garnham (2000; 2004/1998), Peter 
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Golding (2000) and Frank Webster (2002; 2006) who object to the informa-
tion society hypothesis, stressing instead the continued exploitative character 
of capitalist class relations. 
Transnational informational capitalism
Fuchs (2008, 104) speaks of transnational informational capitalism to 
underscore the role of information and knowledge in globalised capital-
ist  production. He approaches knowledge as a dialectical social process of 
 cognition, communication and cooperation (2008, 117). Knowledge is neither 
subjective nor objective, postmodern nor positivist, but encapsulates a subject–
object  dialectic:
The notion of informational capitalism grasps this subject–object dia-
lectic, it conceptualises contemporary capitalism based on the rise of 
cognitive, communicative and cooperative labour that is interconnected 
with the rise of technologies of goods that objectify human cognition, 
communication, and cooperation. Informational capitalism is based on 
the dialectical interconnection of subjective knowledge and knowledge 
objectified in information technologies. (Fuchs 2008, 104)
Following the autonomist Marxist tradition, Fuchs expands the Marxian notion 
of exploitation from industrial labour to knowledge and digital labour, enabled 
by computers and mobile phones. Digital labour refers to the blurring of labour 
and play. In the social factory, work resembles play, and entertainment becomes 
labour-like (Fuchs 2014, 267). 
Fuchs (2008, 202) builds on Hardt and Negri’s notion of the multitude to 
include traditional industrial workers, knowledge workers, houseworkers, the 
unemployed, migrants, retirees and students. He redefines the multitude as an 
expanded notion of the proletariat who produce material or knowledge goods 
and services directly or indirectly for capital, and are deprived or expropri-
ated of resources by capital (2011, 280). Fuchs (2011, 279–280) replaces Negri’s 
term ‘social worker’ with the term ‘knowledge worker’ to refer to workers 
who directly produce knowledge goods and services (for example, hardware, 
 software, data, statistics, advertisements, media content, films, music, etc.), and 
‘workers’ who indirectly produce and reproduce the conditions of capital 
and wage labour such as natural resources, education, sociality, affect, commu-
nication, sex, housework, care, and so on. 
Fuchs replaces the term ‘immaterial labour’ with the term ‘informational 
labour’ to distance himself from the subjectivism of autonomous Marxism 
(2008, 103). Informational labour is not detached from nature and matter, but 
is material itself. It denotes the brain’s materiality involved in cognition, com-
munication and cooperation. Pace Hardt and Negri, Fuchs (2014, 275–279) 
claims that it is a mistake to assume that ‘immaterial labour’ brings about 
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the end of the labour theory of value. Parents, citizens, consumers, Internet 
 prosumers, radio listeners and television viewers are all part of the multitude 
that employs informational or digital labour to produce the commons of capi-
tal’s own social and natural reproduction (Fuchs 2008, 202). The amount of 
this labour time can be measured by counting the hours of unpaid work on the 
Internet, which can be characterised as indirect common surplus value (Fuchs 
2008, 209). Corporations consume the common surplus value produced across 
the whole range of the social factory, including nature, knowledge, commu-
nication, entertainment, culture and public infrastructures (Fuchs 2011, 286). 
Capitalism, thus, exploits the multitude and society as a whole. 
The antagonism between e-cooperation and e-competition:  
economy, politics and culture 
The commons, however, also use capital to reproduce themselves. The multi-
tude makes use of fixed capital (for example, computers and software) for its 
own benefit as in the case of FOSS developers, the digital commons, Internet 
prosumers (for example, file sharing) and citizens themselves who use media 
and Internet services at near-zero marginal cost. Capitalism and the commons 
constantly feed off each other. The Internet has now shifted the antagonism of 
capital and the commons into the digital realm. ‘Transnational network capi-
talism has an antagonistic character, knowledge and new technologies do not 
have one-sided effects, but should be analysed dialectically: they are embedded 
into a fundamental antagonism of capitalism, the one between cooperation and 
competition, that has specific manifestations in the various subsystems of soci-
ety’ (Fuchs 2011, 130). The antagonism between cooperation and competition 
plays out in the antagonism between information as a common/public good 
and as a commodity. The anti-rivalrous nature of information resists com-
modification. This resistance stems from the fundamental antagonism between 
use value and exchange value, with the latter dominating the former; the main 
aspect of a thing being not its usefulness but its commodification (Fuchs 2008, 
164–165). The anti-rivalrous nature of information renders the Internet an 
antagonistic and contested space where class struggle takes the form of the 
contradiction between cooperation and competition, pervading the three sub-
systems of society: economy, politics and culture.
In the Internet economy, the contradiction between cooperation and compe-
tition unfolds in the antagonism between the information gift economy and the 
informational commodity economy (Fuchs 2008, 148–209). The logic of coop-
eration uses information as a gift that circulates in the global peer production 
of the multitude, as manifested in the case of platform cooperativism, FOSS 
development, the digital commons, the makers movement, social movements, 
and so on. The logic of competition, on the other hand, uses information as a 
commodity on the model of platform capitalism that exploits user-generated 
content for the purposes of capital accumulation. 
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The contradiction between cooperation and competition expands in online 
politics via the antagonism between e-participation and e-domination (Fuchs 
2008, 213–294). The logic of cooperation spreads into e-participation 
which aims at digital inclusion via forums of grassroots digital democracy, 
 cyberprotest, rational free online speech, critical online public spheres and 
counter-publics. Fuchs (2008, 163) parts ways here with Lessig’s and Stallman’s 
liberal concept of freedom on the net, where digital knowledge can be both 
commodified and non-commodified. He holds that digital knowledge should 
not be exchanged for money as a commodity, but provided for free. The logic of 
domination is based on commodification, resulting in a digital divide marked 
by information warfare, electronic surveillance and the repression of online 
plurality and tolerance. 
In cyberculture, the contradiction between cooperation and competition 
takes the final form of antagonism between socialisation and alienation (Fuchs 
2008, 299–333). The logic of cooperation takes place in the virtual socialisa-
tion of cooperative online participatory communities who represent a unity in 
diversity of identities and shared meanings through forums of cyber-friendship 
and cyber-love, high-quality cyberscience, critical online journalism and par-
ticipatory e-learning. The logic of competition, on the other hand, occurs in the 
virtual alienation of commodified virtual communities that produce identity 
marketing, symbolic capital, one-dimensional online journalism, cyber-hate, 
high-speed cyberscience, inauthentic art and individualised e-learning. 
Envisaging communism
Fuchs’s (2011, 290–291) core argument is that the Internet is a dialectical 
space that contains both positive and negative potentials: the advancement of 
civil society, public discourse, active prosumptive usage by the masses, more 
open, discursive and democratic forms of education plus the new model of 
 commons-based peer production, all contrast with the corporate appropriation 
of Web 2.0, digital exclusion and digital divides, the exploitation of  Internet pro-
sumers, the fragmentation of the public sphere and the creation of an e- literate 
online elite. The net result is a class-structured online space that is dominated 
by corporations that use the Internet as a medium of capital accumulation and 
advertising (Fuchs 2011, 310). 
Digital media are technologies of domination and liberation at the same 
time. These potentials are, however, not equally distributed. In a class-
based society, we can always take the dominative use of technologies for 
certain, whereas alternative uses aiming at liberation are much more 
fragile and precarious. Only political praxis can bring about humanity’s 
emancipation from repression. (Fuchs 2016, 219)
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Fuchs (2011, 110) situates the media and information economy within the 
societal totality and sees them as being embedded within political struggles. 
He advocates for a human-centred Internet in a human-centred society based 
on an association of free produsers, critical, self-managed, surveillance-free, 
beneficial for all, freely accessible for all, classless and universal (2011, 317). 
The commons-based Internet opposes the corporate-dominated Internet that 
tends to be exploitative, one-dimensional, undemocratic, surveillant, unequal, 
access-restricted, fostering economic concentration, individualistic, class-
divided and fragmented. The commons-based Internet has to be integrated 
into political movements that clash with the capitalisation of society, corporate 
domination, commodification and the imperialistic colonisation of the Inter-
net by capitalist logic (Fuchs 2011, 318).
Fuchs (2011, 311) envisions a post-capitalist world where there is no money, 
no exchange and profit, where work is voluntary and goods are available for 
free. He defines communism in the Μarxian sense of the association of free 
prosumers (2011, 330–331). Communism points to the sublation of class in a 
classless society. It is based on self-management which fosters cooperative pro-
duction and enriches individuality. Societies contain both elements of private 
property and common ownership over the means of production (Fuchs 2011, 
343). Communism does not put an end to individual consumption, but to the 
exploitation of the labour of individuals by a small group of capitalists. In com-
munism, the forces of production have increased to such an extent that the 
springs of common wealth flow abundantly, allowing the economy to flourish 
on the principle: ‘From each according to their abilities, to each according to 
their needs’ (Fuchs 2011, 331–332).
A first step towards communism is the creation of an associationist move-
ment that brings together students, intellectuals, knowledge workers and tra-
ditional workers in struggles against capitalism. An alternative Internet would 
 contribute to the commons transition through the peer production of open 
access projects, open content projects, free software, open source projects, alter-
native online news media, collective digital art projects, cyberprotest,  public 
online media, public access projects, the struggle for net neutrality, the creation 
of free wireless networks, non-commercial and non-profit virtual communi-
ties, and so on (Fuchs 2011, 345). 
The task is to construct political projects that aim at the connection of 
the multiplicity of subject positions that are immanent in the  multitude 
and have the potential to advance struggles that transcend capitalism and  
anticipate a participatory alternative to capitalism, that is, grassroots 
socialism […] The political task is to create a political unity in plurality 
of the multitude so that the internal antagonisms are externalised and 
can be synergistically combining the strength of the now fragmented 
powers be directed against the capitalist class. (Fuchs 2011, 347–348)
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Marxist dialectics vs post-hegemonic discourse
Fuchs’s terminology echoes here Laclau and Mouffe’s politics of hegemony: 
‘grassroots socialism’, ‘subject positions’, ‘unity in plurality’, ‘antagonisms’. 
Yet Fuchs is being critical of post-Marxism without, however, engaging in a 
detailed critique of Laclau and Mouffe’s work. He goes along with the broad-
ening of the notion of class to include non-workers without, however, acced-
ing to a classless analysis (2011, 329). Fuchs (2011, 31) concurs, instead, with 
Žižek’s statement that postmodernism and post-Marxism have, by assuming 
an  ‘irreducible plurality of struggles’, accepted ‘capitalism as the only game in 
town’ and have renounced ‘any real attempt to overcome the existing capital-
ist liberal regime’. This argument, however, is overly generalised and mistaken, 
especially in relation to Laclau and Mouffe, whose work is radically democratic 
and profoundly anti-capitalist. 
The major problem rests on Fuchs’s dialectical methodology which clashes 
head-on with the post-Marxist methodology of discourse theory. Dialectics 
is a formalistic simplification of ontological heterogeneity. It is occasionally 
and partially useful as a methodological tool, not as a transcendental prin-
ciple of immanence, as Fuchs would have it. The dialectical methodology is 
valid when used to diagnose, among other things, the main contradiction of 
capitalism between directors and executants. But it is invalid when advanced 
to an ontological principle. Following Castoriadis, the heterogeneity of onto-
logical  difference crystallises a creation ex nihilo that cannot break down into 
a binary logic. And when it does so, it risks turning into a reversed ideology, a 
reversed rational mastery (Papadimitropoulos 2016), a reversed instrumental 
rationality that eliminates or absorbs ontological difference into two hegem-
onic poles of causal explanation. It reproduces the reversed neopositivism of 
a two- valued logic embedded into the totalitarian hegemony of socialism that 
seeks to become science. 
The advantage of discourse theory over dialectics is to conceive the real as 
overdetermined, as being one and many at the same time: a guitar is a musi-
cal instrument, a design, a commodity, an embodiment of human labour, a 
natural combination of wood, sound and strings and an emotional attachment, 
all at once. Dialectics distorts the polysemia and similitude of things. To iden-
tify and contradict presupposes the logic-ontology of difference, which is ‘pure’ 
multiplicity infused with the meaning of the political which overdetermines 
the social. This is not to deny the central contradiction of capitalism between 
directors and executants, but to situate it in a broader class struggle that takes 
into account identity politics along with the broadening of the notion of class 
to include often contradictory class and subject positions.
This has direct consequences for Fuchs’s understanding of the political, the 
primacy of which over the economy discounts the fact that in order to eat and 
survive, humans need to possess the ontological capacity to search for food 
in a self-organised manner. Thus, the capacity of humans to self-organise 
The Anti-capitalist Commons 211
and not the economy per se is the precondition of survival. The economy is the 
necessary but not the sufficient condition for survival. Coextensive to any 
emergent social structure is the self-instituting power of agency stemming from 
the  radical imaginary of the anonymous collective, as Castoriadis would have 
it. What is missing, further, from Fuchs’s analysis is the psychoanalytic dimen-
sion of affection, which is not reducible to the rationalistic and formalistic 
schema of dialectics. Dialectics is a useful tool of human agency for simplifying 
complexity and understanding social change, but not as an ontological nor an 
epistemological principle per se. By identifying the political with the Marxist 
dialectics of critical theory, Fuchs undermines the political itself. He underes-
timates the political inherent in the self-instituting power of the people which 
transcends a dialectical understanding of the real. Fuchs abstains from the stat-
ism of the Communist Party, but still lacks a coherent post-hegemonic grasp on 
the political. 
Notwithstanding the defects of Marxist dialectics, Fuchs’s work contributes 
enormously to building a holistic alternative to neoliberalism, which could be 
further integrated into a post-hegemonic politics of the common that could 
create political unity in plurality; connect grassroots socialism with current 
institutions; produce chains of equivalence between alternative formations of 
community and governance; and combine horizontalism with verticalism in 
favour of agonistic political commons that share political values or goods, sub-
ject to recurrent question, conflict and revision (Tully 2008, 311–312). Lastly, 
the virtue of Fuchs’s work consists, among other things, in providing a set of 
concrete policy proposals that could be immensely valuable for a post-hegem-
onic, commons-orientated transition:
1. Economic redistribution from high-profit corporations and the rich 
towards low-income classes by increasing taxation of capital and high 
incomes
2. The full cancellation of the debts of developing countries
3. The introduction of a basic income guarantee for all (financed by, for 
example, a Tobin tax)
4. Subsidies for self-managed cooperatives, local hardware production and 
commons-based Internet projects based on free software technologies
5. The introduction of rigidly regulated employment contracts
6. The reduction of working hours without loss of income for employees
7. The establishing of unions
8. Provision of free universal basic services in health and education
9. Universal availability of ICT infrastructure and network connectivity for 
free or at very low prices for all
10. Support for digital literacy and digital involvement for all
11. Large-scale implementation of open social software tools that support 
participatory democracy in education, the media and civil society
12. The introduction of global privacy and data-protection laws
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4.7 The Lack of the Political III
Kioupkiolis has succeeded in politicising the common by commoning the 
political, that is, by attuning Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemonic politics to the non-
hierarchical, open and pluralistic logic of the commons. The post-hegemonic 
politics of agonistic freedom and radical democracy can be instructive as to how 
to connect local and global commons; how to unite and coordinate  dispersed, 
small-scale civic initiatives; and how to relate to established social systems and 
power relations in the market and the state. Post-hegemony is coextensive with 
the work of Dardot and Laval who build upon the concept of the common 
as the self-instituting power of the people to further conceptualise the common as 
an institutionalised right. 
Missing, however, in both approaches is a thorough elaboration of the 
technological and economic implications of the commons. The lack of concrete 
policies for the commons to reach a critical mass is still telling. This gap can 
be filled by envisioning a multidisciplinary account of the common that could 
bring together local and digital commons on the model of open cooperativ-
ism. For the commons to become a sustainable model that can challenge capi-
talism, they need to provide a steady income to their members along with 
conditions of autonomy, sharing, openness and self-realisation. The ultimate 
goal is to  harmonise the basic ideals of freedom and equality under a holis-
tic regime of pluralist and radical democracy capable of gaining broad civil 
trust, support and involvement. This post-hegemonic task implies the creation 
of a post-capitalist economy built around the commons. The role of the state 
and international institutions is pivotal to introducing the policies necessary to 
this end.
Dyer-Witheford and De Angelis were among the first to illustrate a 
 post-capitalist model by formalising the circulation of the common along-
side the circulation of capital. As with Bauwens and Kostakis, the abundance 
of the commons coexists with the artificial scarcity of market capitalism until 
the  latter is forced to adjust to the former in the long run. However, they also 
lack the policy proposals necessary to flesh out this post-capitalist transition. 
Caffentzis and Federici take a more radical stance by advocating the autono-
mous development of the commons against capitalism and the state. They do 
not, however, explain how the commons can survive, reproduce and solve their 
own contradictions under conditions of grave dependence on capitalism and 
the state. 
Gibson and Graham sketch out a more concrete version of a community 
economy that could circulate alongside capitalism and transform the latter into 
post-capitalism. As in the case of the autonomous Marxists, the problem with 
their approach is that they downplay the significant role that the state could 
assume in that transformation. The problem with the communist approach of 
Žižek, Dean and Harvey, on the other hand, is that they overemphasise the role 
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of the state at the expense of the self-instituting power of the people. Mason 
and Fuchs strike a balance between the state and the commons by introducing 
a number of concrete policies aimed at advancing the self-instituting power of 
the people against capitalism and the state. This set of policies could be further 
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A key strand of the core argument put forward in this book is the significant 
lack of the political in the commons literature. The political is understood 
within the theoretical framework of Castoriadis’s concept of the common as 
the self-instituting power of the people, promoting individual and collective 
autonomy. The political embraces direct democracy as the core moral value of 
society, advancing agonistic freedom, plurality and antagonism. 
Whereas all approaches to the commons put forward the self-instituting 
power of the people as the quintessential concept of the common, they do not 
fully address the political in terms of radical democracy and power structures. 
Theorists often rest on a limited or ideological standpoint that runs counter to 
a holistic approach, which would translate into a set of concrete policies sup-
portive of the commons’ sustainability. For this reason, the political has been 
analysed here through the spectrum of a post-hegemonic perspective, aimed 
at rendering the commons the dominant socio-economic paradigm vis-à-vis 
capitalism and the state. Post-hegemony seeks to integrate the economic, 
 technological, sociopolitical and environmental facets of the commons into a 
holistic, multidisciplinary account of the common.
5.1 Liberal, Reformist and Anti-capitalist Arguments
5.1.1 The Liberal Argument
Ostrom shifted the discourse on incentives from the methodological individual-
ism of neoclassical economics to the institutional structure of collective agency. 
She reinvigorated the historical concept of the common as the self-instituting 
power of the people, highlighting the democratic elements of participation 
and inclusion in the collective management of common-pool resources. Her 
design principles for the commons − the demarcation of clear boundaries, the 
 matching of rules with local needs and conditions, the modification of rules by 
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users themselves, the monitoring of resources and the imposition of sanctions 
on free-riders − have been broadly accepted and utilised in multiple settings on 
rural, urban and digital commons. 
Yet the self-management of common-pool resources by local communities 
is overshadowed by the superpowers of states and corporations, thus limit-
ing the self-instituting power of the people. Ostrom’s non-mainstream use 
of  institutional economics and game theory conceals the exploitation and 
power asymmetries inherent in capitalism and the state. She does not take into 
account the contradictory logics that bring the commons into conflict with the 
state and capitalist markets. Local commons are in tension with institutional 
macro-structures and open access commons such as public infrastructures and 
the digital commons. They are politically debilitating at higher levels. In short, 
Ostrom downplays the political as antagonism, struggle and power structures. 
Today, a number of efforts attempt to expand Ostrom’s design principles to the 
digital commons and link the latter with rural and urban commons. Absent, 
however, is a holistic account that encompasses a multidisciplinary framework 
for the commons.
Lessig and Benkler expand the common as the self-instituting power of 
the people from local to digital commons. Contrary to local eco-commons, the 
digital commons are open, plural, voluntary and international. Modularity and 
granularity allow for mass participation, flexibility and distributed leadership. 
Hierarchies tend to be flat and reversible, with the type of affiliation that binds 
the commons being loose and fluid. The ground of the common is not any eth-
nic or local identity, but a shared sense of purpose and an ongoing interaction 
and collaboration along symmetrical rules and ethical lines.
Lessig and Benkler consider commons-based peer production as a third 
institutional model that offers substantial degrees of freedom and power in 
addition to state and market operation. It produces significant information 
and allocation gains compared to managerial hierarchies and markets by intro-
ducing a more refined, flexible and cost-efficient information processing, bet-
ter attuned to the variability of human creativity than managerial hierarchies 
(firms, states) and markets. Its success, therefore, requires that we modify our 
conceptions about incentives, the role of property and contract in the domains 
of information-dependent production, and the theory of the firm and organisa-
tional management, including the state and adjoining institutions. 
Whereas Lessig takes a liberal stance on the commons, Benkler oscillates 
between liberalism and anarchism. His ambivalence revolves around the scope 
and role of commons-based peer production in relation to state and market 
operation. Lessig and Benkler stress the current battle between  corporations 
and the digital commons. To prevent the corporatisation of cyberspace, they 
 propose the expansion of commons-supporting licences and copyrights 
enforced by adequate lobbying, litigation and legal reforms, embedded in 
the generalised production of open source knowledge and peer-to-peer net-
works. Rather than clashing head-on with capitalism, commons-based peer 
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production is anticipated to render predatory capitalism obsolete through 
superior working anti-models, running code and a healthy commons that will 
trump polemics.
Yet monetary motivations still prevail either by necessity or by choice. 
 Commons-based peer production runs mostly on a voluntary and activist 
mode. It occupies a marginal space in the socio-economic landscape, unable to 
offer its members a living. Given its grave dependence on the state and capital-
ism, it cannot reproduce itself into a sustainable mode of production that can 
challenge neoliberalism. Neither local nor digital commons alone can provide 
a viable alternative. The digital commons are not yet replicable in other sectors 
of the economy. The current impotence of the commons vis-à-vis capital and 
the state resides in the absence of a link between local and global (digital) com-
mons. This void is indicative of the broader lack of the political which accounts 
for the strategic non-choice of the liberal commons to band together dispersed 
initiatives into a coherent political strategy capable of opposing the neoliberal 
status quo. Dardot and Laval and Kioupkiolis correctly note that the liberal 
approach to the commons cannot address the repercussions of the contradic-
tions of capitalism and the state.
5.1.2 The Reformist Argument
The reformist approach to the commons purports to advance the self-instituting 
power of the people from a third institutional axis of civil society into a counter-
hegemonic power directed against neoliberalism. Bollier recalibrates the liberal 
state to support the commons rather than the capitalist market, introducing a 
green governance model with the aim of tackling climate change and protecting 
the natural commons. He documents a number of initiatives that attempt to 
bridge the gap between local and global commons and progress the commons 
into a counter-hegemonic project beyond capitalism and the state. 
Rifkin advocates a social democratic commons-orientated transition, in which 
the developed nations in concert with the big corporations would be the lead-
ers of the Third Industrial Revolution, intended to gradually  coalesce around 
the collaborative commons and transform capitalism into post- capitalism. As 
with the liberal approach to the commons, Rifkin’s wishful thinking bypasses 
the contradictions of capitalism and the state, thus reproducing the lack 
of the political. He has succeeded in linking local with global commons via 
the  Internet of Things infrastructure, best served by self- management. Yet the 
 transition to the commons is not merely a technical issue of algorithms 
 programming win–win partnerships between the state, capitalism and the 
commons. It requires a shift to another model of society based on real democ-
racy; hence, the need for the creation of a novel anthropological type anchored 
in the abolition of the division between directors and executants and the 
 establishment of individual and collective autonomy.
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Scholz adds a cooperative twist to the collaborative commons by juxtaposing 
platform cooperativism against platform capitalism (the so-called sharing and 
gig economy). Platform cooperativism consists of online business models based 
on democratic self-governance, platform co-ownership and equitable distribu-
tion of value. The idea is to use the algorithmic design of apps such as Uber in 
the service of a cooperative business model and bring together the roughly 170 
years of the cooperative movement with commons-based peer production. But 
Scholz, too, oscillates between a moderate and a radical thesis. He contends 
that it is unrealistic to anticipate that platform co-ops will dominate capitalist 
markets. Rather, he envisions a more diversified economy. Therefore, there is a 
tension here between the alleged radicalism of platform cooperativism and his 
projecting a mixed economy. 
A more radical line of argument holds that platform cooperativism would 
rather integrate into commons-based peer production. Bauwens and Kostakis 
attempt to bridge Ostrom’s local commons with Benkler’s digital commons by 
incorporating the ecological model Design Global–Manufacture Local (DG–
ML) into the commons, supported by the Internet and free software/hardware. 
They give a challenging spin to platform cooperativism by introducing the 
model of open cooperativism between the commons and ethical market enti-
ties, operating in terms of open protocols, open supply chains, commons-based 
licensing and open book accounting. Open cooperativism aims at the creation 
of a commons-orientated economy based on shared resources from which 
actors can draw and to which they can contribute according to their needs and 
capacities. The commons are ideally backed by a partner state through taxation, 
funding, regulation, education and so forth.
Bauwens and Kostakis’s core argument is that firms that cooperate with the 
digital commons, and therefore have access to a vast pool of knowledge, obtain 
a competitive advantage over proprietary firms that rely solely on their private 
R&D. The hybrid of post-capitalist commons can beat capitalism on its own 
ground: that is, competition. The cooperation of ethical market entities with 
glocal commons, supported by a partner state, can create an abundance of value 
that will force capitalism to adjust to the commons in the long run.
Bauwens and Kostakis’s strategy comprises both state and market mecha-
nisms along democratic, ethical and ecological lines. It aims to gradually trans-
form capitalism and the state into the commons. Yet the commons cannot 
currently compete with the capitalist behemoths on various grounds: capital, 
know-how, skills, political power, etc. Bauwens and Kostakis’s model requires a 
holistic political strategy to translate into centrally coordinated micro/macro-
policies stretching across the entire body of the social. This could be achieved 
by a partner state applying the principles of the commons at a local, regional, 
national and international level.
Arvidsson and Peitersen follow in the footsteps of Bauwens and Kostakis, 
deviating only by tracing out a technologically ‘updated’ Habermasian transfor-
mation of the public sphere. Rather than attuning to a more radical approach to 
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the commons that would steer the self-instituting power of the people against 
neoliberalism, they conform to a mainstream approach. They envisage the 
romantic reconciliation of affect with the commitment of the Enlightenment to 
rationality and measurement through the financial monetisation of productive 
publics, supported by the Internet and open source software/hardware. But this 
vision bears little resemblance to the current status of the commons, which are 
largely co-opted by finance capitalism. 
Arvidsson and Peitersen acknowledge that Internet neutrality is currently 
under threat from political and commercial forces, which are planning to 
impose biased standards favouring their own commercial interests. The last 
decades have already witnessed a state of ‘information feudalism’, where firms 
and corporations make billions out of monetising users’ personal data and 
online activity. To reverse this, they go along with Lessig, Benkler and Bollier 
to advocate for traditional political lobbying and activism to safeguard network 
neutrality and regulate social media companies. The ultimate political goal 
would be a global New Deal around sustainability and social responsibility. But 
this is simply to ignore the contradictions of capitalism and the state, which 
undermine the concept of the common as the self-instituting power of the 
people. The common should not limit itself to a social democratic paradigm, 
but should aim at deepening democracy and empowering citizens themselves. 
Arvidsson and Peitersen do not fully address the political in terms of individual 
and collective autonomy. 
Rushkoff ’s model of digital distributism is more in line with Bauwens and 
Kostakis’s post-capitalist vision in that he envisions a hybrid economy that 
could force capitalism in the long run to adjust to the commons. However, the 
exclusion of the state from Rushkoff ’s account is significantly debilitating for a 
commons-orientated transition.
Wright provides probably the most holistic political alternative for the com-
mons by integrating the self-instituting power of the people into a strategic 
pluralism opening up multiple pathways of social empowerment, embodied in 
a variety of structural transformations. As such, it can function as an institu-
tional multi-format for the various approaches to the commons. Wright’s seven 
pathways to socialism provide a rough map of the direction of social empower-
ment. It is, however, perhaps more efficient to fit Wright’s pluralism into a more 
cohesive post-hegemonic strategy aimed at unifying the different commons 
under a common democracy.
5.1.3 The Anti-capitalist Argument
Kioupkiolis detects a tension between Laclau and Mouffe’s verticalism and 
Hardt and Negri’s horizontalism. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe consider top-
down procedures to be a sine qua non for radical democratic politics, Hardt 
and Negri favour a bottom-up approach. Kioupkiolis attempts to reconcile 
Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemonic politics with the non-hierarchical, open and 
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 pluralistic logic of the commons. His post-hegemonic politics of agonistic free-
dom and radical democracy can, indeed, be instructive as to how to politicise 
the common and connect local and global commons; how to unite and coor-
dinate dispersed, small-scale civic initiatives; and how to relate to established 
social systems and power relations in the market and the state. In short, post-
hegemony could render the self-instituting power of the people the central axis 
of the political in the commons. 
Post-hegemony goes along with the work of Dardot and Laval to the degree 
that they build upon the concept of the common as the self-instituting power 
of the people introduced by Marx, Proudhon and Castoriadis. What is absent 
in both Kioupkiolis’s and Dardot and Laval’s account is a more thorough elab-
oration of the technological and economic conditions of the commons. This 
gap can be filled by a holistic, multidisciplinary account of the commons that 
can bring together local and global commons under post-capitalism. For the 
commons to evolve into a sustainable mode of production capable of chal-
lenging neoliberalism, they need to provide a steady income to their members 
along with the political conditions for democracy and self-realisation. This task 
points to the creation of a social economy built around the commons. Unlike 
Castoriadis, this book makes the case that the role of the state and interna-
tional institutions is pivotal to introducing the policies necessary to this end. 
The commons should not abstain from market and state operation, but rather 
strive to gear both to the interests of commoners. 
Dyer-Witheford and De Angelis were among the first to envisage a post-
capitalist transition by formalising the circulation of the common against 
the circulation of capital. As with Bauwens and Kostakis, the abundance of the 
commons necessarily transacts with the scarcity of market capitalism until 
the latter is forced to adjust to the former. But they also lack a set of concrete 
policies to activate this transition. 
Caffentzis and Federici oppose both state and market operation. They 
 advocate, instead, the autonomous development of the commons against capi-
talism and the state. They do not, however, develop an account of how the com-
mons can survive and solve their own contradictions under conditions of grave 
dependence on capitalism and the state. 
Gibson and Graham offer a more concrete demonstration of a post-capitalist 
community economy. But, as in the case of the autonomous Marxists, they 
downplay the role that the state could assume in this project. The problem 
with the communist approach of Žižek, Dean and Harvey, on the other hand, 
is that they overemphasise the role of the state at the expense of the self- 
instituting power of the people. Mason and Fuchs seek to strike the right 
balance between the state and the commons by introducing a number of con-
crete policies, employing both commons and state mechanisms to promote and 
safeguard the self-instituting power of the people.
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5.1.4 Towards Post-hegemonic Holism
The final step here is to integrate all three approaches to the commons into 
a holistic, multidisciplinary account that encompasses finance, economics, 
 technology, politics, education and law under commons governance. To this 
end, this chapter summarises key proposals from all three approaches to the 
commons, which are by no means exhaustive. These proposals could play 
out in multiple patterns of cross-fertilising strategies that could variously 
advance the self-instituting power of the people beyond capitalism and the 
state. Rather than approaching the commons in terms of scattered and often 
contrasting theories, it would be far more beneficial for both theory and praxis 
to consider them in tandem with a flexible, multi-format set of policies from 
which political agents can draw accordingly. This is not to resort to a politics 
à la carte nor to diminish conflict as the essential element of the political. On 
the contrary, post-hegemonic holism sets pluralism and antagonism as the 
main stage of progressive politics. Since there can be no single theory capable 
of carving out a unique pathway to a post-capitalist, commons-orientated tran-
sition, implications for policy depend on which set of proposals would be more 
relevant under the ever-changing global conditions of class struggle: 
5.2 Liberal, Reformist and Radical Formats
The liberal format
1. The expansion of Ostrom’s design principles − the demarcation of clear 
boundaries, the matching of rules with local needs and conditions, the 
modification of rules by users themselves, the monitoring of resources 
and the imposition of sanctions on free-riders − from local to digital com-
mons (free software and Blockchain technologies). Ostrom’s design prin-
ciples could apply also on a reformist and radical format. 
2. The design of patents and intellectual property to taper away quickly.
3. Municipal funding of neutral broadband networks, state funding of 
basic research, and possible strategic regulatory interventions to negate 
monopoly control over essential resources in the digital environment.
4. Commons-based licensing (GNU, Creative Commons, Copyfair).
5. A number of post-Keynesian policies have been introduced by several 
authors to address the shortcomings of neoliberalism: Mariana Maz-
zucato calls for the ‘socialisation of investment’ by an ‘entrepreneurial 
state’ investing in innovation to address major societal problems such as 
climate change and elderly healthcare (Jacobs and Mazzucato 2016, 14); 
Stiglitz (2016) suggests changes to executive compensation schemes, 
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macroeconomic policies to reduce unemployment, greater investment 
in education and infrastructure and the reform of capital taxation; Yanis 
Varoufakis (2011) advocates a Green New Deal funded by Eurobonds as 
a first step before reimagining the corporation. A further step would be 
to shift the terrain from post-Keynesianism to post-capitalism through the 
creation of commons-centric partner states willing to invest heavily in 
the commons. Rather than reimagining the corporation, post-Keynesian-
ism should reimagine the commons by transforming the state accordingly.
6. Interestingly, DIEM25, the party founded by Yanis Varoufakis, included 
in its agenda (DIEM25 2019) a number of policies in favour of the com-
mons that could push for a more radical transformative politics by:
• enhancing regulations on data protection (GDPR) and e-privacy
• strengthening anti-trust laws
• enforcing cross-platform interoperability and e-portability of data
• introducing the concept of data unions
• decommodifying data through the establishment of a public data 
commons, thereby establishing a Digital Commonwealth
• supporting alternative business models such as platform cooperatives
• fighting tax evasion by platform companies and imposing a digital tax/ 
dividend on the collecting/processing and sale of personal data
• establishing a digital rights framework for e-citizens (the right to 
 encryption, the right to computation, the right to an algorithmic opt-
out and  opt-in)
• transforming intellectual property by limiting its scope and broadening 
the ‘fair use’ concept
The reformist format
1. The adoption of a different language of the commons that would reflect 
their multiple patterns.
2. The creation and use of distributed ledger platforms such as Blockchain 
and Holochain that can advance cooperation on digital networks and 
boost a parallel commons ecosystem running both online and offline.
3. The state could install open platforms inviting citizens to assist city 
 councils in urban planning, government websites encouraging citizen 
feedback about public services, participatory budgeting programmes 
allowing citizens to co-determine spending decisions, government sup-
port for co-housing, volunteer networks for the elderly, and so on. Free 
and open source software could become the default infrastructure in 
public administration and education. Instead of schools turning into the 
quasi-captive extensions of large software corporations’ marketing depart-
ments, they could educate students in the use of open source software, 
which would then have spin-off effects for higher education, municipal 
governments and the general public. State-endorsed open design proto-
cols for information services, housing, ride-hailing services and energy 
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grids could foster open source innovation and benefit local communities, 
preventing proprietary lock-ins by larger companies.
4. Regulation of platform co-ops.
5. Open cooperativism between productive communities, ethical market 
entities and for-benefit associations. Open design, open protocols, open 
supply chains, open value accounting that promote abundance vs scarcity 
and collaboration by mutual coordination, which can in turn sustain a 
circular economy. Cosmolocalism could bring together digital, rural and 
urban commons, energy cooperatives, eco-villages, the degrowth move-
ment and Transition Towns.
6. A commons-centric partner state that implements direct democratic 
procedures and introduces commons-friendly policies in taxation, law, 
education and research. The partner state could support new forms of 
common–public partnerships similar to the cases of Barcelona en Comú, 
Bologna, Naples and Ghent (Bauwens and Niaros 2017). A common–
public partnership is a joint enterprise between a commons association, 
a state or local authority and a trade union or experts, which applies co-
ownership and distributed democratic control of surplus value (Milburn 
and Russell 2019). The democratic structure and surplus distribution is 
contingent on the nature of the joint enterprise, be it the establishment 
of energy company infrastructure, the collective purchasing of a market 
building, initial subsidisation of a platform taxi cooperative, the purchas-
ing of land for a community land trust, and so on. A common–public 
partnership constitutes a self-expanding circuit of radical democratic 
self-governance and centrifugal financialisation that could transfer wealth 
from one initiative to another, thus transforming surplus value into com-
mon use value. Centrifugal financialisation would allow a circulation of 
common use value against the centripetal circulation of capital. 
7. A partner state could establish public forums of democratic participa-
tion such as a Commons CityLab, where an Assembly of the Commons 
(representing citizens) and a Chamber of the Commons (representing 
members of generative enterprises) could work in concert with govern-
ment representatives and knowledge institutions to generate public–
private– common partnerships on the model of Ostrom’s polycentric 
governance. Additional measures would include the provision of adequate 
regulation, financing and legal support for commons initiatives (Bauwens 
and Niaros 2017, 62–79).
8. The DECODE project has built alternative digital platforms in Barcelona 
and Amsterdam to bring the data economy back under democratic con-
trol and give citizens control over their data. It documents a number of 
business and revenue models that could help secure the sustainability 
of the commons. By building a set of technical, economic, social and legal 
tools, they contribute to a multidisciplinary approach to the commons, 
further promoting commons-based peer production on the models of 
platform and open cooperativism.
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9. The deepening of democracy in all three varieties of democratic govern-
ance (direct democracy, representative and associational). Participatory 
forms of direct democracy could create countervailing power against the 
ordinarily powerful groups and elites influencing state governance. 
The design principles of this power are the following: bottom-up partici-
pation, pragmatic orientation, deliberation, state-centred decentralisa-
tion to local units of action such as neighbourhood councils, local school 
councils, workplace councils, and so on. 
10. The commons-orientated structural adjustment of capitalism towards 
more sustainable and socially responsible business models such as open 
sharing and collaboration models, ‘inclusive capitalism’, the  ‘benefit 
 corporation’, ‘flexible purpose corporation’, ‘low-profit limited liability 
company’ and ‘not-for-profit’, which prioritise value creation and money 
circulation by distributing currency to more people and enterprises.
11. In addition to associations of workers or unions exerting power over cor-
porations through the co-determination of funds, and bargaining over 
pay and working conditions, the union movement could create venture 
capital funds, controlled by labour (as in Canada), to provide equity to 
start-up firms that satisfy particular social criteria. Consumer-orientated 
pressure on corporations would be an additional form of civil society 
empowerment over economic power. Fair trade and equal exchange 
movements aiming to connect consumers and producers by building 
alternative global economic networks could also disrupt the economic 
power of multinational corporations.
12. The creation of a social economy: voluntary associations, NGOs, co-ops, 
community-based organisations, all subsidised through donations, char-
ities, grants and taxes (for example, Wikipedia, the Quebec economy). 
Social economy could merge with platform and open co-ops on the prin-
ciples of cosmolocalism and commons-based peer production.
13. Egalitarian public financing of politics, and randomly selected citizen 
assemblies. Political institutions could be designed in such a way as to 
enable secondary associations – labour unions, business associations, 
organisations or civic groups – to play a positive role in deepening 
democracy.
14. The creation of a National Investment Council (NIC) coupled with 
Federal Reserve reforms that would create a ‘QE for the people’ chan-
nelled to commons initiatives; a Fed-administered digital dollar backed 
by Blockchain and accessed via smartphones would further guarantee 
greater financial inclusion. 
15. The creation of a national investment bank linked to a set of non-profit, 
decentralised financial institutions such as credit unions, public banks, 
community banks and non-profit investment banks to provide credit for 
the commons. 
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16. The creation of a non-profit innovation stock market would further open 
up investment opportunities to the broad public and help the commons 
raise capital for expansion.
17. The creation of a commons-orientated Public Investment Platform 
joined by a Public Investment Account.
18. The creation of sovereign wealth funds and inclusive ownership funds.
19. An unconditional basic income could further enhance the social 
economy and the commons.
The radical format 
1. The socialisation of the banking system to promote the democratic finance 
of the commons: social and ethical lending by credit unions and pub-
lic banks, non-profit local and regional banks, crowdfunding (for exam-
ple, Goteo), complementary currencies, time banks. This would include 
the restructuring of the finance system to reward techno-social inno-
vation and discourage rent-seeking behaviour. It would, thus, advance 
 commons-friendly finance structures based on bounded investing such 
as union pension funds, affordable housing investment funds, communi-
ties, interest groups and a mutually supportive range of businesses, where 
money ends up circulating rather than being sucked up by a company 
foreign to the ecosystem.
2. Post-hegemonic horizontalism against any residual verticality: 1) rep-
resentation should emanate from the bottom through decentralised 
decision making based on openness, transparency and diversity; 
2) accountability and revocability of representatives would secure demo-
cratic control by and for the commons; 3) regular rotation in roles and 
responsibilities should be exercised with the aim of empowering all the 
people with relevant skills and knowledge; 4) self-management would 
thereby instil an ethical self-transformation through a subjectivation that 
would induce both individual and collective autonomy.
3. Economic redistribution from high-profit corporations and the rich 
towards low-income classes by increasing taxation of capital and high 
incomes (for example, Tobin tax or high taxes on rent seeking).
4. The commonification of social media.
5. An alternative Internet would contribute to the commons transition 
through the peer production of open access projects, open content pro-
jects, free software, open source projects, alternative online news media, 
collective digital art projects, cyberprotest, public online media, public 
access projects, the struggle for net neutrality, the creation of free wireless 
networks, non-commercial and non-profit virtual communities, and so on.
6. The full cancellation of the debts of developing countries.
7. The introduction of rigidly regulated employment contracts.
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8. The reduction of working hours without loss of income for employees.
9. The establishing of unions.
10. Provision of free universal basic services in health and education.
11. Universal availability of ICT infrastructure and network connectivity for 
free or at very low prices for all.
12. Support for digital literacy and digital involvement for all.
13. Large-scale implementation of open social software tools that support 
participatory democracy in education, the media and civil society.
14. The introduction of global privacy and data-protection laws.
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This book explores the potential creation of a broader collaborative economy through commons-based peer production (P2P) and the emergent role of information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
The book seeks to critically engage in the political discussion of commons-
based peer production, which can be classified into three basic arguments: 
the liberal, the reformist and the anti-capitalist. This book categorises the 
liberal argument as being in favour of the coexistence of the commons with 
the market and the state. Reformists, on the other hand, advocate for the 
gradual adjustment of the state and of capitalism to the commons, while 
anti-capitalists situate the commons against capitalism and the state. By 
discussing these three viewpoints, the book contributes to contemporary 
debates concerning the future of commons-based peer production.
Further, the author argues that for the commons to become a fully 
operational mode of peer production, it needs to reach critical mass arguing 
that the liberal argument underestimates the reformist insight that technology 
has the potential to decentralise production, thereby forcing capitalism to 
transition to post-capitalism. Surveying the three main strands of commons-
based peer production, this book makes the case for a post-capitalist commons-
orientated transition that moves beyond neoliberalism.
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